Maneuverability vs Speed

[RCAFson]

Lundstrom give a complete accounting of the Japanese losses in the attack on the Hornet at Santa Cruz in "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign". Not near a 93% loss rtae
View attachment 727286

The IJN had issues with coordinating strikes and finding their targets. Extreme range was of dubious value when facing an opponent who has AW radar, that could detect shadowing recon aircraft, and mass the CAP to intercept the strikes that actually found the target. Also in the south Pacific, you have a fairly equal day/night cycle, so usable range was limited by available daylight.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The IJN had issues with coordinating strikes and finding their targets. Extreme range was of dubious value when facing an opponent who has AW radar, that could detect shadowing recon aircraft, and mass the CAP to intercept the strikes that actually found the target. Also in the south Pacific, you have a fairly equal day/night cycle, so usable range was limited by available daylight.

The Americans had great difficulties coordinating carrier CAPs throughout 1942.

 

[drgondog]

I think blaming a lack of fuel is a cop out, the BoB was fought on British terms not the Luftwaffe's, using A6M's or 109's with DT's would have resulted in a greater loss of experienced pilots as they started going deeper into England bringing them into range of more fighter groups, once their 7-9 seconds of cannon ammunition is gone what do they do then, fight their way back out with nothing more than two MG's to protect themselves from the coastal fighter groups that have refuelled and rearmed and waiting for them?, how will the bombers fare once they are gone?, burn injuries suffered in the BoB changed the way burns were treated from that point onwards, the effectiveness of De Wilde ammunition is well known, like SR posted, MkII Spits over England were a very different animal to the MkV's over Darwin.

I would disagree. Thirty minutes more loiter/cruise endurance for he Bf 109E should have been enough to change the dynamics of the campaign. Just the ability to send a sweeping force 20 minutes before the escorted main strike would have created havoc on scrambling for takeoff Fighter Command - just as the P-51B/C demonstrated to the LW in first half 1944. I have a letter to me from Galland that emphasized that point as a turning point, coupled with the aggression spawned by Doolitle 'seek and destroy on the ground and in the air' the freed US pilots to Hunt rather than defend.

 

[RCAFson]

The Americans had great difficulties coordinating carrier CAPs throughout 1942.

Yes but they still chewed up the IJNAF raids because their radar detected the raids well before they came into visual range. This allowed the USN to get all or most their fighters into the air, and an alerted and launched CAP, even poorly coordinated, was far superior to a CAP caught by surprise as the bombs were falling.

 

[pbehn]

I would disagree. Thirty minutes more loiter/cruise endurance for he Bf 109E should have been enough to change the dynamics of the campaign. Just the ability to send a sweeping force 20 minutes before the escorted main strike would have created havoc on scrambling for takeoff Fighter Command - just as the P-51B/C demonstrated to the LW in first half 1944. I have a letter to me from Galland that emphasized that point as a turning point, coupled with the aggression spawned by Doolitle 'seek and destroy on the ground and in the air' the freed US pilots to Hunt rather than defend.

Hard to disagree with Galland, but the LW did do fighter sweeps, Park ignored them. What the L/W needed more than a fighter with longer endurance was someone like Doolittle with an actual plan and an organisation behaving like a military organisation, figuring out what worked and repeating or improving on it, figuring out what didnt work and stopping doing it. There is no doubt at all a longer range fighter would have changed the game, if Goering and his minions had the sense to use use it.

 

[MikeMeech]

All MK Is were converted from two pitch to CS during July and Ausgst of 1940. These were DH two pitch props. The MK II had Rotol CS props from the start of production.

Better Propellers for “The Few”: Desmond Cooke’s Legacy in the Battle of Britain

Curator Jeremy Kinney explores the contribution of Royal Air Force leader Desmond Cooke to the improvement of Supermarine Spitfires prior to the Battle of Britain.

airandspace.si.edu

I do know that Hurricanes were in production with Rotol CS props before the Bob but I do not know if two pitch prop Hurricanes were still in front line service. Rolls Royce converted a lot of Mk !s with Merlin XXs and Rotal CS props during the BoB.

Hi
Hurricanes were fitted with Rotol CS propellers on the production line from October 1939 onwards. Those already in service were fitted when undergoing servicing/repair etc. Some Spitfire Mk. I also had Rotol, although most had de Havilland CS by the start of the BoB (the famous de Havilland upgrade, plus production line fits). Both the Spitfire and Hurricane had armoured windscreens and rear armour by the BoB (there was other protection fitted as well). I think this has been discussed before on this forum.

