Malayan Command - Focus is finding and killing invasion force

[taly01]

The only force I can see the British using to turn the odds in Malaya 1941 was their Indian/Ceylon based Fleet, If its carrier group was deployed west of Singapore it could have made raids then retreated to reduce its exposure to Japanese air attacks. And Force Z would become a more balanced fleet with fighter cover from Buffalo's.

Of course this would have been a huge risk if most of fleet never returned, and left India very vulnerable, especially to internal political instability by Indian seperatists (Ghandi's I.N. Congress and Chandra Bose's Indian National Army/Azad Hind).

 

[SaparotRob]

Were there radar equipped Stringbags at the time?

 

[EwenS]

The only force I can see the British using to turn the odds in Malaya 1941 was their Indian/Ceylon based Fleet, If its carrier group was deployed west of Singapore it could have made raids then retreated to reduce its exposure to Japanese air attacks. And Force Z would become a more balanced fleet with fighter cover from Buffalo's.

Of course this would have been a huge risk if most of fleet never returned, and left India very vulnerable, especially to internal political instability by Indian seperatists (Ghandi's I.N. Congress and Chandra Bose's Indian National Army/Azad Hind).

What India / Ceylon based fleet?

At the beginning of Dec 1941 the only capital ship other than Force Z east of Suez was a single slow R class battleship on convoy escort on the west side of the IO with 2 more en route similarly engaged. The rest of the ships in the IO were a mixed bag of of cruisers and a few escorts.

The sole available carrier, Hermes was refitting at Simonstown, South Africa from mid Nov 1941 to the end of Jan 1942. And her air group consisted of about a dozen Swordfish.

Contrary to popular opinion, Indomitable was never intended to be part of Force Z even if she hadn't been delayed by grounding in the Caribbean. Her orders to sail for the IO only came after the outbreak of war with Japan, as did those for Formidable and Warspite which, along with the 3 R class formed the core of the Eastern Fleet by March 1942, with Illustrious en route.

 

[EwenS]

Were there radar equipped Stringbags at the time?

Yes. ASV.II began to be fitted to Swordfish from around mid-1941 but was by no means a universalfit. The IO was not a priority area so I doubt if any of the Swordfish on Hermes had it.

There were technical problems getting ASV.II to work on the Albacore, so it only began to be fitted to that type just before the end of 1941. To make up for this deficit Indomitable acquired a couple of radar equipped Swordfish during her passage to the IO. It is believed that at least some of Formidable's Albacores had Radar by the time of Operation C in April 1942. Illustrious was equipped with Swordfish when she arrived and at least some of them did have radar.

 

[buffnut453]

The only benefit from locating and tracking the convoys is to know with greater precision where and when landings might occur. However, that would require pretty continual coverage over the convoys which, frankly, AHQFE lacked the resources to achieve. It also ignores the fact that, during the final phases of the approach to the Kra Isthmus, the convoys were supposed to have air cover during daylight hours from the IJA fighters based at Idu Phu Quoc (the Ki-43s were fitted with long-range tanks, carried under the wings, for this purpose. Putting slow, vulnerable maritime patrol aircraft over the convoys consistently will likely just mean that more of them would get shot down (as was the case with the first RAF loss of the war in the Far East).

Even if Singapore could track the convoys consistently, they still can't do anything about that knowledge. They can't attack because it would kick off a war that Britain was trying to avoid, and it would give Japan a diplomatic coup for being attacked without warning or being attacked in international waters. Britain was never going to do that.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

[...]It also ignores the fact that, during the final phases of the approach to the Kra Isthmus, the convoys were supposed to have air cover during daylight hours from the IJA fighters based at Idu Phu Quoc (the Ki-43s were fitted with long-range tanks, carried under the wings, for this purpose. Putting slow, vulnerable maritime patrol aircraft over the convoys consistently will likely just mean that more of them would get shot down (as was the case with the first RAF loss of the war in the Far East).

Even if Singapore could track the convoys consistently, they still can't do anything about that knowledge. They can't attack because it would kick off a war that Britain was trying to avoid, and it would give Japan a diplomatic coup for being attacked without warning or being attacked in international waters. Britain was never going to do that.

While I agree with your general points -- no matter what info the Brits gleaned, they lacked the resources to take useful steps -- aren't the emboldened points somewhat contradictory? If the Japanese take the first shots they lose the coup you write of and give the Brits justification for attacking.

