Malayan Command - Focus is finding and killing invasion force

[Admiral Beez]

From October 1941 onwards the British defence strategy assumes that any invasion of Malaya ignore Singapore and southern Malaya, but will instead come from amphibious landings near Singora Thailand and northern Malaya near Kota Baru. The RAF's primary task from late November onwards is thus to find the IJA invasion force at sea and to destroy it before it lands.

To accomplish this, the RAF in Malaya has 218 aircraft, consisting of 60 Brewster Buffaloes, 47 Bristol Blenheims, 24 Vickers Vilderbeests, 24 Lockheed Hudsons and 3 PBY Catalinas. In actuality nearly 40% of this force was in Singapore, including all but six of the TSR aircraft and all three PBY martiime reconnaissance PBYs.

Based on the assumptions above, and that war is believed to commence sometime between the end of November and early December, how would you position and task your aircraft? Below shows the available RAF bases. Myself, I'd move all the Vilderbeests to RAF Kota Baru and RAF Gong Kedak, since they're slow and need to be close to the coast. Forty-eight of the Buffaloes would also be spread among these two airfields plus the reactivated Machang airfield. My three PBYs would be flying from RAF Kuantan on continuous recon to the FIC border and back down the Malay coast. The Blenheims and Hudsons will be positioned at Alor Star and Machang to fly over Thailand if necessary, with any Blenheims with gun packs having these removed and bombs fitted. The remaining twelve Buffaloes will base at RAF Sungei Patani to support either the Alor Star or Kota Baru forces.

The Army is ordered to abandon operation Matador and instead to focus on defending Kota Baru and the Alor Star airbase. If despite the RAF's maritime recon and strikes against the troopships the IJA manages to land in force, the Army will do a proper job demolishing the bases, and RAF will be ordered to regroup at RAF Impoh. This will have been planned for in advance, so procedures to destroy the forward bases and proper AA and supports at the fall back bases are in place. I'd also order the Royal Navy to reposition Force Z to Kuala Terengganu after arriving and refueling at Singapore on Dec 2nd so that it's in position, well under significant RAF protection by Dec 5th.

 

[EwenS]

No doubt you won't like this but you have two things to bear in mind.

Firstly, with regard to your aircraft dispositions, the weather. There is no satellite weather forecasting and the north east monsoon season lasts from Nov/Dec to March. Historically the Japanese invasion convoys were aided by the frequent rain squalls and prevailing violent storms which also had the effect of hindering RAF searches. The other monsoon effect of this was that it resulted in water-logged the airfields in northern Malaya. Flying from Kota Bharu for example was impossible on the 4th and 5th Dec. When flying restarted on the 6th recce Hudsons were able to find the Japanese invasion convoys. The only real fix for the airfields was spending more money pre-war to make these them all-weather.

So is it worthwhile deploying more aircraft to forward airfields if they might get caught on the ground unable to take off. Or do you hedge your bets, forward deploy some units as historical and keep others back? It is a risk either way.

Secondly Brooke-Popham's orders. This from Bloody Shambles vol 1
"Brooke-Popham did not feel justified at this stage [this was around 14.00 on 6 Dec] in ordering "Matador" into operation, but all forces in Malaya were put on full alert; neither did he have authority to order an air strike against Japanese forces at sea unless British, Dutch or American territory had been attacked. No new instructions were forthcoming from London."

These orders dated back to April and should have been updated in the light of subsequent events but hadn't been.

Those orders might have changed if the Catalina that was attacked by Japanese fighters at around 0820 on 7th Dec had not exploded and been unable to get a signal off to Singapore. The fact it didn't return to base could not simply be put down to enemy action given prevailing weather conditions.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'd reckon that you're looking at a 30% reduction in daily strength returns simply for maintenance and upkeep on the aircraft, too. It's not an easy environment for aircraft. And getting spare parts to remote bases might be tough.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I'd reckon that you're looking at a 30% reduction in daily strength returns simply for maintenance and upkeep on the aircraft, too. It's not an easy environment for aircraft. And getting spare parts to remote bases might be tough.

Malayan Command had spares. The sixty Buffaloes for example did not include over forty aircraft held back as spares.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Malayan Command had spares. The sixty Buffaloes for example did not include over forty aircraft held back as spares.