Mike

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yes but they still chewed up the IJNAF raids because their radar detected the raids well before they came into visual range. This allowed the USN to get all or most their fighters into the air, and an alerted and launched CAP, even poorly coordinated, was far superior to a CAP caught by surprise as the bombs were falling.

They chewed up some raids, by no means all, in fact during most of 1942 the Japanese were doing a bit better in terms of aircraft losses during engagements (with the significant exception of Midway), and it was about even for most of 1943

 

[Elvis]

I never said guns were passe. I said that missiles made both speed and maneuverability less important.

Missles turn airliners and cargo aircraft into "fighters"......think about it.

 

[GregP]

This is a bit of a mess. B4Y and B2M were biplanes which were basically experimental / transitional designs and not used during the war. They were quickly replaced by the Nakajima B5N.
The Mitsubishi B5N was not really used during the war. Basically a failed inter-war design.

I think where you wrote Nakajima N6N you are talking about the Nakajima B6N 'Tenzan' / Jill, which was a good design (much faster and longer ranged than the B5N). But it didn't arrive in Theater until later 1943. They lost a lot of these in the Marianas and in the Philippines where they went up against a buzz-saw of Hellcats. It also lacked armor and ss tank protection so was excessively vulnerable.

The Ki-67 was both Army and Navy, but only arrived in 1944 and in small numbers, mainly used to strike land targets. It could carry torpedoes but rarely did during the war.

IJN Carrier Strike Aircraft
I think it's worth reiterating the forces used by the Japanese Navy. The Japanese Navy had two types of strike aircraft, carrier based and land based. During the period 1941-1943 in the war the only Carrier based strike aircraft the IJN used in action on a significant scale were the B5N, D3A, and D4Y. Of those, only the B5N 'Kate' was a torpedo bomber.

The B5N wasn't so great - it was slow, clumsy, and had short range. It was a ship killer though, mainly due to the high quality Type 91 torpedoes it carried. It was also used as a level bomber against ground targets like Henderson Field and Midway. It was slightly better than a TBD devastator but that isn't saying much. The best carrier based strike aircraft for the IJN during this period was the D3A dive bomber. It had pretty good range, better speed, almost incredible accuracy as a dive bomber, and was somewhat difficult for fighters to catch. The D4Y was a promising design (very fast and pretty good range) but it had a lot of teething troubles and was used just as a recon plane for a long time. Also lacked armor etc. But it could be a lethal dive bomber, for example notable for sinking the carrier USS Princeton at Leyte Gulf.

For the later war, one you left off of your list is the excellent Aichi B7A 'Ryusei' / Grace, which was both a dive bomber and a torpedo bombers. This was a superlative design, very fast for a WW2 navy strike aircraft (352 mph) with excellent handling and maneuverability (it was said in tests to outmaneuver the A6M5) protected with armor and ss tanks, and quite heavily armed with two 20mm cannon, and it had superb range of 1,800+ miles. It was probably the best carrier strike aircraft designed during the war. The only problem with is it was too big, being designed for a class of carriers which was essentially strangled in the crib by the USN. And it came much too late and in much too few numbers.

IJN Land Based Strike Aircraft
The Japanese Navy had basically two land based strike aircraft during 1941-43. The first, left off your list, was the Mitsubishi G3M 'Rikko' / 'Nell'. It was designed in 1935 but continued to be used through the war. The G3M was slow and vulnerable, but it had excellent range and could carry those lethal type 91 torpedoes, or the equivalent weight of small bombs. It was primarily a torpedo bomber but was also used as a land based light bomber. It was involved in the strike against the Prince of Wales and the Replulse, struck US bases in the Philippines, Singapore, Wake Island, Darwin, and other targets. The last significant mission was the Battle of Rennell Island where G3M and G4M bombers sunk the US Heavy Cruiser USS Chicago in January 1943.

The second IJN strike aircraft was the Mitsubishi G4M. It was, again, mainly a torpedo bomber, but could carry a light bomb load of the same weight. It was a good bit faster than the G3M and more heavily armed, with a 20mm cannon in the tail (with limited ammo and traverse as Sr6 will point out), but shorter (still quite good) range. It lacked armor and ss tanks until later types. Mainly operating out of Rabaul, G4M sunk ships around New Guinea, the Marianas, and the Solomons thanks in large part to that Type 91 torpedo. It was also used as a recon aircraft and to drop bombs on land based targets such as at Darwin, on New Guinea, and Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.

