The Zero's Maneuverability (1 Viewer)

[Thumpalumpacus]

Too bad for Hitler he got distracted by a little harrassment bombing. He was a week away from hobbling Fighter Command. Four years later it was the Tactical Air Forces that made the Luftwaffe bases in France and the Low Countries untenable, making Operation Overlord possible.

Right, exactly the point. You may not even make the runways unusable, but by blowing up ancillary stuff -- repair shops, parts depots, some fuel bowsers, and so on -- you can sure reduce efficiency even if you don't catch planes on the ground.

 

[MiTasol]

I didn't "ignore" anything at all, and didn't mention internal politics at all.

What I said was the embargo was a defacto blockade, forcing Japan to react. We expected one reaction. They countered with another entirely.

When you "cut off" a country from necessary resouces, you'd best expect some reaction from them. Apparently, we didn't really expoect an attack since NONE of the Pacific bases were ready for one.

Totally agree

 

[GrauGeist]

Both were rapidly fascist, imperialist, racist, anti-communist/socialist and anti-democratic.

Absolutely not Fascist.

The definition of Fascism in modern times has been watered down.

Imperial Japan in the 1930's would have not tolerated a Fascist doctrine/philosophy.

At all.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Absolutely not Fascist.

The definition of Fascism in modern times has been watered down.

Imperial Japan in the 1930's would have not tolerated a Fascist doctrine/philosophy.

At all.

There's an ongoing argument among historians whether inter-war Japan was a fascist state, para-fascist state, totalitarian regime or something else. Certainly Japanese decision makers in the inter-war period drew heavily from European fascism in their national ideology.

Personally, I lean towards the view that it was a fascist state that was integrated within the existing hierarchical and historical structures, rather than the European fascism which largely replaced the prior structures.

 

[Bergjon12]

There's an ongoing argument among historians whether inter-war Japan was a fascist state, para-fascist state, totalitarian regime or something else. Certainly Japanese decision makers in the inter-war period drew heavily from European fascism in their national ideology.

Personally, I lean towards the view that it was a fascist state that was integrated within the existing hierarchical and historical structures, rather than the European fascism which largely replaced the prior structures.

I don't disagree, but I find it rather unhelpful to look for parallels within western culture.

Japanese society was in a militaristic death spiral. Japan had copied western military cultural products with high quality, but had failed to leave behind disruptive feudal military ideals. Also, Japan had copied western political cultural products with less success. It had failed to empower a representative assembly and prioritize civilian control of the military or even a unified military command, leaving the army and navy to behave like feudal clans trying to manipulate the emperor. Describing this situation in terms of fascism clouds rather than clarifies what was going on. The outstanding problem was that the military was more out of control than in control, especially the army. National policy was being formulated on the basis of the narrow interests of the army or the navy, rather than national survival. A particularly glaring example is the 2nd Sino-Japanese war which was instigated by local Japanese army commanders out of pique, not as an act of national policy. Narrow army interests don't come much narrower than that.

A country which conducts business in this way is inevitably headed for a Wile E. Coyote type collision with reality.

I would also like to take this opportunity to say that I find attempts to paint Japan as the victim of this situation to be distasteful.

 

[GregP]

If you're pointing that at me, I didn't claim they were victims at all. I said they we "embargoed" by the U.S.A. and HAD to respond. The fact that the military was dictating the response doesn't make them a victim. They created the conditions for embargo by trying to militarily expand in China. The U.S.A. responded by doing something to show their dissatisfaction with the expansionist actions Japan was taking.

The USA was the victim at Pearl Harbor by not anticipating such a response anywhere. Not one, single US base was on war alert or was looking for an attack as a result of the embargo. That was likely the result of the isolationist policies of the U.S.A. after WWII and before WWII, combined with the reluctance to spend money on the military as a natural response to the Great Depression. All that conspired with the simple lack of experience of our diplomats in dealing with other countries seemingly not constrained by money or democratic politics.

The result was a successful attack on a shallow-water Naval port that was unprecedented in history, so maybe they get a sort of "pass" for not expecting an attack? No way.

We SHOULD have been watching for and preparing for a military response of SOME sort since we knew the embargo of vital raw materials was going to choke Japan if allowed to continue.

I don't cast fault upon Japan for responding. I fault US military leaders and the president for not expecting SOME response of a military nature since we absolutely KNEW the military was in charge of Japan at the time. They were bound to do SOMETHING as a result of the embargo brought on by their own expansionist actions.

Take into account that the Japan of today is NOT the Japan of 1940. So, staing this stuff is not a knock on any current Japanese policies. It is an opinion of what was going on at that time without either villiying it or justifying it.

 

[GrauGeist]

There's an ongoing argument among historians whether inter-war Japan was a fascist state, para-fascist state, totalitarian regime or something else. Certainly Japanese decision makers in the inter-war period drew heavily from European fascism in their national ideology.

