Military/civilian Life

[mikewint]

Why?

By "limiting access" the Army brass were assured that the reporters could only report what they had been allowed to see, the positives (as the Army saw them anyway). Censorship was thus subtle and not overt, e.g.: In WWII the Red Cross was allowed "free access" to POW camps where they saw healthy and well-fed POWs. These were "show" camps maintained for just that purpose. The realty was carefully hidden as it was in Vietnam.

Korea wasn't a declared war either...

True but the US did not act unilaterally. We acted under the UN auspices. Read again my previous line: the press was forbidden to make any derogatory comments about United Nations troops.
While the US went into Vietnam without UN approval, it was not a strictly a US affair. South Korea was our biggest ally sending 320,000 troops over the course of the war. Now the US did foot 25% of the cost of those deployments. Australia was our #2 ally sending 61,000 troops including Infantry, Airborne, Special Forces, Medical, Armour, and even a Naval Destroyer. They were assigned one of the most heavily VC infested districts in Vietnam. Philippines supplied 10,000 Medical personnel. New Zealand 3,800 Arty, engineers, Medical and some really tough SAS units.
There were others and behind the scenes Canada. While welcoming and aiding US draft-dodgers, 30,000 Canadian citizens is US uniforms served in Vietnam, one of them receiving the CMH. Additionally Canada produced over 2.5 billion dollars worth of war materials from uniforms to Agent Orange.

How did we envision the war to be fought by them?

Kennedy did not want the US embroiled in another Korea. The US role was to be one of support, i.e.: training and material. Saigon was to supply the troops and do the fighting albeit with US clandestine US troop support. Nothing was to be overt but the Diem regime simply did not and never had popular support and government after his assignation fared even worse.

Why did these younger journalists feel this way?

The Army had had increasing difficulty getting the Saigon Press Corps to toe the party line. The Army had done everything in their power to discredit them, i.e., bringing in Press corps from the US and taking them on carefully scripted "tours" then returning them home. The Saigon Corps however, being in-country had developed their own informational sources and were less likely to trust the honesty of the Army/Government. The carefully constructed facade was beginning to crack

How did it attack the administration

On January 24, 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeared before a closed hearing of Fulbright's committee. His assessment: "If the U.S. and its allies remained firm, the communists would eventually give up in Vietnam." Rusk's testimony convinced Fulbright that the administration of President Lyndon Johnson was blinded by its "anticommunist assumptions."

Attempting to forestall a buildup of American forces, Fulbright launched a high-profile series of widely televised public "educational" hearings in February 1966. The all-star cast of witnesses included retired generals and respected foreign policy analyst George Kennan.
Kennan advised that the United States withdraw "as soon as this could be done without inordinate damage to our prestige or stability in the area" to avoid risking war with China. His testimony prompted an angry President Johnson to order FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to investigate whether Fulbright was "either a communist agent or a dupe of the communists."

The hearings reached their most dramatic phase when Secretary Rusk and General Maxwell Taylor arrived to lay out the administration's case. Fulbright shifted from his earlier role as a benign questioner of supportive witnesses to a grim prosecutor. The February hearings did not immediately erode Senate support for Johnson's war policies. They did, however, begin a significant shift in public opinion. In the four weeks that spanned the hearings, the president's ratings for handling the war dropped from 63 percent to 49 percent. The testimony of George Kennan and other establishment figures had made it respectable to question the war.

