Luftwaffe after BoB: strategy, tactics, tecnology?

[Elmas]

............
It's easy to be critical of defenders, after the event, but the advantage is always with the attacker, since only he knows where, when, and how he will attack. The Ardennes in 1940, the Luftwaffe switching to London, Pearl Harbour, El Alamein, Torch, Sicily, D-day, all succeeded because of secrecy.

Taranto, Matapan can be added as events when the attackers, with minimum forces at least for the Taranto case, could easily smash the unaware defenders.
From the opposite side, the sinking of the battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth in Alessandria, XII-18-1941.

 

[Njaco]

Lets keep the sarcasm to a minimum - everybody. Last warning.

 

[tomo pauk]

Aready during the the BoB, the weaknesses of the Ju-87 are apparent. For all it's qualities as an accurate and un-expensive bomb delivery system, it need the air supremacy to operate successfully. So what to do with the Stuka for 1941-43 time frame? How much the Hs-129 brigs to the table?

 

[pbehn]

I wonder if some of these comments are coming across as being highly contemptuous of wartime Germany?
I say that tongue-in-cheek, as the Germans weren't idiots - it seems that they tried these tactics and, evidently, found them unprofitable.
Otherwise they would have tried them more often.

I am certainly not contemptuous of wartime Germany I hope it doesnt seem that way with my posts, I am contemptuous of the regime (Hitler and Goering)who seemed to cause mayhem whenever they interfered. At the time the Gislea raids were mounted it is fair to say the British at home were complacent. I visited Eden Camp museum an old WW" POW camp, at the time of the raids even the Germans were not under lock and key, the guards would go to the pub and if anyone visited a "prisoner" would come to get them on the bicycle provided. One night two officers were visiting the camp in a car and had to be shown through the fog where it was by 2 German POWs on bicycles.


During the BoB some put forward the idea of mounting raids against LW airfields in the Pas de Calais, whereas it was a target rich environment in modern parlance it was also full of anti AC flak and soldiers with machine guns.

You could not mount a sneak raid using the Americans without having captured bombers, I believe this was tried and was not a success, it would only ever be a success one time. Mounting sneak raids against night time raiders (bomber command) faces many problems. I frequently fly from an ex WW2 airfield,Middleton St George to Amsterdam, the approximate route that German raiders would have taken. At certain times of the year you take off in the dark and land in broad daylight with a flight schedule of exactly one hour. All BC have to do is schedule the raids to land at dawn and anyone using the stream must get home in daylight. The Chain home radar reached out about 100 miles from the coast meaning any raiders on North England must stay under radar control or fly towards Norway to avoid it. On a clear day you can see "the wash" with East Anglia and Kent in the far distance with the European coast ahead. Any raider to North England would have a long slow flight home at the mercy of radar guided and equipped AC, they would be toast so long as the defenders were alerted to the danger.

Discussion of activities in 1945 must take account of the fact that the regime was not only desperate but knew whatever it did would have no actual effect. 9 weeks before the end of the war they could have destroyed every 4 engined bomber every battleship and killed Churchill Eisenhower Montgomery and the whole chiefs of staff it still would not have changed the outcome, just the aftermath.

A one off raid always has a chance of success but repeating it puts the advantage more and more with the defence, this was learned at cost by Bomber Command with the "Battle of Berlin" it is not really a basis for a strategy. Pearl Harbour was a successful (in qualified terms) sneak raid any attempt to repeat it would have been a disaster.

 

[Aozora]

I'm sorry; I said that's how you were coming across, but I didn't realise you were quoting from someone else's writings.

No problem - I could have worded some things more clearly.

I don't know when he wrote that, but there's a lot of information, which has become available recently (after 1975, at least,) which is putting a new slant on all sorts of things.

Clarification: Ramsay was the editor of The Blitz Then and Now series - volume 3 is dated 1990. The article itself was written by Bob Collis in 1988. The defences were caught napping by Gisela, but it's hard to know whether that was because of complacency, or because (for instance) frontline operations in Europe had absolute priority when it came to allocating resources and manpower.

There have been authors saying that Germany lost the Battle of Britain due to Enigma intercepts giving us advance notice, but Dowding was not on the list of approved recipients, so he was not allowed to read them; this makes Park's achievements all the more remarkable, and shows how lucky we were to have him.

Thank goodness the Brits had us colonials to lean on...

There have been all sorts of fanciful theories about the reasons for not allowing the Meteor into Germany, but it's now known that we didn't want to present the Germans with a free sample of our metal technology, in the event of one coming down; eventually, of course, as the end came closer, it no longer mattered.
Can we start again?

