More advanced aircraft during WW2? Germany or Japan?

[Shortround6]

Allison engine unreliability is an easy conclusion to reach. However by 1942 the U.S. has plenty of test data for the RR Merlin, DB601 and Jumo211. There was no reason to think that all liquid cooled V12s were as crappy as the Allison. Unless American military leadership were living in a state of denial, refusing to believe that some other nations built superior liquid cooled aircraft engines.

Any source for this lack of reliability?

Many engines had trouble in their early years and got better as time went on only to go through troubles again in later models are the last bits of power were dragged out of the design.

Some Allisons racked up close to 1000hrs before overhauls in US training commands.

British noted that Allison engines were much more reliable in P-40s in North Africa than Merlins in P-40s. Some people believe it had to do with the difference in air intakes with Merlin P-40s ingesting much more dust due to it's lower carb intake.
Differences in radiator, oil cooler and even spark plug and magneto cooling can affect reliability from plane to plane ore from one theater to another.

 

[renrich]

The book states that the Allison engine P51 failed to operate properly above 15000 feet so the tests were not completed. The P40F tests were suspended because the engine would not produce maximum power. Besides wondering why the two AAF birds were not prepped properly I wonder why they were not repaired so that maximum performance could be obtained. This info is from "The Great Book of World War II Airplanes" and it has a good section on the Zero with a lot of the history behind it's development. Also has P38, P51, B17, Hellcat, Corsair, Spitfire, Mosquito, Lancaster, 109, 190s through the vaunted TA152, Ju87.

 

[Kurfürst]

The F5b was not in production, or even under development in 1939, according to three independant sources.

The Navweapons site you rely on state the F5B was developed from 1935..

Its development was not begun until aerial torpedo development was taken over by the Luftwaffe, in March 1940. It entered service, late in 1941, according to these sources. I have not seen any conclusive evidence from either Kurfurst or yourself to refute these sources

The list of torpedo stocks show the F5b and F5W stockpiles. You said there were no (italian) F5Ws until 1939 (or 1941 the latter seems a doubtful and contrary to your other claims).

Now the situation in 1939 was then either:

a, There were no improved German F5bs around, which means all of the torps were equally good Italian Whitehead aerial torps, or
b, There were no improved Italian Whitehead F5W aerial torps around, which means all of the torps were German F5bs (which I suspect to be true, and the Italian torps were only brought in the meantime to increase the meager stocks)

You can't have it both way, that there were neither F5b nor F5w, though there is a list clearly showing 76 F5b and/or F5W around..

BTW you are shifting your argument, the original claim was that there were no German torpedo bombers around at the start of the war (wrong - He 115), no long range German dive bombers around (again wrong - Ju 88), and no aerial torpedoes whatsoever and they were not used until something like 1942 (very obviously wrong after reviewing all these sources).

 

[parsifal]

You must be reading a different part of the site. I think you are mixing the F5a with the F5b. With regards to the F5b, the site in its "notes section says as follows:

Notes: The F5b was in service from late 1941 to the end of the war with relatively minor changes. To control flight in the air a wooden K3 tail was used that broke off when entering the water. This was replaced in 1944 with L2 which was similar but had ailerons operated via a heavy gyro. The L2 tail permitted increased dropping speeds and heights, the maximums actually achieved were 183 knots and 390 feet (120 m). The differences in weights and lengths in the table above are due to the different warheads.B

 

[Vincenzo]

and a bit over "Date Of Design 1935"

 

[parsifal]

and a bit over "Date Of Design 1935"

Yes, and Campbell explains this in a lot more detail. The F5B was a development of the f5a. The F5a began development in 1935, with the intention of having stockpiled 600 by 1939. In the end the Germans had ammassed less than 100 of these by 1939, with production at a very low level of 5 per month. It appear that the German Navy had 76 aerial torpedoes in stock, and that 52 of these were expended in trials in October 1939. In September 1939, they did not have a completed delivery system. Dedvelopment was then all but abandoned, until March 1940, when torpedo development was taken over by the Luftwaffe. They began the processes that led to the introduction of the F5b, but this type was not operational until November 1941. In the meantime and as an interim measure the Luftwaffe adopted the F5w, with operational delivery in mid to late 1941.