I'm surprised we didn't do one of the following

1. Unfortunately no such person, i.e., a southern Ho Chi Minh existed. After Diem a series of Military generals usurped political power one by one, coup following coup. After a coup in February 1964, Air Marshall Nguyễn Cao Kỳ became prime minister and Nguyễn Văn Thiệu became the nominal head of state. Kỳ and Thieu functioned in those roles until 1967, bringing much-desired stability to the government. They imposed censorship and suspended civil liberties, and intensified anticommunist efforts. Under pressure from the US, they held elections for president and the legislature in 1967. Needless to say Thiệu was elected president with 34% of the vote in a widely criticized poll. Then came Tet.
2. The Army had been told that by many of its own jungle warfare experts starting in 1965 when Col. Donald Blackburn became head of SOG. Blackburn had been an adviser in the Philippines in 1941. He escaped the Japanese, fled to the hill where he organized Filipino resistance fighters. By the time of MacArthur's return he headed 20,000 trained guerrilla fighters. In Vietnam Blackburn conceived of and implemented Operation Shining Brass. Initially Blackburn formed 5 US led recon teams: Two or three SF troopers plus 9 local Nung tribesmen.
Phase One: These Recon teams would infiltrate southern Laos, find NVA bases and supply areas and direct air strikes to them. In the meantime in Vietnam SOG would train company sized raiding units, "Hatchet Forces".
Phase Two: Once formed and trained these Hatchet Forces would land, sweep through and destroy a target and be gone before the NVA could react.
Phase three: In Laos itself, Laotian tribesmen would be recruited and trained to raid the NVA at every opportunity forcing them to mass together making them bigger and better targets for air raids and Hatchet Forces. The NVA would be attacked and harassed at every turn.
The plan was gutted by politics. William Sullivan US ambassador to Laos gutted the plan restricting operations to two small boxes along the border, refused to allow helo insertion and supporting air strikes.
3. Again Politics. Fearful of another Korea airbases around Hanoi and Haiphong could not be attacked. In addition any number of airfields were located in China itself.

 

[Zipper730]

By "limiting access" the Army brass were assured that the reporters could only report what they had been allowed to see, the positives (as the Army saw them anyway). Censorship was thus subtle and not overt, e.g.: In WWII the Red Cross was allowed "free access" to POW camps where they saw healthy and well-fed POWs. These were "show" camps maintained for just that purpose. The realty was carefully hidden as it was in Vietnam.

So one objective was to limit what the press-corps could actually see and thus couldn't easily report anything damaging even if they wanted to and, produce a good PR image that we were fighting as gentlemen?

Frankly, I would have went with the older rules because even if they saw what they did: I could still keep that data from the public more easily (I'm not pro censorship, but I'm assuming the mindset of a power-structure in conflict). The idea of embedded journalists, which is done now is also an effective strategy because there is a dependence on the people they're with and as a result, form a bond with -- thus they are unlikely to backstab them by reporting something negative.

True but the US did not act unilaterally. We acted under the UN auspices. Read again my previous line: the press was forbidden to make any derogatory comments about United Nations troops.

I saw what you wrote

Interestingly, I never really thought much about whether we had UN approval or not in NVN. That seems to have been conveniently left out of the history books (which is interesting since most PC attitudes are that everything the US does is bad).

South Korea was our biggest ally sending 320,000 troops over the course of the war. Now the US did foot 25% of the cost of those deployments. Australia was our #2 ally sending 61,000 troops including Infantry, Airborne, Special Forces, Medical, Armour, and even a Naval Destroyer. They were assigned one of the most heavily VC infested districts in Vietnam. Philippines supplied 10,000 Medical personnel. New Zealand 3,800 Arty, engineers, Medical and some really tough SAS units.

While I knew Australia was involved, I did not know New Zealand and South Korea was.

30,000 Canadian citizens is US uniforms served in Vietnam, one of them receiving the CMH.

30,000 Canadian citizens served in the US Army?

Kennedy did not want the US embroiled in another Korea. The US role was to be one of support, i.e.: training and material. Saigon was to supply the troops and do the fighting albeit with US clandestine US troop support.

So the issue was finding enough people willing to assist even while Ngo Diem was alive, and the skill sets needed to fight such a war with modern equipment?

The Army had had increasing difficulty getting the Saigon Press Corps to toe the party line. The Army had done everything in their power to discredit them, i.e., bringing in Press corps from the US and taking them on carefully scripted "tours" then returning them home. The Saigon Corps however, being in-country had developed their own informational sources and were less likely to trust the honesty of the Army/Government.

So I guess it was that the war seemed increasingly unbelievable compared to say Korea? They saw through the nonsense and figured out ways to get the information out?

