Malayan Command - Focus is finding and killing invasion force

[buffnut453]

Good point, and we have to remember that even Hermes was well west (over 800 nmi) of Suez.



I still see as viable a British request to position a small BEF into FIC at the same time as the BEF went to France. By Sept 1939 Japan was already holding Hainan and much of Canton province across from Hong Kong and right next door to FIC. By 1939 the US' "moral embargo" was already underway as a protest against Japan's war in China. It would cost Britain very little to move troops from India or Malaya to FIC. When France falls in May 1940 will these British forces be forcibly expelled by the FIC governor or asked to stay on as a deterrent to Japan? Feelings may change when the RN attacks the French navy in July. Anyway, the only way I see British forces getting into FIC before the Japanese is if they're invited.

The problem here is that we're pre-supposing, in mid-1940, that Japan will move into French Indochina. That knowledge/understanding simply isn't available at that time.

The Franco-Thai war, which brought Japanese forces into northern French Indochina ostensibly as "peacekeepers", only started in October 1940. Britain clearly didn't want to get in the middle of the spat between Bangkok and Saigon, otherwise it would have pushed its role as an arbitrator. Remember Britain is trying to seduce Thailand as a bulwark against Japan. Britain won't win Bangkok's support if the former is seen siding with French Indochina....and deploying forces there in mid-1940 will have all the appearance of an Anglo-French alliance in the region.

I know you don't like it when I point out stuff like this but Britain's agency to act was massively constrained by significant structural issues, including political factors and military resource limitations (both capacity and capability). And before you say that "Britain was being spineless and should have just ignored Thailand", remember that forcing Thailand into Japan's camp simply complicates the operational problem for Brooke-Popham because it gives Japan free access to the key port of Singora.

 

[buffnut453]

There are 2 issues in South Asia Pacific (SAP):

1. Politics:
The Dutch and the French both regard the Germans currently occupation of their countries as a temporary problem, and they will be sent home within next couple years and after they have cleaned up the mess, things will go back to status quo.

So, under no circumstances do the local governors want Australian/British/India troops in any serious numbers. Too much fear that British would claim the territories as their own once fighting is done, i.e. British East Indies/British Indo-China.

And British don't want to commit just penny packets.

As pointed out, there is legitimate concern on which way the guns from the India troops will be pointed when fighting starts:
The fathers/uncles of the Indian troops mutinied in WWI and had to be put down by Japanese (they were our allies at time). Not good to find your left flank is suddenly the Japanese right.

There is significant discord over Indian Independence. So, you can't ship the troops to Burma for fear they will be used by opposition to overthrow the current government.

2. Logistics:
An infantry division needs >1,000tons/day of supplies when involved in heavy fighting; armoured needs more, air force and navy even more. Malaysian peninsula has ~8 divisions at start of campaign.

The only place in world, in '41, that can supply 10k tons/day of supplies is North America. From San Francisco to Melbourne to Perth to Singapore takes 45 days for Liberty ship. Given you need shipping both directions and you need some spare capacity, you are looking at in excess of 1M tons of shipping. (Existing shipping in theater is needed to supply civilian population).

To get that amount of shipping would be to stop all convoys to Europe and re-route them to SAP.

And there are issues in country with logistics too.

I disagree with your analysis here...and certainly that these were the 2 key issues facing British forces in the Far East. For starters, Britain was supplying its forces all over the world, including Malaya, so the US clearly was NOT the only place in the world that could supply the required resources. Yes, some of the supplies came from the US but let's not overstate the relative proportion or the importance compared to British-provided supplies.