This means that from 1939 through to the latter part of 1941, the Luftwaffe was without any effective aerial torpedo delivery system. The He 115 was not an effective carrier, and the ordinance was defective until later in 1941. It also took the Luftweaffe some time to develop the specialist skill needed in the anti-shipping units for effective delivery to be considered.

All of this is consistent with my originaql statements

Of the 52 torpedoes expended in the trials no less than 26 were defective. Reason is not stated, but given that the usual procedure was to remove the exploder from the front in trial units, it was unlikley to be in the firing mechanism. Given the extremely narrow launch parameters, I think the there would most likley have been errors in the ignition depth keeping or gyro mechanisms, but these are only gueses.

The Ju 88 was not a true divebomber incidentally. It could undertake shallow dives, but not in the same manner as Ju87s. This was certainly true in 1939, perhaps its delivery was improved later in the war. The first Ju-88s torpedo bombers were not available until 1942.

Until the end of 1941, the main aerial menace for the RN were Ju87Rs ( effectively, long range stukas....there would have been no need to develop these types, if the claim that the Ju88 was an effective long range "true" divebomber were correct. Manifestly they arent). Level bombers such as the Condor were effective against shipping, as were the tactical bombers like the Ju88. They enjoyed very little success against warships, which further reinforces the argument that they were not true divebombers. If they had, they would have been far more dangerous than they actually were

 

[Vincenzo]

Parsifal do you read the table posted fro Kurfuerst? so i think that Campbell take a ohax

 

[Kurfürst]

I think its futile to comment any further on the torpedoes, since you simply ignore the sources posted. Basically running in circles...

As for Ju 88, you are rather alone with your opinion that it was not a dive bomber. The Germans, however, funnily insisted on describing the Ju 88A-1 as "Zweimotoriges Sturzkampf-Schnellflugzug". Perhaps you can give a translation of that for us.

As for its dive bombing capabilities, the type was cleared for dives up 70 degrees with dive bomb sight and a pull-out autopilot. If you believe that a 70 degree dive is a shallow one, I'd like to know your definition of what constitutes a steep dive..

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal do you read the table posted fro Kurfuerst? so i think that Campbell take a ohax

No not at all. since there are at least three accepted sources that refute Kurfurst original post. Also the translation of this table is quite revealing. Augang = "received", Verbrauch = "expenditure", Best am front ja monat = "stock on hand in that month". If you take a detailed look at the table, they were not using their stock of torpedoes, except for a few here and ther until the latter part of 1940. This provides clear evidence that there was something wrong. If they had functional torpedoes, why did they not use them?

I think Kurfursts table is wrong. I think that where it refers to F5b and F5w it is in fact referring to f5a. As far as I know there were no real problems with the F5b, though comnpared to their Japanese counterparts they were very pedestrian, and of limited capability. The F5a was basically a failure, as far as I am aware it was never used operationally, and this is entirely consistent with Kurfursts table

One possible solution is that the stock of torpedoes on hand in 1939 began as F5a standard, but were later converted. I suspect the main differences in the two subtypes might be in the tail assemlies, and it is quite possible the Germans fixed the reason for the failure of the F5a, and then in their records simply recorded them as F5b

 

[Vincenzo]

i see nothing the strange in the traduction of german words, if LW don't give credit at the arial torpedo why must ised its? your are supposition, and on german fact i'm on the side of a german book and not a english/us book (idk Campbell nationality)

 

[parsifal]

I think its futile to comment any further on the torpedoes, since you simply ignore the sources posted. Basically running in circles...

As for Ju 88, you are rather alone with your opinion that it was not a dive bomber. The Germans, however, funnily insisted on describing the Ju 88A-1 as "Zweimotoriges Sturzkampf-Schnellflugzug". Perhaps you can give a translation of that for us.

As for its dive bombing capabilities, the type was cleared for dives up 70 degrees with dive bomb sight and a pull-out autopilot. If you believe that a 70 degree dive is a shallow one, I'd like to know your definition of what constitutes a steep dive..

I dont think it futile at all, and I dont think we are running in circles.....what we arent getting is an acceptance that the Germans had a viable torpedo force from the beginning of the war, or that the Ju88s were a viable dive bomber against naval targets at the beginning of the war. I would have thought you would be interested in finding out the truth rather than simply mouthing nationalistic claptrap....

