Maneuverability vs Speed

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

When your aircrews are getting shot down left and right, you've got to be motivated to make quick improvements. This also benefitted from Swede Momsen's experiments which resulted in a more robust contact exploder, which allowed an increase in drop altitude as well.

When? 1943? or 1944?

 

[SplitRz]

Well, that was a pretty coherant 'no' to the idea of a kinder, more open minded and polite form of discourse then.

If someone wants a narcissistic echo-chamber, Its been my experience that its usually best to grant it to them.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Well, that was a pretty coherant 'no' to the idea of a kinder, more open minded and polite form of discourse then.

Again, I can't say what goes on in your head, but I did not interpret your post you made as a sincere appeal for a 'kinder, more open minded, and polite form of discourse', considering that it was dripping with apparent hostility and was doubling down on bogus interpretations of the points under dispute.

If someone wants a narcissistic echo-chamber, Its been my experience that its usually best to grant it to them.

Like this.

I try to reply to openness, open mindedness, and respect by reciprocating. I am also frank when I detect disdain, arrogance, or malice. This is the part that gets on some people's nerves. I don't adhere to the notion of being rude or dismissive behind a thin veil of politeness. I may not always guess right but I call it like I see it.

Same with the data which is the important part. If I get something wrong, as I not infrequently do, I accept the correction and add it to my little database. That is the main reason to participate in discussions here. If it appears that I am correct and someone is making spurious assertions tinged with personal invective, I point that out for what it is rather than pretend it's all sweetness and honey.

To me, the value of the data that emerges in these discussions is largely to help debunk or correct myths, add nuances to simplistic tropes and cliches. Not to obfuscate for the sake of winning an argument or protecting cherished beliefs that don't hold up to scrutiny.


Like I said before, maybe you should look in the mirror. Also by all means feel free to opt out of any further discussion with me if you think I'm a narcissist.

 

[SplitRz]

However, i do not see any substantial data on the structure of the G4M as either strong or weak. And while it is true that a light structure isn't of nessessity a bad thing, you seemed to list it among draw backs. certainly the Betty lacked protection, but i do not count self sealing tanks and armour as structural deficiensies.

Its a difficult one for me to feel I'd be able to get to the bottom of without seeing (and being able to comprehend!) an engineers report and analysis of comparative strength to weight ratios for the materials and construction - and what degree of redundancy was built into it. There might however, be an expert lurking here - I think some of the contributors have been directly involved with historical airframe servicing and restoration.

Maybe comparative VNe between airframes might give some very kind of crude indication? In the following thread which I'll post a link to below, an VNe of 360mph is quoted for the early Zero marks for example. If accurate, that seems to suggest that the quest for weight reduction may have influenced redundancy and reserve of strength perhaps? Of course, that doesn't implicate the G4M directly, but I guess its a question as to how far and deep the weight saving philosophy across the Japanese manufacturers design philosophy.

It may well be that 'structural weakness' has become unfairly baked into perceptions as you say - if Japanese aircraft were bursting into flames or unprotected components and crew saw them comparatively easily shot-down by gunfire, I guess any objective appreciation of the inherent strength of the airframe would be lost.

Here's that link to the earlier thread post. I'd be interested to read what you think of the discussion that was had. Japanese lightly built carrier aircraft

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Its a difficult one for me to feel I'd be able to get to the bottom of without seeing (and being able to comprehend!) an engineers report and analysis of comparative strength to weight ratios for the materials and construction - and what degree of redundancy was built into it. There might however, be an expert lurking here - I think some of the contributors have been directly involved with historical airframe servicing and restoration.

Maybe comparative VNe between airframes might give some very kind of crude indication? In the following thread which I'll post a link to below, an VNe of 360mph is quoted for the early Zero marks for example. If accurate, that seems to suggest that the quest for weight reduction may have influenced redundancy and reserve of strength perhaps? Of course, that doesn't implicate the G4M directly, but I guess its a question as to how far and deep the weight saving philosophy across the Japanese manufacturers design philosophy.

