Luftwaffe NFs revisited: strong points, shortcomings, paths not taken

[stona]

I don't know which Ju 88 sub type von Lossberg was referring to at the RLM meeting because either he didn't say or the minute taker didn't note it down.

As of July 1st 1944 many aircraft were supposedly struck from production schedules. The 'Lightning Program' was based on a Fuhrerbefehl of 30th June. The Ta 154 and Me 410 were amongst the 20 or so types to be discontinued. The Bf 110 G-4, Ju 88 G and He 219 were to be built in reduced numbers and eventually be replaced by the Ju 388 and Do 335 each of which was to be built at a rate of 550 per month. The order also called for 500 Me 262s and 500 Ar 234 s a month

This is the fantasy world in which the RLM and German aviation industry was operating by mid 1944.

Small wonder that the Luftwaffe ended up with the old tried and tested types.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Erich]

the He 219 actually had the fuG 220d installed, note the white VI numerals on the nose of many craft. the 88G-1 cncept was during the spring of 44 and did not come into ranks till summer of that year. the G-6 finally produced and moved into the NJG's in December of 44. NJG 2 and 3 being the first though both units did recevie some as early as October.

E ~

 

[tomo pauk]

As far as i know the BMW 801 when used on 2 engine aircrafts ( bombers ,nfs) did not use C3 fuel and thus had a lower output
...

The manual for the Ju-188 lists power as 1440 PS in high S/C gear, obtained with 2700 rpm and 1.42 ata - same as with contemporary Fw-190s.

 

[Koopernic]

In regards to the Ju 88, there were several night fighter versions:
Ju 88C6 with Jumo 211 engines, fighter version based on the Ju 88A4 bomber
Ju 88R with BMW801ML engines running on B4 producing 1550hp, latter 801D2 were used.

The Ju 88G series introduced a new canopy, fuselage, larger squared of tail optimised for the more powerful 801 engine.

Ju 88G1 with BMW801D2 engines. These produced 1700hp, on the Fw 190A8 there were increased to 1900hp with higher boost in late 1943 and 2050 in early 1944 with rich mixture injection below 1200m.
The BMW 801E, which was known as the BMW 801TS when used in the Fw 190A9, gave the same power without restriction from June 1944.

Ju 88G6 with Jumo 213A engines, same as the Fw 190D9. These produced 1750hp, which on the Fw 190D9 was increased to 1900hp in October 1944 and 2100hp in December with MW50.
Ju 88G7 with Jumo 213E engines, same as the Ta 152H. It would have produced the same power as the 213A but as it had a two stage 3 speed engine it could sustain power to much higher and broader range of altitudes with a smoother curves. With this engine a speed of 400mph with equipment was possible.

It's not apparent to me whether any one these power boosting methods were fitted, I would imagine they were, though adding water tanks for MW50 or GM-1 Nitrous Tanks would complicate matters.

In theory the Ju 88G could have been fitted with the DB603A which seems to have been available in eary 1943, much earlier than the Jumo 213A.

The designation has nothing to do with the radar fit out.

A development of the Ju 88 was the Ju 388J night fighter variants which had a choice of 4 engines: BMW 801TJ (turbo charged), Jumo 213E, Jumo 222A/B and Jumo 222E/F and had the advantage of pressurisation and a remote controlled rear tail turret but in essence was much as the Ju 88G. Prototypes flew.

The main problem for the Nachtjagt was jam resistant radars and interference free communication links. (Another Post) If they had these they were deadly against the 4 engine bombers even with slower aircraft. They almost defeated bomber command. However faster aircraft are essential to ensure one can get a maximum number of intercepts especially if the RAF has mounted successful diversionary raids. The Luftwaffe burnt out many engines after the feint was discovered.

The He 219 it seems was only a little faster than the Ju 388J or Ju 88G with the same engine, maybe only 10mph when both had 2500hp Jumo 222 engines. One would have to question it.

In terms or aircraft procurement the Luftwaffe's failure was as I see it;
1 the Failure to procure the Fw 187 with tandem cockpit. This was the only aircraft that could have been faster than the Mosquito with available engines despite its relatively small size it still had far more internal volume than a single engine fighter. It lost out since it was felt a larger aircraft was needed to carry the vast array of equipment needed.