I never said the Ju88 was not effective in the naval attack role, at least not in the beginning. However, if you read the detailed action reports of the Royal Navy at the time, virtually all the effective attacks on RN warships delivered were done so by Ju-87s. Successful attacks were carried out by Ju88s but were undertaken using level bombing techniques for the most part, and the percentage of successful strikes is much lower than those delivered by Ju87s. Only a minority of attacks show the Ju88 (according to the RN after action reports I have read), being used in the divebombing role up to the end of 1941. I am fully aware of its description as a divebomber, but its results dont support its claim as such, at least not in that early period. Later, when it was re-equipped with a functional torpedo and low level bombing techniques were perfected it did become very effective. The question begs…if it was so successful as a divebomber, why were most of its attacks against RN heavy ships undertaken using level bombing techniques

Its very telling that in the most successful raid by Ju-88s that I know of, the raid at Bari in late 1943, the Germans did not employ divebombing, but instead opted for low level bombing - the so-called "swedish turnip" method of attack. if the Ju88 was effective as a Ju-87 at divebombing (naval targets) it surely would have used divebombing over level bombing......the argument becomes illogical and unconvincing to me to say it was the scourge of the oceans, only to find there are no tangible result to back that claim up.

To this end I checked the war loss section of my Janes 1945 edition, as well Conways, and other material I have on the RN actions in 1939-41. There were no ships larger than a cruiser lost to the European Axis air attacks. A total of five cruisers were lost in the specified time period, of which two were attributable to Ju88s, and a further two partially attributable. One of these was the HMS Curlew, sunk off Narvik whilst either covering an amphibious operation, or covering the withdrawal of the ships, and therefore constrained in her ability to maneouvre and by the speed that she could move. She was sunk by a stick of bombs in a level bombing attack by Ju88s of the elite KG 30 (which included the test pilot Francke)

The other vessel of cruiser size sunk by Ju88s was HMS Calcutta, off Crete, whilst engaged in evacuation loading from the island of Crete. On this occasion the Ju88s were efficient and deadly, and I do not know the method of attack used. She was hit by 2 x 500 lb bombs from just two Ju88s, On 01-Jun-1941. There unit responsible for this loss was Ii/LG1 about 100 miles north of Alexandria. By this time the germans were employing low level attacks as opposed to medium and high level attacks of the early war period. It is just as likley that Calcutta was hit by a low level level bombing attack as a shallow dive that the the Ju 88s could deliver. But I would give it the benefit of the doubt in this case

HMS Fiji and Gloucester were sunk 22-5-41 off Crete, by sustained and heavy air attacks. The ships repelled a series of heavy air attacks during withdrawal from Kithera Channel. Fiji and Gloucester had been detached to provide AA protection to destroyers Kandahar and Kingston picking up survivors from HM Destroyer Greyhound. The entire Task Group was subjected to further air attacks during which HMS Gloucester was hit and set on fire. These attacks were from Ju87s, Fiji left area with the two destroyers because of continuing air threat. During passage she suffered further damage by near miss from single aircraft (a Ju88 ) causing flooding in the engine room, which reduced speed and caused listing. In subsequent attack she was hit by three bombs (from Ju87s) which increased the list, and she eventually rolled over and sank an hour later in position 34.35N, 23.10E. The immediate rescue of survivors by HM Destroyers Kandahar and Kingston was impossible because of continuing acute danger of air attacks, however rafts and boats left for those able to escape by swimming. 523 members of ship's company were picked up after nightfall. Both cruisers had low stocks of AA ammunition and the judgement to send them to provide defence during rescue is one of the many criticisms made after WW2 in respect of the disastrous operations off Crete in 1941. The attackers in this case were units from LG-1 (Ju88s) and St. G-2 (Ju87s) as well as Me 109s operating as Fighter Bombers. The general consensus is that the mortal blows for both ships was from the Ju-87s rather than the Ju-88s. The Ju 88s may have been operating as as divebombers or as low altitude level bombers in these attacks, but in either scenario were not nearly as accurate as the Ju87s in these attacks. In the case of the hits on the Fiji, three out of the four hits were by Ju87s. Aircraft numbers were approximately equal (Ju88s and Ju87s) in these attacks.