Yes, the Indian independence movement was a concern but the far bigger problem was lack of training for the forces that were present. The massive expansion in the Indian Army in 1940 led to the "milking" of existing units for capable officers and NCOs to form the core of new battalions. Even then, there wasn't enough experience to go around. Many of the Indian soldiers in Malaya had received little training and had were led by NCOs who lacked experience. According to some reports, certain Indian Army units in Malaya were barely capable of handling their rifles effectively. Could more have been done to improve the quality of the Army units in Malaya? Yes, absolutely. Inadequate training in the period 1940-1941 was a major problem that should have been rectified...however, the raw material was poor to begin with.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I don't think DeGaulle was built to accept being sidelined to FIC under any circumstances. He would have read that for what it was and insisted on staying in ETO.

It's a shame that François Darlan's assassin didn't also take out DeGaulle. Post-war Europe may have been less complicated.

 

[southjn1982]

While they weren't combat veterans, they weren't "civilians". They were military pilots, largely fighter pilots, drawn from active-duty American ranks.

As for this sort of school being set up, you're going to need a hefty logistics chain to keep so many different types flying. It would require major high-level support, which might be hard to come by given the resource demands being made much closer to home.

I guess sarcasm isn't your strong point regarding the flying tiger comment plus with all the type in the area the supply chain already exists the idea is that they do training against each other to sharpen skills

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I guess sarcasm isn't your strong point regarding the flying tiger comment plus with all the type in the area the supply chain already exists the idea is that they do training against each other to sharpen skills

Sarcasm doesn't show up well in text, as it relies upon knowing one's interlocutor. You'll have to forgive my inability to read your mind as well as your words.

As for dissimilar training, yes, I'm familiar with the idea. That doesn't ease your supply-chain issues. Four different types of airplanes? Now you've got four different oil filters, four different tire sizes, and so on. Nine different types flying? The Brits had massive problems keeping their five types in the air in part due to lack of spares.

The supply chain may exist, but it was very tenuous and shown by events to be inadequate. If you're going to base more a/c immediately there, you're going to have to beef up your logistical base, and you'll once again run into resistance deploying resources to Malaya when the Germans are having lunch at Cap Gris-Nez.

 

[southjn1982]

Sarcasm doesn't show up well in text, as it relies upon knowing one's interlocutor. You'll have to forgive my inability to read your mind as well as your words.

As for dissimilar training, yes, I'm familiar with the idea. That doesn't ease your supply-chain issues. Four different types of airplanes? Now you've got four different oil filters, four different tire sizes, and so on. Nine different types flying? The Brits had massive problems keeping their five types in the air in part due to lack of spares.

The supply chain may exist, but it was very tenuous and shown by events to be inadequate. If you're going to base more a/c immediately there, you're going to have to beef up your logistical base, and you'll once again run into resistance deploying resources to Malaya when the Germans are having lunch at Cap Gris-Nez.

one of the great point about having a joint command for the whole area is that it massivly improves the logistics chances as a lot of the planes the UK used were also had parts cominality with the limited number of Dutch planes etc yes you would sacrifice some of the force, but on paper ABDACOM had a quite impressive force but they were poorly trained and had massive issues as you would expect from such a new command but if you start a similar command 18 months earlier thay can iron out many of the issues, also by better coordinating their assets they can massively reduce the wear and tear on the limited assets they have while also dramitically imrpoving the logistics chain. Will they still have massive issues, yes they will, but the performance of the forces would be leaps and bounds ahead of what ABDACOM did manage due to the extra time together and thus they would have a fighting chance instead of the suicide mission of what really happened.

 

[special ed]

Sarcasm doesn't show up well in text, as it relies upon knowing one's interlocutor. You'll have to forgive my inability to read your mind as well as your words.

As for dissimilar training, yes, I'm familiar with the idea. That doesn't ease your supply-chain issues. Four different types of airplanes? Now you've got four different oil filters, four different tire sizes, and so on. Nine different types flying? The Brits had massive problems keeping their five types in the air in part due to lack of spares.

The supply chain may exist, but it was very tenuous and shown by events to be inadequate. If you're going to base more a/c immediately there, you're going to have to beef up your logistical base, and you'll once again run into resistance deploying resources to Malaya when the Germans are having lunch at Cap Gris-Nez.

