Martlets in BoB
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4:1 was 1943 as I counted, more like 5 in 1941-42. One can't draw any comparison there, from all the combats between F4F's and Zeroes (and Type 1's in some cases in Solomons in early 1943), from carriers, defending Guadalcanal from high altitude bombing raids, defending shipping at low altitude, escorting attack a/c against Japanese shipping, on offense against Munda etc etc, to all the cases of Hurricanes v Type 1's (and some Zeroes in 1942 and in one combat in 1943) defending Malaya, Sumatra, Burma, Ceylon in 1942 in overall generally disastrous retreating campaigns, then fighting over a static front in Burma in 1943 from secure bases, IOW without a lot of the supposed handicaps of 1942 plus the experience of 1942 institutionally at least, yet barely did any better than in '42 against Type 1's. One a/c coming out about even in all its different cases, and another coming up in the hole big time, and we can't conclude anything, but we can make a conclusion from one anecdote of a head to head mock dogfight as told from one side? I know you didn't bring up that one case, but that's what I was responding to.All told, I calculated the Oscars enjoyed approxamately a 5:1 ratio of success over the Hurricane. However one can't really compare it to the F4F experience.....circumstances were too different. A variety of reasons have been given for the Hurricane's poor preformance in Burma despite it 's statistical competetiveness with other 1st gen Allied fighter designs. Tactics and pilot experience played a key roll.
This reminds me of the AVG sponsored dogfight test between a Buffalo and a P40.
But as usual if we just wave the flag of 'pilots may have differed' to cover any difference in results, then we can't conclude or even suspect anything about differences in a/c combat capability among a/c, unless there are massive performance differences. The Hurricane and F4F didn't differ massively in performance, obviously, but IMO there's enough evidence to strongly suggest that whatever characteristics aren't captured in a simple speed/climb/wing loading type analysis were probably in the F4F's favor, since it did *so* much better over a prolonged period in a variety of situations against Japanese fighters. Or we can stick to an absolute burden of proof that says it wasn't exactly the same pilots and situations, so we can't 100% certainly conclude anything. OK, but we surely can't finish throwing out 2 years of combat results against a similar opponent (which is giving a break to the plane which mainly faced the JAAF, probably) then settle the question based on one mock combat anecdote
. Joe
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no. I mentioned the mock combat only because, like looking at any kill ratio stat, impressions and varying conclusions can be easily made, that and the British didn't know the deck was being stacked against them for Chennault's benefit.
Suspicion revolving around the Hurricane pilots in terms of training was brought up, and hotly disputed, so no, I won't be waving the pilots flag
. I've observed that something, and it may not be performance or pilot, has to be out of wack for disjointed kill ratios to appear but it doesn't have to be either of the two or both.Possibly. Looking at the two plane's situations though, i found that the F4F's clashes with the Japanese were more isolated initially, being confined to four carrier battles in 42. In almost all cases these clashes were concluded in one day. That makes it hard to compare it to planes fighting sustained ops day by day. For the one sustained campaign of 42, the F4F's were fought from one location, defensively for the most part against an opponent fighting under a series of handicaps. By 43 the scenario expands a little bit but by then the Japanese were facing other impediments, including a rapidly declining pilot quality. The Hurricane pilots on the other hand faced more situations of sustained clashes, over a larger aerial battlefield that contained multiple bases and mission profiles, including ground attack and patroling. An argument on pilot quality could be made in the case of the USN which being a smaller org had a greater concentration of veteran and/or highly trained pilots. While not the case with the Marines on Guad, they benefitted from fighting from a defensive posture against an opponent fighting technically from beyond their effective fighting range and which largely dictated when as well as where they would come calling.
Hence i don't see the two situations as being very comparible. The Hurricane's history in general varied depending on Theater. The same general airframe that was competetive at various times and places is the same airframe that suffered a disasterous 0:35 kill ratio during a 5 month period over Malta. The ratio over Burma (5.2:1 in total per my calcs) continues to be argued on why. One damning report commissioned by the RAF did strongly suggest tactics....which was hotly contested by the local commanders. Compared to Chennault's pilot's success adds to the theory but again, i note the 23rd FG operated under some different circumstances that could explain the difference in part. Personally i don't feel its as much due to any hidden F4F performance edge as much as the combat circumstances, tactics and enemy oppositional strength.
