Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 988
- Sep 30, 2021
Japan emerged from isolation into an era of global colonisation, things like the scramble for Africa, with its message of get modern and powerful or be taken over. It continued colonial behaviour into the 20th century after it became unfashionable in other world powers, evolving a system of attacking, keeping things when the worked, sending in the diplomats and blaming hot heads when it didn't. Many Japanese did care why its activities were seen as so bad. In the struggle between those wanting the military solution and those wanting more peaceful methods Japan managed to acquire a reputation for dishonesty as parts of the Government would say one thing but other parts would do another.
Think also of how many empires (or countries) were created by individuals going off and taking control of areas then "presenting" them to the government. With their original expeditions having somewhere between no and full official support. The British Colonial office in the 19th century was very anti colonial in the early period, since it seemed to them adventurers would go off, claim the area, upset the inhabitants and leave the British Government to pick up the costs and colonies were a financial drain. At the end of the 19th century the attitude had radically changed.
Japan taking Korea from China, the Russo-Japanese War (though a number of Japanese gains were taken by European powers after the settlement), the spoils of WWI plus the 21 demands on China. Japan was the last to leave what became the USSR, dreams of expansion into Siberia existed. There was strong support for the idea a great power had a big military and a colonial empire and that Japan deserved to be a great power. Asia ruled by Japan had plenty of support in Japan. The depression and subsequent trade barriers hurt Japan, helping the radical's cause, there was real anger over the poverty in Japan when compared with the west and the way the west was perceived as rigging the rules to keep it that way.
When it comes to the 20+ years of decisions from 1918 on there were plenty of people involved and their ideas and reasons changed over time, as did circumstances. The Japanese Government was a military and civilian government given the Navy and Army ministers had to be serving officers. That gave the Army and/or Navy veto powers. The Japanese Diet was democratic and the story of the 1930's for Japan is the struggle between those that wanted it as a western style legislature and those that wanted it neutered and/or stacked with radicals.
On 14 May 1932 the Japanese Prime Minister was assassinated, the killers found many supporters, their trials became a platform for them to state their beliefs, light sentences, many later reduced.
In Tokyo early morning 26 February 1936, the rebels begin to kill their targets. At 9.00 am the Emperor interrupts the Army officer reading out what was a list of justifications for the killings, with a request to stop the rebellion. So troops and ships were mobilised to surround the rebel held areas, meantime the Army command tried to figure out a way to, in effect, endorse the rebellion or at least get the rebels minimal punishment. On 28 February the final pleas for clemency came in from the Army leaders, including a request for an Imperial agent authorising the rebels to commit suicide. On 29 February the troops finally moved, starting at about 8.00am. The list of conspirators were 1,475 army, 8 civilians and 0 navy. The courts martial were held without publicity, lasted around an hour each and the ringleaders, military and civilian, were executed. The purge was also helped by the fact so many of those killed were navy men, and their killers were army. Post rebellion the new Prime Minister Koki Hirota then was able to stare down the Army's attempts at a blacklist of potential cabinet members. The Diet was more moderate and therefore more able to put a brake on the radicals. Japan's drift to major war was slowed but not stopped. The threats of violence helping supress dissent about radial solutions, the war but not a war with China from July 1937 another reason to clamp down on dissent and push the expansion case, support the troops, it is patriotic.
The "2-26" incident was much more a genuine uprising, the generals did not order it, even if they largely agreed with the demands. Note the demands of the rebels were to annihilate people in power who were hindering "the divine Showa Restoration", these included, military officers, elder statesmen, bureaucrats, political party leaders and "other criminals".
It seems clear Japan could make war on China with minimal risk of intervention from other powers, something evident at the time, The IJA invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and by the end of the year had occupied the area. The Shanghai incident ran from 18 January to 3 March 1932, where the IJN tried to use force to stop the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. Effectively a division of IJA troops was sent in February. The Japanese officially created their Manchurian colony on 25 August 1932. On 31 August 1932 the Japanese invoked their version of the Monroe Doctrine. In March 1933 the IJA occupied key areas of Jehol province. On 27 March 1933 Japan announced it was withdrawing from the League of Nations. In 1934 IJA troops entered Chahar (inner Mongolia) and Hopei (the province Beijing was in). During 1934 the Japanese worked up their plan for a war with the USSR, using 27 out of 30 divisions. Which required the situation in China to be quiet. In Spring 1935 pro Japanese Chinese troops drove the Chinese forces out of Jehol. The Japanese also demanded Chinese troops withdraw from Hopei, which they did.
