Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?

[pinsog]

I'm not sure what kind of fighter was "diving away to save itself when enemy fighters approached", when it performed escort?
Granted, the P-36 have had range advantage over the European fighters that were without drop tanks. Yet, all of the sudden the 310-320 mph P-36 becames scourge for the RAF, while the 350+ mph Bf 109 cant do it.[/QUOTE]

Tomo Pauk: I wanted to respond to this, just to toss out a scenario for everyone to think about.

A somewhat slower extremely maneuverable fighter might have been a very good escort fighter in certain conditions as long as climb rate and ceiling was close to the enemy and speed difference wasn't extreme (Gladiator vs P47M)

Let's bump the German P36 up to 320 mph at altitude along with climb rate (Shortround is right, it has to perform up at 25,000 or so where the combat is) Weaving above the HE111 or JU88, the P36 could always turn into an attack by either a Hurricane or Spitfire. (Picture John Thach during the Midway Torpedo escort mission) If a Hurricane or Spitfire got on its tail, a P36 could easily do a level turn to shake them off, remaining in position above the bombers. An ME109 that got a Hurricane or Spitfire on its tail had to dive away to shake them thereby driving them out of escort position and most likely out of the fight. Now, all that being said, it would not be the best choice as an offensive fighter (like the P51) if your actual aim is to use bombers as bait to destroy RAF fighters. For that you need speed and diving ability to pursue.

Tomo Pauk, a squadron of 310-320 mph P36's above your bombers is a better escort than a squadron of 355 mph ME109's that are halfway across the channel trying to make the airfield before the fuel runs out.

(I'm not saying it could have been done, I'm tossing out an idea for discussion)

 

[tomo pauk]

Tomo Pauk: I wanted to respond to this, just to toss out a scenario for everyone to think about.

A somewhat slower extremely maneuverable fighter might have been a very good escort fighter in certain conditions as long as climb rate and ceiling was close to the enemy and speed difference wasn't extreme (Gladiator vs P47M)

Let's bump the German P36 up to 320 mph at altitude along with climb rate (Shortround is right, it has to perform up at 25,000 or so where the combat is) Weaving above the HE111 or JU88, the P36 could always turn into an attack by either a Hurricane or Spitfire. (Picture John Thach during the Midway Torpedo escort mission) If a Hurricane or Spitfire got on its tail, a P36 could easily do a level turn to shake them off, remaining in position above the bombers. An ME109 that got a Hurricane or Spitfire on its tail had to dive away to shake them thereby driving them out of escort position and most likely out of the fight. Now, all that being said, it would not be the best choice as an offensive fighter (like the P51) if your actual aim is to use bombers as bait to destroy RAF fighters. For that you need speed and diving ability to pursue.

Tomo Pauk, a squadron of 310-320 mph P36's above your bombers is a better escort than a squadron of 355 mph ME109's that are halfway across the channel trying to make the airfield before the fuel runs out.

(I'm not saying it could have been done, I'm tossing out an idea for discussion)

My take is that somewhat good escort is better idea than no escort at all. No escort makes the job easier to the interceptors.

As for the odd escort fighter that might dive, in order to shake off the enemy fighter, that is a whole other situation than the claim from another poster: "With the ability to stay with the bombers instead of diving away to save itself when enemy fighters approached." (my bold) Diving away, presumably in droves, on sight of the enemy was not done by anyone when tasked to escort something.

 

[pinsog]

My take is that somewhat good escort is better idea than no escort at all. No escort makes the job easier to the interceptors.

As for the odd escort fighter that might dive, in order to shake off the enemy fighter, that is a whole other situation than the claim from another poster: "With the ability to stay with the bombers instead of diving away to save itself when enemy fighters approached." (my bold) Diving away, presumably in droves, on sight of the enemy was not done by anyone when tasked to escort something.

