Translation of the article linked in Post 514
(Part III)
The contribution of the figures to the construction of a myth. The "undefeated" Air Force in 1940.
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The losses inflicted: a necessary critical assessment
In order to achieve a more just and realistic assessment, we will therefore propose to proceed by successive approximations. A first necessity is the exclusion of "probable" victories, a new category which did not exist in 1914-1918 and invented by the Air Force, which is not found in any other military aviation (RAF, Luftwaffe, Air Force American, etc.). In the vast majority or almost all of the cases, they are totally hypothetical and do not correspond to any actual destruction, the device concerned and claimed being simply damaged in the best case. In all rigour, they must be considered as highly improbable overall. That's what C.-J does. Ehrengardt: Revisiting the list of units almost systematically and on the basis of stricter criteria, excluding in particular the "probable" victories and the double accounts, he reaches the figure of 693 victories homologated as "safe and therefore officially and institutionally claimed by the French aviation for the period 1939-1940.
Because of this more rigorous method, we are already significantly but definitely moving away from the "thousand Victories". For the campaign of France stricto sensu, the most acceptable starting figure is nearly 600 victories homologated as "safe" (very exactly 594 according to Martin12) from May 10 to June 24. Despite its approximations and some shortcomings, the report by Harcourt does not say anything else in its outline, since it covers the whole period 1939-1940. If we subtract the 70-80 safe victories homologated during the "Funny War" 13 (3 September 1939-9 May 1940) of the 675 victories of the Harcourt report for the period 1939-1940, we find this estimate of about 600 in round figure.
Second necessity: To exclude duplicate accounts, insofar as the Harcourt report is based on the summation of individual unit charts. Given the particular mode of attribution of victories to units and pilots in force in the Air forces at that time, the actual ranking of a unit is not the sum of the individual victories obtained by its pilots as the actual list Of the French hunt as a whole is not the sum of the victories recognized and attributed to its different units. The victories in cooperation (involving several pilots or several groups) are counted as individual victories both to the units as to the pilots, and not split, as for example in the Royal Air Force (RAF). Thus the homologated victory of a single enemy device but obtained in cooperation by several pilots or different units will be recorded to the individual credit of each of them, which has a certain
But this operation does not directly or substantially alter the starting figure insofar as it can be thought that this subtraction is largely offset by the few shortcomings of the Harcourt report (units not taken into account, as has been seen ). For the period 1939-1940, Ehrengardt establishes that the 675 victories claimed as "safe" mentioned in the report of Harcourt correspond to 713 official (homologated as "safe") according to the more precise counts of the units and to 693 excluding Double counting between units (– 20). If we still subtract the 80 safe victories officially homologated during the "Funny war", it always comes back to this figure of the order of 600 for the only campaign of France stricto sensu.
But it is still necessary to introduce another correction and, in particular, to try to distinguish between officially claimed victories through the administrative procedures for approval, which are marked by uncertainty Variable depending on the nature of the approval (extremely strong for "probable"; relatively low for "safe" but not zero for that), and the degree of reality of destruction. We must not fétichiser the official figures which are only approximations, which can only lead to taking all the victories homologated for real destruction, and to confuse the institutional procedure and the reality Effective14 .
Also, third and final requirement, it is necessary to weigh slightly this figure by about 600 by playing a final correction factor of the fact that any victory officially homologated as "safe" does not necessarily correspond and Systematically to an actual destruction found according to criteria if not entirely objective at least relatively objective. A margin of error, linked to the possibilities of observation, verification and confirmation, which cannot be forgotten, exists between the official registration of a claimed victory as "safe" and the actual destruction of an enemy apparatus. The detection and identification on the ground of the aircraft, in particular, is very seldom possible when the aircraft crashed into territory occupied by German forces; In which case it is necessary to use the eyewitness accounts of other pilots who may be subject to subjective and are not always totally reliable.
Of course, we are here in the field of the uncertainty of accounting on the spot, as well established as it is, and this rate is difficult to determine in all rigour and certainty. But it can be estimated that it is probably close to 10% of unfounded claims. Thus, for example, the French fighter aviation claimed several safe and probable victories over seas el-Kebir during the British attack of a squadron of the French Fleet in July 1940. In the light of the English operations reports, no loss is CONFIRMÉE15. And there is no reason to suspect these purely internal administrative and technical documents of any propaganda will, contrary to the figures made public in the Battle of Britain, of which we know today that they were on the side and Others largely inspired and conditioned by the PROPAGANDE16.
At the end of these various calculations and revisions, one can reasonably estimate that the air force or, more accurately, the French aviation as a whole (and therefore not only the fighter aviation or even the air Force, as weak as the Contributions of other specialties or naval aeronautics), is responsible during the campaign of France for the effective destruction of a number of enemy planes greater than 500 and in the order of 550 to the maximum; And for the period 1939-1940, 600 real wins, to stick to a round figure, seem to be a reasonable and realistic approximation.
This estimate seems to be in line with what has long been known of the German losses: 1 300 lost German aircraft (all causes) in operations in May-June 1940 on the Western Front (RAF and DCA included, not forgetting the Aviations Dutch and, to a lesser extent, Belgian) 17. In the end, the official data of the Air force and those based on German sources are not as contradictory and incompatible as it might appear at first glance, but with the imperative requirement to make it a reading and use Critical.
