I have no doubt that the Mosquito could have provided a more useful contribution to the strategic bombing effort than it already did. The limiting factor was, as mentioned previously, the numbers of available bomber variants. And that was because of the other roles it was required to fill.
I never felt that the Mosquito could replace the Lancaster. My view was that it could have acted as a replacement or supplement to the B-17 during the daylight campaign.
One raid that I thought may be possible for the Mosquito would be the first Schweinfurt raid. The range is just about within the Mosquito's capability at low altitude.
The numbers available were not limited by supply of materials as is often touted. DeHavilland at least is clear in his statements about that. The delivery dates are also heavily skewed by the hostility the air ministry showed towards it. As a design, the DH98 was ready for production as early as October 1938, but it would take until 1940 before it began to enter production and then only at a trickle. There were no real hitches in the production of the type (it was actually faster to build than a standard Blenheim turreted bomber) , just official opposition to it as a concept. the original type was designed to meet a specification of carrying 3000 lb bombload a minimum of 1500 miles. the Mosquito , even the early marks could achieve this easily. but the opposition to it as a bomber remained, and most of the early marks were completed as either unarmed recon versions or night fighters. Geoffrey DeHavilland had a bewildering array of variants he was willing to build from the start, so if the production was entered from an early stage rather than dithered about so that the crowning achievement of the Manchester could be built instead, the type could have been shown to fulfil many of the roles that it did.
Imagine if the type had started production in early 1939. It would have been entering squadron service by about June 1939. I believe its capabilities as a type would have forced BC to completely rethink its tactics. The great unknown is how the LW would react. their existing fighters, built around the Me 109 and Me 110 would immediately be shown to be inadequate, lacking both the speed an range to deal with the new bomber. Im tempted to think along the lines of an early introduction of the Me262 but that was still years away in 1939. For the moment Im just going to leave that an open question.
turning now to Schweinfurt/Regensburg option. The first thing that strikes me is that the assumption that losses for the Mosquito being the higher than a B-17 equipped force. I think that is incorrect. Historically the raid was a strike by 376 bombers of sixteen bomb groups against German heavy industry well beyond the range of escorting fighters. 60 bombers lost and 95 damaged, about 58 beyond economic repair.
The lead attack was the Regensburg group, which lost 24 bombers, and at least 60 damaged, 15 of the lost bombers were lost on the inbound leg. 126 of the 144 bombers released bombs over the target. The attack was late, and slow in delivery, giving the defenders plenty of time to get into position, land, refuel and be ready for the next attack.
If this element of the attack substituted Mosquito BXVIs for the B-17gs, instead of the approach speed being 180 mph, or less, it could have been 350mph for a hi approach. to increase bomb hits I would adopt a Hi-Lo-Med mission profile. Flak was noticeably low over Regensburg so losses to flak firing at an aircraft that within the target would be belting along at over 400 mph would be minimal. My guess is that for this strike element, losses might be 2-10 a/c, depending on how well it was delivered and the amount of advanced warning the LW received. One difficulty was that le mays group was tasked to stage through to Algeria after the hit, this would not be possible for the Mosquito hypothetical.
The main attack on Schweinfurt followed the same route basically as Le Mays Group. The organization and disposition of this force left a lot to be desired, and the increasing cloud cover forced the bombers to come in at sub-optimal altitudes. You cant lay this at the feet of the B-17 as a type, but you can say that because of the higher approach speed of the mosquito, the cloud would have been higher at the time of the approach (the cloud was descending as the day wore on) , the mosquito force would be far less constrained by cloud....they would have attacked higher and faster.
This time delay and altitude constraints is very significant to loss rates. The time lag allowed more than 300 defending fighters to be concentrated over or before the target. The time taken in the attacks also allowed many of the early intercepts to attack, land, refuel/rearm and hit the stream on the way out. Moreover at least two gruppen were able to use effectively the new unguided air to air rockets firing them into the tight defensive patterns the B-17s were using.
I am sure there are people here that have a better handle on the details of the battle compared to me, but from what I do know, it was a very bloody affair. Some 22 being shot down and a further 15 or so heavily damaged within the target area . The lead wing of 57 a/c was followed 15 mins later the other wings as they began their runs in. The lead group took many of the losses because the inbound approach was so slow, allowing the germans to be perfectly positioned for their attacks. Only 3 B-17s were brought down by flak, though many were damaged. 183 bombers managed to drop 950000 lbs of ordinance on the target. a total of 30 or so bombers were brought down or damaged within the target area. more time was lost as the bombers were forced to regroup over Meningen. they needed to stay together, as their primary defences, their turreted guns needed massed firepower to keep the losses low. Unfortunately this delay was used to good effect by their enemies.
The americans were again attacked as they retreated toward Brussels then home. At approximately 15:30 German fighters renewed their attacks, concentrating now on damaged bombers. Between 16:20 and 17:00 a covering force of 93 P-47s and 95 Spitfires arrived to provide withdrawal support, claiming 21 fighters shot down, but eight more bombers were lost before the force reached the North Sea, where three more crash-landed. The Schweinfurt force lost a total of 36 bombers and close to 60 damaged.
how might a Mosquito equipped force have fared in this scenario? It would both approach and leave faster, with no loiter time. Only head on attacks by the LW would be effective, and the numbers of fighters able to deploy might be half that achieved historically. We would need to model that battle to get a good idea of potential losses, but with half the number of defenders, only effective through half the attack angles, and no losses outside the target area you might suffer 5-10 Mosquito losses plus the 3, maybe 4 to flak There will be endless debates about how these losses might pan out, but I don't think it unreasonable to claim losses in the region of maybe 10 a/c lost . in exchange for that a force of say 550-600 Mosquitoes (roughly what I think the americans might potentially be able to put into the air) each carrying a 2000lb warload, might drop as much as 1,100,000 lbs of ordinance on the target. A critical point of argument might be the number of mosquito substitutes, but remember, my position is based on a premise of a 1938 entry into production and a 1939 entry into service, and probably a licence production agreement with the Americans. instead of building 7000 mosquitoes, 30000 would be nearer the total.