Making the Uralbomber work

[Howard Gibson]

Not at all. The Allies ran into a very different problem than the one facing Germany over Russia. As I mentioned before even in 1944 the He111 was still able to operate during daylight hours over Russia, but hadn't been able to in the west since 1940. The Soviets lacked high flying fighters and even those they had didn't have heavy enough armament to deal with a heavy bomber, as they were equipped to fight enemy fighters. Against a bomber box, even one without the same firepower of the B17, they couldn't even get close enough to do damage other than maybe via ramming, but due to the lack of altitude performance that would be difficult and depend on them not being too damaged by defensive fire from 13-20mm heavy guns on the bombers.

German bombing of the USSR was not a desperate battle for survival requiring the Russians to change their tactics and their deployment of resources. The important strategic thing the Russians did in 1944 was to carefully prepare for Operation Bagration. They concealed this from the Germans, so it came has a horrific surprise. Perhaps a more effective tactical bombing force, and good air reconnaissance by the Luftwaffe would have helped to manage the catastrophe.

If I unexpectedly deploy a new weapon against you, I get to hammer the crap out of you. If I do not decisively defeat you and force you to surrender, you get to work out weapons and tactics to counter whatever I am doing. The Russians were investigating high altitude flight. The Russians were shipped Spitfire_IXs under lend lease. Out of range of escort fighters, the Spitfires' C-wings can carry four 20mm Hispano cannons. This is very heavy armament by WWII standards. The Luftwaffe, Saburo Sakai and Eric Brown all learned that you attack large, defended aircraft from the front, where you can hit the crew, and the fuel and bombs. None of the large German aircraft had the performance to keep a Spitfire from getting above and in front of them.

 

[z42]

Neither here nor there but my blurry vision keeps seeing the thread title as "Making the Unabomber work".

Well, they have the "angry man with an unhinged manifesto leading to the deaths of innocents" part in common, so maybe there's something to it!

 

[z42]

Goering/Udet really bungled the 2nd generation Luftwaffe developments, which arguably cost the Luftwaffe the air war.

Unless the Germans are turning up in F-86s and Canberras painted with the Balkenkreuz, nope.

Sure, they could have done better than historically (and arguing how is one of the things that make the what-if threads enjoyable, so thank you for stepping up with a scenario for us to discuss!), but winning, no, that's unrealistic with the massive resources of the Allies arranged against them.

 

[bf109xxl]

German bombing of the USSR was not a desperate battle for survival requiring the Russians to change their tactics and their deployment of resources.

The situation was so bad for the Soviets in 1941-1942 that even "pinpricks" in the form of raids by small groups of bombers on critically important facilities could have a serious impact on the course of the war.

The important strategic thing the Russians did in 1944 was to carefully prepare for Operation Bagration. They concealed this from the Germans, so it came has a horrific surprise. Perhaps a more effective tactical bombing force, and good air reconnaissance by the Luftwaffe would have helped to manage the catastrophe.

To reach the summer of 1944, the Soviets had to hold out in 1941-1942, and even in 1943, not everything was so straightforward, despite their numerical superiority.

The Russians were investigating high altitude flight.

They certainly were investigating, however, they were unable to mass-produce reliable high-altitude engines. By the end of the war, the Soviet air defense system was based on Spitfires and Kingcobras.

The Russians were shipped Spitfire_IXs under lend lease.

Deliveries of the Spitfire IX under Lend-Lease began only in the summer of 1944, and these were almost exclusively LF models (only two HF models were delivered) — but even these LFs were superior in altitude to practically everything the USSR could produce.

Out of range of escort fighters, the Spitfires' C-wings can carry four 20mm Hispano cannons.

The Soviets complained that at high altitudes, the Spitfire IX's weapons often malfunctioned due to lubricant freezing.
But that's not the point. As it was correctly pointed out above, even the He 111 was a serious threat to the Soviet air defense until at least mid-1943.

The whole idea of the Uralbomber is incompatible with the Blitzkrieg concept - with the planned rapid achievement of the invasion objective, long-range bombers are of little significance, as the value of factories in the Urals and Siberia drops sharply. I am not sure that the USSR could establish full-scale arms production there without factories in the European part of the country. Some critical components (e.g., petroleum products, optical materials, electrical components, etc.) were produced only "before the Urals," and the entire Volga region and even some of the Ural factories would be within the range of German twin-engine bombers.
On the other hand, the Germans did not plan a war of attrition, where the Uralbomber would be needed, realizing that this was a suicidal idea.