Interlocutor. Isn't that the guy who locks the rooms at the asylum?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

[...] as a lot of the planes the UK used were also had parts cominality with the limited number of Dutch planes etc [...]

I was unaware of this. Might you expand upon this? What types, what parts? I knew they operated export Buffaloes (or is that Buffalii?) which the Brits also operated, but any others?

I have no argument with the idea that earlier coordination of defenses could pay dividends, just so we're clear.

 

[buffnut453]

Another potential advantage of having an Proto-ABDACOM set up in 1940 is that with the various hodpodge of air units both in equipment and doctrine you could make one hell of a dissimilar combat air training school in the region a kinda 1940s era TOPGUN this would be great not only in training pilots for the region but would also be a good finishing school for Australian and New Zealand pilots on route to Europe or North Africa. I also wouldn't be suprised if the Flying Tigers didn't also show up for some pre-deployment training after all they are not combat pilots going to an active warzone but civilian flight instructors for the school.

The problem is that a command structure has to be sufficient for the forces available. In the summer of 1940 there were precisely 20 modern, monoplane fighters (Curtiss H-75s of the RNEIAF) in all of Burma, NEI, Malaya and Singapore. British and Dutch Brewsters (Buffalos and B-339C/Ds respectively) only start arriving in March/April 1941, and the Dutch CW-21Bs arrive even later. The AVG only show up in Burma in mid-1941. Thus, from a purely materiel perspective, you won't really get DACT until the latter half of 1941. Again, it requires a lot of foresight to suggest the establishment of a multi-national DACT school when you only have 20 fighters in theatre.

In terms of training, there were very few RAF pilots with combat experience in the theatre, begging the obvious question of where you're going to get your training staff for your theatre-wide DACT concept. From a sheer staff skillset perspective, it would be hard to get anything started before mid-1941, The problem gets even worse (for the RAF at least) when you consider that those experienced pilots are needed to help stand up the squadrons that are forming. Most of the RAF Buffalo pilots either came straight out of flying training schools or transferred from multi-engine/flying boat squadrons. AHQFE even had to form an ad hoc OTU, named "W Flt", using half-a-dozen ex-21 Sqn RAAF Wirraways to ensure the available pilots actually had experience flying aircraft with flaps and retractable undercarriage (most of the newbie RNZAF and RAAF pilots came straight from flying biplanes). The operational Buffalo squadrons only had, at best, 2-3 pilots with actual operational experience. Given this context, it's hard to see where anyone will find the resources to build a DACT school.

 

[buffnut453]

To add to my last note, 21 Sqn RAAF and 453 Sqn were only declared operational on 19 November 1941. AFAIK, 243 Sqn and 488 Sqn were never declared operational, indeed 488 Sqn only arrived in Singapore in October 1941. The RAF had its hands full just getting units up to operational strength and qualification.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I was unaware of this. Might you expand upon this? What types, what parts? I knew they operated export Buffaloes (or is that Buffalii?) which the Brits also operated, but any others?

Some DEI aircraft had British engines, so I assume also British carburetors, fuel pumps, etc? Three I can think of are the Fokker C.X (Rolls-Royce Kestrel or Bristol Pegasus), Koolhoven F.K.51 (Armstrong Siddeley Cheetah) and Fokker D.XXI (Bristol Mercury).

Good source for DEI info https://dutcheastindies.webs.com/

 

[EwenS]

I was unaware of this. Might you expand upon this? What types, what parts? I knew they operated export Buffaloes (or is that Buffalii?) which the Brits also operated, but any others?

I have no argument with the idea that earlier coordination of defenses could pay dividends, just so we're clear.

The only other type that the RAF and Dutch forces had in common was the Catalina.

205 squadron had 3 in service plus 2 in reserve. The MLD (the RNEI Naval Air Force) had 2 GVT each with 3 aircraft operational plus another 30 in reserve pending formation of new units.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So it looks like there could still be logistics issues supporting multiple types, given the remoteness of the theater and paucity of shipping. Is this an incorrect judgement on my part?