 

[buffnut453]

While I agree with your general points -- no matter what info the Brits gleaned, they lacked the resources to take useful steps -- aren't the emboldened points somewhat contradictory? If the Japanese take the first shots they lose the coup you write of and give the Brits justification for attacking.

Only if the Brits are aware of why the aircraft was lost. As it was, a RAF Catalina was shot down on 7 Dec 1941 (the day before the Japanese invasion, and 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor) by 5x Ki-27s but the Catalina crew couldn't get a message out to Singapore....so the cause of the loss was unknown. Bear in mind this was the period of the northwest monsoon, which made flying conditions, even in peacetime, a dangerous proposition.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Only if the Brits are aware of why the aircraft was lost. As it was, a RAF Catalina was shot down on 7 Dec 1941 (the day before the Japanese invasion, and 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor) by 5x Ki-27s but the Catalina crew couldn't get a message out to Singapore....so the cause of the loss was unknown. Bear in mind this was the period of the northwest monsoon, which made flying conditions, even in peacetime, a dangerous proposition.

Thanks, I hadn't considered that.

 

[EwenS]

While I agree with your general points -- no matter what info the Brits gleaned, they lacked the resources to take useful steps -- aren't the emboldened points somewhat contradictory? If the Japanese take the first shots they lose the coup you write of and give the Brits justification for attacking.

We know now that the Japanese did take the first shots. They downed an RAF Catalina on the morning of 7th Dec. Unfortunately it didn't manage to get a signal off to Singapore before it blew up. All that was known then was that said Catalina had failed to return from its mission. In those days and given the weather conditions that could occur in that region, that was not necessarily indicative of it having fallen victim to enemy action.

But aerial recce had revealed the presence of the invasion convoy on the 6th travelling west across the Gulf of Siam. But follow up flights that day, overnight and the following morning couldn't relocate it. These aircraft were taking avoiding action on sighting Japanese floatplanes and using cloud cover, so were never engaged. The next aircraft was the unfortunate Catalina. It was destroyed around 0800-0900 on the 7th. It was shortly after that that the invasion convoy broke into 5 parts to head for their final invasion points in Thailand (3) and Malaya (2), which involved the southernmost 3 turning south, but still in international waters. Further Hudson sorties in the afternoon and as late as 2100 were reporting Japanese ships from these groups. But no one was firing on them. And no one in Singapore seems to have figured out that the convoy(s) seen on the 6th had split into smaller groups and that it was one or two of those smaller groups that were being reported on the 7th.

So the picture AHQ in Singapore had late evening of the 7th was a completely false one. They were still expecting a large convoy and the air recce was only showing a partial picture because bad weather was interfering with recce sorties further north into the Gulf of Siam.

 

[southjn1982]

Ok...here goes with a scenario to answer the OP. These details were gleaned from original files at the UK National Archives. I'm working from memory but I have all the references once I locate the hard drive that is the back-up for my MA thesis.

The key challenge for Brooke-Popham was time. He needed time to implement Operation MATADOR but waiting until the Japanese landed in Malaya wouldn't afford sufficient time. Equally, Brooke-Popham couldn't attack the Japanese troopships before the landings commenced because that would be contrary to the Hague Convention of 1907. Britain had been courting Thailand, attempting to persuade Bangkok to ally with Britain against Japan in hopes that MATADOR could be launched pre-emptively....but without success. Brooke-Popham needed incontrovertible proof of Tokyo's intentions before the Japanese forces started landing, preferably in a way that could be shared with Bangkok to enable MATADOR to be launched in time....and hunting for Japanese convoys in the Gulf of Siam would NEVER provide the necessary warning or evidence.

In early 1941, Brooke-Popham identified a set of key intelligence indicators that would warn of a Japanese attack. The most important of these was the arrival of Japanese fighter aircraft in the region. Bearing in mind that Japanese forces were already established in French Indo-China, it was logical to assume that any deployment of fighters would be to that country. Thus a key task for the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB), Singapore's intelligence analysis organization, was keeping tabs on airfields and the air order of battle in French Indo-China. Now, in reality, the IJA only deployed fighters at the last minute, just a few days before the invasion forces landed on the east coast of the Kra Isthmus...however, a few days would still provide much better warning than a message saying that landings had already begun.

