Ok...that's a lot of text. However, in order for any of this to happen then the RAF needs to get out of its own way. Standing up an international training school takes a lot of staffwork, not to mention getting international agreements in place. At no point prior to December 1941 was Brooke-Popham authorized to enter into agreements with any foreign nation about defence agreements. For example, the RAF Air Historical Branch Narrative "Far East Defence Policy and Preparation for War: Volume I" pp.36-38 describes the series of conferences at Singapore that took place 226-29 Nov 1940 and 22-25 Feb 1941. The following quotes illustrate the challenges of getting international agreements regarding the Japanese threat:
"In October 1940 the Dutch Commander-in-Chief requested that Staff Conversations might be opened in Singapore [Note: the Narrative notes that the Dutch had made earlier requests to collaborate in 1936 and 1938 but Britain was loathe to agree to any programme of collaboration because London feared the domino effect of multiple mini-agreements similar to those that had resulted in the First World War]. There had been some hesitancy in making this suggestion because of the absence of any undertaking of assistance by H.M. Government should the N.E.I. be attacked by Japan. The Conversations did take place, however, from 26th to 29th November 1940. The British officers included the C-in-C Far East, C-in-C China Station, G.O.C. Malaya, and A.O.C. Far East. The Dutch representatives were Chief of General Staff, Chief of Naval Staff and one other General Staff Officer. The Dutch were ready to cooperate and although no commitments were made, the principles of collaboration were agreed in the event of Japanese attack on Malaya, Borneo or N.E.I. The only practical form of cooperation by redistribution of forces was by air, and to implement this the Dutch would send 3 squadrons of 9 aircraft to Malaya, whilst the RAF would operate 4 reinforcing squadrons from Sumatra. Reconnaissance areas were defined and the following points requiring the approval of both Governments were subsequently authorised or implemented by the British Chiefs of Staff: the exchange of liaison officers; the use of an inter-Allied code; inter-Allied facilities at selected airfields; and the delivery of armaments to the Dutch, but on a low priority. The C.C.S. could not, however, define in advance what movement by the Japanese would constitute an act of war - such would have to be decided by the Government at the time."
I know that was a long read but it points to the detailed level of discussions by senior officers in the theatre, as well as the structural issues that greatly hindered rapid progress. Further conversations in February 1941 inched the ball a little further forward but it's abundantly clear that Britain was in no mood to undertake any action that might commit the nation to additional combat operations if Allies were attacked.
The extent of HQ staff challenges is described in a slightly later section of the same Narrative (pp.38-39) with my bolding for emphasis:
"Work of Air Headquarters, Far East Command
There was little decentralization within the Command beyond the formation of a Group and two operational Group cadres. In March 1941, No.221 Group, with a full staff, was established in Burma, whilst in August an operational Group cadre (No.224 Group) was formed to supervise fighter training and the air defence of Singapore....The expansion programme made the lack of decentralization acutely felt...but suggestions for the appropriate increases in staff were not acceptable to G.H.Q. who already felt that staffs in Malaya were excessive. It was necessary however to fill vacancies in the enlarged G.H.Q. and the new Stations. To supply this need personnel were enrolled from Australia and New Zealand, whilst a proportion of businessmen from Singapore were commissioned. Their qualifications were varied but, although willing and able, their value was limited by their lack of service knowledge and experience. There were few regular officers with Staff training so that not only did the brunt of the work devolve upon a few, but the position was aggravated by the inexperience of officers at Stations."
Against this backdrop, I find it hard to believe that there was any practical way for cooperation to increase between Britain, the NEI and French Indochina in 1940.