Oh ok. Your right, that certainly didn't happen, at least not en mass before the battle started. I can see how a very maneuverable fighter would be handy for certain escort missions. Early on, P47's when forced to dive, we're unable to rejoin the bomber force due to poor climb rate and fuel supply.

This tactic would be better to use when it's more important to destroy the target than shoot down enemy fighters. Ship strikes come to mind. Knocking down a few enemy fighters is nothing compared to sinking a carrier, battleship, cruiser, troop ship etc. so an extremely maneuverable fighter that can constantly turn headon into an attack, causing just enough problems for enemy fighters that the bombers get through, might have been worth a try.

 

[Shortround6]

Let's bump the German P36 up to 320 mph at altitude along with climb rate (Shortround is right, it has to perform up at 25,000 or so where the combat is) Weaving above the HE111 or JU88, the P36 could always turn into an attack by either a Hurricane or Spitfire. (Picture John Thach during the Midway Torpedo escort mission) If a Hurricane or Spitfire got on its tail, a P36 could easily do a level turn to shake them off, remaining in position above the bombers. An ME109 that got a Hurricane or Spitfire on its tail had to dive away to shake them thereby driving them out of escort position and most likely out of the fight.

Tomo Pauk, a squadron of 310-320 mph P36's above your bombers is a better escort than a squadron of 355 mph ME109's that are halfway across the channel trying to make the airfield before the fuel runs out.

(I'm not saying it could have been done, I'm tossing out an idea for discussion)

It might have been worth pursuing but the P-36 wasn't going to be it.
TO get a P-36 up to 320mph at 25,000ft you need over 800hp at that altitude. Not going to happen without a two stage supercharger. and that won't happen till at least mid to late 1942 in prototype form so service use is how far away?

Now the 2nd point is nobody could do a sharp turn at 25,000 without loosing altitude. The P-36 with it's roughly 25.4 lbs per sq ft wing loading isn't enough better (if as good) as the Spit or Hurricane to do sharper turn (pull more "G"s) and not loose as much or more altitude. A large part of the Hawks ability to out turn the Spit at low altitude was A. It's easier to modulate elevators, less likely to over control. B. it's more powerful engine (at low altitude) and constant speed prop meant it could replace energy lost in the turn better than a Spitfire with a 2 pitch prop.
The 2 pitch prop helped take-off and that is it. at some were between 140-160mph while climbing away from the runway (and after the wheels were up) the plane with the 2 pitch prop shifted to course pitch and there the prop stayed (barring some really extreme circumstance) until the plane landed.
The Spitfires were modified with either a bob weight or spring/bungee cord so that more effort was needed on the stick for the elevator and that did away with a lot of the oversensitivity.

 

[pinsog]

Very nicely laid out Shortround.

What about (obviously very hypothetical) the first production version of the Zero?

 

[Shortround6]

Part of the Zero Legend is that there were two Zero's.
The first (the A6M2) came in two slightly different versions, the model 11 and the model 21 and used an engine with a single speed supercharger.
This version despite having a critical altitude of just under 15,000ft, was able to dominate the 2nd rate fighters in use in most of Asia in late 1941 and early 1942.
In large part due to it's light weight.
However the Japanese were not content to rest on what they had already achieved and the had flown the prototype Zero with 2 speed supercharger on July 15th 1941. This became the A6M3. The increase power at altitude didn't come without cost but the critical height of near 20,000ft kept it competitive with the majority of allied fighters for the rest of 1942. It was only the trickle of P-38s and the coming of the two stage F6F and F4U that really out performed the Zero on a technical level. (loss of pilot quality and poor Japanese logistics were eroding the Japanese superiority)

However the Zero would have been in a lot more trouble trying to fly in Europe in late 1941 or 1942 on either side.