One of the Assistant Consuls in Saigon was a man named William Meiklereid. In late-1941, Meiklereid sent a report to London and Singapore about Japanese airfield construction activity in French Indochina. One of the most active developments was the creation of a brand new airfield on the island of Idu Phu Quoc which was, geographically speaking, the closest point in French Indochina to the eventual landing points at Singora, Pattani, and Kota Bharu. Meiklereid's report provided a sketch map of Japanese aircraft dispositions and the locations of airfields that were under construction. Although the report is undated, it almost certainly arrived in Singapore before the commencement of hostilities.

British expectation was that the Japanese invasion convoys would land in French Indochina before embarking on a northward overland invasion into Thailand and around the northern shore of the Gulf of Siam to reach Malaya. However, the development of airfields on Idu Phu Quoc pointed to a different course of action. If the Japanese intended to push north then they would have expended their energies building airfields in the north near the border between French Indochina and Thailand. Instead, they built airfields to the west on an island. Now, it's a basic tenet of air defence that you put your fighters up-threat from the locations you're trying to defend. If Japan intended a move northward into Thailand, surely their fighter aircraft would have been aligned in the north? However, if Japan's intentions were westward facing, then fighters could be expected at the new airfield on Idu Phu Quoc. Brooke-Popham should have been watching that airfield like a hawk. Unfortunately, either FECB dropped the ball or Brooke-Popham himself started over-obsessing about the location of the invasion convoys.

Photographic reconnaissance assets were available in Singapore that could have kept watch on Idu Phu Quoc. Two Buffalo airframes had been converted for the PR role, one a "short range" (SR) airframe with a single camera (serial W8136) and the other a "long-range" Buffalo with extra fuel and oil tanks, and a pair of cameras providing stereo imagery (serial W8166). Development of the LR Buffalo was problemmatic and it wasn't ready for operations until after the Japanese invasion. However, even the SR Buffalo had sufficient legs to reach Idu Phu Quoc from airfields in Northern Malaya. A further PR platform was developed by adapting a Bristol Beaufort. Some 6 airframes had arrived in Singapore in November 1941 from Australia, the first of a planned replacement fleet for the Vildebeests of 36 and 100 Sqns. Given the deteriorating political situation, and teething troubles getting the Beauforts into service, it was decided to send 5 airframes back to Australia but to retain one for PR purposes. It, too, had sufficient range to reach French Indochina, indeed it was tasked with just such a PR mission on 6 and 7 Dec 1941...unfortunately, it was tasked to photograph ports and harbours rather than the new Japanese airfields.

If FECB and Far East Command set up a dedicated imagery collection effort against Idu Phu Quoc, it's likely that the arrival of IJA fighter aircraft would have been detected days before the Japanese invasion of Thailand and Malaya. The photographic evidence of the deployment could have been provided directly to the Thai government in Bangkok and, through embassy contacts, to the US. Such solid evidence of Japanese intentions could have forced a change of heart in Bangkok, and an invitation to British forces to help defend the key port at Singora....essentially enabling MATADOR before the Japanese invasion. Sadly, the fleeting opportunity was missed and the rest is history.

However, the above is a viable option for Brooke-Popham to respond more effectively to the Japanese threat, and it employs resources that were already available to him in November 1941.

Very interesting I've often postulated the only real way to save SE Asia from the Japanese was that if in June 1940 just after the fall of France the UK, Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch East Indies had formed a joint command structure similar to what they attempted with ABDACOM but a year earlier and the US could slot into an existing structure. I believe that by working together earlier they could use the limited resources more efficiently and through the year of training iron out the communication and doctrine problems that plagued ABDACOM and thus even with limited resources they could possibly be good enough to put a big spanner in the works for the Japanese who historically were operating on a shoestring and had very little spare capacity. You are 100% correct their is no way that the UK could have occupied FEI before the Japs moved in in September 1940 both politically and militarily, but and a very big but the Dutch forces in the region significantly outnumbered the French Colonial troops and a Free Dutch led operation under the nominal command of say Prince Bernhard with a couple of French officer in tow showing up in Indochina politically is very different politically from the UK doing it (historically Torch was made to look as American as possible to avoid the political fall out) and if were really lucky we can get DeGualle to fuck off to FIC to lead the French Government in exile and we don't have to deal with him in London. It would also keep Prince Bernhard far away as undoubtedly a brave man he was not trusted by allied High Command and In 1940 the largest military force in SE Asia was the Dutch KNIL but they were horrifically under-equipped but even so they probably could persuade the FIC to switch sides and they did have a reasonable naval presence in the region, but any move would have to be made in either June July or August 1940 the earlier the better.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I don't think DeGaulle was built to accept being sidelined to FIC under any circumstances. He would have read that for what it was and insisted on staying in ETO.