2 Massive engineering resources wasted on the Ta 154. This aircraft was in effect an enlarged Fw 187 with a substantial bomb bay, somewhat inspired by the Mosquito in concept. However, although fast, it was expected to use the plentiful Jumo 211J or Jumo 211N of 1420 and 1500hp respectively. With this engine it could not compete with Mosquito which had 1700hp+ engines due to better fuel and a higher rated altitude due to the two stage supercharger.
It thus couldn't even fulfil the role of being and interim solution pending the He 219. There was much difficulty with the wooden construction, the cockpit shattered in a crash landing (killing test pilots in one case) leading to Kurt Tank promising to redesign the cockpit in aluminium. Various glues proved difficult to find, when a suitable glue was found, tego film, the factory was lost to bombing.

The result was that the aircraft had to wait for the Jumo 213 or some other advanced engine.

In my view a worse waste of resources than the delayed Me 210 since a large amount of engineering time was wasted at Focke-Wulf which could have been put to better use developing the Fw 190 or Ta 152 or Fw 187.

The Heinkel He 219 had been chosen as the Nachtjagts fighter however it was even more dependant on either the Jumo 213 or DB603 or the hoped for Jumo 222. The Jumo 213A and DB 603A were both rated at 1750hp with which the aircraft was still considered under powered. (the He 219 was the only German twin able to climb out if there was an engine failure on take-off so under powered is a relative term.). These engines would hit 2100hp-2260hp at the end of 1944 but by then 3 years had passed since the cancellation of the Fw 187 (which could have been placed in production 1940/41 given its 1938 maiden flight).

One can't really say anything bad about the Me 110, it was around when needed and did its design job of "bad weather fighter" when called upon. The Me 410 did operate successfully as a night fighter but due to the small production run radar equipment was never modified for it.

 

[stona]

1 the Failure to procure the Fw 187 with tandem cockpit. This was the only aircraft that could have been faster than the Mosquito with available engines despite its relatively small size it still had far more internal volume than a single engine fighter.

Whilst I do agree with much of your post I'd like to see some justification for this assertion. The cockpit was so small that Focke-Wulf were faced with either finding legless pilots and we had a monopoly on them, or putting the engine instruments on the nacelles. No prizes for guessing which option they took.

The pilot's position was small even by the standards of German WW2 fighters.

The rear position was just as bad, here with just the standard radio installation.

A night fighter needed endurance. With the tankage of the heavy destroyer version there is an obvious reason why extending into the fuselage to the rear of the bordfunker's position might be problematic. You can't just go adding stuff further behind the CoG, back in the fuselage boom.

The actual proposed night fighter was to have been a single seater with an extra 250 litre fuel tank in the rear cockpit position. I'm trying to think of any successful mid/late war night fighter with a crew of one.

The RLM might not have got many things correct but discounting the Fw 187 as a night fighter because it was far too small was one of them.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

About the Mosquito - only the minority of them used two stage engines. Almost none of the night fighters before late 1944. Against the single stage powered Mossies, a Ta-154 sized NF stood a fair chance, since the engine power was comparable - Merlin 20s vs. Jumo 211J vs. restricted DB 605A/B, and Mossie was a bigger aitcraft.
Of course, the Ta-154 would've make sense if it was produced in metal.

 

[Glider]

While the cocpit design of the heinkel was excellent, the NF crews were requesting 3 crew members and a defentive MG131. ju 88 provided this. Heinkel had to modify the 219 to satisfy this requirement. A modification which, of course, would decrease performance.

I find it interesting that the NF crews were so insistent on the need for a defensive weapon. For a fighter that was up against bombers they must have been seriously spooked about the few RAF NF's operating over German controlled airspace. They must have known that it would impact performance which was the single best defence against attack. A MG131 stands little indeed almost no chance against an RAF NF 4 x 20mm at short range when the attacker would normally have the advantage of surprise

 

[stona]

I think if the British Air Ministry had been in the position the RLM found itself in around 1942/3, with the same options, it would have developed the He 219 at the expense of other night fighter types. Engines would have remained a problem, but not so intractable if hard decisions are taken regarding other types.

