Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Malayan Command had spares. The sixty Buffaloes for example did not include over forty aircraft held back as spares.I'd reckon that you're looking at a 30% reduction in daily strength returns simply for maintenance and upkeep on the aircraft, too. It's not an easy environment for aircraft. And getting spare parts to remote bases might be tough.
Malayan Command had spares. The sixty Buffaloes for example did not include over forty aircraft held back as spares.
Unfortunately not. I'm a purger so after I'd read my Bloody Shambles I sold it on eBay.Forgive my not knowing, but do you have total numbers?
Even though Britain has been at war for three years, Brooke-Popham has zero experience in leading combat aircraft. He was the wrong pick. Any credible leader would have paved over or otherwise weatherproofed a few airfields up north, and ensured that his airfields had AA and ground defences, and in the worst case demolition charges.Secondly Brooke-Popham's orders. This from Bloody Shambles vol 1
"Brooke-Popham did not feel justified at this stage [this was around 14.00 on 6 Dec] in ordering "Matador" into operation, but all forces in Malaya were put on full alert; neither did he have authority to order an air strike against Japanese forces at sea unless British, Dutch or American territory had been attacked. No new instructions were forthcoming from London."
It was fortunate that there were any airfields at all in northern Malaya in Dec 1941. This from "Bases of Air Strategy. Building Airfields for the RAF 1914-1945".Even though Britain has been at war for three years, Brooke-Popham has zero experience in leading combat aircraft. He was the wrong pick. Any credible leader would have paved over or otherwise weatherproofed a few airfields up north, and ensured that his airfields had AA and ground defences, and in the worst case demolition charges.
And keeping almost half of your aircraft at Singapore shows a poor understanding of where the enemy is going to come from. Percival predicted in the 1930s that Japan would land near the Thai border. That's where your aircraft need to be. With credible Buffalo CAP overhead, the slow and steady Vilderbeests could have devastated the landing ships with their torpedoes, if they were all deployed forward. And if the monsoon makes the airfields tricky to use, convert your TSRs to floats.
View attachment 653705
I sometimes think many post on this forum only to tell us why something wouldn't, couldn't or shouldn't be possible. Ewen, I'd say you've got those three covered.It was fortunate that there were any airfields at all in northern Malaya in Dec 1941.
Even though Britain has been at war for three years, Brooke-Popham has zero experience in leading combat aircraft. He was the wrong pick. Any credible leader would have paved over or otherwise weatherproofed a few airfields up north, and ensured that his airfields had AA and ground defences, and in the worst case demolition charges.
And keeping almost half of your aircraft at Singapore shows a poor understanding of where the enemy is going to come from. Percival predicted in the 1930s that Japan would land near the Thai border. That's where your aircraft need to be. With credible Buffalo CAP overhead, the slow and steady Vilderbeests could have devastated the landing ships with their torpedoes, if they were all deployed forward. And if the monsoon makes the airfields tricky to use, convert your TSRs to floats.
Unfortunately not. I'm a purger so after I'd read my Bloody Shambles I sold it on eBay.
It was estimated by High Command that some 336 aircraft would be needed in the defence of Malaya and Singapore in the form of 22 squadrons. When Japan attacked there was 14 squadrons with a total of 215 aircraft.
No. 243 Squadron, No. 488 Squadron, Royal New Zealand Air Force, and Nos. 21 and 453 Squadrons of the Royal Australian Air Force constituted the fighter defence of Malaya.
It's cool, space is limited for me and I'll do the same often enough.
I did a little digging and found this blog at rafmuseum.org.uk which contains this passage:
It contains no breakdown between active aircraft and spares, or spare parts available, though. The same blog also indicates that by the end of day on 8 Dec 41, the RAF in northern Malaya had suffered roughly 60% losses in aircraft, many on the ground (probably due to the field conditions as mentioned above by E EwenS in his post #2, and that by 9 Dec only two squadrons (types unspecified) remained in northern Malaya, the rest having been withdrawn to Singapore; and that by Jan 42 the RAF had only 56 fighters left in the region until reinforced the middle of that month. You probably already know all this but I thought it mete to mention.
Hyperwar reports:
I don't know the table of equipment for those squadrons, though.
RAF Buffalo squadrons officially had 12 Initial Equipment (IE) airframes with an additional 2-4 Immediate Reserve (IR) airframes making a total of 14-16 aircraft on-strength. Since there was a surfeit of spare Buffalos in Singapore in late 1941, and no room to store them, all squadrons had more than 14 aircraft. Most had at least 18 Buffalos on-strength and some had even more than that, although not necessarily all in the same place at the same time.
The quote about "only 56 fighters left" probably refers to front-line available strength and not the total number of airframes available (which would include those undergoing 2nd and 3rd line maintenance or were undergoing repair.
I didn't know all this. Appreciate the post.It's cool, space is limited for me and I'll do the same often enough.
