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Let's not forget that Europe is a pretty small place compared to the Pacific.
Yes I've been to the UK, secondly having another 20 minutes of fuel will allow flexibility to organise and manage your fighters when raids come in and the weather plays no part, home chain was still able to plot bomber forces building up before they crossed the channel, with only 85G of fuel fighter command had to wait till the last minute to launch because they didn't have the fuel to loiter, the reason they wanted very high RoC, with an extra 30G internal you don't need it, once the incoming bombers turn for England launch your fighters and have them at 25,000ft ready to pounce the moment the enemy force is over mainland England.Perhaps you've never been to the UK. In the summer there are some nice days. But there are all too many during which you cannot see very far across the channel due to weather. When I was there, I could see well across the channel less than than 1/3 of the time when we wanted to see the channel. Now, I don't have the weather reports from the Battle of Britain timeframe, but I'd bet you couldn't count on seeing enemy bombers from very far away since it was IFR a good slice of the time. The ETO was largely an IFR theater of operations, especially in fall and winter.
I've never seen a report saying the British were short on fuel during the BOB. In fact, they introduced 100-octane fuel at that time. It increased the top speed of the fighters by some 20-30 mph at altitude, and everyone was happy about that.
I'm going to agree with you here, you only have to look at the endless numbers of youtube video's to see almost all of them focus on high dash P47's, L series onwards P38's and D series Mustangs when talking about the air war, not the trials and tribulations that made up the slug fest from 1940-43 that got them there.On a personal note, I feel the need to re-iterate, though I know not a popular notion around here, that I think it's a problem especially with US fans of WW2 aircraft, to focus almost exclusively on the last two years of the war and the 'ultimate' aircraft, when evaluating the war itself.
Note the speeds at altitudes:I would recommend reviewing this post contributed to the thread by Thomas P.
How bad would a Euro-spec A6M Zero be?
They can't, the engine isn't quite ready yet. While they didn't stick the engine into the A6M8 until 1945 the engine was ready earlier, It was used in the D4Y3 starting in May of 1944 and might have been used a bit earlier? But not 1942. Lower powered versions were used.ww2aircraft.net
3700 km / 2300 miles at low speed (330 km / hr - 205 mph)
1200 miles (with 20 min combat and 30 min reserve) at 250 mph TAS,
Lundstrom:That's true, but this is a separate issue. Some people were making the claim (or at least the implication) that the 109 could... maybe.... almost.... match the range of the Zero, because the Zero's range was only achieved by flying at 150 mph etc. Which is absolute b.s.
I would also note the following three distances
Lae to Guadalcanal - 1480 km
Malta to Cairo -1700 km
Leningrad to Stalingrad - 1680 km
(It seems that the the above range is in NM)One of the worst surprises for the Allies in the early phases of the Pacific War, the Imperial Navy's Mitsubishi A6M2 Type 0 carrier fighter, Model 21 (later ZEKE to the Allies) equipped both carrier- and land-based fighter units. The Reisen (Zero fighter) uniquely combined superb combat performance (especially maneuverability, climb, and acceleration), a reasonably strong armament, and phenomenal range. Very light, only 5,313 pounds at normal load, the Model 21 was powered by a 940-HP, 14-cylinder Sakae radial engine for a top speed of 288 knots at 4,500 meters (14,764 feet) and a climb to 5,000 meters (16,404 feet) of 5 minutes, 50 seconds. The Zero wielded a mixed armament of two Type 97 7.7-mm machine guns mounted over the engine (680 rounds per gun) and two Type 99 20-mm cannons in the wings (only sixty rounds each). Internal fuel tanks held 525 liters (138.7 gallons), invariably supplemented with a 330-liter (87.2-gallon) drop tank. A maximum range of 1,675 miles meant a combat radius of nearly 600 miles, the longest for a single-engine fighter until the North American P-51 Mustang. In common with other Japanese aircraft, the Zero lacked pilot armor and self-sealing fuel tanks. Despite these crucial drawbacks, the high caliber of the Imperial Navy's fighter pilots and the superb performance of the Zero itself rendered combat losses very light.
