The Zero's Maneuverability (2 Viewers)

[Thumpalumpacus]

It was a balancing act for Mac - he had to placate the Phillipine leaders while keeping Washington happy.

Anyone with basic geography skills at the time, could see that the Philippine Islands were a "bridge" between Japan and the Orient.

There was no way in hell that Japan was going to have a Neutral Philippines in their backyard, especially with it being a U.S. "protectorate".

I think B Bergjon12 's point about MacArthur going native is percipient. Mac had lived out there for years, and had family and friends therein. And when on his own accord, without American government approval, he announced that "I shall return", he really committed America to the relief of millions of Filipinos. That wasn't a balancing act. That was him putting his personal feelings into the war mix in a very public way.

Of course Japan was going to take the PI in order to secure the sea routes between NEI and the home islands. We were going to be in the war whether or not Pearl Harbor happened, precisely because of the Philippines.

It's a shame MacArthur and Dick Sutherland made such a shitshow of it. They should have done better, rather than switching plans after the invasion and losing the supplies that might see a protracted defense carried out.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Since we are on the subject, Mac was a narcissist, a seriously deficient military commander, disloyal and consistently insubordinate. He deserved a firing squad. There, I said it.

The sonofabitch got the Medal of Honor for the largest surrender in American military history. There was some real spit-shinin' going on in those dark days.

 

[Bergjon12]

And when on his own accord, without American government approval, he announced that "I shall return", he really committed America to the relief of millions of Filipinos. That wasn't a balancing act. That was him putting his personal feelings into the war mix in a very public way.

Yup. The Ph should have been bypassed, which is what the navy wanted to do. Roosevelt (another narcissist) overruled them and ordered an invasion, which turned into a bloodbath. I believe he did that because he was afraid of Mac's political side and wanted to keep him busy and out of politics.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yup. The Ph should have been bypassed, which is what the navy wanted to do. Roosevelt (another narcissist) overruled them and ordered an invasion, which turned into a bloodbath. I believe he did that because he was afraid of Mac's political side and wanted to keep him busy and out of politics.

Spruance suggested hitting Iwo Jima in Oct 44 instead of PI or Formosa, but that was rejected by King and Nimitz. But besides saving thousands of Marine lives by hitting the island before Kuribayashi (sp?) fortified it, such a move would have startled the Japanese so much that withdrawal from the PI would have been almost mandatory unless you wanted another large island prison colony a la Rabaul or Truk.

MacA's pronouncement really loaded the dice against what was a pretty good idea.

 

[MiTasol]

I think B Bergjon12 's point about MacArthur going native is percipient. Mac had lived out there for years, and had family and friends therein. And when on his own accord, without American government approval, he announced that "I shall return", he really committed America to the relief of millions of Filipinos. That wasn't a balancing act. That was him putting his personal feelings into the war mix in a very public way.

Over the years I have read multiple books that postulated that if Mac had gone direct for Japan instead of detouring thru the PI to have his egotistical return the war would have been somewhat shorter with less allied losses because the detour gave Japan the time to regroup and massively increase the defence of those stepping stones between the PI and Japan. Several of these books made a very strong case but having never seen a rebuttal to these theories I cannot make an informed decision on the claims.

 

[ThomasP]

re

The result was a successful attack on a shallow-water Naval port that was unprecedented in history, so maybe they get a sort of "pass" for not expecting an attack?

??

Taranto Harbor was attacked on 11 November 1940. The RN used similar methods to those used by the Japanese later at Pearl Harbor - except the RN attacked at night with far fewer aircraft and focused on the Italian fleet almost exclusively.

Pearl Harbor was attacked on 7 December 1941. Historical records - including post-war intel - show that Japan had taken notice of the RN attack on Taranto, and that the RNs performance influenced their decision to attack the US Fleet in Pearl.

Taranto Harbor majority depth was ~40 ft.

Pearl Harbor majority depth was ~45 ft.

Incidentally, various parties in the USN also took notice of the RN's success at Taranto. Their analysis of the Pearl Harbor arrangements (conducted in early-1941 - after the attack on Taranto) indicated that a similar attack in Pearl Harbor was possible.


re causes of Pearl Harbor and some of the other stuff

The US post-war analysis of the events at the start of WWII concluded that a lack of any USN or US Army commanders with recent experience remotely resembling serious naval or land warfare was the main contributing factor to the poor performance of US forces in the early stages of the war. This included the commanders at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines, as well as in other theaters. This assessment was held to be true at least through the Tunisia campaign.