On January 24, 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeared before a closed hearing of Fulbright's committee. His assessment: "If the U.S. and its allies remained firm, the communists would eventually give up in Vietnam." Rusk's testimony convinced Fulbright that the administration of President Lyndon Johnson was blinded by its "anticommunist assumptions."

If I recall correctly, they were blinded by their anti-communistic assumptions. They seemed to ignore facts (like the Vietnamese wasn't a blind USSR puppet) and there seemed to be such a combination of politics and careerism that nobody was willing to tell the truth. This seemed to make it impossible for policy makers to properly assess the facts.

Attempting to forestall a buildup of American forces, Fulbright launched a high-profile series of widely televised public "educational" hearings in February 1966. The all-star cast of witnesses included retired generals and respected foreign policy analyst George Kennan.
Kennan advised that the United States withdraw "as soon as this could be done without inordinate damage to our prestige or stability in the area" to avoid risking war with China.

Was there really a serious risk of triggering a war with China?

The February hearings did not immediately erode Senate support for Johnson's war policies. They did, however, begin a significant shift in public opinion. In the four weeks that spanned the hearings, the president's ratings for handling the war dropped from 63 percent to 49 percent. The testimony of George Kennan and other establishment figures had made it respectable to question the war.

And this is where it really starts to crumble... people start thinking "hey... is this even right?".

As for the rest...

1. Regarding the idea of replacing Ho Chi Minh with somebody the people would accept: Since nobody was available for the task, it makes sense why we didn't do it! That being said

• Why was Diem assassinated? JFK told the CIA not to do it
• The term "nominal" in this case... does that mean: De Jurte or De Facto?

2. Regarding the idea of treating the war as a counter-insurgency operation: Why did Ambassador Sullivan restrict these ops to small areas of Vietnam rather than allow them to work without restriction? It almost seems like there was a cabal in our government that wanted a huge war that would fail

3. Regarding OCA Strikes: Why were they fearful of another Korea? While Korea was a massive war that cost a lot of lives, a counter-insurgency operation would be far less costly of human life, and with the airfield's destroyed, we could operate unimpeded. As for airfields in China, I suppose one could put iron clad restrictions on those -- particularly if it was known that the PRC would not come to the aid of NVN.

 

[mikewint]

Frankly, I would have went with the older rules because even if they saw what they did: I could still keep that data from the public

Again go back to the previous post. As a non-war there was no legal way to censor the press and if the Army had initiated censorship that fact would have leaked. This way the press was totally free to report anything they actually saw without government censorship.

I never really thought much about whether we had UN approval or not in NVN

The USA wanted to prevent areas of the world falling under Communist influence. The Cold War was at its height in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the French appealed to the USA for aid in their war against the communist viet minh. The US government was beginning to see Vietnam as another Korea.
US politicians came to believe in the 'Domino Theory' and the "Containment" of communism. The belief was that if one country fell to communism, its neighbors would follow and therefore communism had to be contained before it spread. In 1956 John Kennedy wrote in a book that he was convinced the South Vietnam was essential to the freedom of the entire region of South East Asia.

Thus Eisenhower sent over 700 "advisors" to train and organized the South Vietnamese forces. Kennedy in his turn raised the number to almost 15,000 "advisors"

The "legal" justification for the US becoming involved in Vietnam was because of S.E.A.T.O, South East Asia Treaty Organization, which was established in September 1954. This was a pact that involved; Australia, Bangladesh, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States, in which the military forces of each country would be coordinated o provide for the defense of other countries within the pact. Since South Vietnam was under threat from North Vietnam the Americans felt that they had a treaty obligation to help defend their ally, South Vietnam

30,000 Canadian citizens served in the US Army?

The Canadian Vietnam Veterans Association estimates that about 20,000 Canadians enlisted, although other historians think that number may have been as high as 40,000.
Some were dual citizens who may have been living or working in the U.S., but many other Canadians volunteered, driven by a conviction to fight communism, or by a love of adrenalin.
By the end of the conflict, it's believed at least 134 Canadians had died or been declared missing in action. Their names are on the Wall

So the issue was finding enough people willing to assist even while Ngo Diem was alive, and the skill sets needed to fight such a war with modern equipment?