At Lakunai in the shadow of a large volcano, the Tainan fighter pilots gathered around headquarters to be briefed. Not long before the scheduled departure for Rabi, they learned the new target was Guadalcanal. The news elicited gasps of amazement and eager looks at charts. Lunga Point was all of 560 miles southeast of Rabaul, the farthest combat mission yet asked of the long-legged Zeros. In December 1941, after vigorous training, the Tainan pilots had effectively escorted strikes from Taiwan to Manila in the Philippines, some 500 miles. Now they faced a mission 10 percent longer. (By comparison, Berlin lay about 460 miles from bases in eastern England.)
Yamada wanted all twenty-four operational Zero 21s to escort the land attack planes, but Saitō persuaded him to reduce the number to eighteen, organized in three six-plane chūtais under Nakajima, who revised the flight schedule to include the best pilots. Indeed, four later ranked among the Imperial Navy's ten top fighter aces. According to the plan of attack, the 2nd Chūtai under Lt. Kawai Shirō (NA 64-1937), the senior buntaichō, would proceed ahead of the main body as the "air control force" to surprise enemy interceptors, while Nakajima's other two chūtais flew close cover. Fuel posed the crucial problem. Contrary to the usual practice, the pilots could not jettison their belly tanks before battle, because they needed all of their fuel to get back. Saitō directed those unable to make Rabaul to take refuge 160 miles south at the small, abandoned airstrip on Buka, where the ex-destroyer Akikaze would service aircraft.
Lundstrom:
(It seems that the the above range is in NM)
Limitations of the A6M2-21 over Guadalcanal:
And unlike the ETO the cruise out and back was over water.
I suspect that things like Vmax and WEP might be a bit tough to accurately determine on a captured aircraft, but fuel consumption should be easier to do. In any event TAIC used captured aircraft manuals where possible:And how accurate is TAIC analysis of captured machines under structured testing versus actual operational elements in theater?
GENERAL
Japanese Aircraft Performance and Characteristics TAIC Manual No. 1 is now issued in the Division of Navai
Intelligence by combined personnel of the United States and British Services attached to the Technical Air Intelli- -
gence Center, Naval Air Station, Anacostia, D. C. TAIC Manual No. 1 is the Official Japanese Aircraft P & C
Manual for the Allied Forces and is issued to provide up-to-date Performance and Characteristics data in a stand-
ardized, convenient, and useful form..
Data sheets will be revised as more complete and accurate data becomes available. It is essential, therefore
that revised sheets be entered in the Manual immediately upon receipt and that the supplement number of the
_- revised sheets be entered in the space provided on the inside front cover. '
All sheets pertaining to the same basic type of aircraft, such as the Zeke-types, carry the same basic number _
followed by a different capital letter for each particular model, starting with "A'" for the first model. The capital
letter is followed by a number to indicate page number for the set of sheets covering a particular airplane. For
example the data on Zeke 32 will be found on sheets 102 C-1, 102 C-2, etc., while the data on Zeke 52 will be found
on sheets 102 D-1, 102 D-2, etc. - -
An index is provided for convenience in locating data on fighters, bombers, etc., and for locating data on
engines, armament, radio, etc. - The alphabetical index will assist in rapidly locating data on a given aircraft
PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS |
Except where otherwise stated, performance figures represent estimates of the Technical Air Intelligence
Center and have been calculated after a careful analysis of information derived from intelligence, captured equip-
ment, drawings and photographs using power ratings derived, from the same sources. When authoritative
evidence is not available, it is the policy of TAIC to give the Japanese Aircraft Performance every benefit of the
doubt within reasonable. limits.
Aircraft weights are estimated except where noted. In general the weights have been set up to show the
maximum «military effort for several representative conditions.