Aircraft like the Fw 187, Me 210, Bf 210 and Ta 154 should have suffered the same fate as the Westland Whirlwind, Supermarine Type 305 and a host of others...thanks, but no thanks. The RLM seemed incapable of making such decisions and then, crucially, sticking with them. It led to hopeless confusion within the aviation industry and left the Luftwaffe reliant on older, proven types. After the Focke-Wulf 190's introduction in 1941 (even that was a pre-war design) I struggle to find another totally new aircraft entering service to any great effect and in any great numbers. Less than 270 He 219s were built.

The Jagdwaffe finished the war equipped essentially with the Bf 109 and Fw 190, versions of which they had before the war and in 1941 respectively.

The Nachtjagd finished the war equipped mostly with Bf 110 and Ju 88 nightfighters, both based on aircraft designed in the mid 1930s.

That is a damning indictment of the RLM

Cheers

Steve

 

[tyrodtom]

I find it interesting that the NF crews were so insistent on the need for a defensive weapon. For a fighter that was up against bombers they must have been seriously spooked about the few RAF NF's operating over German controlled airspace. They must have known that it would impact performance which was the single best defence against attack. A MG131 stands little indeed almost no chance against an RAF NF 4 x 20mm at short range when the attacker would normally have the advantage of surprise

I think maybe they wanted that third crew member for his eyes, more than what his pea shooter could do.

A third set of eyes, that could stay out of the cockpit 100% of the time, would be mighty handy in a night fighter.

 

[CharlesBronson]

Talking about general efectiveness I dont feel like they defended the german airpace in a succesful way until 1943. The lack of an small airborne radar like the british AI in 1939-41 was key and later with the big RAF raid of 1942-43 the night fighter was quite impotentent due the big number of bombers and some electronic countermeasures.

 

[stona]

I don't think that the night fighters were impotent until the end of the war. They always niggled away and always caused a steady rate of losses for Bomber Command. I would agree that early in the war there was a technological gap, but there was soon developed an effective system for controlling the fighters. Bomber Command was only developed into the formidable force it became through 1942.

It is true that the rare, spectacular successes of the night fighter force often occurred when a series of factors played into it's hands.

The nearest Bomber Command came to defeat was around the Battle of Berlin and here a substantial deterioration in efficiency was caused by many factors. The weather was significant, along with the long routes flown which meant more fuel was carried at the expense of bomb tonnage. Combine that with the attrition inevitable in what was a campaign rather than a battle and you have an ever increasing reliance on inexperienced crews. The German defences also successfully forced Bomber Command to depart from its fundamental principle of concentration. Up to 20% of sorties flown were diversionary and this led to an obvious dilution of effort.
The most significant factor had nothing to do with the Germans at all. The electronic aids used so effectively over the Ruhr in the preceding months were unavailable for the campaign against Berlin. The limiting range at which Oboe could be used was the most important factor.

Cheers

Steve

 

[gjs238]

The nearest Bomber Command came to defeat was around the Battle of Berlin and here a substantial deterioration in efficiency was caused by many factors. The weather was significant, along with the long routes flown which meant more fuel was carried at the expense of bomb tonnage. Combine that with the attrition inevitable in what was a campaign rather than a battle and you have an ever increasing reliance on inexperienced crews. The German defences also successfully forced Bomber Command to depart from its fundamental principle of concentration. Up to 20% of sorties flown were diversionary and this led to an obvious dilution of effort.
The most significant factor had nothing to do with the Germans at all. The electronic aids used so effectively over the Ruhr in the preceding months were unavailable for the campaign against Berlin. The limiting range at which Oboe could be used was the most important factor.

After going thru so much trouble to develop Oboe, what made BC feel confident to commit to a campaign against Berlin without it?

 

[stona]

what made BC feel confident to commit to a campaign against Berlin without it?

Arthur Harris.

Also success in the campaign in the Ruhr, bombing Italy out of the war (as Harris saw it) and Peenemunde. A belief in 'Window', though the Luftwaffe night fighter force quickly adapted its tactics.

