Midway ATL

I couldn't find a general what-if section so I'm putting this here, Mods feel free to move appropriately as you see fit.

My question is threefold, and I'll put my own answers at the end, so don't scroll down before thinking your own answers:

1) Handwave away the American dive-bomber attack. Maybe like VB and VS 8 they get misled, maybe McCluskey doesn't see the destroyer wake, you know the drill. But at 1100 hrs the Japanese still have four flattops, but also know that there's at least one and probably more American carriers. Do the Japanese prioritize the destruction of American flattops or the invasion of Midway?

2) With all four Japanese carriers still intact, and the assault on Midway going in the next evening, does it win out against the atoll's garrison? Reef, Daihatsu capabilities, on-shore defenses, who wins out?

3) If Japan captures the atoll without much of an American fight, does it matter, given logistics issues etc?


What say you?

1) Flattops. It's why Yamamoto brought the IJN there in the first place.
2) Possibly. Lotsa' artillery on the Japanese fleet but it would have to stick around for too long in ADM. Yamamoto's opinion, methinks.
3) Japan couldn't hold it. Off our coast (close enough)? We'd switch from Germany First to "Unleash Hell" on Japan. Europe can fight its own wars.

Didn't read the spoiler.

If the IJN had concentrated their assets on Midway and omitted the Alaskan Campaign, then the USN would not jave been able to turn the tide, even with the SBD's contribution.

That would have given the IJN the contribution of a fleet carrier and a light carrier compliment as well as the supporting escort and manpower provided by the landing transports.

Securing Midway still would have been a complication to the U.S., as it was a strategic point in the Pacific used by the USN.

GrauGeist said:

If the IJN had concentrated their assets on Midway and omitted the Alaskan Campaign, then the USN would not jave been able to turn the tide, even with the SBD's contribution.

That would have given the IJN the contribution of a fleet carrier and a light carrier compliment as well as the supporting escort and manpower provided by the landing transports.

Securing Midway still would have been a complication to the U.S., as it was a strategic point in the Pacific used by the USN.

Click to expand...

Omitting the Aleutians campaign wasn't on the cards, because that was the sop Yamamoto had to throw in order to get his plan approved. If the Aleutians ops were not in the plan, Midway wouldn't have happened, per the 5 Apr agreement.

If they'd found some other way around it, I still think that logistics -- particularly keeping Ryujo and Junyo (was it? Forgive my sloppy memory) around long enough to matter -- beyond a week or two -- would be problematic. Get Bettys out there quick-like, and even then you can't reach Pearl, and you've got to ship fuel and food across three thousand miles.

Carrier support will melt away fast even without any battle losses simply because there's not that much support available. We Americans experienced the same thing in the Solomons -- but of course had battle losses to drive home the point.

Losing Neosho at Coral Sea forced Fletcher to end the battle there.

GrauGeist said:

That would have given the IJN the contribution of a fleet carrier and a light carrier compliment as well as the supporting escort and manpower provided by the landing transports.

Click to expand...

Except the fleet carrier was the 26 knot Junyo (a merchant liner conversion) whose own airgroup was 6 A6M2 Zeke fighters and 15 Type 99 Val dive bombers to which had been added another 12 Zeke from the 6th Air Group for the Alaskan operation to make up the numbers.

The ship herself had only completed on 3 May 1942 and had minimal time to work up before receiving her air group aboard on 18th May. The IJN fleet left Japan on 26th May to begin Operation AL. Her aircrews were inexperienced and had problems coping with the northern weather.

The light carrier was the Ryujo with an air group of 12 A6M2 Zeke (+2 spares), 9 B5N1 Kate, 9 B5N2 Kate (+2 spares). The B5N1 had been replaced by the B5N2 on the main 6 IJN fleet carriers before PH. Her air group seems to have performed a bit better. But they had the experience of operating over the Philippines, DEI and the Indian Ocean before Midway.

Thumpalumpacus said:

Omitting the Aleutians campaign wasn't on the cards, because that was the sop Yamamoto had to throw in order to get his plan approved. If the Aleutians ops were not in the plan, Midway wouldn't have happened, per the 5 Apr agreement.