Forgive my not knowing, but do you have total numbers?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Forgive my not knowing, but do you have total numbers?

Unfortunately not. I'm a purger so after I'd read my Bloody Shambles I sold it on eBay.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Secondly Brooke-Popham's orders. This from Bloody Shambles vol 1
"Brooke-Popham did not feel justified at this stage [this was around 14.00 on 6 Dec] in ordering "Matador" into operation, but all forces in Malaya were put on full alert; neither did he have authority to order an air strike against Japanese forces at sea unless British, Dutch or American territory had been attacked. No new instructions were forthcoming from London."

Even though Britain has been at war for three years, Brooke-Popham has zero experience in leading combat aircraft. He was the wrong pick. Any credible leader would have paved over or otherwise weatherproofed a few airfields up north, and ensured that his airfields had AA and ground defences, and in the worst case demolition charges.

And keeping almost half of your aircraft at Singapore shows a poor understanding of where the enemy is going to come from. Percival predicted in the 1930s that Japan would land near the Thai border. That's where your aircraft need to be. With credible Buffalo CAP overhead, the slow and steady Vilderbeests could have devastated the landing ships with their torpedoes, if they were all deployed forward. And if the monsoon makes the airfields tricky to use, convert your TSRs to floats.

 

[EwenS]

Total RAF strength in Malaya at the start of Dec was as follows (figures are with squadrons and reserves):

Buffalo 60/52 (squadron strengths in Malaya add to 64 + 2 P.R. aircraft)
Blenheim 39/15 + 8 Blenheim I bombers detached from Burma for armament practice (should probably be 49/15 + 8 - 12 Blenheim If fighters, 20 Blenheim I bombers, & 17 Blenheim IV bombers from squadron listings).
Vildebeest 29/12
Hudson 24/7
Catalina 3/2
Beaufort 6 (see below)

There were also a number of flights of the Malayan Volunteers Air Force flying a hotch potch of training types.

Malayan Volunteers Air Force | Malayan Volunteers Group

The MVAF operate mainly civilian aircraft such as the de Havilland Tiger Moth, Leopard Moth and Rapides. Personnel were recruited from members of the Royal Singapore, the Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Perak flying clubs, in addition the private airline, Wearn

www.malayanvolunteersgroup.org.uk

RAF had received 168 Buffalo in the Far East (other two from the order went to A&AEE in Britain). There was a fifth squadron in Burma along with some reserve aircraft.

A note re the status of the Buffalo squadrons.
67 formed in March 1941, the first with the Buffalo. Moved to Burma in Oct 1941.
243 formed March 1941. 15 Buffalo at Kallang Singapore and a det of 2 at Kota Bharu.

Both these squadrons were formed in Singapore from personnel sent out from Britain. Virtually the only pilots with significant experience were the squadron and flight commanders. The others were fresh from OTU. Ground crews would have had their first experience of the Buffalo in Singapore as all (bar 2) were delivered there direct from the factory.

21 RAAF Pre-war squadron that arrived in Singapore in Aug 1940 with Wirraways. Converted to the Buffalo in summer 1941. 12 Buffalo at Sungei Patani.
453 (Australian) formed 23 May 1941 in Australia and arrived Singapore in Aug. The Buffalo was its first aircraft. 18 aircraft at Sembawang, Singapore.
488 (New Zealand) formed 1 Sept 1941 in New Zealand and arrived in Singapore Nov 1941. Again the Buffalo was its first aircraft. 17 Buffalo at Kallang, Singapore.

There was also a P.R. flight with 2 locally converted Buffalo aircraft. One was short range (c300 mile radius of operation). The other was a long range variant with extra cameras and fuel tanks (c700 mile operational radius). The latter may not have become available until just before Christmas 1941 according to one report I read.

There were complaints about spares shortages (components not aircraft) for the Buffalos and engine problems as many of the engines supplied were ex-civil engines refurbished as Wright couldn't keep up with the increased demand from the manufacturers of a variety of aircraft types in the USA.

The Vildebeest biplane torpedo bombers were due to be replaced by the first Beauforts from the Australian production line. A detachment of 100 squadron personnel had been sent to learn about their new aircraft and deliver them to Singapore. The first 6 arrived on 5th Dec but various factors rendered them next to useless so 5 were sent back to Australia within a few days. The 6th aircraft was fitted with a camera and carried out recce sorties for a couple of days before being destroyed on an airfield in northern Malaya.