The early Zero trying to act as an escort fighter at 25,000ft would have been in serious trouble. Being able to out turn 7500lb P-40s at over 20,000ft is one thing, low powered engine engine was trying to ahul around a fighter almost one ton lighter than the P-40s and Wildcats.
The Spitfires and 109s were about 1/2 way in weight (or less) between the the Zero and the two American fighters and both had much more power in the mid 20,000ft foot band than the Zero and P-39/40.
The later Zero might have done better against the early European fighters but by the middle of 1942 the game had already changed in Europe. MK V Spits were common and MK IXs were coming online and the Germans were introducing 109Gs.

 

[Greyman]

Lancaster VIs

Found a reasonably close test to compare ...

Lancs are from A&AEE, Fort is from data sheet

 

[parsifal]

Translation of the article linked in Post 514
(Part I)
The contribution of the figures to the construction of a myth. The "undefeated" Air Force in 1940.


"From the end of the military operations of the so-called "la campagne de France" (10 May-24 June 1940) which accompanied the signing of the Armistice of June 1940, the role of the Air force and the effectiveness of its action have ceased to be the subject of contro(versy) Often passionate, but also very interested on both sides; Each stakeholder endeavouring to justify itself and to bring to others the decisive responsibility for the very fast and unexpected military defeat of France. In the first time the controversy was essentially political and military. It was a matter of quickly finding leaders at the "Strange defeat" of 1940, according to the famous expression of the historian Marc Bloch. Politically, it is the action of the various Governments of the Third Republic that has been criticized and, in particular, successive ministers of Air: Pierre Cot en 1933-1934 (governments Daladier, Sarraut, Chautemps and Daladier) and 1936 to 1938 (Blum governments and popular Front Chautemps); And Guy the room from 1938 to 1940 (governments Chautemps, Blum and Daladier). On the military level, the action of the Air force was severely challenged and criticized by the Army officials.


In order to respond to the attacks it was subjected to, the French aviation political and military officials have tried to justify themselves, relying in particular on quantitative data from their own services1. From the outset, the figures have therefore been an essential and key source and resource of argumentation. Since the dark years, the controversy has never really ceased, even if over time it has often taken a more technical turn. Today, due to the gradual accumulation of scientific work, the cause appears to be widely heard, at least among specialists, and the weaknesses, limitations and constraints of the Air force and its action have been precisely Identified and analyzed in a non-controversial manner.


In fact, they were hampered in 1940 by several particularly heavy factors which limited their effectiveness: a numerical inferiority to German aviation (in the order of one to three), a lack of equipment technically Point, robust and reliable, renewal of unit equipment in the same time of fighting, organizational weaknesses and coordination difficulties at all levels, in industrial production as well as operational, because of the role Crucial time factor, etc. Some of these factors have been structural: plant exits and late deliveries of many devices; Equipment Calendar of units also late, depending on the output received; But also employment doctrine of cooperation with the Army, limiting the autonomy of the Air force and leading to divide and disperse the available means already in limited number to meet the specific requests of the latter (covers of Hunting of land units, bombardment of German columns) 2.

[Other factors have been much more cyclical, related to the weight of the concrete historical circumstances of this particular moment in the emergence of multiple constraints that have weakened its operational capability and refer to the game of these different Variables: Reequipment of the units while the decisive battle was engaged, due to both the material losses suffered but also the late deliveries of modern apparatus; Changes in airfields and withdrawal of units in front of the German advance forcing them to leave the aircraft out of state to fly; Low "exit rate" of the devices as pilots for both organization and fragility of the APPAREILS3; etc.] (note this paragraph is a poor translation)

On the other hand, the question of the "performance" of French aviation, which technically refers to the numbers compared to the aerial "victories" won and the losses of the Air Force, is an ancient subject of controversy and also of Mythology, but which has not been really decided from a scientific point of view. It is a land on which French military aviation historians are reluctant to engage for various reasons, starting with the complexity and the very technical nature of the data to be established and maîtriser4. It is true that this company is at least difficult and even perilous, the magnitude of the figures can vary in very large proportions according to the categories selected and their character more or less systematic and complete.