Range is computed in straight and level flight at. 1,500 feet altitude. . Bombing plane range figures include
dropping Sf bombs at approximately mid-distance or range.
All speeds are expressed as true airspeed at the altitude concerned and are based on the airplane having a
smooth finish and most favorable drag. Vmax is estimated using Military Power (Mil. H. P.] and when avail- -
- able, War Emergency Power (WEP) for representative conditions. e
Horsepowers are expressed in English units. _
Wing areas are gross areas including fuselage areas intercepted by wings.
Rates of climb are based on Military Power for continuous climbing and War Emergency Power (when avail-
able) for short duration get-a-way climbs. '
Times to altitude are based on Military Power only.
RANGE-SPEED-CLIMB CURVES
. These curves are furnished for convenience in determining the range, speed, and climb of a given airplane
\ under various representative conditions. _ _- -
The point is that Guadalcanal was at the very limit of the A6M2-21's range, even with optimal overwater cruise conditions that would never be feasible in the ETO.What is your point?
Considering the RAF went to mostly might missions fairly soon after trying unescorted daylight bombing, you likely ARE defining air combat too narrowly. You might recall the U.S.A. in the ETO flew 754,818 sorties amd dropped 1,456,423 tons of bombs. The British flew 687,462 sorties and dropped 1,307,117 tons of bombs. That's pretty darned even, any way you cut it. 57.2% to 47.3% of sorties, and the bomb tonnage was even closer.I pointed out that there was relatively little fighter combat going on over NW Europe in 1941-1943 in an earlier post, in the context of the debate going on here for 40 pages comparing European vs Japanese day fighters. My point earlier was that most of the air to air combat at that time was happening in the Pacific, Mediterranean, Russian Front, and China. Not just NW Europe which for some reason always seems to be the default. NW Europe was very important in 1940. And then again very important in 1944 (and late 1943 too). In 1941-43 overall though, it was less important as the war was being mostly fought, and really decided, elsewhere, like Stalingrad, Leningrad, Moscow, Kursk, (second) El Alamein, Malta, Sicily, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Midway etc.
Someone then mentioned the night bombing campaign by the RAF.
I pointed out that wasn't relevant to the discussion. Then I was accused by Reluctant Poster of defining air combat too narrowly.
Here in this last post you are reacting to, I was clarifying what should have already been obvious: In a discussion of speed vs maneuverability and Japanese vs. European and American day fighters, which is what we have been doing, night fighters are not relevant.
I'll spell it out a little bit more:
Night fighters are usually different types of aircraft. Usually but now always twin-engined aircraft with two or more crew. Maneuverability isn't nearly as much of a factor. Key factors are speed, climb. altitude performance, radar, radar countermeasures, and armament, not necessarily in that order.
Also, I am not sure how much fighter vs fighter combat was going on at night anywhere in 1941-43, though there probably was some Mosquitos coming online by then to deal with the Ju 88s and Me 110s which were preying on the RAF bomber streams.
Those calculations are flawed. The fuel usage per hour increases as the TAS increases, and there's no allowances made for Warmup, TO and climb to cruise altitude.
Well, I did bring it up in the context of a fair comparison of combat capabilities between two aircraft.Catching the other guy napping and destroying their planes on the ground is air-war 101, part of how it's done.
I misinterpreted your statement, taking 'annihilated' as being synonymous with 'dominated' or similar, though still, my previous point stands, at least partially. There were still other factors I touched on in my previous post besides the technical capabilities of the Japanese aircraft that would have allowed such crushing victories, among them overwhelming numbers and pilot training.The US lost 188 aircraft at Pearl Harbor. The IJN lost 29 aircraft, mostly to flak.