 

[EwenS]

Even though Britain has been at war for three years, Brooke-Popham has zero experience in leading combat aircraft. He was the wrong pick. Any credible leader would have paved over or otherwise weatherproofed a few airfields up north, and ensured that his airfields had AA and ground defences, and in the worst case demolition charges.

And keeping almost half of your aircraft at Singapore shows a poor understanding of where the enemy is going to come from. Percival predicted in the 1930s that Japan would land near the Thai border. That's where your aircraft need to be. With credible Buffalo CAP overhead, the slow and steady Vilderbeests could have devastated the landing ships with their torpedoes, if they were all deployed forward. And if the monsoon makes the airfields tricky to use, convert your TSRs to floats.

View attachment 653705

It was fortunate that there were any airfields at all in northern Malaya in Dec 1941. This from "Bases of Air Strategy. Building Airfields for the RAF 1914-1945".

"One reason that nothing had been done about more airfields by the time war broke out was that the War Office insisted that it would not pay labour more than forty-five cents daily, which was below the minimum wage even for females, while the Commissioner of Labour was holding out for $1.10 plus rations and accommodations."

And you want concrete runways as well!

Historically until the start of WW2 concrete runways were a rarity anywhere in the world, except perhaps the USA. The weight of aircraft before the late 1930s didn't warrant it. "All weather" in those days meant adequate drainage, which didn't always work out especially in places like Malaya where for example, average rainfall in Dec (1 month alone) ranges between 18 inches in Singapore and 26 inches in Kota Bharu.

It was only in 1939 that concrete runways began to be authorised for existing airfields in Britain itself (where problems with water logging also arose) and 1940 before they became a standard design feature for new airfields. Even in 1945 some remained grass. Concrete runways came with a downside though. Grass fields absorbed a certain amount of water before becoming waterlogged. Concrete increased the run-off requiring even more drainage. And drains in the Far East often came in the form of open ditches which then presented obstacles to aircraft resulting in more mishaps. And the quantities involved became staggering growing from an initial 16,000 cubic yards of concrete to an eventual 400,000 cubic yards for a typical airfield in Britain. All of which has to be sourced and moved. Not so easy in the Far East in 1941.

Even in 1945 with all the experience of airfield building around the world, building all weather airfields in Burma and Malaya was a challenge for the engineers.

During WW2 the Japanese began creating a permanent runway at Sembawang airfield, Singapore using PoW labour but never finished it before the surrender. They seem to have made a fair use of it as a grass field.

Incidentally the average rainfall in Saigon in Dec is about 3 inches. Advantage Japan!

As for the possibility of air strikes against the Japanese invasion convoys it should be noted that the ships left Hainan Island early on the 4th Dec, picking up a more out of Indochina later. The IJAAF moved a number of units into Indochina tasked specifically with providing fighter cover for them so long as their route in the Gulf of Siam was with range.

64th Sentai 35 Ki 43 and 6 Ki 27
59th Sentai 24 Ki 43
1st Sentai 42 Ki 27
11th Sentai 39 Ki 27
77th Sentai 27 Ki 27

The IJNAF had also deployed 25 A6M Zeros and 12 A5M to Saigon.

The convoy (28 ships in total) was also provided with a close escort of one heavy and one light cruiser plus 12 destroyers. On top of that other naval covering forces included one battleship, 6 heavy cruisers and 13 more destroyers. So potentially plenty of AA cover.

It was only around mid morning on the 7th Dec that the invasion convoy broke into 5 parts to head for its destination areas, only 2 of which were on British territory. Until that point it's course was generally west towards Thailand.

 

[Admiral Beez]

It was fortunate that there were any airfields at all in northern Malaya in Dec 1941.

I sometimes think many post on this forum only to tell us why something wouldn't, couldn't or shouldn't be possible. Ewen, I'd say you've got those three covered.

So, if the RAF is tasked with countering the planned for IJN/A landings near Kota Baru, what's your recommended plan?

 

[SaparotRob]

I just read about the SS Automedan. If it hadn't been intercepted by a German commerce raider, how would the defense of Malaya been changed?