Between mid November 1943 and the end of January 1944 Bomber Command flew 7,403 sorties against Berlin for the loss of 384 aircraft. It was a defeat, but not a catastrophic or terminal one. Berlin was substantially damaged but the 'knock out blow' sought by Harris was never even close to being attained.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Koopernic]

Whilst I do agree with much of your post I'd like to see some justification for this assertion. The cockpit was so small that Focke-Wulf were faced with either finding legless pilots and we had a monopoly on them, or putting the engine instruments on the nacelles. No prizes for guessing which option they took.

The pilot's position was small even by the standards of German WW2 fighters.

The rear position was just as bad, here with just the standard radio installation.

A night fighter needed endurance. With the tankage of the heavy destroyer version there is an obvious reason why extending into the fuselage to the rear of the bordfunker's position might be problematic. You can't just go adding stuff further behind the CoG, back in the fuselage boom.

The actual proposed night fighter was to have been a single seater with an extra 250 litre fuel tank in the rear cockpit position. I'm trying to think of any successful mid/late war night fighter with a crew of one.

The RLM might not have got many things correct but discounting the Fw 187 as a night fighter because it was far too small was one of them.

Cheers

Steve

I can't see that you can argue that Fw 187 should not have been produced. It was the only aircraft, single engine or twin engine, that would have had sufficient speed advantage to deal with the PRU Mosquitos, PRU Spitifres and Oboe carrying Mosquitos day or night with the existing engines the Luftwaffe had between 1941 through to 1945. Both the DB605A and Jumo 211F were powerful enough but only in a small airframe like the Fw 187.

Not producing the Fw 187 leaves these aircraft essentially unengaged till the Me 262.

The He 219 really needs 2500hp, it operated with only 1750 and was too slow. The Ta 154 whose airframe never became ready, even in 1944, might have done it but only with the 1944 Jumo 213A. (I'm discounting the DB603A which was in production for the Me 410 in December 1942)

Small radars did become available in the last months of 1943 or January 1944. This was the FuG 216 Neptun radar which saw some service with single engine night fighters such as the Fw 190A and Me 109G. The problem with this was that a pilot staring into a radar scope lost his precious night vision. The Fw 187 could carry a second crew member who could operate the radar, radio and triangulate and navigate the aircraft.

USN did use single engine night fighters but they expected to use radar aiming, thus making night vision not so important. The Fw 187 could carry a second forward facing seat.

Putting secondary engine instruments on the cowling was standard for the Me 110 as well.

The Luftwaffe also didn't need an airborn radar. This is because the Wurzburg-Riesse radar, also useable as blind fireFLAK radar, had a range of over 80km, a bearing accuracy of 0.15 degrees and a range accuracy of 25m. It could guide a night fighter to within 100m of the bomber.

Below Fighters fitted with Neptun radar, one Me 109G with Naxos radar homing device

German engines made explosive advances in power in 1944 and 1945 but that was too late.

 

[tomo pauk]

Hmm - a two-seater Fw-190 night fighter, with radar 'black boxes' in an aerodynamic housing attached on the ETC? Also delete the fuselage MGs, no much worth from those, plus will blind the pilot when fired.
Granted, no 660 km/h but should do close to 600 km/h at 'Notleistung' - at 'Kampfleistung' (2400 rpm and 1.32 ata), the F-190A-6 was good for 585 km/h with ETC and 300 L drop tank.

 

[stona]

I don't argue that the Fw 187 shouldn't be produced. The RLM had its reasons for not ordering it. I don't agree with all of them and I happen to believe that the Fw 187 could have been a decent aeroplane, though nowhere near as good as some of its proponents suggest.
I do believe that the RLM was correct not to develop it as a night fighter, which is what this thread is about. It was too small and who knows what the actual performance of a service night fighter, encumbered with all the equipment which that entails, might actually have been. Nobody knows, it was never tried, even at a prototype stage.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Erich]

historically the fuG 216 was immediately replaced by the FuG 217 which is shown in the S/E fotos. it and the FuG 218 in the S/E did not prove their worth as I stated earlier. a long distnace interceptor was needed the re why S/E's were involved due to radar jamming by window as that ALL fighters were ordered to fly both day and night in the defensive role.