If they'd found some other way around it, I still think that logistics -- particularly keeping Ryujo and Junyo (was it? Forgive my sloppy memory) around long enough to matter -- beyond a week or two -- would be problematic. Get Bettys out there quick-like, and even then you can't reach Pearl, and you've got to ship fuel and food across three thousand miles.

Carrier support will melt away fast even without any battle losses simply because there's not that much support available. We Americans experienced the same thing in the Solomons -- but of course had battle losses to drive home the point.

Losing Neosho at Coral Sea forced Fletcher to end the battle there.

Click to expand...

The fly in the ointment for Yamamoto's plan, was that Kido Butai sailed too fast and too far for his main battle force to engage the USN's elements, which was the main plan: destroy the two surviving US carriers (they assumed Yorktown had been lost).
The benefit of taking Midway was not to attack Hawaii, but to draw the USN into a showdown (which they aspired to, but didn't get until Leyte, which turned out to be more than they bargained for) and to deny USN access west of Hawaii, using Midway as a picket/supply depot much like the USN actually did.

The distance from Midway Atoll to Tokyo was roughly 2,300 miles as the crow flies, incidently. The distance between Sand or Eastern island and Oahu is 1,140 miles.
As far as potential harassment attacks on Oahu, the G3M *could* have done it as well as the H6K or H8K.

The Aleutian campaign *should* have been launched after Midway was secured, to be honest.

GrauGeist said:

The fly in the ointment for Yamamoto's plan, was that Kido Butai sailed too fast and too far for his main battle force to engage the USN's elements, which was the main plan: destroy the two surviving US carriers (they assumed Yorktown had been lost).

Click to expand...

The placement of the Combined Fleet ~300 miles away from the operational area was not an accident of some ships outspeeding the others. Yamamoto's plan envisaged the Combined Fleet where it was in order to be able to support any of the multiple arms of the offensive. The problem wasn't the KdB sailing too far too fast, but the plan deliberately putting the battleships so far away as to be unable to affect any problem that might arise.

GrauGeist said:

The benefit of taking Midway was not to attack Hawaii, but to draw the USN into a showdown (which they aspired to, but didn't get until Leyte, which turned out to be more than they bargained for) and to deny USN access west of Hawaii, using Midway as a picket/supply depot much like the USN actually did.

Click to expand...

Sure. But my point is that the Japanese themselves would have had major problems resupplying the atoll, had they been able to take it. Of course Yamamoto wanted the showdown, that was the point of the plan. The problem for him was that his plan had weak premises.

Also, I'd argue that the Japanese did get a showdown at Midway ... just not the one they'd planned for. By splitting their forces so widely they exposed themselves to defeat in detail, which they partially suffered in losing four carriers.

My own armchair opinion, I would have led with the battlewagons for a bombardment, using KdB as air-cover/recon, and let the Americans try to sink BBs at sea with a naval air force that had zero-point-zero experience doing that, and if and when the American CVs show up, go whole-hog. Let the BBs soften up the atoll, use the flattops to give air cover, and reserve the entire 4 June airstrike for naval strike. My opinion, worth every penny you've paid for it.

GrauGeist said:

The distance from Midway Atoll to Tokyo was roughly 2,300 miles as the crow flies, incidently. The distance between Sand or Eastern island and Oahu is 1,140 miles.
As far as potential harassment attacks on Oahu, the G3M *could* have done it as well as the H6K or H8K.

Click to expand...

Not really. The Nells and Bettys had between 700-900 miles in loaded, operational radius and Oahu was 1100 miles away. They surely could have done active recon, to be sure.

But keeping Midway as an active forward Japanese base would have been mighty expensive.

GrauGeist said:

The Aleutian campaign *should* have been launched after Midway was secured, to be honest.

Click to expand...

With a pinch of hindsightium, it should never have been launched at all. Who in their right mind wants to fly or sail in that shitstorm? Build air bases on Sakhalin and Hokkaido and focus your efforts on a more-remunerative front.

Thumpalumpacus said:

With a pinch of hindsightium, it should never have been launched at all. Who in their right mind wants to fly or sail in that shitstorm? Build air bases on Sakhalin and Hokkaido and focus your efforts on a more-remunerative front.