 

[EwenS]

While others post scenarios without taking cognisance of the limitations that Britain was operating under both in theatre and in terms of juggling priorities between theatres where there was a live shooting war.

It is easy to play armchair general / admiral / air marshall using hindsight to second guess those on the scene at the time. Try looking at things through the eyes of those there, with the information to hand at the time and under the limitations they operated under. Maybe you will then begin to understand why things happened the way they did. Then you can begin to come up with alternatives.

 

[buffnut453]

Even though Britain has been at war for three years, Brooke-Popham has zero experience in leading combat aircraft. He was the wrong pick. Any credible leader would have paved over or otherwise weatherproofed a few airfields up north, and ensured that his airfields had AA and ground defences, and in the worst case demolition charges.

And keeping almost half of your aircraft at Singapore shows a poor understanding of where the enemy is going to come from. Percival predicted in the 1930s that Japan would land near the Thai border. That's where your aircraft need to be. With credible Buffalo CAP overhead, the slow and steady Vilderbeests could have devastated the landing ships with their torpedoes, if they were all deployed forward. And if the monsoon makes the airfields tricky to use, convert your TSRs to floats.

Brooke-Popham was awarded the DSO for leading in combat, so to say he had zero experience leading combat aircraft is entirely false. Yes, his experience dated from WWI but so did that of Dowding, Park and countless other Air-ranking officers in the first 2-3 years of WW2.

Maintaining a "credible" CAP is challenging unless you have radar and a well-oiled ground control capability. Maintaining a CAP of just 2 fighters during daylight hours would eat up the resources of an entire squadron. With only 4 squadrons in all of Malaya and Singapore, that means you can essentially maintain a CAP of 8 fighters in Northern Malaya....and at least 50% of the rest of each squadron will be unable to respond because they're en route back from the CAP or are being serviced after they land on the ground. That means you're pitching 8 Buffalos against, typically, an entire Sentai of Ki-43s, with only limited response options because half your fighter force can't be committed and the rest have to respond after the engagement begins...which means they're at a tactical disadvantage from the start.

Yes, the Vildebeests might have had some successes...if they were operating at night and if (big IF) Brooke-Popham was willing to order them to attack. As others have pointed out, the Japanese invasion convoys were in international waters and Brooke-Popham was under orders not to attack until Japan made the first offensive move. Attacking the convoys before they start landing would give Japan the moral high-ground because Tokyo could claim the British attacked a convoy that was headed for Indochina.

The whole defensive plan for Malaya and Singapore focused on the latter holding out long enough for reinforcements to arrive. Forward deploying more aircraft to the very rough conditions in Northern Malaya would simply have resulted in more aircraft being lost/abandoned as the Japanese overran the airfields. As it was, 21 Sqn and 27 Sqn both essentially ceased to be effective from an operational perspective within a few hours of the first Japanese attacks. Having more aircraft in the same locations likely would simply mean more squadrons becoming inoperable in a very short space of time.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Unfortunately not. I'm a purger so after I'd read my Bloody Shambles I sold it on eBay.

It's cool, space is limited for me and I'll do the same often enough.

I did a little digging and found this blog at rafmuseum.org.uk which contains this passage:

It was estimated by High Command that some 336 aircraft would be needed in the defence of Malaya and Singapore in the form of 22 squadrons. When Japan attacked there was 14 squadrons with a total of 215 aircraft.

It contains no breakdown between active aircraft and spares, or spare parts available, though. The same blog also indicates that by the end of day on 8 Dec 41, the RAF in northern Malaya had suffered roughly 60% losses in aircraft, many on the ground (probably due to the field conditions as mentioned above by E EwenS in his post #2, and that by 9 Dec only two squadrons (types unspecified) remained in northern Malaya, the rest having been withdrawn to Singapore; and that by Jan 42 the RAF had only 56 fighters left in the region until reinforced the middle of that month. You probably already know all this but I thought it appropriate to mention.

Hyperwar reports:

No. 243 Squadron, No. 488 Squadron, Royal New Zealand Air Force, and Nos. 21 and 453 Squadrons of the Royal Australian Air Force constituted the fighter defence of Malaya.

I don't know the table of equipment for those squadrons, though.

 

[buffnut453]

It's cool, space is limited for me and I'll do the same often enough.