HMS Southhampton was sunk 11-01-41 from attacks by Ju87s. According to the Uboat.net site, "HMS Southampton (Capt. Basil Charles Barrington Brooke, RN) was heavily damaged in the Central Mediterranean about 195 nautical miles east-south-east of Malta in position 34º54'N, 18º24'E by German Ju-87 divebombers. 81 men were killed. The ship was finally sunk by torpedoes from HMS Orion and HMS Gloucester.

At 1522 hrs of 11 January, Southampton, in company of Gloucester and destroyer Diamond were at position 34.56 N, 18.19 E, some 220 miles east of the Sicilian coast. At that time they came under attack of a German Squadron consisting of 35 Ju-87s belonging to II/St.G.2. The planes were led by the Group Commander, the famous Oberst (Major) Werner Ennecerus. (]It should be noted that at this time FK X from which the attacking formations were drawn had on strength 50 Ju87Rs and 20 Ju88s).
In this attack the Ju-87s scored a hit with a 500-kg bomb on Gloucester: it was a dud and went through 5 decks, exiting the hull without detonating. Southampton, on the other hand, sustained 2 500-kg bomb hits: the first detonated in the wardroom and the second in the Officer's mess. Huge fires broke out and isolated some of the control for flooding the magazines, rendering the situation immediately critical. After 4 hours of fruitless efforts to bring the conflagration under control, Southampton was abandoned at 1900 hrs, the crew being rescued by Gloucester and Diamond. Subsequently, the wreck received a coup de grace from Orion, which had been despatched to the area to increase the AA protection for the damaged vessels. In the sinking there were 52 dead, 27 of whom officers. The cruiser sank at 2000 hrs in approximate position 34º54'N, 18º24'E."

As can be seen,, whilst the effectiveness of the Ju88 in the aeronaval role is undeniable, the majority of its attacks on major units was using conventional level bombing techniques (at least in the 1939-40 period), and it s effectiveness as a divebomber, compared to Ju87s was limited, judging by the number of attacks and the number of hits achieved. This suggests to me that the label "divebomber" in its role description is somewhat misleading when applied to naval attack. In my opinion it was primarily a level bomber, with a secondary or subsidiary capability as a quasi divebomber…..

It is also interesting to note that the first subtype of the Ju88 capable of launching torpedoes was the A-17 subtype, introduced at the end of 1941. The first subtype of the He 111 capable of carrying a torpedo was the He 111 H-6, first produced in November 1941. Apart from the he 115, which was more a theoretical capability than an actual one, given the numbers of torpedoes actually fired from this platform (less than twenty by the look of it up to the end of 1940), I think it entirely valaid to say that the Germans had no aerial torpedo capability in 1939, and that her first reall capability arose after October 1941.

 

[Glider]

Good information.

One observation about the use of the Ju88 as a dive bomber. What the aircraft is capable of doing, such as the 70 degree dive may well not be what the crew are trained to do. Level bombing and dive bombing take a lot of practice and its quite possible that the crews were only trained for level bombing.

 

[parsifal]

i see nothing the strange in the traduction of german words, if LW don't give credit at the arial torpedo why must ised its? your are supposition, and on german fact i'm on the side of a german book and not a english/us book (idk Campbell nationality)

And the nav weapons is run by a European (german I think, not that that matters one bit), and the book by Isby is a collection of first hand accounts by the people that were there, German officers mostly.

It is possible that the Germans were stockpiling their torpedoes. 76 is so close to zero that it is almost laughable. The Germans produced so many F5bs that by the end of 1943 they had ammassed more than 10000 of them, which is more than the entire US stock at that time.

So apart from not trusting English sources ( I dare not ask why, for your sake) why do you think the Germans had a viable torpedo force and the means to deliver it in 1939

 

[parsifal]

Good information.

One observation about the use of the Ju88 as a dive bomber. What the aircraft is capable of doing, such as the 70 degree dive may well not be what the crew are trained to do. Level bombing and dive bombing take a lot of practice and its quite possible that the crews were only trained for level bombing.