MacArthur, Kimmel, and Short, all followed the official doctrine (at the time) in their initial preparations for war - and this included things like arranging the aircraft to prevent sabotage. While their lack of imagination - and consequent inability to predict what shape the war would take in its opening stages - can be held as a fault, there is no rational reason to think that anyone else would have done better. The lack of experience was just too great. This phenomena is apparent in the progression of the war in Europe as well.

The participants in the decades long planning of War Plan Orange had concluded by ~1935 that the Philippines could not be held against a serious Japanese attack and that any practical reinforcing of the islands would make no difference - the supply lines and reaction times were just too long, and the materiel and personnel needed to drag out the invasion to a useful timeline (until reinforcement and relief) would only result in inevitable and unacceptable losses. Abandoning the PI became a part of the plan. Unfortunately for MacArthur, the planners did not inform him of this decision (his position did not allow him access to the actual plans) until after the war started. MacArthur wanted to defend the PI and continuously requested more war materiel needed to do so, along with permissions to raise and train more PI native personnel - but he was denied said materiel and permissions (partly due to politics in the US and partly due to the effects of the Great Depression) until shortly before the war started. There was subsequently not enough time to implement the hoped for plans. He was subsequently ordered to leave due to the fear by Washington that his capture would be too much of a propaganda asset to Japan. MacArthur felt that the US had betrayed the PI peoples.

NOTE that the progression in developments for defending the PI (or lack thereof) followed a very similar path as the problems with developing Singapore by the British - the distances were too great, and cost and/or politics intervened.

NOTE also that every major Allied combatant had similar problems with reacting effectively during the early stage of the war when attacked by the Germans and Japanese. There is a reason for this.

 

[Frog]

Right. The problem was not intelligence or prognostication, the problem lay in execution. For instance, when Gen Short, GOC Hawaii area, received the above war warnings, rather than scatter his aircraft, set up intensified patrol schedules, and so on, he marshaled his aircraft wingtip along in order to more easily guard them against sabotage feared from the substantial Nisei population on the islands.

Intel is good. It also needs 1) to be interpreted correctly, and 2) to be actionable. What guesses were being made regarding Japanese diplomacy and intentions were interpreted fairly well, but were not actionable, which left it to theater commanders like MacArthur and Short to figure out their own responses.

Regarding the radar detection, I think "dereliction of duty" is too harsh. Lt Tyler was not well trained in radar and was already expecting a flight of B-17s in from California. Further, the crew of the radar station at Opana were themselves training on the set.

The submarine contact and sinking outside the mouth of the harbor should have set every boiler in the fleet alight, you're dead-right.

The failure was more in operational assessments than it was in intel.

This reminds me a copy of an exam about public finances I had to correct :

'' The problem of deficit is not so much about the depenses, but about the ressources. ''

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Over the years I have read multiple books that postulated that if Mac had gone direct for Japan instead of detouring thru the PI to have his egotistical return the war would have been somewhat shorter with less allied losses because the detour gave Japan the time to regroup and massively increase the defence of those stepping stones between the PI and Japan. Several of these books made a very strong case but having never seen a rebuttal to these theories I cannot make an informed decision on the claims.

MacArthur could not escape invading the PI, given geography. Nimitz's Central Pacific drive became then the default, because the islands were smaller and more diffuse. But if you're attacking Japan from New Guinea, the PI must be dealt with. To be clear, the Marines had already cleared Iwo even as the Army was "mopping up" (what a shitty term, you can get killed all the same) in Luzon. Driving up through the PI was much more intensive logistically than even the conquests of the Marianas or Okinawa.

To be fair, bypassing the Philippines would have meant consigning many people, probably well above a million, to death by famine. But disregarding that laudable goal of saving them, going through the Philippines to invade Japan would be slower.

MacArthur's ego, I think, always puckered when he thought about the Central Pacific drive, which went from Tarawa to Okinawa in 18 months, while it took SWPA forces quite a bit longer to get from Port Moresby to Manila.

That is, however, aside my point, that Mac's promise to liberate the PI laid a commitment onto American planners which they could not elide.

 

[MIflyer]

I think that Mac's desire to liberate the PI was based not only on his personal desires but also recognition that a US invasion would cement the PI as a US protectorate. In French Indochina no one invaded to drive out the Japanese and you see what happened there.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think that Mac's desire to liberate the PI was based not only on his personal desires but also recognition that a US invasion would cement the PI as a US protectorate. In French Indochina no one invaded to drive out the Japanese and you see what happened there.

The US had already agreed to Filipino independence by 1946 in 1934, well before WWII started: https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1934PhilippineIndep.pdf

 

[GrauGeist]

Let's add the fact that the U.S. was still struggling with the after effects of the Great Depression.

