The Zero's Maneuverability (4 Viewers)

[MIflyer]

How in the name of everything sane they came up with that idea is beyond me.

Prewar, the RAF adopted a kind of Mutual Assured Destruction approach, deterring war by being able to blast the other European countries cities, a Counter-Value rather than a Counter-Force strategy. So when the war starts and deterrence has failed, what do you do? Answer: The only thing you can do, the only thing you planned to do.

Aside from that I have no doubt they were looking for revenge for the Blitz, much of which as aimed at de-housing.

 

[Bergjon12]

How in the name of everything sane they came up with that idea is beyond me.

It is more than a possibility that Bomber Harris was a cluster B personality.

 

[MiTasol]

So what does that say for the people doing the same thing in Vietnam and the middle east and Ukraine?

 

[SaparotRob]

A lack of originality?

 

[MiTasol]

Military Intelligence - expecting that doing the same thing that failed before would have the opposite result.

 

[Bergjon12]

So what does that say for the people doing the same thing in Vietnam and the middle east and Ukraine?

It says: "S the H up about current politics".

Respectfully.

 

[MiTasol]

According to one source in the 70's, a book by a lawyer who was involved with the Japanese war crimes trials, the quality issue came from the Japanese taking all males out of school when they reached a certain age and then stuck them in war production factories. At their next birthday they were conscripted into one of the military services. This meant that they spent a relatively large percentage of their manufacturing time in training and became cannon fodder soon after becoming competent at their jobs. Other countries used women workers and/or classified the male workers as essential and blocked them from being conscripted.

The book had a title something like Imperial Conspiracy.

This book has a similar name to the one I read but I do not think it is the same one going by the Wiki summary.

Japan's Imperial Conspiracy - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It is available at Japan's imperial conspiracy : Bergamini, David, 1928- : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive but I am too busy to read it.

Note also that wiki has a page on the war crimes trials (International Military Tribunal for the Far East - Wikipedia).

Being wiki its accuracy is open to discussion but it does include this statement.

 

[MiTasol]

Prewar, the RAF adopted a kind of Mutual Assured Destruction approach, deterring war by being able to blast the other European countries cities, a Counter-Value rather than a Counter-Force strategy. So when the war starts and deterrence has failed, what do you do? Answer: The only thing you can do, the only thing you planned to do.

Aside from that I have no doubt they were looking for revenge for the Blitz, much of which as aimed at de-housing.

Maybe do what General Kenney did in the SWPA. Concentrate on destroying the airfields and destroying aircraft on the ground so that the enemy cannot defend itself from aerial attacks on military targets.

This should have been obvious especially seeing they knew how close the LW came to killing fighter command and how that would have left Britain aerially defenceless.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Maybe do what General Kenney did in the SWPA. Concentrate on destroying the airfields and destroying aircraft on the ground so that the enemy cannot defend itself from aerial attacks on military targets.

This should have been obvious especially seeing they knew how close the LW came to killing fighter command.

He only did that because there were no cities to bomb.

 

[tomo pauk]

This should have been obvious especially seeing they knew how close the LW came to killing fighter command

How close was that?

 

[Bergjon12]

Maybe do what General Kenney did in the SWPA. Concentrate on destroying the airfields and destroying aircraft on the ground so that the enemy cannot defend itself from aerial attacks on military targets.

This should have been obvious especially seeing they knew how close the LW came to killing fighter command and how that would have left Britain aerially defenceless.

Without wanting to diminish responsibility, LeMay tried destroying the Tokyo factories with precision bombing, but the results were less than impressive because of windshear and other stuff. So he opted to burn the city.

Without wanting to diminish responsibility.

 

[Bergjon12]

How close was that?

In the immortal words of Father Ted: "Couple of miles?"

 

[MiTasol]

How close was that?

It was the point where LW changed tactics from largely attacking airfields to mainly attacking cities.

 

[MIflyer]

Without wanting to diminish responsibility, LeMay tried destroying the Tokyo factories with precision bombing, but the results were less than impressive because of windshear and other stuff.

Actually they were getting very good at the daylight precision attacks and in fact they never completely abandoned them, including the famous attack where they hit a engine factory and then dropped a hung bomb on the way out and accidentally destroyed the same company's HQ building. But Japanese industry consisted not mainly of large factories but lots of desely packed small workshops with highly flammable construction. Even the B-25 bomb load for the Doolittle raid recognized that. You could not take out most of their industry without burning large areas of their major cities.