 

[southjn1982]

I don't think DeGaulle was built to accept being sidelined to FIC under any circumstances. He would have read that for what it was and insisted on staying in ETO.

Probably true but at the same time can he survive the loss of prestege as whoever is the govener of such a large and important oiece of the French empire that would have the potential to dominate the Free French economically and militarily will become a major rival and will havr a lot more legitimacy.

 

[EwenS]

Very interesting I've often postulated the only real way to save SE Asia from the Japanese was that if in June 1940 just after the fall of France the UK, Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch East Indies had formed a joint command structure similar to what they attempted with ABDACOM but a year earlier and the US could slot into an existing structure. I believe that by working together earlier they could use the limited resources more efficiently and through the year of training iron out the communication and doctrine problems that plagued ABDACOM and thus even with limited resources they could possibly be good enough to put a big spanner in the works for the Japanese who historically were operating on a shoestring and had very little spare capacity. You are 100% correct their is no way that the UK could have occupied FEI before the Japs moved in in September 1940 both politically and militarily, but and a very big but the Dutch forces in the region significantly outnumbered the French Colonial troops and a Free Dutch led operation under the nominal command of say Prince Bernhard with a couple of French officer in tow showing up in Indochina politically is very different politically from the UK doing it (historically Torch was made to look as American as possible to avoid the political fall out) and if were really lucky we can get DeGualle to fuck off to FIC to lead the French Government in exile and we don't have to deal with him in London. It would also keep Prince Bernhard far away as undoubtedly a brave man he was not trusted by allied High Command and In 1940 the largest military force in SE Asia was the Dutch KNIL but they were horrifically under-equipped but even so they probably could persuade the FIC to switch sides and they did have a reasonable naval presence in the region, but any move would have to be made in either June July or August 1940 the earlier the better.

As is so often the case the pure numbers don't give the whole story. OK the French had c50,000 troops in FIC compared to c120,000 for the Dutch in the DEI in late 1941. So your plan looks good, in theory. But have you at the composition of those forces and their role?

The role of the DEI troops was defence of the colony and internal security, not taking the fight outwith to places like FIC. And look at the physical area that needed to be covered. Efforts had been made from 1938 to expand the core professional forces from around 40,000 through various recruitment schemes, a policy that was accelerated from May 1940, with a view to improving the defence of the colony.

So at the end of 1941 there are 19,000 deployed in various islands throughout the region incl 10,000 in Sumatra for largely internal security purposes. The remaining 94,000 were in Java. But those included 28,000 Support Troops (Town & Rural Guards and other voluntary organisations recruited from May 1940 - the equivalent of the British Home Guard as far as I can see). And then there were Coastal Troops, Aviation units, Medical units etc that account for another 4,500.

That leaves about 44,000 in 3 KNIL divisions plus another 17,000 Territorials and Indonesian Militia on Java, many of whom were recent recruits or even retired personnel encouraged to join up again.

So you end up with a core army not too dissimilar in size to that of the French in Indochina. How many can you afford to remove from Java in mid-1940 to support an invasion of FIC, without weakening the DEI colony defences to a direct Japanese attack? If we look to the French Colonial experience in Africa then securing a quick switch of allegiance to the Allies is not one to be counted on. Loyalty to Vichy remained strong.

 

[buffnut453]

The biggest issue is that Malaya in the summer of 1940 simply doesn't register on the priority list. We're looking at it because we know what happened in late 1941 and so we're trying to align the sun, moon and stars to counter the Japanese threat. Britain didn't have that luxury of hindsight.