The ratios were similar in Malaya (RAF using Hurricane II and Brewster F2A) and Java (mix of Dutch planes and US P-40s, and some experimental types) and the Philippines (P-40s and P-35s)
In Malaya, in December 1941 the British initially had four fighter squadrons of F2A Buffalos, and six or seven bomber squadrons with Blenheims, Hudsons, and obsolete Vildebeasts, plus some Catalinas. These were reinforced by some Dutch air force planes and 50 x Hurricane IIB in January. By the end of January all of these aircraft were all wiped out in the air mainly by Ki-27s and Ki-43s, and by being bombed or overrun on the ground.
In Java the Dutch also had the not very good F2A Buffalos and some RAF Hurricanes, one Albacore and a fairly useless Vildebeast, but later reinforced by the Americans with modern aircraft including P-40s, some unique and interesting US point defense fighters called CW-22 "Demon", DB-7 (A-20), B-17s, and A-24s. Due to the chaos on the ground not all of these aircraft made it into combat - some were dumped into the harbor in their crates. They also had some German Do 24 and US PBY flying boats which were mostly used to evacuate people. A larger shipment of P-40s was supposed to be coming but was sunk on the proto-carrier USS Langley (along with 33 doomed US pilots who survived the Langley sinking but then died when their rescue ship USS Edsall got sunk the next day). The Japanese were using A6M among other aircraft in Java / Dutch East Indies / Indonesia.
The Philippines was defended by the US Far East Air Force consisting of 54 x P-40E, 18 x P-40B, 18 x Seversky P-35s, and had B-17 bombers available. These were attacked Dec 8/ 9 by the Japanese mainly flying A6M for fighters, and were wiped out by Dec 23
I never considered the factor in bold before. I am largely in agreement with your points here.The handful of P-40s and one P-36 that were able to get airborne on Dec 7 in Hawaii (mostly from one small arifield the IJN neglected to bomb) shot down maybe 6-10 aircraft from the second wave of the Japanese attack. Mainly just by taking advantage of the chaos, losing three to the Japanese and at least one to friendly fire. The significance of their brave action was, aside from the pilots directly involved, to propaganda and to slightly help assuage morale in that very bad moment. But not so much beyond that.
I must admit my shortcomings in this aspect of the war especially, as discussion or sources on this particular issue are somewhat difficult to find. Even if there were adequate pilots assigned to those areas, would they have had the necessary training and experience to take full advantage of their equipment and as well as they could have under different circumstances? This question concerns the RAF and RAAF pilots especially, as criticism is often levied at them specifically.I've heard this too, that people disliked by command etc. were sent to the Far East. But even if this is true, it assumes that the upper leadership / command structure could tell, in advance, who was going to be a good fighter pilot or not. Many of the pilots who fought in Malaya were RAAF and RNZAF pilots who turned out to be very good during later battles in the Pacific (and in the Middle East). For them it wasn't so much a remote position but more like their back yard. Similarly, the Philippines and Hawaii were seen as somewhat 'cherry' assignments for US pilots, compared to for example Panama or Alaska. Here again, several people who became notable aces later in the war were found.
So I think that claim is mostly B.S., though it is founded in some beliefs really held during and before the war, especially in the UK.
What of the AM-35? It managed to reach production as an engine powering the rather fast Mig-1, however little that aircraft contributed to the war, and it had further improvements that distinguished it from its predecessor. Compare this effort to to non-existent efforts of the Japanese, who had largely forgone designing liquid-cooled engines of any type whatsoever.You can stop right there. as GrauGeist already pointed out, this isn't true. The best liquid cooled engines used by Russia (Klimov M100 series) used in the Yak 1 / 7 / 9 / 3 fighters, were directly derived from the French / Swiss / Spanish Hispano-Suiza 12Y. These were good, but being based on the 12-Y were small and never reached the power of Merlin, Allison, or DB 600 series engines. They were still much better than the overweight Mikulin engine (developed from the BMW IV, and used on the unsuccessful MiG-3).
The most powerful Soviet radial engine built during the war, the excellent Shvestov Ash-82 (1530-1900 hp), used in the La 5 / 5FN / 7 / 9 was developed from the US Wright R-1820 Cyclone.