That's one I haven't seen, but it makes sense; why gift the Germans new materials when they could already do so much with the ones they were forced to use.

 

[pbehn]

Thank goodness the Brits had us colonials to lean on...



That's one I haven't seen, but it makes sense; why gift the Germans new materials when they could already do so much with the ones they were forced to use.

Park was a Brit only post war is it considered he wasnt he served with distinction in WWI, in the operations of the BoB I dont think they would have been much use to Park (or indeed Dowding) by the time they were de coded and passed around they were literally yesterdays news and much of it was couched in what they wanted Goering to hear.

I have read that the meteor wasnt allowed to operate in forward positions for fear of an engine falling into german hands but in my mind the real fear was it eventually falling into Russian hands. Laughable in view of what happened later a change of government and we gave Russia an engine to copy.

 

[gjs238]

I have read that the meteor wasnt allowed to operate in forward positions for fear of an engine falling into german hands but in my mind the real fear was it eventually falling into Russian hands. Laughable in view of what happened later a change of government and we gave Russia an engine to copy.

 

[KiwiBiggles]

Park was a Brit only post war is it considered he wasn.

Hmmm. Born in NZ, educated in NZ, joined the NZ Army, lived his last years in NZ, died in NZ. No, I think is one we can honestly claim as a New Zealander.

 

[pbehn]

Hmmm. Born in NZ, educated in NZ, joined the NZ Army, lived his last years in NZ, died in NZ. No, I think is one we can honestly claim as a New Zealander.

I didnt mean that he wasnt a New Zealander I meant that it didnt matter where he was from. At the critical time of the battle a New Zealander controlled the key sector and an Angla Canadian was in charge of production. Its a pity those days are past IMO.

 

[stona]

Park was undoubtedly a Kiwi, but something of an expatriate. He happened to be back in NZ in July 1946 when his father died in Oamaru. It was the first time he'd been back for more than thirty years.

There were many capable and successful officers from the 'Old Commonwealth' who served with immense distinction with the RAF. Men like Park, Coningham, Benett and many more whom we were fortunate to have on our side. The junior service seems to have had a particular attraction for these forward thinking and adventurous men who might have struggled in the more (much more) traditional structures of the Army or Royal Navy.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Koopernic]

This is an interesting thread.

There were serious shortfalls in the Luftwaffe's performance in as number of areas. Procurement was one, lack of time and expectation for preparation for a long term long range war over the vastness of Africa, the Soviet union and the Atlantic was another.

Procurement:

1 The Focke-Wulf Fw 187. This was a private venture aircraft developed in the wake of Focke Wolfe's loss to Messerschmitt's Bf 109. It flew in 1938 and was over 100km/h (62mph) faster than the Bf 109 or Bf 110 when using the same Junkers Jumo 210 engines. It had always been planed to use the larger DB601/DB605 series engines in this aircraft. It was capable of easily carrying 4 x 20mm guns. Range was about 70% greater than the Bf 109 and about 45% greater than the Bf 110. This indicates that practical operational radii of over 420 miles as opposed to 240 miles for the Bf 109.

What went wrong? The Luftwaffe couldn't see the value of a lightweight, twin engine high power to weight ratio aircraft fully able to compete with single engine fighters and exceed them in some areas such as speed and range. It kept trying to turn it into "zerstoerer" like aircraft similar to the Me 110, something which would of course ruin the performance, some proposals ended up with rearward facing guns, raised cockpits etc. A two seat night fighter version with a second tandem forward facing cockpit made sense because even though the standard Luftwaffe night fighter radars the Lichtenstein and SN2 were a little big the Germans developed an excellent night fighter radar from their FuG 216 "Neptune" series tail warning radars that with lobe switching was small enough for even the Me 109 and Fw 190.

The aircraft was cancelled in 1942 in favour of the Heinkel He 219, a much larger more powerfull aircraft able to carry more equipment. Because the 219 required 2000hp class engines such as the DB603, Jumo 213 (it really needed the 2500hp Jumo 222) Focke-Wulfs Ta 154 was seen as an interim solution as it could use the smaller 1500hp Jumo 211N which was as a dvelopment of the Jumo 211J in widespread availabillity. However with this engine the aircraft could not in theory cope with the British Mosquito and had to wait for the 1750hp Jumo 213A. The Ta 154 Moskito had great problems with its wooden construction, being regarded as unsafe in a crash landing, when a suitable plywood was found, Tego film the factory was lost to bombing.

