OK but that tendency implies that the I-16 probably wouldn't make a very good gun platform.
What are the conditions to be a good gun platform?
I'm no pilot and I have never flown any plane.
I
do not blame you for anything, but men that wrote books about I-16 as Keith Dexter, Green, Swanborough etc...and recieved money for that and supposingly being qualified specs ignored or even never understood the difference, yet evident between unstability, and lack of stability.
i have to do with the statements from men who did (do, since here are some convincing reissues). Golodnikov claims that the 1-16 ''was a complicated aircraft, demanding in piloting technique. It could fall into a spin at the slightest "overhandling'. He says he liked that. I can imagine pilots who wouldn't.
The I-16 was at least no novice aircraft, It was overly sensitive to control mouvements and the inertia moments around all three axes was extremely small. The CG coincided with the centre of pressure so longitidinal stability was marginal.
What to say, high class pilots made an asset from this default, avoiding
with ease bursts from foe firebursts, bad pilots were in mortal danger themselves, well before any clash with the ennemy.
Just to call cat, a cat...
Well actually that is not false. The I-180 was not taken in production which is all that i claimed. According to wiki a couple of testpilots lost their lives and another prefered to bail out in stead of landing. Either don't make for a good reputation. Besides that I won't dispute there were political reasons aswell. But if the production of the I-180 did not get of the ground in real history there is no reason why it should in our altered scenario.
What
is not false, is that I-180 was ordened for serial production at the end of 1939 despite accidents in
zavod 21, since state accident comission neither attributed crashes to bad aircraft design.
The factory however preferred to give the priority
- to the production plan, 2207 I-16 were achieved in 1940, but there were lacking some other 300, so director and his team was in jeopardy fot that failure, and chose to do not attribute much means to Yangel, the Polikarpov's OKB deputy, the later famous soviet rockets builder, that was a young engeneer that time with no experience and no relationships.
- to their own design department leaded by M. Pashinin.
Anyway, constant Yangel's complaints led to a state comission from NKAP and VVS reprensentatives managed by the assistant of the state comissar to the industry V.P. Balandin. The comission
obliged zavod 21 to give 10 I-16 in february, 20 on march, plus one I-180sh type.
It would be to long to tell the full story, but only 10 planes were on assembly within 7-8 mounth in march, and only 3 achieved in april after another big anger/scandal from VVS-fighter command representatives. The analysis (of this secund
pressure group) led altogether with factory specialists revealed that the production rate in case of the swith to the I-180, would be the same that for the I-16.
In case of war in 1940? It's the most difficult decision to replace an existing model by a more modern one. The trade-off between loss of production and the advantages of the new product is difficult to asset and depends of the state of the war at that time.
It's easy to be critical with the benefit of hindsight, but I-18 was rather a chance to SU. Why?
1)
feasability: I-18 had a lot of common with I-16, and was easily digestible for soviet industry unlike LaGG, and Yaks using another technology. It was the sole fighter in spring of 1940 advanced enough to reach production status.
2)
performance: As experience showed the I-180-3 (assembled in Polikarpov's workshop) demonstrated 575 km/hin may of 1940, without canopy, wrecked fuselage and unadapted propeller. So 600 km/h and were considered as
virtually reached, once those shortcomings resolved.
In the meantime first three serial I-180s (from
zavod 21) were ready in april of 1940. They reached 585 km/h despite criticism to their lack of finish.
3)
agility: Due to small size, light wing loading and high power to weight ratio, the plane was virtualy as nimble as the I-16. That could't be said for MiG-3, LaGG-3, not even Yak.
4)
handling It's CG went to 24% of the M.C. instead of 28-31. That mean stability improvement, easier handling.
But in 1940, the inexperienced NKAP leadership, to much rejenuvated by Stalin's purges was underestimating radial engines, and paved the way to fighters with liquid-cooled ones.
In case of war and urgency, they won't had the opportunity to afford themselves to be influenced only by fashion of the time and other subjective reasons!