It may well be that 'structural weakness' has become unfairly baked into perceptions as you say - if Japanese aircraft were bursting into flames or unprotected components and crew saw them comparatively easily shot-down by gunfire, I guess any objective appreciation of the inherent strength of the airframe would be lost.

Here's that link to the earlier thread post. I'd be interested to read what you think of the discussion that was had. Japanese lightly built carrier aircraft

I am no expert on the Zero, but one thing I remember reading was that the wing and fuselage were made as a continuous structure. I.e. instead of having the wings bolted on like most US and European planes. In a sense this may be thought of as a little bit like the geodesic construction of the Wellington - it made for a stronger 'skin' which maybe relied a little bit less on internal support. For the Zero, it meant that construction was a little bit more labor intensive, which may have cut down on production numbers (though they built a lot). But I think it contributed to strength. maybe somebody else here knows the details better.

Zero was limited in dive speed, but it seemed to be able to pull G pretty well and hold up to carrier landings better than say, a Seafire.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

When? 1943? or 1944?

Yep. I think it was Lockwood who had him set up to test for the exploder failures and that in 1943.

He discovered the metal on the firing pin was too weak, but found (according to Drachinifel in his episode on the Mk 14) a wrecked airplane or three with the right metal for the job, so they set up a small machine shop with the express purpose of making replacement pins to ship out to the fleet.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yep. I think it was Lockwood who had him set up to test for the exploder failures and that in 1943.

He discovered the metal on the firing pin was too weak, but found (according to Drachinifel in his episode on the Mk 14) a wrecked airplane or three with the right metal for the job, so they set up a small machine shop with the express purpose of making replacement pins to ship out to the fleet.

What I'm trying to figure out here is how soon did some kind of improved Mark 13 make it into the field? And do you know how soon they sorted out the other issues like not detonating, running too low, running in circles etc. etc.

When did they improve the speed? or did they?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

(same for Mk 14 and Mk 15)

EDIT: Wikipedia says some improvements in August-September 1943 and notes that during the Battle of Vella Gulf in Aug 43 the torpedoes worked better. It also says:

"The issues with the Mark 14 and Mark 15 torpedoes were not completely fixed until November 1943 when Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid (Seventh Fleet, SWPA) overruled Rear Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie, who refused to believe that his torpedoes had malfunctions, and ordered all submarine and destroyer captains to disable their faulty magnetic detonators and also the contact pin problem was finally resolved that same month.[5]"

Do you know when Momsen did his tests on the Mk 13 and when his suggestions were adopted?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

In a way, it seems like while the Japanese had a kind of 'gap year' in which they were set back a little bit by the early A6M3 and the late arrival of the B6N and trouble with the D4Y, the US also had a gap year where they were using really overloaded F4F-4, with some apparent complacency, did not develop an improved engine for them (later seen in the FM2) and were also still stuck with defective / useless torpedoes until the second last third of the year. And as we know SB2C was also taking a long time to become viable. The USN carrier war was still being fought mainly by F4F-4s and SBDs in 1943, TBFs were there and helped with recon, ASW and attacking enemy bases, but without viable torpedoes their value was limited.

The British too were stuck with underwhelming or badly delayed newer generation of naval aircraft with the Seafire, Barracuda and Firefly during 1943.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

What I'm trying to figure out here is how soon did some kind of improved Mark 13 make it into the field? And do you know how soon they sorted out the other issues like not detonating, running too low, running in circles etc. etc.

When did they improve the speed? or did they?

The improvements in speed started in 1943 (thanks Bill for the heads-up on the typo), with the addition of the shrouds, and then later that year with the replacement firing pins (stouter pins not only were more reliable, they also allowed an expanded drop envelope.

The unreliable detonator issue was really a mix of three problems. The depth setting wasn't accurate, and in the first half of 42 tended to run about 10' too deep. This made the magnetic detonator less apt to fire. Once the depth problem was settled by later in 42, it was forbidden to turn off the mags, but at this point many skippers didn't trust them and set depth for contact explosion. Unfortunately, this resulted in the magnetic warhead going off 50-100 yds short. Remember too that the magnetic field in that part of the globe was different from where the warheads were tested, so even with the problem "fixed" you still got some duds. And then, of course, the contact-exploder design sucked and was prone to bending or shearing from by-the-book strikes, i.e. perpendicular to the target hull.