Later in the war another one not on your list was the Yokosuka P1Y 'Ginga' / 'Frances', another very good design (fast at 340 mph, excellent range of 3,000 miles) that came too late, though they did make 1,000 of them. It too was designed mainly a torpedo bomber though it ended up being used as a kamikaze.

Think for a moment about the purpose of a navy bomber. I think that will help.



Did it ever occur to you that maybe you are just wrong? Or partly wrong? Maybe you are just looking at it from another perspective.



The discussion of the G4M is relevant to the discussion of the A6M (representing maneuverability) and the merits of the Japanese armed forces in general, which was part of the OPs query.

Yah, typo on the Tenzan.

Right back at you on the "Did it ever occur to you" question. We had a Betty diorama at the Planes of Fame for about 10 years before we sold it to Paul Allen.

We had several talks about it, as you might expect. All mentioned bombs. None mentioned torpedoes except for the Prince of Wales and Repulse. We all KNOW it carried and delivered torpedoes. We just disagree on how often they were used. Seems minor in the relative scheme of things.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes but they still chewed up the IJNAF raids because their radar detected the raids well before they came into visual range. This allowed the USN to get all or most their fighters into the air, and an alerted and launched CAP, even poorly coordinated, was far superior to a CAP caught by surprise as the bombs were falling.

Right, though because of limitations of the radars' A-scopes, altitude was very hard to discern. Coupled with Wildcats and their slow rate of climb, more often than not they were caught out of position vis altitude.

The other benefit, which kinda dovetails with what you wrote above, is that not only could you launch fighters, you might have time to launch bombers/scout planes, so that in the event of damage fewer airframes were vulnerable.

Nothing changed appreciably until the establishment of CICs, which integrated pip-scopes along with scouting reports, radio intercepts, and other intelligence. This allowed for a very efficient use of the CAP. We see the results (when coupled with better fighters!) at Philippine Sea.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Missles turn airliners and cargo aircraft into "fighters"......think about it.

I have. A big radar return showing that flight profile will most certainly be a priority target, because it's either an AWACS, a refueling tanker ... or a missile truck.

 

[RCAFson]

Right, though because of limitations of the A-scopes, altitude was very hard to discern. Coupled with Wildcats and their slow rate of climb, more often than not they were caught out of position vis altitude.

The other benefit, which kinda dovetails with what you wrote above, is that not only could you launch fighters, you might have time to launch bombers/scout planes, so that in the event of damage fewer airframes were vulnerable.

Yes, the early AW radars relied upon noting the distance that the aircraft passed through radar lobes to get an idea of altitude:

H.M.S. Hood Association-Battle Cruiser Hood: H.M.S. Hood Reference Materials - DM 220/76: Reports of performance in H.M.S. Hood, H.M.S. Illustrious, H.M.S. King George V and smaller vessels of RDF279

(see section 3.8)

The lack of radar GCI CiC training both on the carrier and in the air also limited USN CAP interception performance in 1942.

The USN often had to launch aircraft other than fighters to clear the flight decks for fighter operations, since they always used a permanent deck park for aircraft stowage. OTOH, the SBD was used at Bouganville and Coral Sea to aid the CAP.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yah, typo on the Tenzan.

Right back at you on the "Did it ever occur to you" question. We had a Betty diorama at the Planes of Fame for about 10 years before we sold it to Paul Allen.

View attachment 727306

We had several talks about it, as you might expect. All mentioned bombs. None mentioned torpedoes except for the Prince of Wales and Repulse. We all KNOW it carried and delivered torpedoes. We just disagree on how often they were used. Seems minor in the relative scheme of things.

Great diorama!

I'll meet you half way on it. I believe it was designed principally as a torpedo bomber, but seeing as the US carrier fleets mostly stayed a fairly good distance from Rabaul, it wasn't used that way as much as they probably thought it would be, and it was indeed used a bit more as a bomber. Which is a microcosm of the general problem for the Japanese in WW2, because you could say the same about the A6M. They were both made to quickly win naval battles, and started to have some trouble when diverted into the role of fighting a long attrition war.

But it's worth remembering the USS Chicago in 1943. The G4M - and the older G3M which was also right there with it, were a potential ship-killing hammer within a certain radius of Rabaul and a couple other bases in that same general area. I think it's part of the reason the US fleets steered clear for a while. Once they had the Hellcat, the G4M was kind of 'aged out' you could say, and was less of a threat (though I still wouldn't completely discount it if I was a skipper).