I believe Kurfurst when he says that the Ju88 was capable of a 70 degree dive. Whether it was efficient at that angle, I dont know. What I am certain of is that it was not as dangerous as the Ju87 ion that periuod 1939-41. I think your suggestion may have a lot to do with it, but it might also be that they simply were not that efficient as divebombers against ships

 

[Zniperguy114]

Put it this way, Both nations had great planes for the theatre they were a part of. But, to answer the question, I would have to sayGermany by far. Sure japan made many good planes, i. e. the ledgenary zero, but germany made one hell of a great invention, the jet. The Me 262 was one great fighter, although it didn't save the Nazis. But it lead to, thanks to captured german enginers, the earlier creation of the modernized USAF jets about a decade earlier than we(the US) origanally may have done so. Another reason for my choice is than Japan's planes may have been light weight and highly menoverable, they were highly vunerable. So vunerable, one .50 calibre round to the gas tank from an ailled plane could down it.

 

[parsifal]

(Following text represents a selection From "Hitler's Luftwaffe" by Tony Wood and Bill Gunston,
[1997], "The Story of the Torpedo Bomber" By Peter C. Smith, [1974],and Die grossen Luftschlachten des Zweiten Weltkriegs : Flugzeuge, Erfolge, Niederlagen. [1993], ISBN: 3704360295). I have relied on a secondary source to produce this transcription.

The most successful German torpedo-bomber in WW2 was the He 111 H-6. The most enviable results of this type have been achieved through combat actions that were undertaken from Bardufoss and Banak airfields in Norway - predominantly by KG 26 (Löwen Geschwader) - against allied convoys plying the North Cape route from mid-June 1942 onwards.

Although slightly outdated, the He 111 possessed some very good flight characteristics. First of all, old "Doppel-Blitz" (double lightning) was a steady machine, unwavering in level flight, completely predictable within cruise regime, with a possibility to be smoothly trimmed, as well as with quite handy low-level cornering speed. The plane was initially designed to be an unyielding bombing platform and its behavior has completely reflected that assignment.

He 111H-6 produced from late 1941 was the first torpedo-variant of the type able to carry heavy external loads, including bombs larger than 250 kg, or a pair of torpedoes, beneath the fuselage. The He 111H-6 was both versatile and well liked by its crews, serving on all fronts with the Luftwaffe.

Potentials of air-launched torpedoes, however, were discovered commensurately very late, because the German torpedo development had been completely in the hands of the Kriegsmarine since 1932, which had actually purchased the Horten naval torpedo patents from Norway in 1933 and the Whitehead-Fiume patents from Italy in 1938. Germans, essentially, had used a variant of the Norwegian aircraft-dropped torpedo – the 450mm Schwarzkopf F5 with a range of 2000 meters and maximum speed of 33 knots. It was armed with a 200 kg Hexanite explosive warhead. Subsequent German derivative, improved LF 5B travelled at a speed of 40 knots, and was armed with a 180 or 250 kg warhead filled also with Hexanite.

It has to be mentioned, however, that the technical development toward German air-launched torpedoes was pursued in a rather leisurely manner, mainly because it was conducted by the Seeluftstreitkrafte (naval air division of the Kriegsmarine), and the results of trials and reports of combat operations were jealously guarded by the navy. During extensive torpedo-dropping trials, carried out in 1939, both the He 59 and He 115 floatplanes were used, and the failure rate of the torpedoes was a amazing 49 percent!

In 1941, the Luftwaffe decided to pursue its own development trials with the intention of setting up a powerful force of torpedo-bombers. The first torpedo development establishment was formed at Grossenbrode, on the Baltic coast. Several aircraft types were intensively tested and it was soon apparent that the proven and long-established He 111, as well as the faster Ju 88 were the most suitable types.

Luftwaffe unit Kampfgeschwader 26 was anticipated to play the leading role in this new torpedo plan, and Stab, I and III/KG 26 were selected as the specialized torpedo-units, while II/KG 26 remained in the classicist level-bomber role. It sounds almost unbelievable, but the tactical detachment of a few of KG 26's He 111s to Flieger Korps X in the autumn of 1941 for torpedo operations was short-lived due to lack of torpedoes!

In January 1942, the Luftwaffe's demands for the centralization and control of all German and Italian torpedo development were finally granted. Colonel Martin Harlinghausen was appointed as the head of all Luftwaffe torpedo development, supply, training and operational organizations, with the TorpedoTraining School established at Grosseto in Italy. During the early months of 1942, I/KG 26 underwent torpedo conversion-courses, lasting between three and four weeks. The Gruppe's He-111H-6's could carry two torpedoes slung on racks beneath the belly; the standard torpedoes used were the German LT F5 and LT F5W, both of 450-mm caliber, with the latter based on the Italian model made by Silurificio Whitehead di Fiume.