The USAAF did not have a policy of Dehousing in Germany, but did not ignore it, either. The October 1943 8th AF attack on Munster was intended to destroy the RR yards but as part of that effort they wanted to destroy the surrounding housing and thus leave the rail workers with no place to live, thereby reducing their efficiency. And in order accomplish that, recognizing the kind of dispersion that occurred with bombing, the aiming point was the Munster Cathedral.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

Actually they were getting very good at the daylight precision attacks and in fact they never completely abandoned them, including the famous attack where they hit a engine factory and then dropped a hung bomb on the way out and accidentally destroyed the same company's HQ building. But Japanese industry consisted not mainly of large factories but lots of desely packed small workshops with highly flammable construction. Even the B-25 bomb load for the Doolittle raid recognized that. You could not take out most of their industry without burning large areas of their major cities.

The USAAF did not have a policy of Dehousing in Germany, but did not ignore it, either. The October 1943 8th AF attack on Munster was intended to destroy the RR yards but as part of that effort they wanted to destroy the surrounding housing and thus leave the rail workers with no place to live, thereby reducing their efficiency. And in order accomplish that, recognizing the kind of dispersion that occurred with bombing, the aiming point was the Munster Cathedral.

I believe what Bergjon12 was describing were the initial raids on Japan at the altitude capability of the B-29.
The problem was that bombing from the Jetstream was quite inaccurate but if it could have been done, it would have kept fighter intercepts to just about none. This was at or above the service ceiling of many of the Japanese fighters.
For acceptable accuracy, the raids had to be brought lower and at that point they were capable of being intercepted.

- Ivan.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The 10 October 1943 raid by the 8th Air Force on Munster, the railway workers, not just their housing, were mentioned as a target, according to the book Strategic Bombing of Germany 1940-45 by Levine. The USSBS European Theater report 62, Weather factors in combat bombardment operations in the European Theater target weather table on page 8 notes for around two thirds of non visual bombing the weather was in the "blind" category, 8/10 clouds or worse. The following table is 2/3 percentage of non visual bombing by the 8th // Bomber Command percentage of effort against cities.

Jun-44 25.6 // 1.3
Jul-44 27.7 // 16.8
Aug-44 5.1 // 16.7
Sep-44 37.2 // 28.3
Oct-44 51.4 // 75.3
Nov-44 58.3 // 54.4
Dec-44 43.5 // 36.2
Jan-45 45.2 // 35.5
Feb-45 49.9 // 50.7
Mar-45 37.7 // 44.2
Apr-45 14.2 // 14.6

As to the European oil attacks the USSBS notes some 212,301 short tons of bombs dropped on oil targets, 114,394 by the USAAF and 97,907 by the RAF, according to the USSBS definition of oil targets, which is those in Greater Germany. Richard Davis reports the 8th Air Force dropped 77,169.4 and the 15th Air Force 59,873.7, total 137,043.1 short tons of bombs on oil targets in 1944/45, Bomber Command's official tonnage against all oil targets in 1944/45 is 95,553 long or around 107,020 short tons, grand total on oil 244,063 short tons in a campaign that lasted almost exactly a year. In 1943 the USAAF says its heavy bombers dropped 47,452 (ETO) + 50,456 (MTO) short tons of bombs, Bomber Command dropped 157,457 long or 176,352 short tons of bombs, giving a 1943 total of 274,260 short tons. A 1943 campaign against axis oil to the same extent as 1944/45 would absorb 89% of effort, against better defences, from bases in the Mediterranean that were further away, with less experienced forces, with lower accuracy at night at least, with day bombing virtually only visual and make the attacks very much more predictable. It was not until Q2/44 the necessary conditions, bases, forces, equipment etc. was reached to actually hurt and keep hurting European Axis liquid fuel supplies by bombing.

Similar for a campaign against the Luftwaffe airfields, a very large number available just in France, given the size of the French Air Force in 1940. In early September 1940 the Luftwaffe thought it was winning the Battle of Britain but it was working to a deadline, which created the debate between keep hitting airfields but not see enough RAF fighters each day or hit a target the RAF must defend, thereby drawing more RAF fighters into combat, which worked as lots more RAF fighters appeared when the target was London. Incidentally Keith Park was not worried about damage to the airfields as such, more about the co-located control rooms, the Luftwaffe had direction found them.

Japan's Imperial Conspiracy has the theme the attacks in 1941/42 were the culmination of a decades long core Japanese policy of taking over Asia fully endorsed and lead by the Emperor. Some Japanese decided the USA, Britain, China and Netherlands (America, Britain, China, Dutch, East Indies ABCD) had a co-ordinated policy, at times long standing, to keep Japan limited, undertaking "attacks" or "blocks", hence why Japan was forced by this hostility into a defensive war. Throw in the USSR/Communists, time to break the encirclement. Also from WWI Japan had noted occupying an area strengthened claims to keep it post war.