The elections were not held in 1956 and Diem became increasingly corrupt and violent. Trade unionists, religious leaders and journalists were thrown into jail. Diem was a Catholic in a country where 70% of the population was Buddhist. Increasingly he faced opposition from Buddhists and replied with greater cruelty. Diem's actions led to opposition groups forming the National Liberation Front which began a guerrilla war against the government of South Vietnam. By 1963 Diem's rule in South Vietnam was so corrupt that he was facing continuous opposition. Several Buddhist monks burned themselves to death in protest. Diem's government had no popular support thus ARVN troops had no motivation to fight for it. Diem's Draft was to send companies of soldiers into a village, round up every male from 14 to 50, hand them a gun and uniform and march them off.
Eventually the US saw the hopelessness of continuing to prop up the Diem government. Initially Kennedy threatened to withdraw military aid and then backed a plot by South Vietnamese generals to arrest Diem. He was murdered just three weeks before Kennedy's own assassination.

Was there really a serious risk of triggering a war with China?

War? probably not but a million or so Chinese "volunteers" boiling across the border. Both China and Russia were heavily involved with the NVA and both Russian and Chinese soldiers fought with NVA troops much as American "advisers" had done. Both Russian and Chinese pilots flew Migs against US aircraft.

1. Diem and his brother were executed in the back of an armored personnel carrier by ARVN officers on the journey back to military headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base. While no formal inquiry was conducted, the responsibility for the deaths of the Ngô brothers is commonly placed on Minh's bodyguard, Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung, and on Major Dương Hiếu Nghĩa, both of whom guarded the brothers during the trip. Minh's army colleagues and US officials in Saigon agreed that Minh ordered the executions.
Nominal in the sense that Ky actually held all power Thieu was a figurehead
2. Sullivan was ambassador to Laos and his justification was that he did not want a "neutral" country involved with a possible spreading of the war into Laos
3. Again the fear of direct intervention by China backed by the USSR was always a fear after Korea

 

[Zipper730]

Again go back to the previous post. As a non-war there was no legal way to censor the press and if the Army had initiated censorship that fact would have leaked.

And the reason for this was the war was not approved by the UN and we did not declare war in the traditional sense? I assume the Gulf of Tonkin resolution did not change this?

Why didn't we just embed the reporters with the combat units like in Iraq?

The "legal" justification for the US becoming involved in Vietnam was because of S.E.A.T.O, South East Asia Treaty Organization, which was established in September 1954. This was a pact that involved; Australia, Bangladesh, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States, in which the military forces of each country would be coordinated o provide for the defense of other countries within the pact. Since South Vietnam was under threat from North Vietnam the Americans felt that they had a treaty obligation to help defend their ally, South Vietnam

But the real reason was of course to stop the spread of Communism.

The Canadian Vietnam Veterans Association estimates that about 20,000 Canadians enlisted, although other historians think that number may have been as high as 40,000.

Makes sense

By the end of the conflict, it's believed at least 134 Canadians had died or been declared missing in action. Their names are on the Wall

As they should

War? probably not but a million or so Chinese "volunteers" boiling across the border.

Like Korea... I'm curious how much high explosives, blast-fragmentation, and incendiaries were needed to cook all the Chinese that poured across Korea ()I remember reading about cases where F4U's just loaded up, took off, bombed, strafed, then landed, re-armed without refueling, over and over again.

Both China and Russia were heavily involved with the NVA and both Russian and Chinese soldiers fought with NVA troops much as American "advisers" had done.

So the concern was that, even if officially, they wouldn't come to their aid, they'd unofficially come to their aid?

Both Russian and Chinese pilots flew Migs against US aircraft.

Actually, from what I remembered reading: The Russians flew training but not combat, and this was corroborated by the fact that the USAF/NSA were intercepting radio transmissions and never heard any Russian unlike Korea. As for Chinese, I have nothing on that, but wouldn't be shocked.