Click to expand...

The Japanese already had air and naval bases in the Kurile Islands to the East of Sakhalin (only the southern part of which, south of the 50th Parallel, was Japanese territory from 1905 to 1945) before WW2 broke out. Those islands run from Hokkaido north east to just south of the Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula. They were the japanese territory nearest the Aleutians. The most north easterly were on the islands of Shumshu & Paramushiro immediately south of Kamchatka. Those two islands by 1945 had 6 airfields with a capacity to handle 600 aircraft, if only the japanese hsd had them. Hitokappu Bay on Etorofu Island at the southern end was a natural harbour which provided a refuelling and jumping off point for the IJN PH raid.

These bases became targets for USAAF & USN aircraft in 1944/45 from Alaskan air bases. The Soviets invaded the Kuriles on 18th Aug 1945 against Japanese opposition and worked their way south. The last opposed landing was on 1st Sept 1945.

As for who wants to fight there, better ask the Americans, with it being US territory. US reinforcement of the theatre began in Aug 1940. By mid-1942 they had established an airfield on Umnak Island, just short of half way along the chain from the Alaskan mainland. And part of the US response to the Japanese invasion was to build further airfields along the chain. Adak was ready by mid-Sept 1942. By mid-1943 they began to run bombing missions to the Kuriles from recaptured Attu.

Even after the Japanese were removed from the Aleutian islands in 1943 the USN maintained a force of cruisers and destroyers, the North Pacific Force later TF90-92, of older cruisers and destroyers. From early 1944 they would occasionally sortie to bombard Japanese facilities in the Kuriles.

Another minor and little known campaign in WW2.

As far as the carrier part goes, if by some perplexing happening KB still has all it's carriers intact at 11.00, TF16 and 17 are finished. By 11.00 KB knew the americans had at least a carrier, and by 13.00 that it had 3. Without the crippling damage KB suffered in OTL and the chaos ensuing, it's possible D4Y scout's message of 3 carriers might be received much earlier.

So at 11.00 there will be the first wave launch from KB targeting likely TF17, consisting likely of 12 or possibly more Zeros, 34 D3As from CarDiv2 and let's say 27 B5Ns from CarDiv1, the rationale being that given the heavy losses of CarDiv2's B5Ns (only 18 remaining operational) there wouldn't be enough for the second wave. At any rate Yorktown would be overwhelmed by such an attack of 73 or more planes, it will be either sunk outright or mortally crippled.

The second wave would then launch towards TF16, again probably 12 Zeros but possibly more, around 35 D3As from CarDiv1, and 36 B5Ns from all carriers, totaling 83 or more planes. Again such numbers would be sufficient to at least cripple both Enterprise and Hornet, leaving them helpless against further air or surface attack. Likely all US carrier will be sunk by the evening or by next morning at the latest.

However, we can expect KB aircraft losses to be heavy, between outright losses and damaged aircraft it is likely that perhaps not more than half the strike aircraft will be operational by next day (though some damaged ones might be returned to service in a day or two), the situation being better re Zeros.

It is likely that Kurita will be allowed to press on to bombard Midway during the night, adding to the damage there, with little fear of air attack at dawn since the US airpower is almost destroyed completely. It's possible a few VB-8 planes might still be on Midway, plus whatever survives from the Midway planes. It is also possible some other carrier planes might have been evacuated to Midway (probably surviving F4Fs from CAP, maybe some search SBD), but these planes might have been further attrited by Kurita's bombardment.

After finishing the US carriers, the next day KB might launch another 1 or 2 strikes against Midway, facing whatever surviving US aircraft are still flying, likely decimating them further, but at the cost of additional KB aircraft losses.

I'm not going to the whole invasion thing as that is a whole other can of worms. Honestly, if they are smart, after eliminating all 3 US carriers and letting Kurita and maybe even Kondo make a mess of Midway, the japanese should call it a day and retire. Eliminating the US carriers was the primary objective, with this done no point risking further losses. The KB aircraft/aircrew losses would be concerning enough.

EwenS said:

As for who wants to fight there, better ask the Americans, with it being US territory.

Click to expand...