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
To begin with the F4F4 used in the Solomons had not nearly the performance of some of the earlier Wildcats, to some extent the result of British demands for more guns. In some cases the performance of the early F4F3 was only equaled finally by the much later FM2. IMO, the F4F3 would have been a formidable opponent against the LW in the BOB and probably superior to the Hurricane for the following reasons. The Wildcat guns would have a much heavier throw weight and a longer firing time with 400 rounds per gun. If the British pilots were as well trained as USN pilots they would have been using high deflection gunnery that the Wildcat was suited for and which was highly effective against bombers. The Wildcat would have been more survivable than the Hurricane, mainly because of the radial versus liquid cooled engine. The Wildcat would have had a range advantage and overall performnace would have been roughly equal depending on how much armor and protected fuel tanks were in place.
I don't think with all due respect it adds anything to what I said. You are pointing out differences, some I'd agree with others I wouldn't, but there are always differences unless you're considering different a/c operated by the same fighter unit in the same place and time.
The biggest problem with your analysis is that it directly ignores one of the main points I made. In *1943* in Burma, with secure bases over a static front, Hurricanes did hardly any better than in 1942, 4+:1* in favor of Type 1 in '43. Which to me casts doubt on the theory of overwhelming importance of specific details of combats and campaign situation in 1942, and makes it clearly illogical not to consider F4F results in 1943 (which were also not dramatically different than in 1942, actually). Not just considering calendar years, the typical exchange ratio's in operations from Guadalcanal didn't change a lot either from when Zeroes were operating directly from Rabaul to when they gained Buin as a staging base (for long range Model 21's or home base for shorter legged Model 32's), which wasn't that far from Guadalcanal for any Zero. And the combat scenario's 'at' Guadalcanal and from Guadalcanal in lower Solomons campaign actually varied quite a lot, I'd review the specific references on that one to rectify any idea of a single scenario.
There was relatively little progression of results for either Hurricanes or F4F's all the way from their initial combats with the Japanese well into 1943 (F4F-4's didn't engage much after mid 1943). Both were doing slightly to somewhat better by the end of that period than the beginning, but with a much bigger gap between the two than any progress either made. Even though, things like combat experience of units and tactical situations varied quite a lot for both over that period. So explanation in terms of tactical situations is tortured IMO, it tends to rely on generalizations that don't stand up well over the whole period. Likewise 'tactics' in the specific sense, since those varied also and had plenty of time to *be* varied if they weren't working (if you don't change tactics that don't work, that's not a 'tactics' problem, it's a leadership problem). Likewise with experience level of particular units, varied considerably for each over whole period.
In contrast a more simple explanations is that the F4F was a more practically effective air combat machine, against opponents like the Zero or Type 1 at least. Another simple explanation would be a systematic difference between more basic organizational factors in RAF and the US naval air arms when it came to fighter combat. I wouldn't exclude the latter explanation completely, but comparing RAF/USAAF/USN-MC performances where they can be compared in other cases, that doesn't seem to be consistently the case to the extent of the difference in results between those two planes v the Japanese. So if I had to guess I'd say practical effectiveness advantage of the F4F is probably part of the explanation; of course there doesn't have to be a single explanation.
* if 4:1 and 1:1 is going to be judged essentially irrelevant after a brief even oversimplified review of differences or supposed ones in situations and tactics so forth, it can't make sense to quibble over 4 v 5, can it?
My count from the Shores works, FWIW, was:1941-42, "Bloody Shambles" Vol 1 and 2", Hurricanes downed ~6 Type 97's for 8 losses to Type 97's, 4 Type 1's for 20 losses, 6 Zeroes for 35 losses; Dec '42-Dec 43 in "Air War Over Burma": Hurricanes downed 12 Type 1's for 55 losses, and no Zeroes for 3 losses, with judgement calls about 'crash landings' and such, but I don't think any fair count would be *seriously* different. It's counted combat by combat not considering losses on either side unless the results are clearly given for both sides.
Joe
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JoeB as you know the Hurricane vs japanese fighters what tatics used? If Hurricane try to dog/turn-fighter v/s Type 1 and 0 this partially can explain the bad result. The Hurricane formation were on 2 or 3 planes? if they used the old 3 planes formation this also can explain partially bad resutl comparate with Wildcat that used 2 planes formation.
