More advanced aircraft during WW2? Germany or Japan?
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oh can easily reply they aren't not reliable on not anglosasons things (obv. this is not true for all). i don't think they had a viable torpedo force in '39, and i never tell so, few torpedoes and little used. i think they have a working torpedo (F5b) in little number (76) with no/very few train on it and limited to seaplane unit.
parsifal
Colonel
But the more shallow the dive angle, the less accurate the bomb runs. And if the dive speed was 300-350 knots this would also have an adverse effect on the accuracy of the bomb runs.
Now, whether people choose to say the Germans did not have a viable torpedo force, or want to argue semantics and say that 76 torpedoes being delivered by a force of 20-30 planes still leads to the conclusion that the Germans lagged badly behind the Japanese in terms of their airborne torpedo technology, and despite quite massive efforts later in the war were never close to them (the Japanese) in terms of force effectiveness.
Ive done some further research on Luftwaffe torpedo operations in 1940.
The first operation use of airborne torpedoes by the Luftwaffe was in the Spanish Civil War. From mid 1936 a small number of Heinkel He 59 seaplanes served with the Seeflieger Gruppe AS/88 of the Condor Legion, operating from the island of Majorca. This unit was operational until the spring of 1939, and during this time launched a number of airborne torpedoes in combat. However due to problems with the LT F5 torpedo only one was successful. An attack on the British merchant ship Thropeness (4,700 GRT) which on the night of 21st July 1938 was entering the Spanish port of Valencia loaded with grain. At the time it was claimed by the Spanish Nationalists that this ship had been sunk by a mine.
By the start of WW2, the Seeflieger possessed 30 operational He 59s in four Staffeln. At this time the He 115 was starting to come into service, but due to the fragility of the LT F5 torpedo it couldn't be carried, as the He 115 couldn't fly slow enough, without stalling, to release the LT F5 torpedo successfully.
From October 1939 the few He 59s flew a limited number of torpedo operations against Allied shipping, but the only success recorded by He 59s using torpedoes in WW2 was the sinking of the British fishing steamer, Active (185 GRT) on the 18 December 1939.
In March 1940 with technical improvements to the LT F5 torpedo (including a new rudder) commenced, the He 115 B was earmarked for torpedo operations. The B subtype had some minor issues with carrying the 1600 lb torpedoes, since the original ETC racks were not rated to carry such a heavy load, and the chin mounted defensive armamanet tended to get in the way of the torpedo launches. These problems were addressed in the c-4 subtype, introduced from Spring 1941, which deleted the chin armamanet and strengthened the ordinance racks
It was intended to replace the He59 with the He 115, but this could not be done until the F5 torpedo was modified so that its launch speeds and heights were suited to the faster He 115. Though the redesigned torpedo was still far from outstanding, it was at least functional. The new mark of torpedo still required the He 115 to fly as slow and low as it possibly could, and even then failures were common, due primarily tio the weaknesses in the exploder that had been fitted.
Over the next few months due to limited available supplies of the torpedo (135 in March) few operations were undertaken. In July 1940 the only operational airborne torpedo Staffel ready for action was 3/Ku.Fl.Gr 506 based at Stavanger, to be followed by 1./Ku.Fl.Gr 106 from mid August based at Norderney
From August as other He 115 torpedo attack units became operational, combat sorties increased though the limited number of torpedoes available was always a problem ( in September the figure was down to 38 at one point)
The first successes of the He 115 units may have been the sinking of Llanishen (5,035 GRT) and the Makalla (6,680 GRT) of Convoy CA 203 in the Moray Firth on the 23 August 1940, but some sources put their loss down to bombs not torpedoes.
The first confirmed success of He 115 torpedo bombers was the sinking of the Remuera (11,445 GRT) by Ku.Fl.Gr 506 on the 26 August 1940.
Over the next 4 months until the end of the year the Luftwaffe used about 160 airborne torpedoes in operations against British shipping in Northern waters, Luftwaffe claims were high (one unit alone, 3./Ku.Fl.Gr 506 was credited with sinking 124,000 GRT) but when checked against British losses, Luftwaffe torpedo bombers probably sank a total of 7 or 8 Allied merchant ships of around 50-60,000 GRT in 1940.
During this period there were attempts to use both the He 111 and Ju 88 in the torpedo bomber role, but due to problems with inter service rivalry, and the LT F5 torpedo, none became operational in 1940. It would be late 1941 before the He 111 H-6 subtype and the Ju88 A17 torpedo aircraft were ready, and some months into 1942 before crews for these aircraft were proficient in their use. The Italians were generally ahead of the germans in the development of their torpedo squadrons.