Personally, I lean towards the view that it was a fascist state that was integrated within the existing hierarchical and historical structures, rather than the European fascism which largely replaced the prior structures.

Showa Statism predates Italian Fascism by nearly half a century.

Neither is connected, as they each are a result of independent circumstances.

 

[Bergjon12]

If you're pointing that at me, I didn't claim they were victims at all.

I was not thinking of you.

Regarding US preparedness, as I said, the move to Pearl was war preparation. The US government and military of the time were dysfunctional bodies. The government was paralyzed by the experience of having served a narcissist for almost a decade. The military was lethargic from the comfort of peacetime and a lack of martial spirit, or in the case of MacArthur, insubordination bordering on treason. This combination of factors left the door open to a coup de main by Japan.

Saying that the US was unaware of and not prepared for the military option, as a binary proposition, is false.

Let's watch 'Tora Tora Tora' together to find the truth.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUvpYBcFpZc

 

[GregP]

Video doesn't lead my PC anywhere. Just FYI, not a complaint.

Pearl Harbor, Guam, and the Phillppines were not prepared. I'm not too sure what other bases WERE prepared.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I don't cast fault upon Japan for responding. I fault US military leaders and the president for not expecting SOME response of a military nature since we absolutely KNEW the military was in charge of Japan at the time. They were bound to do SOMETHING as a result of the embargo brought on by their own expansionist actions.

Actually, we understood that we were pushing Japan into a corner. We undertook diplomatic negotiations that lasted well into Nov 1941 in an attempt to avert war. It's true that Cordell Hull's note of 26 Nov 1941 was unacceptable to the Japanese, and understood as such by Americans in the know, such as Ambassador Grew, immediately when they saw it.

When it was rejected, the following messages were sent out:

Message Sent by Navy Department, 27 November 1941:This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move is expected with the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of the naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in War Plan 46 [The Navy's war plan]. inform district and army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department.

Department of Army dispatch, 27 November: Negotiations with Japan appear to have terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest of possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat, not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned to Rainbow Five [the Army's war plan]so far as they pertainto Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essentialofficers.

Message sent by Chief of Naval Operations, 3 December: Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese Consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn...confidential and secret documents.

https://olli.gmu.edu/docstore/700docs/0901-703-PEARL%20HARBOR%20WARNINGS.pdf

It was understood that the drift towards war, which had been ongoing since American objections to Japanese aggression in China -- not to mention the sinking of USS Panay -- was not being curtailed.

Laying blame for the Pacific War at the feet of American policy ignores the fact that Japan refused to compromise its aggression in China even through a couple of years of diplomacy.

We knew there would be a military response. What we didn't know is where that blow would fall. We expected at worst that the Philippines would be invaded, or more likely that the Japanese would attack British and Dutch holdings in Southeast Asia.

We anticipated that there would be a military response. We just didn't know where that response would be. This is recorded in our national archives. Don't rewrite documented history.

 

[Bergjon12]

Pearl Harbor, Guam, and the Phillppines were not prepared. I'm not too sure what other bases WERE prepared.

'Not prepared'. What does that mean?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

'Not prepared'. What does that mean?

Pearl Harbor ships were at minimal staffing levels, ammunition was locked away, air patrols were not on a wartime footing.

In the PI, MacArthur and Sutherland refused any idea of striking airfields on Formosa even after news of the strike on PH happened. They did launch aircraft to clear airfields, but as it happened those American planes came short of fuel, they landed not very long before the first Japanese strikes hit, and many were destroyed on the ground.

We Americans, despite the war-warnings I've linked above, were still not combat-wise.

 

[Bergjon12]

We Americans, despite the war-warnings I've linked above, were still not combat-wise.

That is very well put and I would defend that statement all week long.

However;

US forces in Ph had a well-established war plan and specific and current orders to carry out that plan, which MacArthur disobeyed, what I am tempted to call an act of treason. That is not unpreparedness, that is insubordination by a single individual.

US forces in Hawaii were using newly installed radar equipment and beefed up air patrols intended to catch exactly the kind of attack that did occur. Radar did in fact pick up the attacking wave. The information failed to be passed on because of a dereliction of duty by a single individual, which does not equate to unpreparedness. Similarly a mini-sub sighting was not passed on bc of dereliction of duty by another individual.

OK I got this.

The problem was a lack of readiness, not preparedness, in the case of Hawaii.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

That is very well put and I would defend that statement all week long.

However;

US forces in Ph had a well-established war plan and specific and current orders to carry out that plan, which MacArthur disobeyed, what I am tempted to call an act of treason. That is not unpreparedness, that is insubordination by a single individual.

US forces in Hawaii were using newly installed radar equipment and beefed up air patrols intended to catch exactly the kind of attack that did occur. Radar did in fact pick up the attacking wave. The information failed to be passed on because of a dereliction of duty by a single individual, which does not equate to unpreparedness. Similarly a mini-sub sighting was not passed on bc of dereliction of duty by another individual.

OK I got this.