I did a little digging and found this blog at rafmuseum.org.uk which contains this passage:



It contains no breakdown between active aircraft and spares, or spare parts available, though. The same blog also indicates that by the end of day on 8 Dec 41, the RAF in northern Malaya had suffered roughly 60% losses in aircraft, many on the ground (probably due to the field conditions as mentioned above by E EwenS in his post #2, and that by 9 Dec only two squadrons (types unspecified) remained in northern Malaya, the rest having been withdrawn to Singapore; and that by Jan 42 the RAF had only 56 fighters left in the region until reinforced the middle of that month. You probably already know all this but I thought it mete to mention.

Hyperwar reports:



I don't know the table of equipment for those squadrons, though.

RAF Buffalo squadrons officially had 12 Initial Equipment (IE) airframes with an additional 2-4 Immediate Reserve (IR) airframes making a total of 14-16 aircraft on-strength. Since there was a surfeit of spare Buffalos in Singapore in late 1941, and no room to store them, all squadrons had more than 14 aircraft. Most had at least 18 Buffalos on-strength and some had even more than that, although not necessarily all in the same place at the same time.

The quote about "only 56 fighters left" probably refers to front-line available strength and not the total number of airframes available (which would include those undergoing 2nd and 3rd line maintenance or were undergoing repair.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

RAF Buffalo squadrons officially had 12 Initial Equipment (IE) airframes with an additional 2-4 Immediate Reserve (IR) airframes making a total of 14-16 aircraft on-strength. Since there was a surfeit of spare Buffalos in Singapore in late 1941, and no room to store them, all squadrons had more than 14 aircraft. Most had at least 18 Buffalos on-strength and some had even more than that, although not necessarily all in the same place at the same time.

The quote about "only 56 fighters left" probably refers to front-line available strength and not the total number of airframes available (which would include those undergoing 2nd and 3rd line maintenance or were undergoing repair.

Thanks, this post helps my understanding of the situation. I was figuring an average of 16 a/c per squadron (based on the more general numbers in my link above) but couldn't find firm numbers, and to be honest it's been a long day and I don't have the energy for a deeper search -- so thanks again for your detail.

 

[SaparotRob]

It's cool, space is limited for me and I'll do the same often enough.

I did a little digging and found this blog at rafmuseum.org.uk which contains this passage:



It contains no breakdown between active aircraft and spares, or spare parts available, though. The same blog also indicates that by the end of day on 8 Dec 41, the RAF in northern Malaya had suffered roughly 60% losses in aircraft, many on the ground (probably due to the field conditions as mentioned above by E EwenS in his post #2, and that by 9 Dec only two squadrons (types unspecified) remained in northern Malaya, the rest having been withdrawn to Singapore; and that by Jan 42 the RAF had only 56 fighters left in the region until reinforced the middle of that month. You probably already know all this but I thought it mete to mention.

Hyperwar reports:



I don't know the table of equipment for those squadrons, though.

I didn't know all this. Appreciate the post.

 

[EwenS]

I just read about the SS Automedan. If it hadn't been intercepted by a German commerce raider, how would the defense of Malaya been changed?

From the Japanese perspective it seems to have changed very little. It had been drafted in Aug 1940 and the Japanese didn't get to see it until mid-Dec. Boyd "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters" concluded about the Automedon incident

"....Overall, set against the other factors the Japanese had to consider in contemplating a move into Southeast Asia - above all the American response, but also the evolving strategic picture through 1941 - it seems unlikely the Automedon capture had more than a marginal impact on Japanese decisions."

I'm not even clear when, or even if Britain learned of its capture. They knew the ship had been sunk but of the actual capture of the documents? The weighted bag that report, and much else, was contained in should have been thrown overboard. German shelling killed those with responsibility for doing that. It took the Germans hours to break into the strong room to find them, so no help given by the surviving crew. And the surviving crew went into captivity arriving back in France some months later.

From the British perspective the Automedon incident did not change anything. That Aug 1940 appreciation is viewed by Boyd as "...a reasonably honest assessment of Britain's predicament in the Far East....." Its capture didn't cause Britain to go out and make any changes to its strategy or its military deployments, so far as I can see. Amongst the documents captured, it probably wasn't the most significant. Code books were also captured. But I can't immediately find any information on changes of RN codes in the aftermath of the Automedon incident.