Sure, national political considerations, but I'd rather let the Japanese sit there fat, dumb, and mighty unhappy. It was never going to be more than a dead end.

EwenS said:

…

Another minor and little known campaign in WW2.

Click to expand...

It's certainly true for me.

mack8 said:

So at 11.00 there will be the first wave launch from KB targeting likely TF17, consisting likely of 12 or possibly more Zeros, 34 D3As from CarDiv2 and let's say 27 B5Ns from CarDiv1 [...] At any rate Yorktown would be overwhelmed by such an attack of 73 or more planes, it will be either sunk outright or mortally crippled.

The second wave would then launch towards TF16, again probably 12 Zeros but possibly more, around 35 D3As from CarDiv1, and 36 B5Ns from all carriers, totaling 83 or more planes. Again such numbers would be sufficient to at least cripple both Enterprise and Hornet [...]

However, we can expect KB aircraft losses to be heavy, between outright losses and damaged aircraft it is likely that perhaps not more than half the strike aircraft will be operational by next day [...]

Click to expand...

I'd like to point out that combat losses and damage would be felt immediately, and that the second strike you posit would almost certainly be weaker and not stronger than the first. After all, aside from any combat losses or damage, you'll almost certainly have some mechanical issues arise that reduce the numbers in the second strike.

It would no doubt be a bad afternoon for Americans, but remember too that they have the option of retiring at any time to Point Luck or another point east, while the Japanese might not be able to afford the luxury of a stern chase.

If all four KdB flattops survive the 10:20 attack and complete the rearmament and launching as Nagumo envisioned, they may well have won -- fair point. The question is whether they can achieve that victory before attrition and fuel issues force a reconsideration.

SaparotRob said:

It's certainly true for me.

Click to expand...

Here's about 2 1/2 hours in two vids to give you some good dope:
View: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLvwPt9MhP59_Svyt8BWpKxg3dZI8wRXdG

SaparotRob said:

It's certainly true for me.

Click to expand...

Alaska was hugely important to the Soviets in WW2 for maintaining the flow of Lend Lease supplies. Nearly 50% of Lend Lease to them went via the North Pacific one way or another.

Aircraft flown from US factories on the ALSIB route.

Shipping routes using Soviet shipping (only some of which was itself supplied under Lend Lease).

So long as Japan & the Soviet Union were not at war this traffic went virtually unmolested. And note some of the routes used. Straits of Tsushima round southern Japan until 1943 and the increasing US sub campaign. Round the end of the Kamchatka Peninsula with the Japanese occupied Kuriles only a few miles away. Use of La Perouse Strait between Hokkaido and southern Sakhalin, both Japanese territory.

And part of the price for getting the USSR to enter the war against Japan in 1945. Project Hula.

Thumpalumpacus said:

I'd like to point out that combat losses and damage would be felt immediately, and that the second strike you posit would almost certainly be weaker and not stronger than the first. After all, aside from any combat losses or damage, you'll almost certainly have some mechanical issues arise that reduce the numbers in the second strike.

It would no doubt be a bad afternoon for Americans, but remember too that they have the option of retiring at any time to Point Luck or another point east, while the Japanese might not be able to afford the luxury of a stern chase.

If all four KdB flattops survive the 10:20 attack and complete the rearmament and launching as Nagumo envisioned, they may well have won -- fair point. The question is whether they can achieve that victory before attrition and fuel issues force a reconsideration.

Click to expand...

The second wave would be made of the aircraft that bombed Midway and returned, of which like i mentioned there were still 18 B5N operational plus 35 D3As (one was lost in the Midway attack and 4 damaged but my understanding is that the 4 damaged ones were still operational, but even if not, there would still be 31 D3As available at a minimum). The timing of the first and second strikes are based on the OTL Hiryu attacks.

The attrition would be felt in a potential third strike in the afternoon, intended to mop up any surviving US carriers, this wave would be made of whatever operational aircraft remaining from the first and second waves, i guesstimated about half of those attack aircraft would have remained operational, but would have still amounted to 25-30 B5Ns and a similar number of D3As, plus Zero escorts. The losses would have been relatively light because at this point the US carriers wouldn't have had any CAP to speak of since they would have been crippled already by the first and second waves.