The tendency to circle is something I know less about, but I don't think they ever solved it. According to Capt Toti in one of the videos I will list below, the proclivity to circle carried forward to the Mk17 as well.

By the fall of 1943 the main problems had largely been solved, and weapons shipped to the fleet didn't carry the problems forward, except the circling. Of course you're always going to get duds and malfunctions, especially with a weapon as finicky as a torpedo, but that's par for the course.

Here's a couple of longish vids to watch when you have the time:

Drachinifel:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ5Ru7Zu_1I

Unauthorized History of the Pacific War:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JEu5xqA1TvE

Both are worth the watch.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Remember too that the magnetic field in that part of the globe was different from where the warheads were tested, so even with the problem "fixed" you still got some duds.

Wow that is far out!

And then, of course, the contact-exploder design sucked and was prone to bending or shearing from by-the-book strikes, i.e. perpendicular to the target hull.

The tendency to circle is something I know less about, but I don't think they ever solved it. According to Capt Toti in one of the videos I will list below, the proclivity to circle carried forward to the Mk17 as well.

The interesting thing about this, or one of the interesting things, is how hard it was to communicate this problem up the chain of command and back to the contractors (which I think was the navy itself, right?) who were making the weapons. It's almost the grim dark counterpoint to the sunny story of the Thach Weave.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The interesting thing about this, or one of the interesting things, is how hard it was to communicate this problem up the chain of command and back to the contractors (which I think was the navy itself, right?) who were making the weapons. It's almost the grim dark counterpoint to the sunny story of the Thach Weave.

BuOrd absolutely refused to accept blame for the issues for well over a year, and I think it was ComSubPac in 1942 at Pearl who'd forbidden skippers deactivating magnetic detonators -- because he'd had a hand in designing them. The guys at BuOrd at that time were the same guys who designed the contact exploder, and refused to admit any error, blaming the issues on sub skippers. It took a direct order from Adm King to get them to work on the problem, and this was only after the tests had started to show the flaws, undeniably, in late 1942.

IMO, the denialist behavior of BuOrd in this process amounts to criminal negligence, especially when you consider that prewar, only one live test was conducted, IIRC. One. It's shocking that not one officer there was prosecuted.

Once the problems were ironed out, by early 1944 it was a generally a good torpedo ... but tell that to the dead submarine crews.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

BuOrd absolutely refused to accept blame for the issues for well over a year, and I think it was ComSubPac in 1942 at Pearl who'd forbidden skippers deactivating magnetic detonators -- because he'd had a hand in designing them. The guys at BuOrd at that time were the same guys who designed the contact exploder, and refused to admit any error, b;aming the issues on sub skippers. It took a direct order from Adm King to get them to work on the problem, and this was only after the tests had started to show the flaws, undeniably, in late 1942.

IMO, the denialist behavior of BuOrd in this process amounts to criminal negligence, especially when you consider that prewar, only one live test was conducted, IIRC. One. It's shocking that not one officer there was prosecuted.

Once the problems were ironed out, by early 1944 it was a generally a good torpedo ... but tell that to the dead submarine crews.

Agree with all of that 100%. Imagine how frustrating, heartbreaking, for those skippers, and the pilots etc., who were being blamed for this catastrophe. Definitely shows a major weakness in the US system here IMO. Similar to (but more severe than) some of the problems with the P-38 etc.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Agree with all of that 100%. Imagine how frustrating, heartbreaking, for those skippers, and the pilots etc., who were being blamed for this catastrophe. Definitely shows a major weakness in the US system here IMO. Similar to (but more severe than) some of the problems with the P-38 etc.

Watch that UHotPW video. The vitriol Capt Toti (himself a retired USN submarine flotilla commander) heaps upon BuOrd and the process of design, development, and fixing the problems has to be heard to be believed.

 

[SplitRz]

Thank you for taking the time to give a reasoned answer.