...it if was for the valid reasons you have mentioned here. Even so, I have never heard of any attempts by the Japanese to make any further improvements to the engines they had licensed from the Germans unlike the Soviets with their licensed engine(s), nor any attempts to design their own, for that matter, and issues with complexity are mentioned frequently as a reason for the Japanese largely avoiding this type of engine. This deficiency, an inability to mass-produce "complex" designs, paints a rather dim image of Japanese technical ability in regards to aircraft engines. The Ha-201 engine in the Ki-64 had an unusual design as part of its unconventional configuration, but it was otherwise a pair of DB 601 engines coupled together, and the plane itself was a failed prototype regardless.The Japanese came to focus on radial engines mainly, for the same reason that the US Navy did - because they were easier to maintain in a harsh environment, less vulnerable to damage (a single bullet or shrapnel hole in the radiator can shut down an inline engine) and didn't require additional special fluids i.e. Ethylene glycol. It was an adaption to the Pacific Theater, not a failure of engineering. They did have some trouble with their adapted DB 601 engine in the Ki-61 but that wasn't unusual.
I will acknowledge this, at the very least.The Japanese radials, further more, like the 18 cylinder Nakajima Homare (1,650-2,200 hp) and it's precursor, the smaller 14 cylinder Nakajima Sakae (1130 hp), known for it's unusually high efficiency, were actually native designs, although you can trace their influence back to both the Bristol Jupiter and P&W R-1340 Wasp back in the 1930s.
A longer time than helpful, if it's flawed design was ever fully fixed.The Homare was also a bit more powerful than the Shvestov 82, though it took longer to fully 'debug'.
I have no objection to this statement in the scope of this discussion, that is what I will say about it.See above, this is basically a red herring. It's also worth repeating, as GrauGeist already pointed out, it was normal for engine designers to copy foreign designs, and was done all over the world by every major power including the US and UK.
Apparently, large amounts of documentation was destroyed, both towards the war's end and afterwards, though I'm not certain how much this applies to the case of the Ki-98 exclusively.Yeah, wise. I don't think you are on very solid ground, though precise performance figures on Japanese fighters are still debated and we don't seem to have very good sources on them.
I guess I must retract my statement, if only because the PTO, beyond all Japanese aircraft in truth, is largely overshadowed by the ETO.I would say that the Zero is extremely underrated, and this is mainly because so many people, in particular in the US, focus almost exclusively in the last two years of the war in evaluating aircraft. In part because that is when US aircraft were dominant.
I suppose I should have brought up the British Gloster Whittle as opposed to German jet aircraft as my example previously...still, the first aircraft to exceed 1000kph was the German rocket-powered Me 163A "V4" aircraft, and a variant of the German V2 rocket was the first man-made object ever to break the Karman Line and reach space. These examples are relevant to WWII aviation I would say, as well as this topic, especially the former, and the Japanese had nothing comparable in terms of speed or jet/rocket technology, which doesn't speak well to Japanese aviation as being anywhere near 'the pinnacle' ever, as that article that I can't find claims (and I swear it exists, or existed, however irrelevant of a source it may be). I will walk back my claim that Japan wasn't a major power, in that its navy appeared to outweigh those of the other powers such as France or Italy, and was fairly competent. It's army still seems to be of a lower standard in comparison, less so compared to Italy however.You seem like a smart guy, you write pretty well and have a sense of humor, but you are making assertions (Japanese were inferior to Europeanz and the Nazis made the best stuff!!!) which are a little creepy, and not supported by the facts.
I guess I would have to agree with that view somewhat.Which by your own admission, you aren't really up to speed on.