1. Diem and his brother were executed in the back of an armored personnel carrier by ARVN officers on the journey back to military headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base. While no formal inquiry was conducted, the responsibility for the deaths of the Ngô brothers is commonly placed on Minh's bodyguard, Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung, and on Major Dương Hiếu Nghĩa, both of whom guarded the brothers during the trip. Minh's army colleagues and US officials in Saigon agreed that Minh ordered the executions.

So the CIA didn't do it?

Nominal in the sense that Ky actually held all power Thieu was a figurehead

So, de facto

2. Sullivan was ambassador to Laos and his justification was that he did not want a "neutral" country involved with a possible spreading of the war into Laos

Was his position justified based on the information at the time? Was there any location we could have trained them outside of Laos or Vietnam?

3. Again the fear of direct intervention by China backed by the USSR was always a fear after Korea

So it basically consisted of...

• The fact that the PRC officially didn't have a mutual defense agreement with NVN but might unofficially intervene?
• The concern that either: Clashes with PRC aircraft would draw them increasingly into the conflict, or that said clashes would lead to the temptation by the USAF/USN to bomb the PLAAF's airfields, and in doing so escalate the conflict?

 

[mikewint]

Tonkin resolution did not change this?

Why didn't we just embed the reporters with the combat units like in Iraq?

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.
Embed? Reporters did go on combat missions...carefully staged ones

how much high explosives, blast-fragmentation, and incendiaries were needed

Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, who led the Far East Bomber Command of B-29s that participated in the bombings, described the plan as going "to work burning five major cities in North Korea to the ground, and to destroy completely about 18 major strategic targets." Curtis Lemay boasted that Strategic Air Command "burned down just about every city in North and South Korea both." He also estimated that "over a period of three years or so, we killed off . . . 20 percent of the population." And future secretary of state Dean Rusk, who also served in the State Department under the Truman administration, would say that the United States bombed: "Everything that moved in North Korea, every brick standing on top of another."
The U.S. dropped a total of 635,000 tons of bombs, including 32,557 tons of napalm, on Korea
In Vietnam the sheer number of explosives used is absolutely astonishing. The United States Air Force dropped in Indochina, from 1964 to August 15, 1973, a total of 6,162,000 tons of bombs and other ordnance. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft expended another 1,500,000 tons in Southeast Asia. This tonnage far exceeded that expended in World War II and in the Korean War. The U.S. Air Force consumed 2,150,000 tons of munitions in World War II – 1,613,000 tons in the European Theater and 537,000 tons in the Pacific Theater.

The Russians flew training but not combat,

Lt. Randy "Duke" Cunningham (pilot) and Lt. JG. Willie "Irish" Driscoll (RIO) in their F-4J Phantom II "Showtime 100", VF-96 Fighting Falcons, publicly stated "I don't believe every pilot we faced in Vietnam had tan skin, slanted brown eyes, and black hair..."
F-105 Thud pilot, Jack Broughton, in his book Thud Ridge stated that he saw a VPAF F-6 (Chinese MiG-19 Farmer clone) flown by a Soviet pilot. He looked up close and personal with the pilot and saw his blond hair and blue eyes.

Was his position justified based on the information at the time?