This means that modern equipment was in short supply and slowly replacing older/obsolete types. This in turn, saw areas like the Philippines recieving those older types. The U.S. forces were stocked with WWI vintage equipment and obsolete aircraft and provided U.S. and Philippine forces little chance of any success against superior Japanese forces.

At Pearl Harbor, the military was also hamstrung by economic shortcomings, which is why the bases were staffed by skeleton crews on the weekends.

Congress held the purse strings and the Army & Navy had to work with the crumbs tossed their way

 

[GregP]

"The US post-war analysis of the events at the start of WWII concluded that a lack of any USN or US Army commanders with recent experience remotely resembling serious naval or land warfare was the main contributing factor to the poor performance of US forces in the early stages of the war. This included the commanders at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines, as well as in other theaters. This assessment was held to be true at least through the Tunisia campaign."

I don't buy that one above at all. Having recent combat experience or no recent combat experience doesn't excuse a complete lack of preparedness, and they were unprepared. I was in two armed services, and preparation is basic to military phiilosophy. You prepare not for the enemy's expected actions, but for his capabilities for action. If you don't, you are simply unprepared, and they were.

 

[special ed]

Formosa was not bombed as recon showed heavy cloud cover which would prevent accurate B-17 attacks. The B-17Ds would have been unescorted, the theory of the time being they could protect themselves. The Japanese airfields were under cloud cover, but not low enough to prevent Japanese acft takeoff, but would have hampered the high altitude bombing theory at the time. Mac did not want to risk "his" prize B-17s. Post war evaluations indicated the Japanese were unprepared for aerial attack on Formosa. The first attacks by B-17s would have disrupted immediate Japanese plans for P.I. attacks, but additional attacks by B-17s would have been met with U.S. losses. The attacks on the P.I. would still have occurred, but later, possibly allowing U.S. resupply. The Japanese would have been more concentrated on the P.I. and less on fortifying the outlying islands, such as Guadalcanal.

 

[Frog]

I think that Mac's desire to liberate the PI was based not only on his personal desires but also recognition that a US invasion would cement the PI as a US protectorate. In French Indochina no one invaded to drive out the Japanese and you see what happened there.

The British helped us before the japanese capitulation (organization of Force 136) and after to some extend as they were seeing a communist insurrection emerging, something they were already seeing in Malaysia.
The US under Roosevelt directives were strongly anti French in Indochina, having been intoxicated by uncle Ho and his staff that presented themselves as '' nationalists " and consequently benefited of active US support. Following events demonstrated later what really was going on. What did not help then is the fact that local US agents were often from lefty background.

 

[Bergjon12]

"The US post-war analysis of the events at the start of WWII concluded that a lack of any USN or US Army commanders with recent experience remotely resembling serious naval or land warfare was the main contributing factor to the poor performance of US forces in the early stages of the war. This included the commanders at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines, as well as in other theaters. This assessment was held to be true at least through the Tunisia campaign."

I don't buy that one above at all. Having recent combat experience or no recent combat experience doesn't excuse a complete lack of preparedness, and they were unprepared. I was in two armed services, and preparation is basic to military phiilosophy. You prepare not for the enemy's expected actions, but for his capabilities for action. If you don't, you are simply unprepared, and they were.

What is the difference between preparedness and readiness?

 

[SaparotRob]

I'll try this one! Readiness is how quick you are at being able to grab all the stuff you already prepared in advance?

 

[Bergjon12]

I'll try this one! Readiness is how quickly being able to grab all the stuff you prepared for?

That's pretty good. I doubt there is a shorter one that is better.

You win a cookie mr. Rob.

 

[GregP]

What is the difference between preparedness and readiness?

They are two different words and mean different things to different people.

In military terms, they are almost interchangeable, but not likely so for politicians and other civilians who have no training in military science.

 

[Bergjon12]

They are two different words and mean different things to different people.

In military terms, they are almost interchangeable, but not likely so for politicians and other civilians who have no training in military science.

Disagree very much.

Readiness is being able to perform your duty when the situation arises; knowing what you should do and having the fortitude to do it correctly. Readiness is created by training and factors that lift morale and innate human qualities such as intelligence as well as ensuring that available equipment is in a serviceable state.

Preparedness is having the right weapons, being well supplied, having knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts, movements and intentions and being accordingly deployed.

Top-notch preparedness will do very little, if anything, to improve readiness, and vice versa.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Preparedness happens on the doctrinal and equipment level. Readiness happens at the lower-unit level, driven by junior officers and NCOs.