The irony is that the Fw 187 could have made outstanding use of the Jumo 211, which was producing more power than even the DB605 and was at no disadvantage when a pressurised cooling circuit was introcued. Dietmar Hermann estimates its speed as 750km/h (463mph) with late war German fighter engines such as the DB605ASM and DC/DB. Surely it would have made as much trouble as the RAF Mosquito.

Strategic Bombers Ju 89 and Dornier Do 19. These were cancelled, as was argued by Albert Kesselring, because the resources didn't exist to produce them without compromising the Luftwaffe's ground support role severely. The aim was to defend against bordering nations France and Poland not conduct a war against the UK.

However it's clear that a small number of long range bombers opperating in the Maritime role would have had a significant impact on the Battle of the Atlantic. The Ju 89 was developed via way of the Ju 90 into the impressive Ju 290 and without the burden of its 'transport' fueselage would have been more impressive: far more capable of opperating in an environment with carrier based fighters due to the speed and rear turret.

This also leaves the Fw 200 free for transport roles: invaluable for supply extended supply routes to North Africa and the Soviet Union where the Ju 52 was very poor. The Luftwaffe needs something as good as the C54/DC-3. Perhaps more Fw 200, or Ju 252.

Strategic Bomber He 177. No problem working out what is to be done here: the coupled engines should be replaced with individually mounted Jumo 211, DB601, DB605, DB603, BMW 801, Jumo 213. This was recomended by Ernst Heinkel in 1940 who begged for this tom be done when he sensed the problems with these engines. When an aeronautical engineer who owns the company is 'begging' one should listen. Had his advice been followed this transition might have been as smooth as the Mancheter to Lancaster.

Really if only one aircraft was developed Ju 89, Do 19, He 177, HE 277 or Me 264 would have had a considerable impact.

Ju 288 and Jumo 222 engine. Although the Jumo 222A1/B1 passed a 100 hour @ 2500hp test serious problems such as cases cracking and errosion soon developed in some examples. Without this engine the Ju 288 super bomber could not be built as weight growth had precluded derating to 2000hp.

Ultimatly there was nothing wrong with this engine. The problems had been solved so that it was scheduled for production in the second half of 1944 for use in the Ju 388, He 219, Me 264 "Amerika Bomber" and latter Ju 488 and Do 335.

Document for its production are reproduced in Christoph Vernalaken Martin Handigs's majestirial 400 page book "Junkers Ju 388 Development, Testing of the Last Junkers High altitude aircraft." Due to the allied invasion it became more imortant to disperse Jumo 213 production facilities and so the Jumo 222 original September 1944 production start was delayed by around 4 months to Feb 1945 under RLM engine production program 326/III by which time it was too late. Production of the Ju 222A2/B2 was scheduled in September 1944 as it was considered debugged.

No Allied engine or German engine was designed, produed and debugged in under 6 years. Had the Germans managed a 2500hp engine running of 87 octane in 1942 they would have been miracle workers. Having said that there was an test runs of the 30% bigger Jumo 222E/F (nearly 60L displacement instead of just over 45) which seemed a diversionary waste of time. It nevertheless remained of interest as a even bigger 3500hp class engine. Not sure what to do here? The alternative coupled engines, DB606 and DB610 had their own problems. Perhaps 4 separate engines.

Nearly every German aircraft scheduled for production in 1945 would have used the Jumo 222.

Me 264 "Amerika Bomber". This aircraft's design was initiated in 1940 a little after the B-36 was started. It was a bold attempt to produce an aircraft 70% the size of the B-29 which could nevertheless fly 15000km/9300miles so as to attack the Eastern Seaboard of the USA to a depth of a few hundred miles from German and French bases. Deeper with in flight refueling.

The aircraft was conceived arund 4 x 2100hp DB603H engine using C3 fuel and would have required 2048m of runway, 1400m with RATO. It flew in December 1942, problems related to heavy controlls and control surface flutter. Nothing too serious. It had been hoped (rather quixotically) that it could perform its mission with the 1500hp Jumo 211P, but this proved impossible. The aircraft suffered polical problems and lack of support in the form of provision of the neccesary hanger space. I suspect Milch's antipathy with Professor /willy Messerscmitt. A version with the 2050 hp BMW 801E (which was in production in its fighter form in June 1944 for the Fw 190A-9's BMW 801TS. However this engine has a little more drag and fuel consumtion and barely could do the mission. The Jumo 213A reached 2100p in productionn in November 1944 on B4 fuel only but could have done so earlier on C3.