Small business however defined tends to employ most of the workforce while being a minority of economic output. Given total war all businesses are helping the war effort while small business tends to be scattered around the urban area, which can be used as justification for city raids. Be interesting to find the 1945 figures for Japanese small businesses, how many and how much of the manufacturing sector they made up compared with Germany, the Zaibatsu cartels (Mitsui, Mitsubishi etc.) had a big footprint in Japan's economy. For example most aircraft factories were really assembly plants, taking parts from the manufacturers. Japan's cities were usually more vulnerable to fire than European cities, and with lower fire fighting capacities.

The B-29 raids on Japan started on 14 June 1944 but XX Bomber Command did a number of raids on places in South East Asia. When it comes to altitude according to the USAAF of 1,201 sorties reporting bombing above 25,000 feet 1,078 were December 1944 to March 1945, the other 123 sorties were September/October 1944. Actually quiet neat, XX Bomber Command, XXI Bomber Command and a final month from XX Bomber Command, for further strikes against specific targets the USAAF lowered the attacking altitudes. The January 1945 raids indicate higher altitudes did not guarantee lower losses to fighters, particularly against an intact air raid tracking and interception system.

USAAF 1945 Statistical Digest. Operations section. Table 165 Aircraft Losses on Combat Missions, 20th Air Force. Table 192 20th Air Force, missions against primary targets. Number of aircraft attacking / Number of Missions, Average bombing height, average mission size, losses by cause.
XX Bomber Command

Altitude	less than	8,000 to	15,000 to	over	Average	Average	Lost to	Lost to	Lost to	Lost to
Month	8,000 feet	15,000 feet	25,000 feet	25,000 feet	Height	Mission	a/c	AA	a/c+AA	Other
Jun-44​	/	47 / 1	77 / 1	/	19,398​	62.00​	1​	0​	0​	9​
Jul-44​	/	/	70 / 2	/	16,778​	35.00​	1​	0​	0​	2​
Aug-44​	/	39 / 1	95 / 2	/	20,000​	44.67​	3​	1​	0​	10​
Sep-44​	/	/	83 / 1	90 / 1	17,526​	86.50​	1​	0​	0​	2​
Oct-44​	/	/	172 / 3	33 / 1	23,642​	51.25​	1​	0​	0​	4​
Nov-44​	/	/	242 / 5	/	21,127​	48.40​	8​	0​	0​	11​
Dec-44​	/	/	233 / 5	/	20,000​	46.60​	5​	4​	0​	7​
Jan-45​	/	66 / 2	290 / 7	/	20,000​	39.56​	1​	0​	0​	3​
Feb-45​	10 / 1	49 / 1	340 / 5	/	18,424​	57.00​	1​	0​	0​	3​
Mar-45​	94 / 5	24 / 1	94 / 2	146 / 2	18,630​	35.80​	0​	2​	0​	0​
Total	104 / 6	225 / 6	1696 / 33	269 / 4	19,398​	46.82​	22​	7​	0​	51​

XXI Bomber Command

Altitude	less than	8,000 to	15,000 to	over	Bombing	Average	Lost to	Lost to	Lost to	Lost to
Month	8,000 feet	15,000 feet	25,000 feet	25,000 feet	Height (feet)	Mission	a/c	AA	a/c+AA	Other
Nov-44​	/	/	23 / 1	24 / 1	23,500​	23.50​	1​	0​	0​	3​
Dec-44​	/	23 / 1	/	341 / 6	24,786​	52.00​	3​	1​	0​	17​
Jan-45​	/	/	/	207 / 5	27,000​	41.40​	12​	0​	2​	13​
Feb-45​	/	/	/	360 / 4	27,000​	90.00​	6​	0​	0​	20​
Mar-45​	1855 / 9	/	288 / 2	/	9,364​	194.82​	0​	7​	0​	27​
Apr-45​	288 / 6	1189 / 19	1291 / 57	/	17,079​	33.76​	13​	11​	9​	24​
May-45​	339 / 9	1043 / 7	2497 / 38	/	16,731​	71.83​	8​	11​	4​	65​
Jun-45​	715 / 14	1025 / 9	3048 / 30	/	15,123​	90.34​	8​	12​	2​	22​
Jul-45​	292 / 9	4282 / 43	1120 / 13	/	12,577​	87.60​	0​	2​	2​	18​
Aug-45​	56 / 2	873 / 10	1937 / 15	/	15,889​	106.15​	1​	3​	0​	7​
Total	3545 / 49	8435 / 89	10204 / 156	932 / 16	15,866​	74.57​	52​	47​	19​	216​