It's worth noting that Japanese intentions still weren't clear as late as October/November 1941. British analysis of the problem showed 2 possible courses of action for Japan: a southward advance against Thailand, Malaya, Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, and a northward push against Russia. That analysis was remarkably accurate, so it's hardly surprising that Britain had a tough time working out a meaningful response, particularly given pressures in other parts of the world where Britain was already at war. Bear in mind that, from June 1940 onwards, Britain was already fighting Germany and Italy with zero allies outside the British Empire. Taking on another global power in the form of Japan wouldn't make much sense unless the situation was forced on London.

For anyone interested in the topic, I can recommend "Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences", edited by Nobutaka Ike. It's a very dry compilation of the minutes of policy meetings in Tokyo. However, it makes very clear that senior leaders in Tokyo didn't have a clearly formulated plan until very late in 1941. It's hard to divine Japanese intentions when Japan, itself, hasn't made up its mind.

Given all these factors, I don't see action in the summer of 1940 as a viable option. Britain simply had too much on its plate...like fighting for its own survival. Plus, as I and others have noted, the in-theatre forces, even combining British and Dutch resources, were inadequate for any kind of substantive action towards French Indochina.

 

[southjn1982]

As is so often the case the pure numbers don't give the whole story. OK the French had c50,000 troops in FIC compared to c120,000 for the Dutch in the DEI in late 1941. So your plan looks good, in theory. But have you at the composition of those forces and their role?

The role of the DEI troops was defence of the colony and internal security, not taking the fight outwith to places like FIC. And look at the physical area that needed to be covered. Efforts had been made from 1938 to expand the core professional forces from around 40,000 through various recruitment schemes, a policy that was accelerated from May 1940, with a view to improving the defence of the colony.

So at the end of 1941 there are 19,000 deployed in various islands throughout the region incl 10,000 in Sumatra for largely internal security purposes. The remaining 94,000 were in Java. But those included 28,000 Support Troops (Town & Rural Guards and other voluntary organisations recruited from May 1940 - the equivalent of the British Home Guard as far as I can see). And then there were Coastal Troops, Aviation units, Medical units etc that account for another 4,500.

That leaves about 44,000 in 3 KNIL divisions plus another 17,000 Territorials and Indonesian Militia on Java, many of whom were recent recruits or even retired personnel encouraged to join up again.

So you end up with a core army not too dissimilar in size to that of the French in Indochina. How many can you afford to remove from Java in mid-1940 to support an invasion of FIC, without weakening the DEI colony defences to a direct Japanese attack? If we look to the French Colonial experience in Africa then securing a quick switch of allegiance to the Allies is not one to be counted on. Loyalty to Vichy remained strong.

I said it was a big if personally I think it would be too big a risk although in early summer 1940 the Japanese were busy losing the 100 Division offensive in China and had nothing to divert themselves so there is a very small window of opportunity and timing is everything. But the real goal is to have an active command in the region working together training and sharing even the limited resources and in the hope that in the time they do have they can improve the combat effectiveness of the forces enough to cause serious issues for the Japanese who's operation in 1941/42 were done on a shoe string and relied on a lot of luck. In an ideal world a joint UK, AUS, NZ and Dutch command founded in the summer of 1940 to secure the region would be significantly more effective than the historical ABDACOM as they will have more time to prepare. If I could make it happen I would put it under the command of Roger Keyes with the Aussies and the Dutch providing Army and Sub commanders especially Conrad Emil Lambert Helfrich as for army commanders Blamey is availiable but needed in North Africa so I would consider someone Hein ter Poorten for a senior role but luckily Gerardus Johannes Berenschot would still be allive as he hasnt had his flying accident coming back from a conference with Brook Popham and is the best commander the KNIL ever had as well as being liked and well regarded by the rest of the allies and after being shafted by the RAF in the UK I would be looking at Park as commander of the air-force but although his reputation was damaged I think Brooke Popham is treated a little unfairly and I would not be too miffed if he had to stay as head of the air forces. With the Aussies filling up a lot of other roles. Keyes was a very talented 5 aggressive star rank with political skill and a good international reputation and he was actively wanting a command an was in reality given the Commando forces much to the annoyance of many people who wanted him out of the London as he was a nuisance so ending him to a backwater would make London happy. This would also send a positive message to the Americans and maybe shake loose a bit of extra support where possible. I think a pre existing multi-national command even starved of resources would be significantly more effective than the historical ABDACOM and if founded in 1940 the historical communication and doctrine issues should be largely ironed out by December 41. One of the other advantages is by having an established and well known and 5 star rank officer in the field people like MacArthur have to deal with an officer with much more political skill than he does with an even better reputation from WW1 and who outranks him thus solving a lot of this issues of integrating US forces when the war does start. Plus the UK sending Keyes to the Far East would also send a strong message to the Japanese.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Probably true but at the same time can he survive the loss of prestege as whoever is the govener of such a large and important oiece of the French empire that would have the potential to dominate the Free French economically and militarily will become a major rival and will havr a lot more legitimacy.