 

[ssnider]

Why not do the Uralbomber on the cheap? Build the He 111z-2 6-9 months earlier than the He 11z was with maybe more fuel in the center wing. The capability to attack Ural targets forces the Soviets to expend more recourses defending them, even if you don't attack them often. I would be more inclined to go after the airfields on Iceland. Still kinda nrrd a Uralfighter thou.

 

[yulzari]

The specifications for a Uralbomber are not wildly different to those for a maritime long range aeroplane. That latter task justifies itself but a proportion optimised for long range bombing pits me in mind of the effort Britain put in to deal with just a small handful of Junkers Ju86 in high altitude form. Widely ranging air attacks on key industrial sites previously thought to be put of a attack range can cause a response of Soviet resources switched from OTL work to defensive protection of all vulnerable key sites and away from the front line.

Not that I am suggesting that the latter effect is worth building Uralbombers in itself. But if it can piggyback upon a worthwhile maritime long range production line as an extra then it may be useful. The POD of a maritime aeroplane is in itself questionable as Hitler's defeat of France master plan just finished off by saying 'and the the British will come to terms'. No forward planning of what to do if they do not so why would they want to build maritime aeroplanes to operate out of Norway and France?

 

[don4331]

The specifications for a Uralbomber are not wildly different to those for a maritime long range aeroplane. That latter task justifies itself but a proportion optimised for long range bombing pits me in mind of the effort Britain put in to deal with just a small handful of Junkers Ju86 in high altitude form. Widely ranging air attacks on key industrial sites previously thought to be put of a attack range can cause a response of Soviet resources switched from OTL work to defensive protection of all vulnerable key sites and away from the front line.

Not that I am suggesting that the latter effect is worth building Uralbombers in itself. But if it can piggyback upon a worthwhile maritime long range production line as an extra then it may be useful. The POD of a maritime aeroplane is in itself questionable as Hitler's defeat of France master plan just finished off by saying 'and the the British will come to terms'. No forward planning of what to do if they do not so why would they want to build maritime aeroplanes to operate out of Norway and France?

I was thinking similar lines:

Pre-WWII, if you suggested Poland, much less France would fall in 6 weeks, they would have a room with padded walls for you. Trying to run the gap between England and France would be risky, even if you fly fast/high. So, you are looking at airplane that can fly from Bremen, north of Scotland, then south to Celtic Sea/Bay of Biscay with enough loiter time to provide useful reconnaissance for the u-boats before retracing path back to Germany - an excellent use of a "Uralbomber".

Also, isn't every 85mm AA gun and every high altitude fighter kept in Urals to defend factories again the bombers, 1 less operating at the front lines?

Lastly, aircraft trade payload for range. If the Uralbomber isn't going all the way to the Urals, wouldn't it be able to transport several time more "payload" against Moscow, etc.

 

[wiking85]

Why not do the Uralbomber on the cheap? Build the He 111z-2 6-9 months earlier than the He 11z was with maybe more fuel in the center wing. The capability to attack Ural targets forces the Soviets to expend more recourses defending them, even if you don't attack them often. I would be more inclined to go after the airfields on Iceland. Still kinda nrrd a Uralfighter thou.

I have considered that option as well, but it has limited payload and the problem of engine fuel efficiency.

The specifications for a Uralbomber are not wildly different to those for a maritime long range aeroplane. That latter task justifies itself but a proportion optimised for long range bombing pits me in mind of the effort Britain put in to deal with just a small handful of Junkers Ju86 in high altitude form. Widely ranging air attacks on key industrial sites previously thought to be put of a attack range can cause a response of Soviet resources switched from OTL work to defensive protection of all vulnerable key sites and away from the front line.

Not that I am suggesting that the latter effect is worth building Uralbombers in itself. But if it can piggyback upon a worthwhile maritime long range production line as an extra then it may be useful. The POD of a maritime aeroplane is in itself questionable as Hitler's defeat of France master plan just finished off by saying 'and the the British will come to terms'. No forward planning of what to do if they do not so why would they want to build maritime aeroplanes to operate out of Norway and France?