 

[buffnut453]

Some DEI aircraft had Armstrong and Bristol engines, so I assume also British carburetors, fuel pumps, etc? Two I can think of are the Koolhoven F.K.51 (Armstrong Siddeley Cheetah) and Fokker D.XXI (Bristol Mercury).

There was only a single Fokker D.XXI in the NEI and the FK-51 was a basic trainer, so not a lot of use for the DACT concept.

 

[southjn1982]

There was only a single Fokker D.XXI in the NEI and the FK-51 was a basic trainer, so not a lot of use for the DACT concept.

when you look at the list of aircraft used by the KNIL in the 1930s and 40s most of them used either UK parts or US parts or have planes in service with the RAF that were license built by other commonwealth nations like Australia logistics would be tough but it they make a start of it in 1940 by December 1941 they will have a lot if issues ironed out plus a joint command formed in 1940 instead of as a result of the Arcadia Conference would also have a much more sensible approach to procurement and British and Dutch orders for US equipment would not be competing against each other and by making larger orders they can also save resources. The few planes that the Dutch had that can't be sourced from the commonwealth and are in service are the Dutch Dornier bombers and their Me 108 trainers although there may be a few spare Dornier parts salvagable in fields in southern England and it's worth a look. Of course any School would not be operational until mid 41 but that's not a problem if a joint South East Asian Command is formed in the summer of 1940 which is round about the time the UK was doing a comprehensive report on the defenses in the region. They have almost 18 months to work shit out. Will they be a world beating force with no issues of course not but they don't need to be the Japanese offensive was so overstretched a delay of a couple of days hear and their could have collapsed the whole thing and with an extra year and a half of getting their shit together it is possible. Their are also major political gains in Washington that could be made if the US think the western Allies are going to make more than a token effort, maybe some of the equipment MacAurthur fucks up with gets sent their instead who knows. But with SEA talking with a single voice when it comes to getting equipment things improve. ABDACOM wasn't a bad idea it was just too late. Personally I think a lot of the succsess would be down to the commander of the region but in 1940 thier is arguably only one choice for a theatre commander who has the political skill the reputation and the drive an desire to get things done and that is Roger Keyes who was an Admiral of the Fleet as well as being the member of parliament who collapsed Chamberlains government when he attacked it in the Norway Debate and was actively trying to get an active command in real life he was made the first director of the Commando force and proved that he could make a very effective force despite the lack of resources and opposition from within the military. Plus London want him far away.

 

[buffnut453]

when you look at the list of aircraft used by the KNIL in the 1930s and 40s most of them used either UK parts or US parts or have planes in service with the RAF that were license built by other commonwealth nations like Australia logistics would be tough but it they make a start of it in 1940 by December 1941 they will have a lot if issues ironed out plus a joint command formed in 1940 instead of as a result of the Arcadia Conference would also have a much more sensible approach to procurement and British and Dutch orders for US equipment would not be competing against each other and by making larger orders they can also save resources. The few planes that the Dutch had that can't be sourced from the commonwealth and are in service are the Dutch Dornier bombers and their Me 108 trainers although there may be a few spare Dornier parts salvagable in fields in southern England and it's worth a look. Of course any School would not be operational until mid 41 but that's not a problem if a joint South East Asian Command is formed in the summer of 1940 which is round about the time the UK was doing a comprehensive report on the defenses in the region. They have almost 18 months to work shit out. Will they be a world beating force with no issues of course not but they don't need to be the Japanese offensive was so overstretched a delay of a couple of days hear and their could have collapsed the whole thing and with an extra year and a half of getting their shit together it is possible. Their are also major political gains in Washington that could be made if the US think the western Allies are going to make more than a token effort, maybe some of the equipment MacAurthur fucks up with gets sent their instead who knows. But with SEA talking with a single voice when it comes to getting equipment things improve. ABDACOM wasn't a bad idea it was just too late. Personally I think a lot of the succsess would be down to the commander of the region but in 1940 thier is arguably only one choice for a theatre commander who has the political skill the reputation and the drive an desire to get things done and that is Roger Keyes who was an Admiral of the Fleet as well as being the member of parliament who collapsed Chamberlains government when he attacked it in the Norway Debate and was actively trying to get an active command in real life he was made the first director of the Commando force and proved that he could make a very effective force despite the lack of resources and opposition from within the military. Plus London want him far away.