So, overall an unfortunate incident, but not one that had any great effect on British plans for the defence of Malaya.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Yes, the Vildebeests might have had some successes...if they were operating at night and if (big IF) Brooke-Popham was willing to order them to attack. As others have pointed out, the Japanese invasion convoys were in international waters and Brooke-Popham was under orders not to attack until Japan made the first offensive move. Attacking the convoys before they start landing would give Japan the moral high-ground because Tokyo could claim the British attacked a convoy that was headed for Indochina.

It's noteworthy how spineless and lacking in initiative the late Empire British were compared to the earlier Brits. There's a fark'n invasion fleet amassing in FIC and Formosa and we'll do nothing, in fact we'll employ willful deniability and ignorance by not monitoring this build-up. Now there's an invasion fleet sailing towards us, but we can't attack it because we're afraid of making the first move, when the act of sailing an invasion fleet IS the first move. Can you imagine the US taking this position if they'd discovered the Kido Butai a hundred miles off Hawaii launching its strike aircraft? "Oh, maybe they're just exercising their fleet, I'm not sure, let's wait and see if they take the first shot?" No chance, the USAAC and USN would have attacked it without hesitation - in fact the USN did attack IJN submarines outside Pearl Harbour before the IJNAS strike began - what would Phillips have ordered if a couple of IJN submarines were discovered sailing outside the Singapore port? What were his ROEs?

It seemed the 1930s-40s Brits were always lacking any aggression or assertiveness, always hoping that the enemy will just leave them alone. Clearly, even though they now possessed the largest navy in the world, a large air force and credible army (and yes, they were busy in the North Atlantic, North Africa and Med), the demographic and economic catastrophe of the First World War had scarred many a British leader into a jelly-like state. Compare this to the British military and political leaders of the 18th and 19th Century, even as late as the 1890s Fashoda crisis the British were willing to march right into the face of an opponent and make them blink. But the world, including Tokyo watched a neutered, frightened Britain do nothing when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936 in clear violation of Versailles and the world had Britain's measure.

20th Century Britain needs some 18 and 19th Century British backbone. First of all, at the fall of France in May 1940, Britain needs to march into FIC (with a Free French general in front) before Japan does. And do it before you piss off everyone by sinking the French navy in July 1940. And this doesn't mean you need to deplete the forces in the UK then fighting the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic. FIC is defended by a relatively small, ill-equipped French force, and if well played diplomatically (such as Britain making sure a Vichy general does not take over FIC) can be taken without a shot. But really what Britain should have done is when they offered to send the BEF to France in Sept 1939 Britain should have requested to send a smaller (mostly Indian, or even better French Canadian) BEF to FIC to offer similar support against Japan. With this in place at the fall of France, Japan can't invade in summer 1940 without fighting the Brits.

What Brooke-Popham. Phillips and Percival need is a firm tripwire ROE from London that does not require further reassurance or recheck - and make them known to the Japanese, Thais, DEI, FIC and the USA. "If we see any IJN or IJA forces in Malay (or Thai) water this will be considered a violation of our territory and a state of war will be in place between Japan and Britain, and such forces will be forcibly engaged". And then move whatever submarines available from the Home and MTO to Terengganu along with your PBYs to keep an constant monitor of FIC ports. And on the assumption that their still going to invade, put the RAF in place to attack the invasion fleet. I'd also position Force Z with working radar (and with dedicated Buffalo cover) at Terengganu - it's no good sitting in Singapore far to the south when Percival predicted years back that the invasion will come via Thailand and northern Malaya. Put a RAF man in the radar plot room aboard HMS Prince of Wales to coordinate the RN/RAF response.

 

[buffnut453]

It's noteworthy how spineless and lacking in initiative the late Empire British were compared to the earlier Brits. There's a fark'n invasion fleet amassing in FIC and Formosa and we'll do nothing, in fact we'll employ willful deniability and ignorance by not monitoring this build-up. Now there's an invasion fleet sailing towards us, but we can't attack it because we're afraid of making the first move, when the act of sailing an invasion fleet IS the first move. Can you imagine the US taking this position if they'd discovered the Kido Butai a hundred miles off Hawaii launching its strike aircraft? "Oh, maybe they're just exercising their fleet, I'm not sure, let's wait and see if they take the first shot?" No chance, the USAAC and USN would have attacked it without hesitation - in fact the USN did attack IJN submarines outside Pearl Harbour before the IJNAS strike began - what would Phillips have ordered if a couple of IJN submarines were discovered sailing outside the Singapore port? What were his ROEs?