However, i do not see any substantial data on the structure of the G4M as either strong or weak. And while it is true that a light structure isn't of nessessity a bad thing, you seemed to list it among draw backs. certainly the Betty lacked protection, but i do not count self sealing tanks and armour as structural deficiensies.

I can't really say how large a percentage of Japanese designs were structurally light or even weak. Some certainly were, but like the preferrence for radial engines do not make the Ki-61 a radial engined fighter, so the light structure of, say, the Ki-43 does not make the structure of specifically the G4M lightweight. Saying that the probably wasis not a proof.

Another old horse being trotted out is how armour and self sealing tanks were sacrificed in the design of the A6M. Where the Zero stands out is the time it took, far too long, before these were added to the aircraft. While some aircraft were designed in the late 30'es with protective measures incorporated (some IJAF bombers amongst them), it was not as common that exclusion was a sacrifice or a revoluitionary departure from current design praxcis. Exactly when it was becoming common, in the design process, or retrofitted as afterthought, is of course open to argument.

I think it is a shame that we know comparatively little about Japanese (and other participants planes) that we do, compared to planes like the Spitfire or B-17. That is not only because of bias, but also the availabilty of sources and ability to read what exists in the original language. No, I still don't believe Google translate suffices. But it avails us nothing to extrapolate from what we do know to what we don't know. In the case of the G4M the fact that the damn thing ligtet up so easily, will remove badly shot up aircraft returning to base from the dataset out of proportion with better protected designs with which we can, provisionally, compare them.

i sometimes consider the A6M to be both the most underrated and the most overrated aircraft of ww2. As many media want to present everything as a sensasion, first the myth of its invincibility, and then the myth of its utter uselessnes, has to be debunked over and over. we've discussed it often in this forum. And then the discussion starts over, with much of the old threads being not ignored, but rather not read. When i attempt to read everything just of current threads before posting, I often end up not posting at all.

This is partly an effect of the internet. I can mention a new (at least to me) channel on Youtube called something like 'mysterious super plane'. Both the utter thrash it presents in the videos, and the insane speed with which it puts out new videos, points to it mostly being made by chat bots.

I stumbled across the following. Interesting article. Again, its about the Zero rather than the G4M, but makes some interesting reading. Are there any assertions made here that should be challenged?

"It has often been said that "the engine makes the airplane," whether it's the Spirit of St. Louis' Wright Whirlwind, the P-51's Merlin or the 747's JT9D. In the late 1930s the Japanese had developed nothing more powerful than several 800- to 1,000- hp radials with little growth potential, at a time when American, British and German manufacturers were cranking out 1,200-hp engines, with 2,000 hp visible on the horizon. So Horikoshi needed to make his new fighter super light, which he did in part by having lightening holes cut and drilled through every internal airframe part possible—a technique that racecar builders would recognize immediately. In fact, Horikoshi could be called the Colin Chapman of aircraft designers; Chapman was the Lotus designer whose mantra was "simplicate and add lightness."

This horrified some traditional engineers, one of whom, when later asked to identify the Zero's main weakness, complained that "it was full of holes!" Horikoshi also persuaded the navy to change its ultimate-load standards for many components he didn't consider crucial; he designed them to "fail" but then rebound to their previous shape as soon as the load was reduced. As a result, the Zero was the fastest 1,000-hp, radial-engine fighter ever produced—but one with a number of single-point-failure locations that, if hit, could bring down the airplane.

The Zero was skinned with the lightest-gauge aluminum possible, and when the shadows were right, some photos of Zeros in flight show them seemingly clothed in crinkled tinfoil, especially in the cockpit area. British test pilot Eric Brown, who flew a captured Zero immediately after the war, even today recalls the constant noise of the oil-canning fuselage skin—"like the sound produced when one pushes on the side of a large biscuit tin." A typical Zero loaded with full fuel and ordnance weighed about 5,500 pounds—less than a midsize Cessna twin. A fully loaded Hellcat weighed well over twice that much, and definitely wasn't full of holes."