Terry McGrady
Airman
- 21
- Jun 11, 2009
Hi Joe,
In Braiin Cull and Paul Sortehaug's book Hurricanes over Singapore The Appendices give a total of 138 Hurricanes reaching Singapore and Java. Of this total 6 were lost at sea on transfer Singapore Batavia, and
12 were transferred to the Dutch Leaving 120 for use of the RAF. 9 of these were destroyed on the Ground
Leaving 111
a Dozen were flown over to Java . So 99 were lost / abandoned-90 in Aerial Combat.
Claims made against Japanese were 86 Destroyed 38 Probables and 9 on ground or water.
But to be honest we can talk and quote till the cows come home . The fact remains getting back to the Original post The Martlet was not used in the BoB.
Cheers
Terry McGrady
In Braiin Cull and Paul Sortehaug's book Hurricanes over Singapore The Appendices give a total of 138 Hurricanes reaching Singapore and Java. Of this total 6 were lost at sea on transfer Singapore Batavia, and
12 were transferred to the Dutch Leaving 120 for use of the RAF. 9 of these were destroyed on the Ground
Leaving 111
a Dozen were flown over to Java . So 99 were lost / abandoned-90 in Aerial Combat.
Claims made against Japanese were 86 Destroyed 38 Probables and 9 on ground or water.
But to be honest we can talk and quote till the cows come home . The fact remains getting back to the Original post The Martlet was not used in the BoB.
Cheers
Terry McGrady
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
The typical combat formation of the experienced IJN pilots was a three plane formation. If Hurricane pliots were using the 3 plane formation then they must have had roughly equal advantages.
The Gruman XF4F-3 that at its trials in early 1939, attained a max speed of 335 mph at 21,300 ft., was powered by XR-1830-76 engine with a two-stage supercharger offering 1,200 h.p. for take-off and 1,000 h.p. at 19,000 ft. In August '39 Gruman offered export models with four different engines. The French ordered 81 pwered by the Wright R-1820-G205A rated at 1,000 h.p. at 13,500 ft, and the Greeks by Pratt Witney R-1830-S3C4G rated at 1,000 hp at 11,500 ft.
It was the French machines which the British took over, hence to my mind it seems plausible to assume that if they ordered it for the RAF/FAA it have had an engine rated at a higher altitude - more like the trials machine.
According to Owen Thetford, and Hough Richards - the max speed for the BoB Hurricane was 316 mph.
When considering the preformance of the Hurricane in the Far East, i'm including the actions of 42 (though not in the ratio i quoted in this thread). At no time did the great things expected of the Hurricane occur. The Ki-43 seemed to have it's number from beginning to end. The Burma fighting however is a good focal point because the 42 actions were more sporadic, and could in part be lumped with the poor preformance of other Allied units as part of the initial learning curve, excluding Burma which had several things going for it which resulted in a more normal and competetive kill ratio vs. the JAAF.
During the height of the Guad fighting, the Wildcat's only situaiton of a sustained campaign experience, the combat mission and stance of the F4F was pretty limited from what i've studied. As I mentioned, after the conclusion of the campaign by 43, the Japanese naval airforce had suffered fatal attrition (carrier combats and Guad campaign combined) which would mar it's performance greatly for the rest of the Solomons campaign, exaserbated by the arrival of F4U and P-38's to the mix. The UK situation in 43 was different and larger in scope.
As is said....."possibly" and i agree that F4F effectiveness could be a piece of it, but given the technical comparison vs the gulf in certain ratios, i doubt it. Like i said, the same plane that fought Germany's best competetively also was the same airframe that suffered some of the worst ratios experienced by any fighter plane, and in the case of operations in Burma suffered an exchange that was abnormal given the matchup.....hence the debate and controversey as documented in Shores' Vol III. I do feel that in the case of USN/RAF comparisons, its not out of bounds to credit the more typical competetive ratio of exchange one would expect to the more thorougly trained status of the fighter pilots as documented by Lundstrom. RAF org was much bigger and their program tended to put very green pilots into the air and worse, in situations they probably should not have been placed in (such as during the Malta fighting) In the case of green Marine pilots, you have the specific circumstances of the Henderson Field fighting that favored their success, and their survival throughout the key period of that conflict in 42. You
Who's judging a4:1 (or a 5:1) vs. 1:1 irrelevent? Given the mystery i'd say its very relevent!