That was the intention for the He177 IOTL. It was to be a long-range naval recon/attack aircraft as well as a long-range bomber against land targets. Remember too that the Germans also were concerned about eventual US entry into the war, so a long range naval recon aircraft would be highly useful even if Britain comes to terms. The US had the same idea and was developing the B36 for intercontinental strikes as well.

As to the diversion of Soviet resources, they were pushed to the limit in 1942, so forcing them to disperse could push them over the edge:

https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/totalwar2005.pdf

Unless the Germans are turning up in F-86s and Canberras painted with the Balkenkreuz, nope.

Sure, they could have done better than historically (and arguing how is one of the things that make the what-if threads enjoyable, so thank you for stepping up with a scenario for us to discuss!), but winning, no, that's unrealistic with the massive resources of the Allies arranged against them.

If the Ju288 had worked out, the Me210 had come around on time, and the He177 mess up hadn't happened then things could have gone considerably differently. There was massive waste from scrapped or messed up projects. Even with problems with engine development due to lack of certain materials, things like the Jumo 222 should have been viable if not 'developed' to death. Then the Ju288 would have been pretty untouchable and might have mooted the Ural Bomber/He177 project due to range and general performance. Russia was on the edge in 1942 and if things had gone somewhat differently and they folded then the US and UK assumed they could not win against a Germany not tied down by Russia. While the materials on paper look daunting there is considerable nuance with the specific problems of the Allies being able to use that material.

The situation was so bad for the Soviets in 1941-1942 that even "pinpricks" in the form of raids by small groups of bombers on critically important facilities could have a serious impact on the course of the war.

To reach the summer of 1944, the Soviets had to hold out in 1941-1942, and even in 1943, not everything was so straightforward, despite their numerical superiority.

They certainly were investigating, however, they were unable to mass-produce reliable high-altitude engines. By the end of the war, the Soviet air defense system was based on Spitfires and Kingcobras.

Deliveries of the Spitfire IX under Lend-Lease began only in the summer of 1944, and these were almost exclusively LF models (only two HF models were delivered) — but even these LFs were superior in altitude to practically everything the USSR could produce.

The Soviets complained that at high altitudes, the Spitfire IX's weapons often malfunctioned due to lubricant freezing.
But that's not the point. As it was correctly pointed out above, even the He 111 was a serious threat to the Soviet air defense until at least mid-1943.

Fully agreed.

The whole idea of the Uralbomber is incompatible with the Blitzkrieg concept - with the planned rapid achievement of the invasion objective, long-range bombers are of little significance, as the value of factories in the Urals and Siberia drops sharply. I am not sure that the USSR could establish full-scale arms production there without factories in the European part of the country. Some critical components (e.g., petroleum products, optical materials, electrical components, etc.) were produced only "before the Urals," and the entire Volga region and even some of the Ural factories would be within the range of German twin-engine bombers.
On the other hand, the Germans did not plan a war of attrition, where the Uralbomber would be needed, realizing that this was a suicidal idea.

This however is completely at odds with the facts:

A–A line - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The A–A line as the end-goal of military hostilities was chosen because an occupation of the entire Soviet Union in a single military campaign was considered impossible in view of its geographic dimensions. The remaining Soviet industrial centers further eastward were planned to be destroyed by aerial bombardment, for which an entire Luftflotte ("air fleet"; equivalent in status to an army group) was to be assigned.[5]​

5. Rich, Norman (1973). Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, pp. 210–212. W. W. Norton & Company Inc., New York.

This is the entire point of the Ural Bomber or Bomber A that emerged as the He177 IOTL. So contrary to your statement above, the Germans in fact planned as part of their success to destroy the Urals production centers with bombers to prevent a resurgence and developed and produced the He177 for that goal. In the scenario I'm proposing the Germans end up having to their actually functional heavy bombers, ready to start in 1942, to hit the factories that are west of the Urals and in the Urals if possible. Plus with the Upper Volga factories being much closer or even deep interdiction of the highly concentrated rail system nearer to the front to prevent reinforcements arriving to Stalingrad during Case Blue, the use of these heavy bombers would be considerably easier and they could carry heavier loads to target than having to travel all the way to the Urals.