Right, and having to make guesses about such a complex personality is a matter fraught with the possibility of error. Interesting discussion, though.

 

[southjn1982]

Another potential advantage of having an Proto-ABDACOM set up in 1940 is that with the various hodpodge of air units both in equipment and doctrine you could make one hell of a dissimilar combat air training school in the region a kinda 1940s era TOPGUN this would be great not only in training pilots for the region but would also be a good finishing school for Australian and New Zealand pilots on route to Europe or North Africa. I also wouldn't be suprised if the Flying Tigers didn't also show up for some pre-deployment training after all they are not combat pilots going to an active warzone but civilian flight instructors for the school.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I also wouldn't be suprised if the Flying Tigers didn't also show up for some pre-deployment training after all they are not combat pilots going to an active warzone but civilian flight instructors for the school.

While they weren't combat veterans, they weren't "civilians". They were military pilots, largely fighter pilots, drawn from active-duty American ranks.

As for this sort of school being set up, you're going to need a hefty logistics chain to keep so many different types flying. It would require major high-level support, which might be hard to come by given the resource demands being made much closer to home.

 

[don4331]

There are 2 issues in South Asia Pacific (SAP):

1. Politics:
The Dutch and the French both regard the Germans currently occupation of their countries as a temporary problem, and they will be sent home within next couple years and after they have cleaned up the mess, things will go back to status quo.

So, under no circumstances do the local governors want Australian/British/India troops in any serious numbers. Too much fear that British would claim the territories as their own once fighting is done, i.e. British East Indies/British Indo-China.

And British don't want to commit just penny packets.

As pointed out, there is legitimate concern on which way the guns from the India troops will be pointed when fighting starts:
The fathers/uncles of the Indian troops mutinied in WWI and had to be put down by Japanese (they were our allies at time). Not good to find your left flank is suddenly the Japanese right.

There is significant discord over Indian Independence. So, you can't ship the troops to Burma for fear they will be used by opposition to overthrow the current government.

2. Logistics:
An infantry division needs >1,000tons/day of supplies when involved in heavy fighting; armoured needs more, air force and navy even more. Malaysian peninsula has ~8 divisions at start of campaign.

The only place in world, in '41, that can supply 10k tons/day of supplies is North America. From San Francisco to Melbourne to Perth to Singapore takes 45 days for Liberty ship. Given you need shipping both directions and you need some spare capacity, you are looking at in excess of 1M tons of shipping. (Existing shipping in theater is needed to supply civilian population).

To get that amount of shipping would be to stop all convoys to Europe and re-route them to SAP.

And there are issues in country with logistics too.

 

[Admiral Beez]

At the beginning of Dec 1941 the only capital ship other than Force Z east of Suez was a single slow R class battleship… The sole available carrier, Hermes was refitting at Simonstown, South Africa

Good point, and we have to remember that even Hermes was well west (over 800 nmi) of Suez.

Given all these factors, I don't see action in the summer of 1940 as a viable option. Britain simply had too much on its plate...like fighting for its own survival. Plus, as I and others have noted, the in-theatre forces, even combining British and Dutch resources, were inadequate for any kind of substantive action towards French Indochina.

I still see as viable a British request to position a small BEF into FIC at the same time as the BEF went to France. By Sept 1939 Japan was already holding Hainan and much of Canton province across from Hong Kong and right next door to FIC. By 1939 the US' "moral embargo" was already underway as a protest against Japan's war in China. It would cost Britain very little to move troops from India or Malaya to FIC. When France falls in May 1940 will these British forces be forcibly expelled by the FIC governor or asked to stay on as a deterrent to Japan? Feelings may change when the RN attacks the French navy in July. Anyway, the only way I see British forces getting into FIC before the Japanese is if they're invited.