While I/KG 26 underwent conversion at Grosseto, its future and the bases from which it would operate had already been decided. Luftflotte V, based in Norway and Finland, needed additional bomber support to interdict Allied convoys on the Murmansk/Archangelsk route. In March, Göring ordered Luftflotte V to collaborate with the aerial reconnaissance units of the Kreigsmarine and to attack the convoys when they came into range, and also to shift bomber forces from the Finnish front to accomplish this task. Within I/KG 26, based at Banak and Bardufoss, there were 12 crews available for torpedo operations with the Heinkel He 111H-6 planes.

During March and April, various PQ [and retuning QP] convoys were succesfully attacked. Although the Luftwaffe claimed all 35 ships sunk, they had only sunk seven. New lessons had been learned, however, which were to form the basis of later tactics when greater torpedo forces were expected to be available. Coordinated torpedo and bomber attacks sowed confusion among the defensive screen. The most favorable time was at dusk, with the torpedo-bombers coming in from the darker hemisphere aided by the ships' pre-occupation with dive bombers and level bombers by the Ju-88's of KG 30, thus affording the low-flying Heinkels of KG 26 an element of surprise. The tactic known as "Golden Zange" (Golden Comb) consisted of a mass torpedo attack by as many as 12 He-111's flying in wide line-abreast, with a simultaneous release of torpedoes to obtain the maximum spread while dividing defensive fire.

Aircrafts have been spaced about 200-300 meters apart, and both LT F5b (improved version) and Italian LT F5W torpedoes were used. The F5W was preferred as the F5b's whisker-type detonating pistol seldom operated when the target was hit at an sharp angle. Torpedoes were launched at a range of 1000 meters, and usually from a height of 40 meters (125 feet), the parent aircraft flying dead straight and level in order for the weapon to enter the water at the stipulated 12 degrees. AA fire, particularly that of 20mm Oerlikon guns, was considered a greater threat than escorting RN fighters. Observation of torpedo-tracks or hits was next to impossible, as the parent aircraft had to execute violent evasive action as soon as the weapon was dropped. The Ju-88's of KG 26 had considerably more success than the Ju-88's of KG 30, and sunk the majority of the merchant ships claimed.

Ill-fated convoy PQ-17 was set upon for five days, in which 23 out of 33 ships were sunk, and Luftflotte V accounting for fourteen of them. This action saw the use of a few He-115 floatplane torpedo-bombers too, but mainly the He-111's of I/KG 26 and the Ju-88's of KG 30 were in action.

By the end of July, III/KG 26, under captain Nocken, had completed the course at Grosseto and had transferred its Ju 88A-4 torpedo-bombers to Rennes-St.Jacques. They eventually wound up at Banak along with a considerable anti-shipping force of bombers, torpedo-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft.

Convoy PQ 18, which came under attack in mid-September 1942, differed from previous Arctic convoys in that its anti-aircraft defenses included an aircraft carrier. Though the Luftwaffe achieved its greatest success to date by sinking a large number of ships, they lost 41 bombers. Royal Navy Hurricanes and Martlets [Grumman F4F Wildcats in British service], the long and strenuous flights of the bombers, and intense AA fire made torpedo-bombing mostly hazardous. Chances of rescue for a downed crew were practically non-existing, and life in the freezing waters of the Arctic was measured in minutes only.

The above mentioned attack saw the last of the massed torpedo attacks by the Luftwaffe, and never again were the concentration and results achieved in subsequent actions in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. With the Allied landings in North Africa, the Mediterranean became the pivot of Axis anti-shipping operations, but Allied air superiority forced massive casualties. The poor performance of torpedo-bombers thereafter was partly due to inexperienced replacement aircrews, Allied air supremacy, and relegation to night attacks where air opposition was weaker. The deepening fuel crisis and shortages further curtailed training. During the first ten days of the Normandy operation with hundreds of targets, only five vessels were sunk. Norwegian air strength was supplemented by the Ju 188, but during a four-day attack where 200 torpedoes were launched, all failed to hit. By early 1945 KG 26 had all but lapsed into inactivity.