It looks like the above are separate to the mine laying figures, from Table 193,
XX Bomber Command

Month	Number	New Fields	Aircraft	Aircraft	Tons of	Tons of Mines	Aircraft
Month	Missions	laid	Airborne	to Primary	Mines laid	on Primary	Lost
Aug-44​	1​	1​	14​	8​	12​	8​	0​
Gap
Jan-45​	2​	2​	76​	66​	233​	197​	0​
Feb-45​	1​	1​	12​	10​	36​	27​	0​
Mar-45​	4​	3​	73​	71​	259​	253​	0​
Total	8​	7​	175​	155​	540​	485​	0​

XXI Bomber Command

Month	Number	New Fields	Aircraft	Aircraft	Tons of	Tons of Mines	Aircraft
Month	Missions	laid	Airborne	to Primary	Mines laid	on Primary	Lost
Mar-45​	2​	5​	196​	184​	1,070​	1,070​	5​
Apr-45​	5​	1​	57​	45​	288​	256​	0​
May-45​	10​	12​	421​	364​	2,617​	2,334​	5​
Jun-45​	12​	2​	367​	321​	2,229​	2,044​	1​
Jul-45​	12​	7​	384​	314​	2,390​	2,076​	6​
Aug-45​	5​	2​	185​	159​	1,157​	1,034​	0​
Total	46​	29​	1,610​	1,387​	9,751​	8,814​	17​

Mine tonnage includes jettisoned mines

 

[Jabberwocky]

They didn't exactly "get into a war."

Before World War II, the US imposed a series of economic sanctions and a de facto blockade on Japan, culminating in a full oil embargo in 1941, after Japan's expansion into French Indochina and other aggressive actions in Asia. So, they were hurting for raw material and there was no real way to end the blockade whort of a military action. They were forced to either fight a war they didn't really seek or want, or surrender as a country. Japanese millitary leaders were basically forced into being pro-war by the situation.

This analysis ignores the state of Japan's internal politics in the 1930s.

The militarists had effectively captured control of the government through the late 1920s and early 1930s. Japanese politics were divided between the radical ultranationalists in the 'Imperial Way' faction on one side and the somewhat more restrained 'Control' faction on the other.

Both were rapidly fascist, imperialist, racist, anti-communist/socialist and anti-democratic. Both based their geopolitical views on expansionism of the Japanese empire. Both sides thought a war with the US was inevitable - although they different on the expected extent - and were preparing for such from at least the middle of the 1930s.

 

[GregP]

This analysis ignores the state of Japan's internal politics in the 1930s.

The militarists had effectively captured control of the government through the late 1920s and early 1930s. Japanese politics were divided between the radical ultranationalists in the 'Imperial Way' faction on one side and the somewhat more restrained 'Control' faction on the other.

Both were rapidly fascist, imperialist, racist, anti-communist/socialist and anti-democratic. Both based their geopolitical views on expansionism of the Japanese empire. Both sides thought a war with the US was inevitable - although they different on the expected extent - and were preparing for such from at least the middle of the 1930s.

I didn't "ignore" anything at all, and didn't mention internal politics at all.

What I said was the embargo was a defacto blockade, forcing Japan to react. We expected one reaction. They countered with another entirely.

When you "cut off" a country from necessary resouces, you'd best expect some reaction from them. Apparently, we didn't really expoect an attack since NONE of the Pacific bases were ready for one. None of that depends on internal p;olitics; it is basic national survival.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

He only did that because there were no cities to bomb.

It still makes sense to take out opposition air first. Once you do that, the sky is the limit -- so to speak, of course.

Attacking airfields is a key part of gaining aerial superiority. Aside from breaking logistics, it's always better to break airplanes on the ground. Aside from Kenney in SWPA, that's exactly what Doolittle did in early-mid 1944 ... unleash the fighters to strafe the everloving shit out of (amongst other targets) airfields.

But you gotta love Kenney for his parafrags and gunships.

 

[Greg Boeser]

It still makes sense to take out opposition air first. Once you do that, the sky is the limit -- so to speak, of course.

Attacking airfields is a key part of gaining aerial superiority. Aside from breaking logistics, it's always better to break airplanes on the ground. Aside from Kenney in SWPA, that's exactly what Doolittle did in early-mid 1944 ... unleash the fighters to strafe the everloving shit out of (amongst other targets) airfields.

But you gotta love Kenney for his parafrags and gunships.

Too bad for Hitler he got distracted by a little harrassment bombing. He was a week away from hobbling Fighter Command. Four years later it was the Tactical Air Forces that made the Luftwaffe bases in France and the Low Countries untenable, making Operation Overlord possible.