Had focus been maintained nuiscence raids on the US Eat Coast could have diverted massive US resources to Homeland protection by the end of 1944. Versions with the Jumo 222 would have had enough power to do the mission without RATO.

Me 210/410. The aircraft was late due to handling issues, because it was urgently needed it was ordered into production before its test flight. This meant production tooling and jigs were built, while production of other types was shut down. Waiting for thee flight test program to complete was not an option since something needed to be ramped up for production.

I put this down to bad risk managment. Its likely Willy Messerschmitt was at fault for intervening in the design process and shortening the tail. After this Messerschmitt began assesing the risk with each item and develop in parrallel alternatives (eg longer tail, with slats bigger slats) etc to ensue that issues were quickly resolved.

It was an excellent aircraft. Some could carry a 1000kg SB1000 / 410 bomb in the bomb bay.

Heinkel He 280. Build the small version of this fighter even if it is short ranged and underarmed with 3 x 20mm canon.

 

[stona]

The root problem with the Me 210/410 seems to have been a misunderstanding at the RLM of what Messerschmitt AG was offering. The RLM was expecting a direct derivative of the trusty and reliable Bf 110, hence the order now seemingly premature order for 2,000 aircraft. Messerschmitt were planning an entirely new design and had come to the conclusion that this was required some time in late 1937 or early 1938, certainly before the RLM issued the contract for the type.

Where the blame lies I know not, but many seem to lay it at Messerschmitt's door, and specifically Messerschmitt himself. This seems a bit unfair as the RLM must have been made aware that Messerschmitt were preparing an entirely new design but failed to appreciate how far removed from the old Bf 110 it was going to be.

The problems were not quickly resolved. The type was designed in 1938, first flew in September 1939, but was still not a 'significant player' (Milch's own words) in 1942. Messerschmitt AG promised 95 completed and modified airframes by the end of 1942 and that is indeed an insignificant number. It took four years to really rectify the problems.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Thank goodness the Brits had us colonials to lean on...

There's more; it's now thought that Leigh-Mallory saw him as a threat to his own path of promotion, so had him shifted out to Malta, which should have been the end of him. Park proceeded to completely reorganise things, and the rest, as they say, is history.
He realised that "Woody" Woodhall was a sick and broken man, after his time on the island, so had him sent home to rest.
It had been practice to send the fighters south, to gain height, before returning to the fight, but this meant that the bombing was over before they arrived; Park sent them in different directions, including north, east and west, so that they could turn and converge on the attack before it reached the island.
He also agitated for conversion sets, to get rid of the large Vokes filter on the Vc, so that it could regain some speed; by this he reckoned they could cope with the 109G (raids were normally at medium height, where the V was more of a threat.) He also managed to wangle some IXs to be flown direct from Gibraltar, using ferry tanks; they had been earmarked for the desert, but he got them.
Although it's more for modellers, I can give you an example of how new information is coming to light; for years there's been controversy over the blue Spitfires delivered by Wasp to Malta. We've known, for some time, that Malta asked for "sea camouflage" on fighters, and thought this meant RN colours, but, only a few months ago, in a file on Malta Hurricanes, I found a note that, by "sea camouflage" Malta meant (presumably Dark) Mediterranean Blue; this means that Wasp's captain didn't paint them blue on a whim, he knew that was the colour Malta wanted.

 

[stona]

We've known, for some time, that Malta asked for "sea camouflage" on fighters, and thought this meant RN colours, but, only a few months ago, in a file on Malta Hurricanes, I found a note that, by "sea camouflage" Malta meant (presumably Dark) Mediterranean Blue; this means that Wasp's captain didn't paint them blue on a whim, he knew that was the colour Malta wanted.

Now that is interesting. Like many I've assumed that "sea camouflage" probably meant the TSS, so it's good to know that was a false assumption.
Does this imply that Dark Mediterranean Blue paint was supplied to Wasp? I've always found it hard to believe that some kind of ship's paint was slapped on.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Milosh]

What is the difference between Dark Mediterranean Blue and the dark blue use on USN a/c?

 

[stona]

They are both dark blue colours, but they are not the same colour. When I said 'ship's paint' I was referring to the opinion held by some that some sort of non-aviation paint, as used for painting the ship, was used. This just doesn't sound likely to me. A USN aviation paint may or may not have been a possibility, I don't know. The information above might imply that the correct British colour was used.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Does this imply that Dark Mediterranean Blue paint was supplied to Wasp?