Myth of the Zero

 

[BarnOwlLover]

That's the issue with structural design. Light is good, but it has to make sense. That's what I like about the engineering of planes like the Spitfire and the lightweight P-51s and the F-82. They were light relative to other aircraft, but didn't sacrifice strength unnecessarily. Of course, the XP-51F was powered by a 1700hp Merlin, and the G and the P-51H had Merlins that made over 2000hp, so the power helped.

But even in racing, a lot of time power trumps lightweight. Look at American Le Mans Series races in 2007-2008 where the Audi R10s dominated the LMP2 cars, even though they were just as fast or even slightly faster on a clean lap. The more powerful Audis could slice though traffic like it was nothing and if close enough down any straight away, there was no defending against its acceleration and speed. Most LMP2 wins in '07 in the ALMS were down to better fuel mileage or catching lucky breaks (Mosport '07 is a big one there).

Again, fighter pilots want more of everything, but everything is also a compromise to some degree. It's up to the designer and the service as to which ones make more sense.

 

[GregP]

A trope can mean a figure of speach, but your comment was clearly meant in the second sense, i.e. as a cliche and therefore divorced from reality.

This was the second time in a row that you suggested I was repeating some fallacy out of ignorance, while yourself repeating fallacies which are pretty obvious for anyone (including many reading this thread whether they admit it or not) who are familiar with the operational history and aircraft active in the Pacific and China / Burma / India Theaters.

Also, I'm glad you knew a pilot. But you are not the only one who knew WW2 veteran pilots.

It is very well known among aviation historians and enthusiasts (including most people in this forum) that radial engines are generally less vulnerable, in particular to smaller caliber gunfire and shrapnel, than liquid cooled engines.
This was mentioned repeatedly in the IJA and IJN fighter policies and
It was also mentioned by Japanese pilots.

These are facts. Your acceptance of the facts is irrelevant to me

The original context of this was could A6M shoot down Allied fighter aircraft with it's 7.7 mm machine guns, once the cannon ammunition ran out. The answer is yes.

The whole debate about the alleged ineffectiveness of Japanese guns is kind of made moot by looking at the operational history, such as has been recently posted in the thread, which shows that the Japanese aircraft wrought a fair amount of havoc on the American, just as they had earlier against the British.



So you are an expert on the Hineri Komi now? I posted the link to the wiki you are quoting from here, you think I don't know what it says?

I can't say what is going on inside your head, but it appears as if you are being willfully obtuse here, simply because you don't want to accept the obvious, because that would require admitting that you were wrong. Not uncommon in such debate

View attachment 727668
In that image, the American plane (which looks like a Hellcat) is in white, the Japanese plane (seems to be a Zero) is in Gray. I drew a little cone in red to portray the angle of attack.

As you can see in the image, Hineri Komi allows the Japanese pilots to attack from above and at short range. Almost at a 90 degree angle in the image. This would bypass the armor behind the pilot's seat, and expose both the engine and the pilot to attack from a largely unprotected direction.

This is also what happens when diving down from above to attack, as Japanese fighters often did, and when turning inside an opponent in a horizontal turn, as they also typically did. Japanese pilots were also trained to attack enemy aircraft from behind and below, climbing up at a steep angle, something A6Ms were particularly good at. This also bypasses the armor, if the angle is steep enough.

I originally posted all this to explain to you how it worked, because you seemed not to know a lot about Pacific Theater warfare or the Zero. Not to prove to you something you don't want to believe. I can't do the latter.

When getting in discussions like this, if they get a little heated, I try to keep in mind that I'm not only talking to the person I'm debating in a given exchange. That person may not actually want to know the answer, but may just want to win the argument. Again I don't know I can't read minds. But other people reading the thread however may want to know pertinent data



The reference to the IL2-armor is not even close to being irrelevant to the point. You suggested that the Il-2 having an inline engine was (to you, quite obvious) proof that radial engines were not less vulnerable. I pointed out that they put armor all around the engine on the Il-2. (If they hadn't, they would have been crashing at probably double the already quite high rate they were).