Tension in northern China was on the rise as the Nationalists closed in on the (semi) independent warlords there, forcing them to choose between fighting the nationalists or joining them. The Japanese expansionists were not happy about the idea they could face a united China, instead of a collection of warlords they could manipulate or easily defeat. The colonial faction was not happy about the long term threat a united China would pose to the Japanese colonies on the mainland. The excuse for intervention of lawlessness was going away.
Inside the military there was the Kodo ha (Imperial Way) faction aiming for a military dictatorship under the Emperor (The civilians with their links to big business had plenty of corruption scandals to parade) and the Tosei ha or control faction who wanted the army in the field to be controlled by GHQ and were less interested in a military dictatorship.
Kodo ha, 100% soldier, Emperor higher than the law, "direct rule of the Emperor", divine origin believers, anti communist, politicians no good, no compromise, unhappy with peace, battlefield men, Nazi type sympathisers.
Tosei ha, more law abiding, lay stress on merit, respect status quo, believe in cooperating with politicians and businessmen, consider international cooperation important.
The trouble for the officers in charge were the increased radicalisation of subordinates, "Rule from Below"
According to the Japanese statistical yearbook the official Japanese expenditure by the war and navy departments goes like this, in million yen, year, war, navy
1930 201 / 242
1931 227 / 227
1932 374 / 313
1933 463 / 410
1934 459 / 483
1935 497 / 536
1936 511 / 567
1937 591 / 645
1938 488 / 679
1939 825 / 804
1940 1,192 / 1,034
1941 1,156 / 1,497
Total Japanese government expenditure grew from 1,558 million yen in 1930 to 8,134 million yen in 1941. Note the struggle for parity between the army and navy. The problem is to capture all the expenditure on defence, not just the departmental budgets. According to Japan's War Economy by Erich Pauer in 1930 the Japanese government spent 28.6% of its budget on defence and 17.7% on debt. By 1935 it was 46.3% and 17.6% respectively, in 1940 50.3% and 15.5%. Government liabilities in the first 5 years of the 1930s came to 3.7 billion yen, the next 5 years 20.5 billion yen. (the 1941-45 period 168.5 billion yen)
In June 1937 there was a USSR border incident which was resolved largely without fighting, but when Japan signed the anti Comintern pact the USSR stepped up its support to China.
China incident first shots fired 7 July 1937, fighting from then on. The army had become radicalised enough to conduct massacres as well as running around wielding swords.
In July 1938 the Japanese demanded control of all disputed border areas with the USSR and Manchuria. This was supported by a corps level attack to take one area and the local commanders, as near usual, kept going beyond their ordered stop line and were then kicked back out in 3 days, with 500 Japanese dead and 1,000 wounded. Then came Nohomon in June and July 1939, including a major attack against the Emperor's express orders, the result was a Japanese division nearly annihilated. With things like Japanese air strikes on Siberian airfields, after the fighting and armistice the Kwantung Army command was purged. It seems there was a faction who planned China then the USSR, and they were very discomforted by the Hitler-Stalin agreement in August 1939. Even in December 1941 about 25% of the army strength was in Manchuria.
In 1940/41 China was asking for US help in having Japan to the peace table. Japanese terms, China would recognise the new Inner Mongolia Government (Can you say Japanese colony), Japan could enlarge garrisons in Northern China. No Anti Japanese officials would be appointed in North China. The Shanghai DMZ would be enlarged (equals more Japanese troops in Shanghai). All anti Japanese policies eliminated, with Japan determining anti Japanese. China would join the Anti Comintern pact. China would cut tariffs for Japanese goods. China would respect foreigners rights and interests in China. (Japan would take or do what it wanted). Later came merging the Nationalist and Japanese sponsored governments.
The risks are of course obvious from hindsight, in 1940 the great risk was the European Empires with colonies in Asia might be breaking up and failure to fill that power vacuum would mean Japan losing a great opportunity to instantly have big and wealthy additions to the Empire. Additions that would make it dominant in the rubber and tin trade and provide all the oil the country needed as well as plenty of food. Powerful and successful allies had been found in Europe, the Red Army Counter attack near Moscow started on 5 December 1941, well after Japan's war decision. Japan told itself it had easily won all its modern wars, even when badly out numbered. The military control of the government meant military solutions and requirements tended to come first. The amount of political violence in Japan meant many thought there was a real risk of civil war, making some decide better to fight an external enemy and possibly lose than defeat yourselves and end up destroyed anyway.
A war between Japan and the US became as close to inevitable as possible when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, with its conditions about what to do if another major power entered the then existing European war, the US had a copy almost immediately. During 1940 it became clear Japan was stockpiling strategic resources, helping that was a bad move, especially before operation Barbarossa as it risked materials making it to Europe, or being used in any attack on South East Asia in support of the Axis. The Japanese judged the US would enter the war as soon as Japan attacked South East Asia, or soon after, derailing the offensive.