On 23 July 1962, a formal "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos" was signed in Geneva. It provided for a coalition government and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country by 7 October. The United States pulled out its 666 military advisers and support staff, and Air America stopped dropping weapons to the Hmong. Assistant Secretary of State Averill Harriman, who was intent on ensuring US compliance with the Geneva accords, allowed the CIA to retain only two men in Laos to monitor Communist compliance with the agreement. Almost overnight an almost limitless supply of North Vietnamese soldiers — who didn't consider themselves "foreign" — were pitted against the hapless, unmotivated, poorly led, small and divided Army of Laos.
Enter State Department Ambassador William Sullivan. It was he that assisted our venerable liberal U.S. senior statesman, Averill Harriman, in allowing the North Vietnamese that incredible sweet deal they got in '62 to keep all foreign armies off their western border.
And there is more: Ambassador William Sullivan was the U.S. Ambassador to Laos from 1964 to 1969 — during the time of the U.S. build-up in South Vietnam — and he insisted that the U.S. maintain tacit compliance with the sweet North Vietnamese deal he helped create. He took second- and third- and fourth-hand information — often from our enemies — that civilians had been hurt by USAF bombings of NVA facilities in Laos. He quickly severely restricted bombings. Fighting in Laos at the time was called "the Bill Sullivan war." Or as has been suggested, "the Bill Sullivan lack of war." Ambassador Sullivan opposed all military activities in Laos designed to support the war in South Vietnam. He maintained paramount control of all US activities, military or otherwise, in country. He opposed US ground action in Laos, and closely scrutinized air attacks. In tribute to his opposition, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was labeled "Sullivan's Freeway" by MACV.
In 1966 Sullivan relented a bit and allowed Helo insertions up to 12 miles from the border. Sounds like a large area but in triple canopy jungles the number of usable LZs was limited. Within a few months all were being watched by NVA teams. The PRC-25 radios carried by the teams could not reach over the mountains along the border. Relay stations were proposed located on the mountain tops. Sullivan again refused to allow it. Eventually he allowed just one to be built.

 

[Zipper730]

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Can that be interpreted to be something war-like? Could that kind of censorship be imposed?

Embed? Reporters did go on combat missions...carefully staged ones

I was talking about Iraq, not Vietnam...

Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, who led the Far East Bomber Command of B-29s that participated in the bombings, described the plan as going "to work burning five major cities in North Korea to the ground, and . . .

No... I know the figures for the whole conflict. I was just idly curious how much was used to wipe out the Chinese people coming across the boarder (it was half curious question, half joke).

In Vietnam the sheer number of explosives used is absolutely astonishing.

Yeah it exceeded WWII and Korea together.

F-105 Thud pilot, Jack Broughton, in his book Thud Ridge stated that he saw a VPAF F-6 (Chinese MiG-19 Farmer clone) flown by a Soviet pilot. He looked up close and personal with the pilot and saw his blond hair and blue eyes.

VPAF = Vietnamese People's Air Force?

On 23 July 1962, a formal "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos" was signed in Geneva. It provided for a coalition government and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country by 7 October. The United States pulled out its 666 military advisers and support staff, and Air America stopped dropping weapons to the Hmong. Assistant Secretary of State Averill Harriman, who was intent on ensuring US compliance with the Geneva accords, allowed the CIA to retain only two men in Laos to monitor Communist compliance with the agreement.

That sounds monumentally stupid: Two people doesn't sound like enough people to enforce compliance unless they were supported by other people. Looking at this, you'd almost think that if non-compliance occurred, nobody would be there to spot it

Enter State Department Ambassador William Sullivan. It was he that assisted our venerable liberal U.S. senior statesman, Averill Harriman, in allowing the North Vietnamese that incredible sweet deal they got in '62 to keep all foreign armies off their western border. And there is more: Ambassador William Sullivan was the U.S. Ambassador to Laos from 1964 to 1969 — during the time of the U.S. build-up in South Vietnam — and he insisted that the U.S. maintain tacit compliance with the sweet North Vietnamese deal he helped create. He took second- and third- and fourth-hand information — often from our enemies — that civilians had been hurt by USAF bombings of NVA facilities in Laos.

Why did he do this? He either was very stupid, or deliberately working against the interest of the United States

 

[Zipper730]

mikewint

Wait... did the Vietnamese pilots wear a helmet? How would you see blonde hair if you had a covered head?

 

[tyrodtom]

mikewint

Wait... did the Vietnamese pilots wear a helmet? How would you see blonde hair if you had a covered head?

Good question.
I've seen that claim about a blond haired, blue eyed, mig pilot before.
I don't remember the details, but if the Mig was shot down, and during the ejection his helmet come off, it's possible.
But it hard enough to tell someone's eye color from 10 feet.

I do wonder how the other pilot got that close.
Sounds like a little tale enhancement.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Wait... did the Vietnamese pilots wear a helmet? How would you see blonde hair if you had a covered head?

Helmet, visor, oxygen mask; "blond hair and blue eyes" sounds a bit far-fetched to me.
Cheers,
Wes