It does not seem to be necessary at all. Since quantitative data are essential instruments of argumentation, demonstration and finally legitimization, this debate, now more pacified, even if it is sometimes still passionate, is not only statistical and accounting. Through these controversies, it is finally the representation of the role of the Air force, its contribution to defeat, or on the contrary its "undefeated" or even "victorious" character, which are played, built and ARGUMENTENT5:


To understand what bitter victory or glorious defeat means [emphasis added], we must go through the forbidding account, but how edifying, the forces in presence, the victories and the dead in the field of honour. 6


In this field, the frequently mentioned figures of the "Thousand Victories" won as 500 to 900 aircraft lost by the Air force in May-June 1940 fall under the "pious myth", but socially and institutionally interested. The balance being in some way relatively equal between sustained losses and aerial victories won, this evaluation has as its function, if not to "prove" strictly speaking, at least to accredit and validate, with regard to the victories obtained in number Substantially equivalent, the idea of the relative effectiveness of the Air force and that of its non-responsibility in the defeat of 1940. Since this seems to have been one of the main issues of these accounting and statistical controversies for the institution and its representatives or advocates. A kind of functional equivalent comparable to that of "the undefeated Navy" in games that are both actors and representations aimed at imputing to other institutions the responsibility of defeat and imposing this belief, but which proves here Much more debatable and problematic

Historical work on the Air Force during this period is now relatively numerous, well documented and rich in information, and there is finally a critical synthesis in the matière7. However gaps still remain. We would like to focus here on this particular aspect of the debate by proposing to present, clarify and put into perspective the different data of the problem, in a manner as simple, legible and rigorous as possible. First, the first step is to establish critically the number of aerial "victories" won by the French Air Force mainly on its German counterpart, the Luftwaffe. Then, in a second step, we will then try to make a more exhaustive and realistic assessment of the actual losses, limiting themselves in one case as in the other exclusively to combat equipment (hunting, bombardment, recognition), category Of course having the greatest military meaning.

Two complementary phenomena, but opposite and reverse, can then be highlighted: On the one hand, that of a notable overestimate of the number of suspected enemy devices destroyed by the Air force; On the other hand, that of the equally significant underestimation of the losses suffered by the French military aviation which were much more numerous and important than it is most often mentioned. The taking into account of these two phenomena leads to a completely different balance of victories and losses that drastically changes the representation of the role of the Air force in May-June 1940"..

 

[parsifal]

Translation of the article linked in Post 514
(Part II)
The contribution of the figures to the construction of a myth. The "undefeated" Air Force in 1940.



The number of victories won by the Air force. Official estimates to a critical assessment

In this area, it is important to note a significant overestimation which should be highlighted in the accounting mechanisms. Indeed, in May-June 1940, French aviation was not responsible for the destruction of 900 to 1 000 enemy aircraft, mainly Germans, but also Italians to a much lesser extent, as it is often claimed, but much more Modestly in the order of 500. It is therefore important to revisit the data available as strictly as possible.

The official "winners" of the French Hunt and the myth of the "thousand" victories

There is a great confusion about this, and there is a significant difference between the claimed victories and the actual destructions. The first source of confusion is the chronological delimitation of the period under consideration. In the estimation of the Air force's victory, the "Funny War" (3 September 1939-9 may 1940) is included in the vast majority of cases, which is a notable and significant source of confusion: one passes thus insensitively from the "Thousand Victories" French aviation (naval aeronautics included, as weak and marginal as its contribution) in 1939-40 to the "thousand victories" of the Air Force fighter aviation during the French campaign, which is already not quite the same thing.