By 1940/41 there had been plenty of moves and counter moves, depending on the chosen start date it is easy to decide one was the driver and the other doing the reacting.
Think also of how many empires (or countries) were created by individuals going off and taking control of areas then "presenting" them to the government. With their original expeditions having somewhere between no and full official support. The British Colonial office in the 19th century was very anti colonial in the early period, since it seemed to them adventurers would go off, claim the area, upset the inhabitants and leave the British Government to pick up the costs and colonies were a financial drain. At the end of the 19th century the attitude had radically changed.
Japan taking Korea from China, the Russo-Japanese War (though a number of Japanese gains were taken by European powers after the settlement), the spoils of WWI plus the 21 demands on China. Japan was the last to leave what became the USSR, dreams of expansion into Siberia existed. There was strong support for the idea a great power had a big military and a colonial empire and that Japan deserved to be a great power. Asia ruled by Japan had plenty of support in Japan. The depression and subsequent trade barriers hurt Japan, helping the radical's cause, there was real anger over the poverty in Japan when compared with the west and the way the west was perceived as rigging the rules to keep it that way.
When it comes to the 20+ years of decisions from 1918 on there were plenty of people involved and their ideas and reasons changed over time, as did circumstances. The Japanese Government was a military and civilian government given the Navy and Army ministers had to be serving officers. That gave the Army and/or Navy veto powers. The Japanese Diet was democratic and the story of the 1930's for Japan is the struggle between those that wanted it as a western style legislature and those that wanted it neutered and/or stacked with radicals.
On 14 May 1932 the Japanese Prime Minister was assassinated, the killers found many supporters, their trials became a platform for them to state their beliefs, light sentences, many later reduced.
In Tokyo early morning 26 February 1936, the rebels begin to kill their targets. At 9.00 am the Emperor interrupts the Army officer reading out what was a list of justifications for the killings, with a request to stop the rebellion. So troops and ships were mobilised to surround the rebel held areas, meantime the Army command tried to figure out a way to, in effect, endorse the rebellion or at least get the rebels minimal punishment. On 28 February the final pleas for clemency came in from the Army leaders, including a request for an Imperial agent authorising the rebels to commit suicide. On 29 February the troops finally moved, starting at about 8.00am. The list of conspirators were 1,475 army, 8 civilians and 0 navy. The courts martial were held without publicity, lasted around an hour each and the ringleaders, military and civilian, were executed. The purge was also helped by the fact so many of those killed were navy men, and their killers were army. Post rebellion the new Prime Minister Koki Hirota then was able to stare down the Army's attempts at a blacklist of potential cabinet members. The Diet was more moderate and therefore more able to put a brake on the radicals. Japan's drift to major war was slowed but not stopped. The threats of violence helping supress dissent about radial solutions, the war but not a war with China from July 1937 another reason to clamp down on dissent and push the expansion case, support the troops, it is patriotic.
The "2-26" incident was much more a genuine uprising, the generals did not order it, even if they largely agreed with the demands. Note the demands of the rebels were to annihilate people in power who were hindering "the divine Showa Restoration", these included, military officers, elder statesmen, bureaucrats, political party leaders and "other criminals".
It seems clear Japan could make war on China with minimal risk of intervention from other powers, something evident at the time, The IJA invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and by the end of the year had occupied the area. The Shanghai incident ran from 18 January to 3 March 1932, where the IJN tried to use force to stop the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. Effectively a division of IJA troops was sent in February. The Japanese officially created their Manchurian colony on 25 August 1932. On 31 August 1932 the Japanese invoked their version of the Monroe Doctrine. In March 1933 the IJA occupied key areas of Jehol province. On 27 March 1933 Japan announced it was withdrawing from the League of Nations. In 1934 IJA troops entered Chahar (inner Mongolia) and Hopei (the province Beijing was in). During 1934 the Japanese worked up their plan for a war with the USSR, using 27 out of 30 divisions. Which required the situation in China to be quiet. In Spring 1935 pro Japanese Chinese troops drove the Chinese forces out of Jehol. The Japanese also demanded Chinese troops withdraw from Hopei, which they did.
Tension in northern China was on the rise as the Nationalists closed in on the (semi) independent warlords there, forcing them to choose between fighting the nationalists or joining them. The Japanese expansionists were not happy about the idea they could face a united China, instead of a collection of warlords they could manipulate or easily defeat. The colonial faction was not happy about the long term threat a united China would pose to the Japanese colonies on the mainland. The excuse for intervention of lawlessness was going away.