Despite heavy losses, however, the experiences of KG 26 in Norway had confirmed the effectiveness of aerial torpedoes in maritime warfare. Ten of the thirteen ships destroyed were the victims of torpedoes delivered by KG 26. Of the 860 sorties flown by Stumpff's Luftflotte V aircraft against PQs 16, 17, and 18, over 340 were made by torpedo bombers. German assessments of these operations confirmed that the torpedo bomber was the most efficient mean of destroying enemy merchant ship. The calculations undertaken by Luftwaffe's 8th Abteilung have proved that while only one vessel was sunk for every 19 bombing sorties undertaken, torpedo missions sank an Allied vessel on every 8 sorties, that is, they were on average twice as effective as high-level or dive-bombing attacks, and one-quarter of all the torpedoes launched struck their targets.

...says it all, and better than I could really

 

[DAVIDICUS]

In January 1942, the Luftwaffe's demands for the centralization and control of all German and Italian torpedo development were finally granted. Colonel Martin Harlinghausen was appointed as the head of all Luftwaffe torpedo development, supply, training and operational organizations, with the TorpedoTraining School established at Grosseto in Italy. During the early months of 1942, I/KG 26 underwent torpedo conversion-courses, lasting between three and four weeks. The Gruppe's He-111H-6's could carry two torpedoes slung on racks beneath the belly; the standard torpedoes used were the German LT F5 and LT F5W, both of 450-mm caliber, with the latter based on the Italian model made by Silurificio Whitehead di Fiume.
...

Aircrafts have been spaced about 200-300 meters apart, and both LT F5b (improved version) and Italian LT F5W torpedoes were used. The F5W was preferred as the F5b's whisker-type detonating pistol seldom operated when the target was hit at an sharp angle.

Like I said, from a January 1943 U.S. Intelligence Bulletin:

Torpedo squadrons are believed to have the highest morale of all units of the Italian Air Force. Their efficiency is such that Germany has sent squadrons to Italy for instructions in torpedo tactics. Italian aircraft torpedoes are believed to be superior to those of German design and are probably used by the German Air Force.

 

[DAVIDICUS]

On the use of the Ju-88 as a dive bomber, an allied intelligence report published April 22, 1943 notes that the German Air Ministry had issued new instructions establishing restrictions on flying the Me-109, Fw-190, He-177 and Ju-88. These restrictions concerned damage to airframes due to "overtaxing their capabilities."

Specifically with respect to the Ju-88, reference is made to the difficulty of controlling Ju-88 aircraft at a dive angle of 60°, and it is stated that in the future they are to be rigged for a dive angle of 50° only. This will limit the indicated air speed in the dive to between 329 and 341 mph as against 341 to 354 mph obtained in a 60° dive.

An earlier August 27, 1942 intelligence report indicated observations of German air attacks over Malta:

All heavy attacks were by day, with a few light raids by night. The Germans never employed straight, high-level bombing. Full use was made of the sun and any available cloud cover. The practice of feinting was used--starting to dive towards one objective and then turning to attack the real target.

Until the middle of March, with one exception, only JU 88's were used by the Germans. Later JU 87's were also constantly used. The JU 88's approached between 12,000 and 18,000 feet and came in at angles that varied between 30° and 60°, releasing their bombs at 6,000 to 9,000 feet, sometimes pulling out as low as 4,000 feet. Generally, the JU 87's dived very steeply, pulling out at the same height as the JU 88's.
...
At least in the bombing attacks on Malta, Germans showed the trait, observed in the last war, of doing the same thing at the same time every day. During the heavy raids it was normal routine to receive an attack of about 75 bombers soon after breakfast, a second at lunch time, and a third at about 6 in the evening. This regularity was found to be a great convenience.

 

[parsifal]

Thanks Davidicus

Makes me think the Ju88 was too heavy to operate as a true dive bomber in the sense of the Ju87. Basically, the greater the weight of the aircraft, the more stresses on the airframe.

Also those dive speeds seem very high. I thought the reason for the great accuracy of the Ju87 was a combination of its slow dive speed and the steep angle of the dive

 

[davebender]

I suspect that it true. However until the invention of better bomb sights which allowed accurate shallow angle bombing there was no choice. It's pointless to bomb at all unless you have a reasonable chance to hit the target.