Source:
Luftwaffe Aerial Torpedo Aircraft and Operations in World War II, by Harold Thiele
This whole discussion arose because people wanted to claim that the Germans had the capability to undertake all of the roles demanded of the Japanese air forces in 1941. Torpedo bombing was just one of the areas suggested that they could not have fulfilled. Clearly all this debate has shown that the germans were not up to undertaking a torpedo bombing role to anywhere near the proficiency displayed by the Japanese in their offensive operations. Until the latter part of of 1941, and in fact extending well into 1942, they possessed only a handful of operational airgroups, equipped with a torpedo not even close in terms of capability to the aerial torps being used by the Japanese at that time. Maybe they could have, but the fact is they didnt......as i said in my originall postings, each nation developed aircraft to suit the needs of their respective theares and operations they were carrying out
Now, whether people choose to say the Germans did not have a viable torpedo force, or want to argue semantics and say that 76 torpedoes being delivered by a force of 20-30 planes still leads to the conclusion that the Germans lagged badly behind the Japanese in terms of their airborne torpedo technology, and despite quite massive efforts later in the war were never close to them (the Japanese) in terms of force effectiveness.
Ive done some further research on Luftwaffe torpedo operations in 1940.
The first operation use of airborne torpedoes by the Luftwaffe was in the Spanish Civil War. From mid 1936 a small number of Heinkel He 59 seaplanes served with the Seeflieger Gruppe AS/88 of the Condor Legion, operating from the island of Majorca. This unit was operational until the spring of 1939, and during this time launched a number of airborne torpedoes in combat. However due to problems with the LT F5 torpedo only one was successful. An attack on the British merchant ship Thropeness (4,700 GRT) which on the night of 21st July 1938 was entering the Spanish port of Valencia loaded with grain. At the time it was claimed by the Spanish Nationalists that this ship had been sunk by a mine.
By the start of WW2, the Seeflieger possessed 30 operational He 59s in four Staffeln. At this time the He 115 was starting to come into service, but due to the fragility of the LT F5 torpedo it couldn't be carried, as the He 115 couldn't fly slow enough, without stalling, to release the LT F5 torpedo successfully.
From October 1939 the few He 59s flew a limited number of torpedo operations against Allied shipping, but the only success recorded by He 59s using torpedoes in WW2 was the sinking of the British fishing steamer, Active (185 GRT) on the 18 December 1939.
In March 1940 with technical improvements to the LT F5 torpedo (including a new rudder) commenced, the He 115 B was earmarked for torpedo operations. The B subtype had some minor issues with carrying the 1600 lb torpedoes, since the original ETC racks were not rated to carry such a heavy load, and the chin mounted defensive armamanet tended to get in the way of the torpedo launches. These problems were addressed in the c-4 subtype, introduced from Spring 1941, which deleted the chin armamanet and strengthened the ordinance racks
It was intended to replace the He59 with the He 115, but this could not be done until the F5 torpedo was modified so that its launch speeds and heights were suited to the faster He 115. Though the redesigned torpedo was still far from outstanding, it was at least functional. The new mark of torpedo still required the He 115 to fly as slow and low as it possibly could, and even then failures were common, due primarily tio the weaknesses in the exploder that had been fitted.
Over the next few months due to limited available supplies of the torpedo (135 in March) few operations were undertaken. In July 1940 the only operational airborne torpedo Staffel ready for action was 3/Ku.Fl.Gr 506 based at Stavanger, to be followed by 1./Ku.Fl.Gr 106 from mid August based at Norderney
From August as other He 115 torpedo attack units became operational, combat sorties increased though the limited number of torpedoes available was always a problem ( in September the figure was down to 38 at one point)
The first successes of the He 115 units may have been the sinking of Llanishen (5,035 GRT) and the Makalla (6,680 GRT) of Convoy CA 203 in the Moray Firth on the 23 August 1940, but some sources put their loss down to bombs not torpedoes.
The first confirmed success of He 115 torpedo bombers was the sinking of the Remuera (11,445 GRT) by Ku.Fl.Gr 506 on the 26 August 1940.
Over the next 4 months until the end of the year the Luftwaffe used about 160 airborne torpedoes in operations against British shipping in Northern waters, Luftwaffe claims were high (one unit alone, 3./Ku.Fl.Gr 506 was credited with sinking 124,000 GRT) but when checked against British losses, Luftwaffe torpedo bombers probably sank a total of 7 or 8 Allied merchant ships of around 50-60,000 GRT in 1940.
During this period there were attempts to use both the He 111 and Ju 88 in the torpedo bomber role, but due to problems with inter service rivalry, and the LT F5 torpedo, none became operational in 1940. It would be late 1941 before the He 111 H-6 subtype and the Ju88 A17 torpedo aircraft were ready, and some months into 1942 before crews for these aircraft were proficient in their use. The Italians were generally ahead of the germans in the development of their torpedo squadrons.