Your question however sounds fairly logical, and for a fact the Russian Su-2 dive bomber had a radial engine, as did dedicated ground attack aircraft of many other nations, such as the German HS 129 did have radial engines, as did say, the AD-Skyraider. I don't know enough about the history of the Il-2 to say why they didn't use their radial engine. So far as I know the Soviets did not in fact have "many excellent radials" as you put it. In fact only one which would have been powerful enough would have been the Shvestov ASh-82 which was used on the La 5 - 11 series of fighters. That may be the reason why they didn't use it.

The Wiki for the IL-2 notes: "A radial engine powered variant of the Il-2 with the Shvetsov ASh-82 engine was proposed in 1942 to remedy projected shortages in the Mikulin inline engines. However, the Shvetsov ASh-82 was also used in the new Lavochkin La-5 fighter which effectively secured all available engines to the Lavochkin bureau."

The decision to use the Mikulin inline may have been for the aerodynamics, i.e. to improve speed, as in-line engines had less drag, generally speaking. It may also not have been the wisest decision as the IL-2 had a very high loss rate. It may also have been because few other Soviet aircraft used the Mikulin. The MiG-3 used the earlier AM-35 but it was discontinued.



I'm not in the least sensitive to disagreement. I am also not going to mince words when somebody says, implies or suggests that I'm making things up or propagating rumors. I find the rumors and tropes about WW2 aircraft irritating. I spend a lot of effort trying to debunk or add nuance to those.



I'd say look in the mirror mate. John Lydon was (and still is) fairly sarcastic himself and notoriously snippy with people asking what he thought were stupid questions. Like him or not he had the gift of gab. GG Allin was pretty incoherent and was never particularly sarcastic or glib. I was never a fan.

I can't say what motivates you, I'm sure you are a nice guy and we'd probably get along fine in person. But this post comes across smug and overly self confident in particular given that you are simultaneously making it clear you are a little bit out of your depth on the subject of Pacific Theater warfare. Sometimes it's better when you don't know, just admit it and thank the other person for allowing you to learn something new. That is what I try to do (and have done throughout this thread as in many others her

Your post above is sort of funny Bill. You write like your opinion is the only rational opinion. It isn't, and the subject might be quite so clear cut as you indicate.

Here's a table partly from American Combat planes by Ray Wagoner. It is the upper half, consisting of the USAAF in the ETO:

Note the USAAF and the US Navy/ Marines don't save the same data at all. So, the USAAF doesn't break out the losses by cause like the USN/MC do. The USN/MC can tell you losses to AAA, A?C, Operational, on ground or ship, etc. The USAAF cannot do that by choice. OK, let's look at combat losses per combat sorties. If your theory holds true, the radials should have a significantly lower loss rate than the inlines since they're so vulnerable.

1) The P-47 has a loss rate per combat sortie of 0.73%. Radial.
2) The P-51D has a loss rate per combat sorties of 1.18%. Inline.
3) The P-40 has a loss rate per combat sortie of 0.82%. Inline.
4) The P-61 Black Widow has a loss rate per combat sortie of 0.69%. Radial.
5) The Spitfire (in U.S. service) has a loss rate per combat sorties of 0.66%. In;ine.
6) The Beaufighter (in U.S. Service has a loss rate per combat sorties of 0.94%. Radial.

So, the P-40 is within 0.1% of the P-47. The Spitfire has an advantage over the P-47 of 0.06%. Not too shabby for an inline. The P-515D is the worst and of course, we don't have the breakout of reasons, but it flew mostly escort and SHOULD have a higher loss rate. It amounts to 0.35%, or a 42% advantage for the P-47. But the P-47 didn't fly escort duty NEARLY as much as the P-51D did.

Since we can't break out the reasons for the higher loss rate of the P-51D, it is very tough to support your theory that the linlines were much more vulnerable to ground fire because the loss rates in the ETO, where the Germans surely had some good ground fire units, just don't show much difference. And the difference they DO show cannot really be broken out by cause.