Inside the military there was the Kodo ha (Imperial Way) faction aiming for a military dictatorship under the Emperor (The civilians with their links to big business had plenty of corruption scandals to parade) and the Tosei ha or control faction who wanted the army in the field to be controlled by GHQ and were less interested in a military dictatorship.
Kodo ha, 100% soldier, Emperor higher than the law, "direct rule of the Emperor", divine origin believers, anti communist, politicians no good, no compromise, unhappy with peace, battlefield men, Nazi type sympathisers.
Tosei ha, more law abiding, lay stress on merit, respect status quo, believe in cooperating with politicians and businessmen, consider international cooperation important.
The trouble for the officers in charge were the increased radicalisation of subordinates, "Rule from Below"
According to the Japanese statistical yearbook the official Japanese expenditure by the war and navy departments goes like this, in million yen, year, war, navy
1930 201 / 242
1931 227 / 227
1932 374 / 313
1933 463 / 410
1934 459 / 483
1935 497 / 536
1936 511 / 567
1937 591 / 645
1938 488 / 679
1939 825 / 804
1940 1,192 / 1,034
1941 1,156 / 1,497
Total Japanese government expenditure grew from 1,558 million yen in 1930 to 8,134 million yen in 1941. Note the struggle for parity between the army and navy. The problem is to capture all the expenditure on defence, not just the departmental budgets. According to Japan's War Economy by Erich Pauer in 1930 the Japanese government spent 28.6% of its budget on defence and 17.7% on debt. By 1935 it was 46.3% and 17.6% respectively, in 1940 50.3% and 15.5%. Government liabilities in the first 5 years of the 1930s came to 3.7 billion yen, the next 5 years 20.5 billion yen. (the 1941-45 period 168.5 billion yen)
In June 1937 there was a USSR border incident which was resolved largely without fighting, but when Japan signed the anti Comintern pact the USSR stepped up its support to China.
China incident first shots fired 7 July 1937, fighting from then on. The army had become radicalised enough to conduct massacres as well as running around wielding swords.
In July 1938 the Japanese demanded control of all disputed border areas with the USSR and Manchuria. This was supported by a corps level attack to take one area and the local commanders, as near usual, kept going beyond their ordered stop line and were then kicked back out in 3 days, with 500 Japanese dead and 1,000 wounded. Then came Nohomon in June and July 1939, including a major attack against the Emperor's express orders, the result was a Japanese division nearly annihilated. With things like Japanese air strikes on Siberian airfields, after the fighting and armistice the Kwantung Army command was purged. It seems there was a faction who planned China then the USSR, and they were very discomforted by the Hitler-Stalin agreement in August 1939. Even in December 1941 about 25% of the army strength was in Manchuria.
In 1940/41 China was asking for US help in having Japan to the peace table. Japanese terms, China would recognise the new Inner Mongolia Government (Can you say Japanese colony), Japan could enlarge garrisons in Northern China. No Anti Japanese officials would be appointed in North China. The Shanghai DMZ would be enlarged (equals more Japanese troops in Shanghai). All anti Japanese policies eliminated, with Japan determining anti Japanese. China would join the Anti Comintern pact. China would cut tariffs for Japanese goods. China would respect foreigners rights and interests in China. (Japan would take or do what it wanted). Later came merging the Nationalist and Japanese sponsored governments.
The risks are of course obvious from hindsight, in 1940 the great risk was the European Empires with colonies in Asia might be breaking up and failure to fill that power vacuum would mean Japan losing a great opportunity to instantly have big and wealthy additions to the Empire. Additions that would make it dominant in the rubber and tin trade and provide all the oil the country needed as well as plenty of food. Powerful and successful allies had been found in Europe, the Red Army Counter attack near Moscow started on 5 December 1941, well after Japan's war decision. Japan told itself it had easily won all its modern wars, even when badly out numbered. The military control of the government meant military solutions and requirements tended to come first. The amount of political violence in Japan meant many thought there was a real risk of civil war, making some decide better to fight an external enemy and possibly lose than defeat yourselves and end up destroyed anyway.
A war between Japan and the US became as close to inevitable as possible when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, with its conditions about what to do if another major power entered the then existing European war, the US had a copy almost immediately. During 1940 it became clear Japan was stockpiling strategic resources, helping that was a bad move, especially before operation Barbarossa as it risked materials making it to Europe, or being used in any attack on South East Asia in support of the Axis. The Japanese judged the US would enter the war as soon as Japan attacked South East Asia, or soon after, derailing the offensive.
By 1940/41 there had been plenty of moves and counter moves, depending on the chosen start date it is easy to decide one was the driver and the other doing the reacting.