To defend my intentions, I will say that I wanted inquiring about the reasons behind the seemingly slower speeds and weaker engines of Japanese fighters, and why they are held in high regard, especially for their maneuverability, when the other powers were producing increasingly faster aircraft, and did not place as much emphasis on maneuverability, largely, at the very least. In addition to this, I also wanted to discuss the claim that the Japanese, the IJA especially, favored maneuverability, and range, over speed, a claim that has been brought up here and elsewhere.I am not one of the long established regulars on here so I know what it's like to come from "outside the clique" so to speak, which is why I've been trying to provide you some of the data you are lacking. There is a lot of knowledge in this forum and people who can point you to even more. That's what it is for. Debating who is inferior to whom is kind of more for I don't know, reddit or something.
I'm looking at TAIC 38:It takes ~13 USgal for the A6M2 for WUTO and climb to 13,123 ft.
The fuel usage/SFC for best range at 168mphIAS/205mphTAS at 13,123 ft was .48 lb/BHP-hr
"The reason for (most of) the discrepancy between the 2 reports are the speeds and altitudes at which the tests for the range were flown.
In the TAIC Report No.38 (the one I posted) the flight was at 168mphIAS/205mphTAS at 13,123 ft, using optimum weak mixture cruise for maximum range (with DT) of 2298 miles, for a flight time of 11.2 hrs under these conditions.
The ranges in the TAIC No.102D graph on pg.1 were flown with Normal power (the maximum sustained rich mixture setting) at an unspecified altitude. Obviously the power setting and rich mixture would increase the fuel usage a lot and decrease the range by a lot.
The maximum range (with DT) in the TAIC No.102D chart at the bottom of pg.2 was flown at 143mphIAS/146mphTAS at 1,500 ft for a range of 1844 miles, with a flight time of 12.6 hrs. 143mphIAS at 1,500 ft would be 175mphTAS at 13,123 ft. If we figure the ~same fuel usage per hour at 143mphIAS/175mphTAS 13,123 ft we get 175mphTAS x 12.6 hrs = 2205 miles for the range.
I figure that one or the other test was off a bit either in measurement, or assumed best economic settings. Or possibly the range value in Report No.38 was calculated with no allowance for climb to altitude.
Since this gives only 98 miles difference in range I think we can assume the numbers are fairly consistent?"
The A6M5 tested in TAIC report No.38 carried 237.7 USgal of fuel total with DT.
The A6M2 and A6M5 used 11-12 USgal for WUTO and climb to 13,123 ft. NOTE that the range from the TAIC No.102D chart at the bottom of pg.2 was flown at 1,500 ft. So maybe only 7 USgal used for WUTO and climb to 1,500 ft?
The Sakae 12 and 21 use ~.48 lb/BHP-hr in weak mixture cruise, and ~.56 lb/BHP-hr in rich mixture cruise.
The numbers for the TAIC report No.38 were generated in 1945 using a fully functional A6M5.
As far as I can work out the numbers are good.
As I wrote, the FC had certain thought-out nterception procedures, the convoy battles of July 1940 reinforced the thinking when so many of the British pilots who parachuted into the sea died, the British sea rescue system was still quite undeveloped compared to the German system, starting with personal equipment. And the endurance of Hurricane Mk. I or Spitfire Mk. I was not hopeless. On 9 Sept 1940 Spits of 66 Sqn durations sorties were 1 h to 1 ½ h including a climb to 22,000 feet and an aerial battle or two, some managed to rally after the first battle, others continued as lonely hunters. More fuel would have been nice as would four 20 mm cannon with 150 rpg, more protection etc, but with 1030 hp engine one could not get all niceties, and especially late during the Battle, against fighter bombers and heavily escorted Ju 88 raids heavier interceptors would have been a bad choice.Yes I've been to the UK, secondly having another 20 minutes of fuel will allow flexibility to organise and manage your fighters when raids come in and the weather plays no part, home chain was still able to plot bomber forces building up before they crossed the channel, with only 85G of fuel fighter command had to wait till the last minute to launch because they didn't have the fuel to loiter, the reason they wanted very high RoC, with an extra 30G internal you don't need it, once the incoming bombers turn for England launch your fighters and have them at 25,000ft ready to pounce the moment the enemy force is over mainland England.