If I add up ALL the radials (P-47, P-61, Beaufighter) the aggregate for radials is 0.73% loss rate per combat sortie. 433,778 sorties.
If I add up ALL the inlines (P-38, P-39, A-36, P-40, P-51D, Spitfire) the aggregate for inlines is 1.10% loss rate per combat sortie. 464,701 sorties.

The difference is 0.37% per combat sortie. That's about a 33% difference but, again, I'd expect more loss from the P-51D because of its mission. Escorting bombers is ALWAYS over heavily-defended targets. Tactical ground attack is nowhere near as often hitting something that is stationary, like a city, defended by dug-in AAA sites. Tactical is more like hitting an armored column or a supply base. They had defenses, but not nearly as much as an airfield or a a refinery or a ball bearing factory.

The claim of inline vulnerability rings a bit hollow in real life over 898,479 combat sorties and wasn't very well supported in Korea, either as I recall. In fact, they selected P-51Ds over P-47s for ground attack in Korea. Both were available in large numbers.

I used to think air-cooled radials had an advantage, too, until I looked at the actual numbers. When you do, they look very equivalent. It's tough to look at the Navy numbers and reach a conclusion because there are no inlines represented and USAAF aircraft rarely attack an armored ship with concentrated AAA pointing at a plane that is coming right down the barrel and not moving around much in the gunsight since it is targeting the ship. That makes hitting a dive bomber or torpedo bomber much easier than for a ground crew shooting at a plane NOT attacking them specifically.

I'm sure you can follow the facts and see it isn't nearly as one-sided for the air-cooled radials as your claim above might otherwise indicate.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Your post above is sort of funny Bill. You write like your opinion is the only rational opinion.

That buddy, is your opinion. I post what I think is the most rational opinion at the moment. I am known to change my mind when new facts present themselves.

It isn't, and the subject might be quite so clear cut as you indicate.

I don't think I made the claim you think I made.

Here's a table partly from American Combat planes by Ray Wagoner. It is the upper half, consisting of the USAAF in the ETO:

You have posted that table a bunch of times in this forum. I, and others, have pointed out repeatedly that your numbers are wrong. I think I even recall you acknowledged it in one thread, when the source of some of the alternative numbers were given. But you don't seem interested. It doesn't really matter here though...

1) The P-47 has a loss rate per combat sortie of 0.73%. Radial.
2) The P-51D has a loss rate per combat sorties of 1.18%. Inline.
3) The P-40 has a loss rate per combat sortie of 0.82%. Inline.
4) The P-61 Black Widow has a loss rate per combat sortie of 0.69%. Radial.
5) The Spitfire (in U.S. service) has a loss rate per combat sorties of 0.66%. In;ine.
6) The Beaufighter (in U.S. Service has a loss rate per combat sorties of 0.94%. Radial.

So, the P-40 is within 0.1% of the P-47. The Spitfire has an advantage over the P-47 of 0.06%. Not too shabby for an inline. The P-515D is the worst and of course, we don't have the breakout of reasons, but it flew mostly escort and SHOULD have a higher loss rate. It amounts to 0.35%, or a 42% advantage for the P-47. But the P-47 didn't fly escort duty NEARLY as much as the P-51D did.

In my opinion, even if your numbers were correct which in my opinion they definitely aren't, such a comparison is completely pointless. There are too many factors in the wartime "loss rates by fighter type" to narrow it down to any role the type of engine might have. Compared to all other factors like: speed, maneuverability, climb rate, critical altitude, pilot training, tactics used, quantity and quality of AAA faced, type of missions flown (low or high altitude being just one aspect of that), type of air opposition faced, armor and ss tanks, structural strength of the aircraft, availability of radios, etc. etc., there is no way to isolate any one factor, especially a relatively minor factor like inline vs radial engine.

The claim of inline vulnerability rings a bit hollow in real life over 898,479 combat sorties and wasn't very well supported in Korea, either as I recall. In fact, they selected P-51Ds over P-47s for ground attack in Korea. Both were available in large numbers.

You might want to look at the Corsair and AD

I used to think air-cooled radials had an advantage, too, until I looked at the actual numbers.

What actual numbers? Loss rates across the entire war?