It seemed the 1930s-40s Brits were always lacking any aggression or assertiveness, always hoping that the enemy will just leave them alone. Clearly, even though they now possessed the largest navy in the world, a large air force and credible army (and yes, they were busy in the North Atlantic, North Africa and Med), the demographic and economic catastrophe of the First World War had scarred many a British leader into a jelly-like state. Compare this to the British military and political leaders of the 18th and 19th Century, even as late as the 1890s Fashoda crisis the British were willing to march right into the face of an opponent and make them blink. But the world, including Tokyo watched a neutered, frightened Britain do nothing when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936 in clear violation of Versailles and the world had Britain's measure.

20th Century Britain needs some 18 and 19th Century British backbone. First of all, at the fall of France in May 1940, Britain needs to march into FIC (with a Free French general in front) before Japan does. And do it before you piss off everyone by sinking the French navy in July 1940. And this doesn't mean you need to deplete the forces in the UK then fighting the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic. FIC is defended by a relatively small, ill-equipped French force, and if well played diplomatically (such as Britain making sure a Vichy general does not take over FIC) can be taken without a shot. But really what Britain should have done is when they offered to send the BEF to France in Sept 1939 Britain should have requested to send a smaller (mostly Indian, or even better French Canadian) BEF to FIC to offer similar support against Japan. With this in place at the fall of France, Japan can't invade in summer 1940 without fighting the Brits.

What Brooke-Popham. Phillips and Percival need is a firm tripwire ROE from London that does not require further reassurance or recheck - and make them known to the Japanese, Thais, DEI, FIC and the USA. "If we see any IJN or IJA forces in Malay (or Thai) water this will be considered a violation of our territory and a state of war will be in place between Japan and Britain, and such forces will be forcibly engaged". And then move whatever submarines available from the Home and MTO to Terengganu along with your PBYs to keep an constant monitor of FIC ports. And on the assumption that their still going to invade, put the RAF in place to attack the invasion fleet. I'd also position Force Z with working radar (and with dedicated Buffalo cover) at Terengganu - it's no good sitting in Singapore far to the south when Percival predicted years back that the invasion will come via Thailand and northern Malaya. Put a RAF man in the radar plot room aboard HMS Prince of Wales to coordinate the RN/RAF response.

Really? And what forces are the going to use to invade French Indochina?

In the May-Jul 1940 timeframe, the RAF in the Far East had no fighters, just 3 squadrons of Blenheims, the 2 squadrons of Vildebeests and a few Short Singapore flying boats. The British Army in Malaya as of November 1940 comprised 17 Battalions....that's about 17,000 men. I'm afraid only an idiot would start a war with such paltry forces...and that's ignoring the logistical challenges of moving any of those ground forces to French Indochina (no standing RN force of note in Singapore, no amphibious landing craft).

Yes, the French forces in Thailand weren't exactly strong...but they still numbered about 50,000 men and 100 operational aircraft. Please explain to me how 17,000 British Empire forces are going to take on a larger force while still defending Malaya without denuding existing forces in the UK?

You make some big and bold statements about the British being spineless. I would say economics was the bigger driver rather than a lack of courage. The Great War bankrupted the UK and was the death knell for the British Empire. It just took 20 years for the patient to finally expire. How on earth is Britain going to generate forces in May 1940 to invade French Indochina when it's just been drummed out of Europe? Free French forces were still just a concept in the May-July 1940 timeframe so there's no way you'll get a French general with any sizeable French force out to the Far East in that timeframe....not when the UK itself is facing it's strongest test of moral courage, and standing alone to do it.

One of the traits of the autocratic Axis regimes is expansion of fighting. From 1936 onwards, every time Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and Fascist Italy had the opportunity to take the foot of the gas and consolidate, the refused that option and instead doubled down on expanding the war. That trait overstretched resources and ultimately led to their downfall. It seems you're suggesting that Britain should follow the same path in 1940 by invading French Indochina without cause and at a time when Britain's very existence was in doubt.