. What's no mystery is that we have differing theories as to why. Nothing wrong with that. . For me, any time a campaign exceeds a 3:1 ratio, thats interesting because it's unusual. 4:1, 5:1, 12:1? doesn't matter at that point....something unusual is going on. Shores had his theories too....so did the RAF. Bergerud just wrote off Kill ratios in general as "a bit of a mystery" in his extensive study of South Pacific air combat. I don't blame him. So many variables. Like the 1.2:1 ratio at Henderson, the 0:35 ratio during the five month period over Malta is more easily explained....the Hurricane experience in the Far East, not so easily explained. In regards to our respective figures....there are bound to be small differences in counting and tracking. I was not implying my figures are more accurate.....just stating what i got.
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Terry McGrady
Airman
- 21
- Jun 11, 2009
Hi Merlin ,
I used to believe those performance figures until I read the Secret years Flight Testing at Boscombe Down 1939 - to 45
Remember there is a vast difference between Manufactures quoted figures ( Lightly loaded A/C no guns . Ammo etc ) THan the ones Tested in service.
Brewster Buffalo 321MPH according to some sources.295 was best speed obtained by in tests
I used to believe those performance figures until I read the Secret years Flight Testing at Boscombe Down 1939 - to 45
Remember there is a vast difference between Manufactures quoted figures ( Lightly loaded A/C no guns . Ammo etc ) THan the ones Tested in service.
Brewster Buffalo 321MPH according to some sources.295 was best speed obtained by in tests
Terry McGrady
Airman
- 21
- Jun 11, 2009
Your right. Sorry......didn't mean to hijack the the thread.
No problem Mate,
In fact , it was all very interesting and it led me to do some research of my own.
I looked at the operations of 224 Group in the Arakan , Between October 1842 and June 1943, paying particular attention to Hurricane operations .
I found that the Hurricane Squadrons claimed 34 Oscars and 24 Bombers and Recce A/C
Total Hurricane losses were 67 .
This at first seems somewhat of a minus situation 58 vs 67 , until you break down the Hurricane losses.
If we look at AIR COMBAT losses - a/c vs A/C then a different pattern emerges
Of the 67 Hurricanes written off 18 were due to accidents and 13 to AA Thus AIR COMBAT losses of
Hurricanes was in fact 36 .
The claims against the Japanese are constant
So Oscar vs Hurricane = 34 against 36 a Kill/ loss Ratio of 0.94:1in favour of the Oscar
Taking account of the Bombers /Recce A/C shot down the Kill/loss ratio becomes 1.6:1 in favour of the Hurricane
Ain't stats great
Cheers
Terry McGrady
No problem Mate,
In fact , it was all very interesting and it led me to do some research of my own.
I looked at the operations of 224 Group in the Arakan , Between October 1842 and June 1943, paying particular attention to Hurricane operations .
I found that the Hurricane Squadrons claimed 34 Oscars and 24 Bombers and Recce A/C
Total Hurricane losses were 67 .
This at first seems somewhat of a minus situation 58 vs 67 , until you break down the Hurricane losses.
If we look at AIR COMBAT losses - a/c vs A/C then a different pattern emerges
Of the 67 Hurricanes written off 18 were due to accidents and 13 to AA Thus AIR COMBAT losses of
Hurricanes was in fact 36 .
The claims against the Japanese are constant
So Oscar vs Hurricane = 34 against 36 a Kill/ loss Ratio of 0.94:1in favour of the Oscar
Taking account of the Bombers /Recce A/C shot down the Kill/loss ratio becomes 1.6:1 in favour of the Hurricane
Ain't stats great
Cheers
Terry McGrady
Terry you comapre claims with real loss this is not the right way, look JoeB posts where are comparate real losses for both
Terry McGrady
Airman
- 21
- Jun 11, 2009
No I'm illustrating the point that you can quote all sorts of figures and come to different conclusions depending what figure you use
The Hurricane losses are accurate. The Claims made by the Hurricane Pilots were confirmed. But the only certain fact is the Hurricane losses .