When you do, they look very equivalent. It;s tough to look at the Navy numbers and reach a conclusion because there are no inlines represented and USAAF aircraft rarely attack an armored ship with concentrated AAA pointing at a plane that is coming right down the barrel and not moving around much in the gunsight since it is targeting the ship. That makes hitting a dive bomber or torpedo bomber much easier than for a ground crew shooting at a plane NOT attacking them specifically.

I'm sure you can follow the facts and see it isn't nearly as one-sided for the air-cooled radials as your claim above might otherwise indicate.

I never guessed at any particular ratio. I have no idea how significant the difference would be, even if you could isolate it. I would doubt it would make a major difference. But neither do a lot of other factors which we know did matter. For example, all things being equal, 4 guns are better than 2 guns, right? Especially four cannon vs. 2 machine guns, right? Or say, 6 heavy machine guns vs. 2?

But Ki-43s, which only carried two guns (both or either of which could be 7.7mm or 12.7mm) definitely had the statistical edge in combat with both Hawker Hurricane IIC (four 20mm cannon) and vs. P-51A / A-36 - both of which types were also faster (per the OP), the P-51A and A-36 were both much faster than the Ki-43.

I don't think there is any way to quantify the relevance of any single design factor when looking at total wartime numbers, but we can rule out the idea that a given factor matters above all others. For example, it's clear that speed wasn't the only determinant of victory.

I happen to be building an A-36 model right now (I like the type) and i was discussing it with a friend, we were talking about bombs (I screwed up one of the bombs putting it together and had to find some alternative in the spare parts box). So I looked up the Wiki on the A-36. Now we can't take Wikipedia at face value, I'll be the first to admit. But I did notice that it made two points relevant to this discussion:

"A-36As also served with the 311th Fighter Bomber Group in the China-Burma-India theater. The 311th had arrived in Dinjan, India by late summer 1943 after being shipped across the Pacific via Australia.[26] Two squadrons were equipped with the A-36A while the third flew P-51As. Tasked with reconnaissance, dive bombing, attack and fighter missions, the A-36A was outclassed by its main opposition, the Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscar." The light and highly agile Japanese fighter could outmaneuver the A-36A at all altitudes but did have some weak points: it was lightly armed and offered little protection for pilot or fuel tanks. However, the A-36A fought at a significant disadvantage, having to carry out long-range missions often at altitudes above The Hump that meant its Allison engine was below peak performance. In a fighter escort mission over Burma, three A-36As were lost without scoring a single victory. The A-36A CBI missions continued throughout 1943–1944 with indifferent results. The A-36A remained in service in small numbers throughout the remaining year of the war, some being retained in the US as training aircraft."

and also

"Despite establishing a reputation for reliability and performance, the one "Achilles' heel" of the A-36A (and the entire Mustang series) remained the ventral-fuselage location of the radiator/cooling system, leading to many of the losses.[23]"

On that last point they list their source as William N. Hess, Fighting Mustang: The Chronicle of the P-51. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970.

It wasn't just whether an aircraft had a radiator, it was also how the radiator was plumbed that mattered. As I have pointed out.

 

[GregP]

There's nothing wrong with Ray Wagoner's table. It is not for the entire war; it is for the ETO and the numbers were pretty good for 1982. I still think the numbers published in 1946 are as good as they can get. All the new revisions are from someone who wasn't there and doesn't have all the data the guys who compiled the numbers had at the time.

And you have earned a well-deserved click on the "ignore" button. Done.

Live long and prosper O wise one.

 

[PAT303]

hold up to carrier landings better than say, a Seafire.

The Seafires problem wasn't strength or structural, the reason they suffered damage was a result of them floating over the deck via air cushioning meaning the pilots had to fly them onto it, because they had to land them hard they would bounce back up into the air as the struts didn't have enough rebound control, the arrestor gear would then restrain the aircraft while it was in the air slamming it back down again, pretty much the same issue's the Corsair had, fitting MkIII wings could have been a good fix, lasty this type of arrestor gear also caused the plane to pivot forward like a seesaw driving the prop into the deck..