Ok...that's a lot of text. However, in order for any of this to happen then the RAF needs to get out of its own way. Standing up an international training school takes a lot of staffwork, not to mention getting international agreements in place. At no point prior to December 1941 was Brooke-Popham authorized to enter into agreements with any foreign nation about defence alliances or collaboration. For example, the RAF Air Historical Branch Narrative "Far East Defence Policy and Preparation for War: Volume I" pp.36-38 describes the series of conferences at Singapore that took place 226-29 Nov 1940 and 22-25 Feb 1941. The following quotes illustrate the challenges of getting international agreements regarding the Japanese threat:

"In October 1940 the Dutch Commander-in-Chief requested that Staff Conversations might be opened in Singapore [Note: the Narrative notes that the Dutch had made earlier requests to collaborate in 1936 and 1938 but Britain was loathe to agree to any programme of collaboration because London feared the domino effect of multiple mini-agreements similar to those that had resulted in the First World War]. There had been some hesitancy in making this suggestion because of the absence of any undertaking of assistance by H.M. Government should the N.E.I. be attacked by Japan. The Conversations did take place, however, from 26th to 29th November 1940. The British officers included the C-in-C Far East, C-in-C China Station, G.O.C. Malaya, and A.O.C. Far East. The Dutch representatives were Chief of General Staff, Chief of Naval Staff and one other General Staff Officer. The Dutch were ready to cooperate and although no commitments were made, the principles of collaboration were agreed in the event of Japanese attack on Malaya, Borneo or N.E.I. The only practical form of cooperation by redistribution of forces was by air, and to implement this the Dutch would send 3 squadrons of 9 aircraft to Malaya, whilst the RAF would operate 4 reinforcing squadrons from Sumatra. Reconnaissance areas were defined and the following points requiring the approval of both Governments were subsequently authorised or implemented by the British Chiefs of Staff: the exchange of liaison officers; the use of an inter-Allied code; inter-Allied facilities at selected airfields; and the delivery of armaments to the Dutch, but on a low priority. The C.C.S. could not, however, define in advance what movement by the Japanese would constitute an act of war - such would have to be decided by the Government at the time."

I know that was a long read but it points to the detailed level of discussions by senior officers in the theatre, as well as the structural issues that greatly hindered rapid progress. Further conversations in February 1941 inched the ball a little further forward but it's abundantly clear that Britain was in no mood to undertake any action that might commit the nation to additional combat operations if Allies were attacked.

The extent of HQ staff challenges is described in a slightly later section of the same Narrative (pp.38-39) with my bolding for emphasis:

"Work of Air Headquarters, Far East Command

There was little decentralization within the Command beyond the formation of a Group and two operational Group cadres. In March 1941, No.221 Group, with a full staff, was established in Burma, whilst in August an operational Group cadre (No.224 Group) was formed to supervise fighter training and the air defence of Singapore....The expansion programme made the lack of decentralization acutely felt...but suggestions for the appropriate increases in staff were not acceptable to G.H.Q. who already felt that staffs in Malaya were excessive. It was necessary however to fill vacancies in the enlarged G.H.Q. and the new Stations. To supply this need personnel were enrolled from Australia and New Zealand, whilst a proportion of businessmen from Singapore were commissioned. Their qualifications were varied but, although willing and able, their value was limited by their lack of service knowledge and experience. There were few regular officers with Staff training so that not only did the brunt of the work devolve upon a few, but the position was aggravated by the inexperience of officers at Stations."