The primary and essential source in this area is the "Harcourt report", the name of the general inspector of hunting during this period, which constitutes the approximate summation of the charts of the twenty-four main hunting units of The Air force (known at that time as hunting groups, GC as acronym), and its derivatives reviewed and corrected over the years. This table will not be reproduced in the sense that, on the one hand, its detail per unit does not interest us directly and where, on the other hand, it already appears in several publications8. This report provisionally establishes the number of victories homologated and thus officially claimed by the fighter aviation for the period 1939-1940 to 919. This figure is broken down into 675 victories considered "safe" and 244 qualified as only "probable", a distinction which must be returned, insofar as it introduces another major source of confusion and distortion. This allowed some to gradually move from the 919 victories officially homologated to the more symbolic and emblematic figure of the "thousand victories" 9, without however the report of Harcourt being directly at the origin of this myth.

But these very quickly hot figures in the days following the armistice of June 1940 are only an approximation based on the data and information available at a given time and centralized by the aviation Inspector of French hunting: Without having any aberrations, they sometimes contain errors of detail but are mostly incomplete and partial insofar as they do not take into consideration all units of the Air force. At this first official assessment, it is appropriate to add the respective "scores" of the following units which are not taken into account in the Harcourt report: multiplaced Hunting (six squadrons being the equivalent of three groups, Official designation of Air Force units): Ten registered safe victories; Polish GC: twelve; Air defence patrols or light squadrons (ELD) (DAT): twelve; Naval Aviation Fighter Squadrons: twelve; As well as the few complementary victories homologated in bombardment and Reconnaissance10 Aviation.

However, in total and overall, with the sole exception of a particular hunting group, however, these figures do not fish at all by excess, quite the opposite. Based on the systematic counting of March and Unit operations Journals (JMO), primary source, B.C. Ehrengardt reaches the figure of 713 "safe" and 266 "probable" victories, representing a total of 979 officially approved and therefore claimed victories (still this figure does not take into account the few victories obtained by the bombardment Aviation and of recognition).

On the basis of the Harcourt report but extrapolating to excess and much more recently, some authors even go so far as to assert, implicitly or explicitly, that by including German apparatus accidentally destroyed in return for missions in France, the French Air Force, and essentially the fighter aviation, would be responsible for the destruction of 1 300 planes, that is to say, the total German losses of the Luftwaffe during this campaign, as if the British Royal Air forces ( RAF) had not been present and she also strongly engaged in fighting. Fifty years after the events, this is what is not far from doing implicitly the author of the article presenting the various contributions devoted to the commemoration of the Battle of France in the Air News-Magazine of the Air Force, When he writes:.


"To these 733 victories of the hunt, are added those acquired by bombardment, assault, recognition or observation. (...) With the 120 aircraft slaughtered by anti-aircraft land forces and the few 450 casualties for war damage, the Luftwaffe actually loses 36.9% of its entire front-line fleet"

( quote from For the honour of French wings, air News-Air Force Magazine, 1990.)


For various reasons, these figures appear highly subject to surety, not as such (the number of victories claimed and officially homologated), but in their real meaning, namely the actual destructions. In particular, but not only, because of the inclusion of "probable" victories, which radically distorts the debate.

 

[parsifal]

Translation of the article linked in Post 514
(Part III)
The contribution of the figures to the construction of a myth. The "undefeated" Air Force in 1940.


"

The losses inflicted: a necessary critical assessment

In order to achieve a more just and realistic assessment, we will therefore propose to proceed by successive approximations. A first necessity is the exclusion of "probable" victories, a new category which did not exist in 1914-1918 and invented by the Air Force, which is not found in any other military aviation (RAF, Luftwaffe, Air Force American, etc.). In the vast majority or almost all of the cases, they are totally hypothetical and do not correspond to any actual destruction, the device concerned and claimed being simply damaged in the best case. In all rigour, they must be considered as highly improbable overall. That's what C.-J does. Ehrengardt: Revisiting the list of units almost systematically and on the basis of stricter criteria, excluding in particular the "probable" victories and the double accounts, he reaches the figure of 693 victories homologated as "safe and therefore officially and institutionally claimed by the French aviation for the period 1939-1940.