Source:
Luftwaffe Aerial Torpedo Aircraft and Operations in World War II, by Harold Thiele
This whole discussion arose because people wanted to claim that the Germans had the capability to undertake all of the roles demanded of the Japanese air forces in 1941. Torpedo bombing was just one of the areas suggested that they could not have fulfilled. Clearly all this debate has shown that the germans were not up to undertaking a torpedo bombing role to anywhere near the proficiency displayed by the Japanese in their offensive operations. Until the latter part of of 1941, and in fact extending well into 1942, they possessed only a handful of operational airgroups, equipped with a torpedo not even close in terms of capability to the aerial torps being used by the Japanese at that time. Maybe they could have, but the fact is they didnt......as i said in my originall postings, each nation developed aircraft to suit the needs of their respective theares and operations they were carrying out
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The intelligence report regarding new flying restrictions was imposed to "reduce the loss of, or damage to, particular planes by overtaxing their capabilities."
The He-177 combines light elevator control with good elevator effect, but has a comparatively low factor of safety, with the result that wrinkling of the skin on the wings or wing failures may occur from careless flying. Permissible pull-out acceleration at the present time amounts to 2.3g with a flying weight of 27 tons, and crews are reminded that high stresses may be caused when pulling out of a glide at high speed, by sharply pulling up out of horizontal flight at any speed, and in steep turns or by strong vertical gusts at high speed. A warning is issued that the automatic pull-out apparatus can unintentionally cause a strain of over 2.5g by tail-heavy trimming before the release of the bombs, by pulling back on the control column at the time of the automatic pull-out if the centre of gravity lies too far to the rear, or when dive-bombing is done in very gusty air. In the latter case, speed should be reduced to 186 mph. The pilot must be trained to watch closely the air speed indicator and the acceleration warning apparatus during every pull-out.
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In the case of all aircraft of the Me-109 series, including the Me-109G, attention is called to the numerous accidents caused by wing breakages, resulting from strains induced by air speeds in excess of the permissible maximum limits. A notice is to be placed on all airspeed indicators in these aircraft.
Warning is also given against yawing in a dive, which under certain conditions leads to high, one-sided wing stresses which the wing tips cannot support. When yawing occurs, the dive is to be broken off gradually, without exercising force. Wing tips must be examined and checked frequently for signs of failures. When yawing is encountered during turning, correction must be made with the rudder only and not with the ailerons. Mention is also made of high-wing stresses caused by the unintentional unlocking of the landing gear especially the dropping of one side in a dive. It is stated that steps are being taken to prevent this.
The report also discusses the directive to reduce the maximum permissible speed of the Fw-190. It did not go into specific structural liabilities as with the Me-109.
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The He-177 combines light elevator control with good elevator effect, but has a comparatively low factor of safety, with the result that wrinkling of the skin on the wings or wing failures may occur from careless flying. Permissible pull-out acceleration at the present time amounts to 2.3g with a flying weight of 27 tons, and crews are reminded that high stresses may be caused when pulling out of a glide at high speed, by sharply pulling up out of horizontal flight at any speed, and in steep turns or by strong vertical gusts at high speed. A warning is issued that the automatic pull-out apparatus can unintentionally cause a strain of over 2.5g by tail-heavy trimming before the release of the bombs, by pulling back on the control column at the time of the automatic pull-out if the centre of gravity lies too far to the rear, or when dive-bombing is done in very gusty air. In the latter case, speed should be reduced to 186 mph. The pilot must be trained to watch closely the air speed indicator and the acceleration warning apparatus during every pull-out.
...
In the case of all aircraft of the Me-109 series, including the Me-109G, attention is called to the numerous accidents caused by wing breakages, resulting from strains induced by air speeds in excess of the permissible maximum limits. A notice is to be placed on all airspeed indicators in these aircraft.
Warning is also given against yawing in a dive, which under certain conditions leads to high, one-sided wing stresses which the wing tips cannot support. When yawing occurs, the dive is to be broken off gradually, without exercising force. Wing tips must be examined and checked frequently for signs of failures. When yawing is encountered during turning, correction must be made with the rudder only and not with the ailerons. Mention is also made of high-wing stresses caused by the unintentional unlocking of the landing gear especially the dropping of one side in a dive. It is stated that steps are being taken to prevent this.
The report also discusses the directive to reduce the maximum permissible speed of the Fw-190. It did not go into specific structural liabilities as with the Me-109.
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parsifal
Colonel
Thankyou for the correction, and you are correct. Some sources state that some H-4s were converted to the torpedo role later in 1941, and that some H-5s were also converted in this way. No sources that I could find listed the first operational units earlier than October November 1941, though there were a couple that said He 111s were converted to torpedo roles in early 1941. I discarded these entries because of their non-specivity. Perhaps the aircraft became available, but time was needed to train the crews, in any event it was not until the latter part of 1941, that the first torpedo squadrons began deployment
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