I did a little digging and found this blog at rafmuseum.org.uk which contains this passage:
It contains no breakdown between active aircraft and spares, or spare parts available, though. The same blog also indicates that by the end of day on 8 Dec 41, the RAF in northern Malaya had suffered roughly 60% losses in aircraft, many on the ground (probably due to the field conditions as mentioned above by E EwenS in his post #2, and that by 9 Dec only two squadrons (types unspecified) remained in northern Malaya, the rest having been withdrawn to Singapore; and that by Jan 42 the RAF had only 56 fighters left in the region until reinforced the middle of that month. You probably already know all this but I thought it mete to mention.
Hyperwar reports:
I don't know the table of equipment for those squadrons, though.
From the Japanese perspective it seems to have changed very little. It had been drafted in Aug 1940 and the Japanese didn't get to see it until mid-Dec. Boyd "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters" concluded about the Automedon incidentI just read about the SS Automedan. If it hadn't been intercepted by a German commerce raider, how would the defense of Malaya been changed?
It's noteworthy how spineless and lacking in initiative the late Empire British were compared to the earlier Brits. There's a fark'n invasion fleet amassing in FIC and Formosa and we'll do nothing, in fact we'll employ willful deniability and ignorance by not monitoring this build-up. Now there's an invasion fleet sailing towards us, but we can't attack it because we're afraid of making the first move, when the act of sailing an invasion fleet IS the first move. Can you imagine the US taking this position if they'd discovered the Kido Butai a hundred miles off Hawaii launching its strike aircraft? "Oh, maybe they're just exercising their fleet, I'm not sure, let's wait and see if they take the first shot?" No chance, the USAAC and USN would have attacked it without hesitation - in fact the USN did attack IJN submarines outside Pearl Harbour before the IJNAS strike began - what would Phillips have ordered if a couple of IJN submarines were discovered sailing outside the Singapore port? What were his ROEs?Yes, the Vildebeests might have had some successes...if they were operating at night and if (big IF) Brooke-Popham was willing to order them to attack. As others have pointed out, the Japanese invasion convoys were in international waters and Brooke-Popham was under orders not to attack until Japan made the first offensive move. Attacking the convoys before they start landing would give Japan the moral high-ground because Tokyo could claim the British attacked a convoy that was headed for Indochina.
It's noteworthy how spineless and lacking in initiative the late Empire British were compared to the earlier Brits. There's a fark'n invasion fleet amassing in FIC and Formosa and we'll do nothing, in fact we'll employ willful deniability and ignorance by not monitoring this build-up. Now there's an invasion fleet sailing towards us, but we can't attack it because we're afraid of making the first move, when the act of sailing an invasion fleet IS the first move. Can you imagine the US taking this position if they'd discovered the Kido Butai a hundred miles off Hawaii launching its strike aircraft? "Oh, maybe they're just exercising their fleet, I'm not sure, let's wait and see if they take the first shot?" No chance, the USAAC and USN would have attacked it without hesitation - in fact the USN did attack IJN submarines outside Pearl Harbour before the IJNAS strike began - what would Phillips have ordered if a couple of IJN submarines were discovered sailing outside the Singapore port? What were his ROEs?
It seemed the 1930s-40s Brits were always lacking any aggression or assertiveness, always hoping that the enemy will just leave them alone. Clearly, even though they now possessed the largest navy in the world, a large air force and credible army (and yes, they were busy in the North Atlantic, North Africa and Med), the demographic and economic catastrophe of the First World War had scarred many a British leader into a jelly-like state. Compare this to the British military and political leaders of the 18th and 19th Century, even as late as the 1890s Fashoda crisis the British were willing to march right into the face of an opponent and make them blink. But the world, including Tokyo watched a neutered, frightened Britain do nothing when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936 in clear violation of Versailles and the world had Britain's measure.
20th Century Britain needs some 18 and 19th Century British backbone. First of all, at the fall of France in May 1940, Britain needs to march into FIC (with a Free French general in front) before Japan does. And do it before you piss off everyone by sinking the French navy in July 1940. And this doesn't mean you need to deplete the forces in the UK then fighting the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic. FIC is defended by a relatively small, ill-equipped French force, and if well played diplomatically (such as Britain making sure a Vichy general does not take over FIC) can be taken without a shot. But really what Britain should have done is when they offered to send the BEF to France in Sept 1939 Britain should have requested to send a smaller (mostly Indian, or even better French Canadian) BEF to FIC to offer similar support against Japan. With this in place at the fall of France, Japan can't invade in summer 1940 without fighting the Brits.
What Brooke-Popham. Phillips and Percival need is a firm tripwire ROE from London that does not require further reassurance or recheck - and make them known to the Japanese, Thais, DEI, FIC and the USA. "If we see any IJN or IJA forces in Malay (or Thai) water this will be considered a violation of our territory and a state of war will be in place between Japan and Britain, and such forces will be forcibly engaged". And then move whatever submarines available from the Home and MTO to Terengganu along with your PBYs to keep an constant monitor of FIC ports. And on the assumption that their still going to invade, put the RAF in place to attack the invasion fleet. I'd also position Force Z with working radar (and with dedicated Buffalo cover) at Terengganu - it's no good sitting in Singapore far to the south when Percival predicted years back that the invasion will come via Thailand and northern Malaya. Put a RAF man in the radar plot room aboard HMS Prince of Wales to coordinate the RN/RAF response.