Against this backdrop, I find it hard to believe that there was any practical way for cooperation to increase between Britain, the NEI and French Indochina in 1940.

 

[southjn1982]

Ok...that's a lot of text. However, in order for any of this to happen then the RAF needs to get out of its own way. Standing up an international training school takes a lot of staffwork, not to mention getting international agreements in place. At no point prior to December 1941 was Brooke-Popham authorized to enter into agreements with any foreign nation about defence agreements. For example, the RAF Air Historical Branch Narrative "Far East Defence Policy and Preparation for War: Volume I" pp.36-38 describes the series of conferences at Singapore that took place 226-29 Nov 1940 and 22-25 Feb 1941. The following quotes illustrate the challenges of getting international agreements regarding the Japanese threat:

"In October 1940 the Dutch Commander-in-Chief requested that Staff Conversations might be opened in Singapore [Note: the Narrative notes that the Dutch had made earlier requests to collaborate in 1936 and 1938 but Britain was loathe to agree to any programme of collaboration because London feared the domino effect of multiple mini-agreements similar to those that had resulted in the First World War]. There had been some hesitancy in making this suggestion because of the absence of any undertaking of assistance by H.M. Government should the N.E.I. be attacked by Japan. The Conversations did take place, however, from 26th to 29th November 1940. The British officers included the C-in-C Far East, C-in-C China Station, G.O.C. Malaya, and A.O.C. Far East. The Dutch representatives were Chief of General Staff, Chief of Naval Staff and one other General Staff Officer. The Dutch were ready to cooperate and although no commitments were made, the principles of collaboration were agreed in the event of Japanese attack on Malaya, Borneo or N.E.I. The only practical form of cooperation by redistribution of forces was by air, and to implement this the Dutch would send 3 squadrons of 9 aircraft to Malaya, whilst the RAF would operate 4 reinforcing squadrons from Sumatra. Reconnaissance areas were defined and the following points requiring the approval of both Governments were subsequently authorised or implemented by the British Chiefs of Staff: the exchange of liaison officers; the use of an inter-Allied code; inter-Allied facilities at selected airfields; and the delivery of armaments to the Dutch, but on a low priority. The C.C.S. could not, however, define in advance what movement by the Japanese would constitute an act of war - such would have to be decided by the Government at the time."

I know that was a long read but it points to the detailed level of discussions by senior officers in the theatre, as well as the structural issues that greatly hindered rapid progress. Further conversations in February 1941 inched the ball a little further forward but it's abundantly clear that Britain was in no mood to undertake any action that might commit the nation to additional combat operations if Allies were attacked.

The extent of HQ staff challenges is described in a slightly later section of the same Narrative (pp.38-39) with my bolding for emphasis:

"Work of Air Headquarters, Far East Command

There was little decentralization within the Command beyond the formation of a Group and two operational Group cadres. In March 1941, No.221 Group, with a full staff, was established in Burma, whilst in August an operational Group cadre (No.224 Group) was formed to supervise fighter training and the air defence of Singapore....The expansion programme made the lack of decentralization acutely felt...but suggestions for the appropriate increases in staff were not acceptable to G.H.Q. who already felt that staffs in Malaya were excessive. It was necessary however to fill vacancies in the enlarged G.H.Q. and the new Stations. To supply this need personnel were enrolled from Australia and New Zealand, whilst a proportion of businessmen from Singapore were commissioned. Their qualifications were varied but, although willing and able, their value was limited by their lack of service knowledge and experience. There were few regular officers with Staff training so that not only did the brunt of the work devolve upon a few, but the position was aggravated by the inexperience of officers at Stations."


Against this backdrop, I find it hard to believe that there was any practical way for cooperation to increase between Britain, the NEI and French Indochina in 1940.