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yes, the early AW radars relied upon noting the distance that the aircraft passed through radar lobes to get an idea of altitude:

H.M.S. Hood Association-Battle Cruiser Hood: H.M.S. Hood Reference Materials - DM 220/76: Reports of performance in H.M.S. Hood, H.M.S. Illustrious, H.M.S. King George V and smaller vessels of RDF279

(see section 3.8)

The lack of radar GCI CiC training both on the carrier and in the air also limited USN CAP interception performance in 1942.

The USN often had to launch aircraft other than fighters to clear the flight decks for fighter operations, since they always used a permanent deck park for aircraft stowage. OTOH, the SBD was used at Bouganville and Coral Sea to aid the CAP.

They had more SBDs and fewer fighters during Coral Sea, they adjusted the mix subsequently for more fighters. Ironically they seemed to have a bit more trouble coordinating the fighters when they had a lot more of them, so in some cases the CAP was less effective.

 

[GregP]

As I understand it, Paul Allen was going to restore that G4M to flight status, but he passed away before he funded the project. I have no idea what is happening with it at this point.The people running his museum in Everett, WA don't seem to be nearly as fond of aircraft as Paul himself was, just based on his museum since that time. But, I could be wrong. I don't get to Seattle as often as I'd like to.

 

[PAT303]

Lundstrom give a complete accounting of the Japanese losses in the attack on the Hornet at Santa Cruz in "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign". Not near a 93% loss rtae

From what I understand 93% loss was from that one strike, same as the 6 Betty's that all went down, lets get real, losing 25% of your A6M's, 52% of Vals and 50% of Kates is simply unsustainable in anyone's language,

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

From what I understand 93% loss was from that one strike, same as the 6 Betty's that all went down, lets get real, losing 25% of your A6M's, 52% of Vals and 50% of Kates is simply unsustainable in anyone's language,

Read about some more of those carrier battles. The US lost 150 planes at Midway out of 360 total, a 41% loss, and that was considered a major victory. They (the US) lost 69 out of 128 aircraft at Coral Sea, also considered a victory (if less resounding!).

During the battle of Santa Cruz, which I think you are talking about, the US lost 81 aircraft out of 136 available. That's a 60% loss rate. Japanese lost 99 out of 199, about 50%.

Naval war in the Pacific was hard core bruh.

(and this is an example of what I mean about quick / decisive naval victories vs long attrition battles)

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

As I understand it, Paul Allen was going to restore that G4M to flight status, but he passed away before he funded the project. I have no idea what is happening with it at this point.The people running his museum in Everett, WA don;t seem to be nearly as fond of aircraft as Paul himself was, just based on his museum since that time. But, I could be wrong. I donlt get to Seattle as often as I'd like to.

That is too bad.

 

[PAT303]

I would disagree. Thirty minutes more loiter/cruise endurance for he Bf 109E should have been enough to change the dynamics of the campaign. Just the ability to send a sweeping force 20 minutes before the escorted main strike would have created havoc on scrambling for takeoff Fighter Command - just as the P-51B/C demonstrated to the LW in first half 1944. I have a letter to me from Galland that emphasized that point as a turning point, coupled with the aggression spawned by Doolitle 'seek and destroy on the ground and in the air' the freed US pilots to Hunt rather than defend.

But this goes back to my constant argument of putting another 30G in the Spit allowing them to be at altitude instead of madly scrambling at the last minute, war is fluid, the RAF would soon counter the tactic's because they had the ability to do so, the Luftwaffe in 1944-45 didn't, furthermore the Luftwaffe did try low level softening up attacks on airfields in front of the main strike but then abandoned them after heavy losses, the most famous was against Kenley using Do17's with small HE bombs on the deck down the runways followed by JU88's at altitude.

 

[PAT303]

Naval war in the Pacific was hard core bruh.

Absolutely, but how many IJN aircrew were lost compared to the USN?, if an Allied pilot was hit the armour plating, bullet proof glass and SS tanks gave him the best chance to stay up or to get out and if shot down every effort was made to rescue them, the Japanese pilots had none of that, the more you read about the IJN the more you find it wasn't so much about the aircraft but the effect of loosing experienced aircrew that hit them the hardest. The RAF and Luftwaffe learnt back in 1939-40 that planes are easy to replace, pilots aren't.