Others have gone through copies of the ship's manifest, and found no evidence of non-American paint (or any paint, for that matter) being taken on board.
It has long been believed that all the aircraft had to be repainted (which would have put a heck of a strain on the stores,) but a memo from a senior mandarin of the Air Ministry says that he has been able to get any, as yet undelivered, aircraft repainted at the factory, so only those already in Scotland would need to be painted there, or on board the carrier.
This implies (maybe, possibly) only a few, which, if the paint was well thinned (there are some showing the original pattern through the top coat) could have gone onto, and been accepted by, the paint already there.

 

[Just Schmidt]

The most effective alterations are of course the utopian ones, like crusially not attacking the USSR before a 'solution' was found to the British problem.

Of course a war with the USSR was inevitable in the longer perspective. At the beginning of negotiations for the Molotow-Ribbentropp pact, the latter suggested it should be set to run for a hundred years. The russians protested that, as they had been very publicly enemies of the worst sort till then, nobody would believe that to be serious, therefore setting 10 years as the duration. Of course neither party probably intended it to be that long, and both parties probably realised the intentions of the other party. It was simply opportunism all round. That leaves the question when, and who, to break it. Traditional geostretics would dictate at the latest when Germany was at peace with everybody else.

Personally I don't believe Stalin planned a break in 41, the forward deployment of russian forces can be explained by the USSR's emphasis on an offensive defensive strategy. In my assassment I go with Evan Mawdsley (Thunder in the East) which also
offers the crusial observation that Stalin, far from being afraid of a German attack, believed he was negotiating from a position of strength. On paper it is easy to see why. The reason not to attack Germnany (or germany's vassals in the east) was that it was more economic to have the capitalist countries weaken themselves as much as possible first. And in contrast to the nazis Stalin was not a romantic when it came to war, it was simply politics.

Hitlers restless romanticism probably doomed die Luftwaffe to the campaign it could not win, the discrepansies in resourses was simply to big. The alternative was simply refusing to loose, thereby in the end facilitating a settlement, especially after the entry of the USA (which probably could have been delayed considerably, but not avoided in the long run).

Anyway, the strategy would be to husband the strenght of all forces, not least die Luftwaffe. But then I agree that more bombers should have been deployed against shipping, and less over Britain. On the other hand die luftwaffe was far to eager to act as fire-brigade on the eastern front. There a more modern 1 engined ground attack aircraft than the Ju 87 would have been very usefull. And a decent replacement for the Ju 52 should also have been found. But I suspect that no new aircrafts could turn the tide, the discrepansy in awailable ressourses was simply to big. As it were, the Germans did pretty well in quite a few areas, even if it is easy to point to blunders. Any kind of truly strategic bombing campaign should be ruled as beyond the awailable ressourses, though a nuicanse raid should be tried once in a while. For one thing, they cost a lot of fuel, and synthetic plants are no free lunch. They have to be build instead of something else, and somebody have to work in them instead of somewhere else. Again we reach the conclusion that the axis simply didn't possess enough materials and manpower, they were WASTLY outnumbered.

How they could have acted to better the chance of a draw (from sheer exhaustion, however unlikely it was) is pretty well covered in the thread, though some suggestions are hard to judge. Personally I like the Fw 187, but it was quite a narrow airframe, some of the instrumants were mounted on the inside of the engine nacelles. Maybe something more adaptable would have been needed? And I often (to my surprise) see the Me 410 classified as quite fast, surely that must be as a bomber? Was it really the best 2 engined multipurpose aircraft they could get to serve in numbers in 44? Were they even better than the later Ju 88's? At the end of the day, I'm sure that some improvements to material could have been achieved.

A must is not wasting pilots flying supplies into Stalingrad and North africa. Many instructors, at that. Even Kholm and Demyansk might have been worth less than the cost. Husbanding, feinting and occasionally consentrating the forces for big blows, not wasting at the perifery.

On big issue that haven't been commented on is perhaps slightly off topic (just as 'don't attack Russia and USA), but probably would have helped more than anything except these two:

For gods sake realise that the enemy is reading much of your signal traffic!

 

[gjs238]

For gods sake realise that the enemy is reading much of your signal traffic!

 

[stona]

This implies (maybe, possibly) only a few, which, if the paint was well thinned (there are some showing the original pattern through the top coat) could have gone onto, and been accepted by, the paint already there.

But does that mean that they would have used some US paints or did some British paint sneak its way on board? I can imagine a few cans shoved in the cockpits along with the wing tips

Cheers

Steve