ASeule(???) outstanding question, to definitively clarify the figures and their distribution: the respective contributions of the French and English DCA and the share of the other aviations. To stick to round figures (necessarily approximate, but the important thing here is to set orders of magnitude more in line with the historical reality), if we credit the French aviation of 500 real victories for the campaign of France and the DCA of 100, we obtain a total approximate of 600 enemy aircraft destroyed by the French armies; If the RAF is credited with 400 real victories and the British DCA of 50 (total: 450), a total of 1 050 destroyed German aircraft is coming; This leaves about 250 real victories to the Dutch (surtout18) and Belgian aviations to a much lesser extent. This assessment, for the approximate reason that it is, remains perfectly compliant or compatible with the total German aircraft losses in May-June 1940, of which there is no reason to doubt the veracity.
Official figures for actual losses of a completely different magnitude. Significant underestimation of Air force casualties
In this field we observe a process comparable to the evaluation of victories won by the Air Force but in the opposite direction of a systematic underestimation: These are not 4 to 500 aircraft that the Air Force lost because of the fights of May-June 1940 But in the order of 1 500 to 2 000, much more and three to four times more. Again, it is necessary to show the accounting mechanisms and their effects on the representation of the effectiveness of the action of the French aviation.
Officially recognized material losses
This assessment of losses is also quite central, since it is based on a false balance of victories (significantly overstated by the official certification procedures, as has been seen) and losses (dumped) that the myth otherwise From the "victory" of the Air force, at least from an "undefeated" weapon in May-June 1940 was able to build up and develop widely until our jours19. The official figures are indeed very partial and it seems necessary to take them on as rigorous, precise and diverse a basis as possible, in order to correct them and to make them more in line with the historical reality.
A threefold conclusion can be reached: on the one hand, these data favour "noble" losses (directly in combat) in relation to the professional military ethics of airmen and according to a classification grid particularly Restrictive; On the other hand, they accredit the idea that the Air force held in some way "its rank" and was effective, the losses being less than the "thousand victories" otherwise obtained at least claimed; But unfortunately, they do not correspond to reality, and by far the total losses are of a completely different magnitude.
In the first place, it was essentially the combat casualties that were retained. In this area, estimates range from 410 to 575, with official data becoming increasingly uncertain towards the end of the campaign, as the Air force disorganized and the evacuation of the most exposed airfields and Threatened, many groups were even folded in North Africa in mid-June 1940 in the event of a possible continuation of the GUERRE21
Almost a thousand victories for the loss of 4 to 600 devices (more or less), it is with regard to this comparison speaking, apparently balanced but fundamentally biased that some have claimed to argue in favor of the thesis of an Air force "undefeated", even Even relatively "victorious", or whose contribution would have been important, if not decisive, with regard to the possibility of the RAF winning the Battle of Britain. Moreover, this figure of combat casualties, it is true relatively small, is not explained by any superiority but is the revealing part of the numerical inferiority of the Air force vis-a-vis the German aviation, and on the other hand, of Its low rate of exits linked to the shortage of devices as to a high rate of equipment unavailability. Here too, we must not be mistaken in interpretation.
This only estimate is still far too partial to be true. To combat casualties, it is appropriate to add, on the one hand, the ground losses by bombardment of the parking lots of the Air force units, which led to the destruction of 230 aircraft and, on the other hand, the accident losses which were also numerous (230); or more than 450 additional perdus23 devices. This makes for a more complete assessment of losses which is in the range of 900 planes to 1 000 depending on the sources (there also more or less complete and systematic) but the thesis of an "undefeated" Air force is still tenable insofar as , either the losses are still lower than the claimed wins, or the balance is still relatively balanced.
But these figures still remain significantly and even very strongly undervalued and do not conform to reality insofar as they do not take into account significant additional losses: on the one hand, abandonment and even self-destruction By the units themselves of devices not in flight and not repairable immediately on the airfield evacuated often in the precipitation before the German advance (thus numerous fighter jets Morane-Saulnier 406 and even of Dewoitine 520 Much more modern, rare and précieux24); On the other hand, abandonment of new devices pending delivery but not evacuated (whether or not they were taken into account by the Air force, no matter, ultimately, this essentially administrative distinction) in the parks of some CONSTRUCTEURS25; Finally, reformed later sometimes in the weeks or even the few months following the armistice of June 1940, but because of their direct participation in the fighting; Thus many of the hunters Morane-Saulnier 406 and Bloch 152 of the repair shop of the Air Force (ARAA) of Aulnat, near Clermont-Ferrand, stored after the armistice before being reformed because they could not be repaired.
In order to have a more complete and systematic view of the situation, it is necessary to complete this first assessment with a complementary analysis. The figure of actual physical losses of the Air force can be validated "hollow" by a critical reading of the inventories carried out in the aftermath of the Armistice by the military institution itself. Without this sensitive re-evaluation, we are obliged to note that several hundred machines that have been released from the factory and delivered to the Air force have disappeared or simply volatilized, without any explanation and without leaving any traces. As human losses are not subject to bail, only material losses that appear to have been considerable in a limited and relatively short period of time will be attached.