Their were oppertunties but they were wasted especially in August 1940 when the UK conducted a report into the defense of the region and concluded that they lacked the manpower. There had been prescidence for a joint allied command and before the Fall of France and many people in the military believed that Foch's appointment and the creation of the supreme war council in 1918 was the reason for allied victory many people in government not only in the UK but also the Dominions were suggesting it. The UK did accept a joint command in 1941 but too late to be of any use. While there was resistance in the military especially from the RAF it was something Churchill himself actively considered. Yes there would be issues not one is saying there wouldn't be but that does not mean that it can't happen. Churchill was also under a lot of pressure from Robert Menzies over the role of Australian forces and Austalian fears in the region even before Menzies 4 month trip to the UK (many people supported adding Menzies to the UK War Cabinet and their have long been rumours that some people actually wanted him to replace Churchill) and one of the things that was considered was a joint command structure with the Australians and Dutch, what really sunk the proposal was when Menzies pushed to far and wanted defacto controll over Malaya with the Governor reporting directly to the Australian Government. As a way to placate the Australians and to encourage the release of more Australian forces it was very seriously contemplated by the UK Government to create a joint command structure in the summer of 1940.

 

[buffnut453]

Their were oppertunties but they were wasted especially in August 1940 when the UK conducted a report into the defense of the region and concluded that they lacked the manpower. There had been prescidence for a joint allied command and before the Fall of France and many people in the military believed that Foch's appointment and the creation of the supreme war council in 1918 was the reason for allied victory many people in government not only in the UK but also the Dominions were suggesting it. The UK did accept a joint command in 1941 but too late to be of any use. While there was resistance in the military especially from the RAF it was something Churchill himself actively considered. Yes there would be issues not one is saying there wouldn't be but that does not mean that it can't happen. Churchill was also under a lot of pressure from Robert Menzies over the role of Australian forces and Austalian fears in the region even before Menzies 4 month trip to the UK (many people supported adding Menzies to the UK War Cabinet and their have long been rumours that some people actually wanted him to replace Churchill) and one of the things that was considered was a joint command structure with the Australians and Dutch, what really sunk the proposal was when Menzies pushed to far and wanted defacto controll over Malaya with the Governor reporting directly to the Australian Government. As a way to placate the Australians and to encourage the release of more Australian forces it was very seriously contemplated by the UK Government to create a joint command structure in the summer of 1940.

Entirely agree that plenty of mistakes were made and opportunities missed. Also agree that pretty much anything is possible. However, at the end of the day, it's down to the British Government, and not Brooke-Popham, to make international agreements, to prioritize operational theatres, and to resource the armed forces.

I maintain that, when we compare the operational situation in the Far East in 1940 with the threats Britain faced much closer to home, it's abundantly clear why Malaya fell to the bottom of the pile in terms of priorities. Battle of Britain, Norway, Western Desert, and even East Africa (with consequences for shipping movements through the Suez)...all demanded much more attention than Malaya.

Could British military and civilian leaders in Singapore have done better? Absolutely! There was a lack of imagination in how to use the available forces. Training, across both Army and RAF, took too long and was often focused on the wrong things. Lack of operational experience greatly hindered progress...but all the good leaders that had the needed operational experience were actively employed in areas where there was a real fighting war. Any "what if" scenario that requires large increases in force or fundamental changes to the political scenario lie at the highly improbable end of the spectrum.

 

[Shinpachi]

I remember the day of March 11, 2011 when the great tsunami hit the Matsushima Air Base of JASDF near Sendai City. The base commander fully trusted the Meteorological Agency which announced the tsunami would hit in half an hour and issued order "Evacuate to the rooftop". Tsunami actually came after an hour to pile up the wreck of precious jet fighters and helicopters. Loss was estimated one billion dollars including repair costs/time. On the other hand, JGSDF in Sendai immediately flew a helicopter to check the tsunami and contributed to civillians' evacuation.

 

[special ed]

In Sendai, the mark of a leader.