Sure:
I note that Owen Thetford quotes the Buffalo at 292 mph.
What type of 'Martlet/Wildcat' are you refering to? And with what engine?
Terry McGrady
Airman
- 21
- Jun 11, 2009
Figures were for Martlet MKII IV . MKI -I've seen figure for top speed quoted as 304 mph.
Climb figures weren't up to much either 1560 ft/min
The Martlet / Wildcat MKVI was the best performer322 mph being quoted with water injection adding another 13 mph to that top speed.
It was frequently found at Boscombe Down that the Top Speeds obtained by many American A/C was up to 25 -30 mph less than the Manufacturers figures
Right time for bed so I'll say good night
Cheers
Terry McGrady
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Mike Williams has the British Martlet/Wildcat data sheets at the bottom of F4F Performance Trials
Martlet I - 313 mph
Martlet II - 317
Wildcat II - 300
Wildcat III - 307
Wildcat IV - 298
Wildcat V - 332
Martlet I - 313 mph
Martlet II - 317
Wildcat II - 300
Wildcat III - 307
Wildcat IV - 298
Wildcat V - 332
Terry McGrady
Airman
- 21
- Jun 11, 2009
Interesting that it differs with the findings at Boscombe Down . Mind you individual A/C varied and such things as sealing gun muzzle making sure panels were flush fitted Aerial masts etc polished Airframe all made a difference
First re: Terry, sorry 'mate' but somebody else first brought up an anecdote of mock dog fight which supposedly established the relative effectiveness of the two types so I didn't start it. A thread simply answering the question whether the F4F fought in the BoB proper would be a one word thread: no.
1. Back to the digression,
I don't understand why we'd just look at 1942 results. To me the really intriguing fact is that things for RAF Hurricanes in Burma got hardly any better through 1943 than they had been in 1942, in actually a larger sample of instances than '42 but not in fact much different in scope from Solomons actions, smaller if anything, and also involved a fair variety of situations (intercepting Japanese bombers, sweeping/patrolling, defending own bombers).There are some constants over that whole period Jan 42-Dec '43 (same AF, same a/c) but most other things changed or varied. The simplest explanation is one of those two constants was the main reason, nature of the RAF or units they sent to relative backwaters like Burma (true, that can never be disproven) or the Hurricane as an airplane.2. Again I'd review it combat by combat. The Guadalcanal/lower Solomons combats vareid quite a lot. Many were interceptions of medium/high altitiude escorted bombers (as were some Hurricane combats in Burma, in 42 and 43), but some were interceptions of low altitude anti-shipping or carrier strikes (by IJN carriers v Guadalcanal), interceptions of fighter sweeps, escort of Allied a/c against Japanese convoys or airfields (Munda in Dec 1942), plus the carrier battles which featured fighter combats usually dissimilar to the classic Guadalcanal interceptions, but all the results showed a strong central tendency toward roughly equal losses on both sides. And also again, it makes no sense to exclude F4F results in 1943 on two different counts:
a. I'm not excluding Hurricane v Type 1 results for '43, but pointing them out as especially interesting
b. F4F results in '43, as long it was a major player, were not actually greatly different than in '42, so if in fact JNAF quality plunged so rapidly, there must have been something else holding down the F4F's.
It's a somewhat further digression, but the answer there is that the idea that Japanese fighter quality went down the tubes totally in 1943, at least early in that year, is a common but questionable generalization; there are numerous important exceptions to it, at the very least. It's demonstrably not true of JAAF fighters in Burma. They did better against all comers in 1943 than they'd fared v the AVG in 1942, AVG v Type 1 combats, not just v Type 97's. And again Hurricanes did about as badly v Type 1's in Burma in both '42 and '43. USAAF P-40's and P-51A's (and RAF Mohawks) did better against Burma based Type 1's in 1943 than Hurricanes did, but not as well as the AVG had done in '42. The Spitfire's disastrous record v the Zero in Australia was entirely in 1943. A number of early F4U and P-38 combats in the Solomons didn't go well either. Especially in the comparison we're drawing here, F4F and Hurricane combat records, there's no reason to exclude 1943 results.
Joe