The problem was a lack of readiness, not preparedness, in the case of Hawaii.

Right. The problem was not intelligence or prognostication, the problem lay in execution. For instance, when Gen Short, GOC Hawaii area, received the above war warnings, rather than scatter his aircraft, set up intensified patrol schedules, and so on, he marshaled his aircraft wingtip along in order to more easily guard them against sabotage feared from the substantial Nisei population on the islands.

Intel is good. It also needs 1) to be interpreted correctly, and 2) to be actionable. What guesses were being made regarding Japanese diplomacy and intentions were interpreted fairly well, but were not actionable, which left it to theater commanders like MacArthur and Short to figure out their own responses.

Regarding the radar detection, I think "dereliction of duty" is too harsh. Lt Tyler was not well trained in radar and was already expecting a flight of B-17s in from California. Further, the crew of the radar station at Opana were themselves training on the set.

The submarine contact and sinking outside the mouth of the harbor should have set every boiler in the fleet alight, you're dead-right.

The failure was more in operational assessments than it was in intel.

 

[Greg Boeser]

If you're pointing that at me, I didn't claim they were victims at all. I said they we "embargoed" by the U.S.A. and HAD to respond. The fact that the military was dictating the response doesn't make them a victim. They created the conditions for embargo by trying to militarily expand in China. The U.S.A. responded by doing something to show their dissatisfaction with the expansionist actions Japan was taking.

The USA was the victim at Pearl Harbor by not anticipating such a response anywhere. Not one, single US base was on war alert or was looking for an attack as a result of the embargo. That was likely the result of the isolationist policies of the U.S.A. after WWII and before WWII, combined with the reluctance to spend money on the military as a natural response to the Great Depression. All that conspired with the simple lack of experience of our diplomats in dealing with other countries seemingly not constrained by money or democratic politics.

The result was a successful attack on a shallow-water Naval port that was unprecedented in history, so maybe they get a sort of "pass" for not expecting an attack? No way.

We SHOULD have been watching for and preparing for a military response of SOME sort since we knew the embargo of vital raw materials was going to choke Japan if allowed to continue.

I don't cast fault upon Japan for responding. I fault US military leaders and the president for not expecting SOME response of a military nature since we absolutely KNEW the military was in charge of Japan at the time. They were bound to do SOMETHING as a result of the embargo brought on by their own expansionist actions.

Take into account that the Japan of today is NOT the Japan of 1940. So, staing this stuff is not a knock on any current Japanese policies. It is an opinion of what was going on at that time without either villiying it or justifying it.

The US military was gearing up for war. Mobilization had begun in 1940. Military commands across the Pacific had been alerted to expect hostile moves by Japan. Example: The USS Enterprise, ferrying VMF-211 To Wake Island in early December, did so under full wartime readiness. Admiral Kimmel and General Short in Hawaii had recieved alerts in late November. That they failed to prepare for an attack on the Hawaiian bases had more to do with pre-war beliefs that the Japanese would focus on SE Asia and the Philippines.

 

[GrauGeist]

MacArthur also had to deal with the President of the Philippines, who was adamant that he had a peace deal with Japan and did not want Mac to antagonize them.

There were also the case of Halsey putting Task Force 8 under full wartime footing on their way back from supplying Wake Island.
The SBDs of Scouting 6 were fully armed and deployed to sweep ahead of the fleet. Their arrival at Pearl was just crappy luck.

 

[Bergjon12]

MacArthur also had to deal with the President of the Philippines, who was adamant that he had a peace deal with Japan and did not want Mac to antagonize them.

Mac was a very political person on the whole. Judging by his relationship with the Ph Prez, he had gone native as well.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

There were also the case of Halsey putting Task Force 8 under full wartime footing on their way back from supplying Wake Island.
The SBDs of Scouting 6 were fully armed and deployed to sweep ahead of the fleet. Their arrival at Pearl was just crappy luck.

Yep. Even before the attack on Pearl, Halsey had issued orders to his task force to address any unknown contact as hostile and act accordingly.

 

[GrauGeist]

Mac was a very political person on the whole. Judging by his relationship with the Ph Prez, he had gone native as well.

It was a balancing act for Mac - he had to placate the Phillipine leaders while keeping Washington happy.

Anyone with basic geography skills at the time, could see that the Philippine Islands were a "bridge" between Japan and the Orient.

There was no way in hell that Japan was going to have a Neutral Philippines in their backyard, especially with it being a U.S. "protectorate".

 

[Bergjon12]

It was a balancing act for Mac - he had to placate the Phillipine leaders while keeping Washington happy.

I'm sorry, I don't buy that. Mac's behavior was caused by his own problematic immersion in Ph politics. In fact, your statement describes the very essence of 'going native'.

If Mac had attacked Formosa like he was ordered to, what exactly were the Phs going to do about it?

Since we are on the subject, Mac was a narcissist, a seriously deficient military commander, disloyal and consistently insubordinate. He deserved a firing squad. There, I said it.