Because of this more rigorous method, we are already significantly but definitely moving away from the "thousand Victories". For the campaign of France stricto sensu, the most acceptable starting figure is nearly 600 victories homologated as "safe" (very exactly 594 according to Martin12) from May 10 to June 24. Despite its approximations and some shortcomings, the report by Harcourt does not say anything else in its outline, since it covers the whole period 1939-1940. If we subtract the 70-80 safe victories homologated during the "Funny War" 13 (3 September 1939-9 May 1940) of the 675 victories of the Harcourt report for the period 1939-1940, we find this estimate of about 600 in round figure.

Second necessity: To exclude duplicate accounts, insofar as the Harcourt report is based on the summation of individual unit charts. Given the particular mode of attribution of victories to units and pilots in force in the Air forces at that time, the actual ranking of a unit is not the sum of the individual victories obtained by its pilots as the actual list Of the French hunt as a whole is not the sum of the victories recognized and attributed to its different units. The victories in cooperation (involving several pilots or several groups) are counted as individual victories both to the units as to the pilots, and not split, as for example in the Royal Air Force (RAF). Thus the homologated victory of a single enemy device but obtained in cooperation by several pilots or different units will be recorded to the individual credit of each of them, which has a certain

But this operation does not directly or substantially alter the starting figure insofar as it can be thought that this subtraction is largely offset by the few shortcomings of the Harcourt report (units not taken into account, as has been seen ). For the period 1939-1940, Ehrengardt establishes that the 675 victories claimed as "safe" mentioned in the report of Harcourt correspond to 713 official (homologated as "safe") according to the more precise counts of the units and to 693 excluding Double counting between units (– 20). If we still subtract the 80 safe victories officially homologated during the "Funny war", it always comes back to this figure of the order of 600 for the only campaign of France stricto sensu.

But it is still necessary to introduce another correction and, in particular, to try to distinguish between officially claimed victories through the administrative procedures for approval, which are marked by uncertainty Variable depending on the nature of the approval (extremely strong for "probable"; relatively low for "safe" but not zero for that), and the degree of reality of destruction. We must not fétichiser the official figures which are only approximations, which can only lead to taking all the victories homologated for real destruction, and to confuse the institutional procedure and the reality Effective14 .


Also, third and final requirement, it is necessary to weigh slightly this figure by about 600 by playing a final correction factor of the fact that any victory officially homologated as "safe" does not necessarily correspond and Systematically to an actual destruction found according to criteria if not entirely objective at least relatively objective. A margin of error, linked to the possibilities of observation, verification and confirmation, which cannot be forgotten, exists between the official registration of a claimed victory as "safe" and the actual destruction of an enemy apparatus. The detection and identification on the ground of the aircraft, in particular, is very seldom possible when the aircraft crashed into territory occupied by German forces; In which case it is necessary to use the eyewitness accounts of other pilots who may be subject to subjective and are not always totally reliable.

Of course, we are here in the field of the uncertainty of accounting on the spot, as well established as it is, and this rate is difficult to determine in all rigour and certainty. But it can be estimated that it is probably close to 10% of unfounded claims. Thus, for example, the French fighter aviation claimed several safe and probable victories over seas el-Kebir during the British attack of a squadron of the French Fleet in July 1940. In the light of the English operations reports, no loss is CONFIRMÉE15. And there is no reason to suspect these purely internal administrative and technical documents of any propaganda will, contrary to the figures made public in the Battle of Britain, of which we know today that they were on the side and Others largely inspired and conditioned by the PROPAGANDE16.

At the end of these various calculations and revisions, one can reasonably estimate that the air force or, more accurately, the French aviation as a whole (and therefore not only the fighter aviation or even the air Force, as weak as the Contributions of other specialties or naval aeronautics), is responsible during the campaign of France for the effective destruction of a number of enemy planes greater than 500 and in the order of 550 to the maximum; And for the period 1939-1940, 600 real wins, to stick to a round figure, seem to be a reasonable and realistic approximation.

This estimate seems to be in line with what has long been known of the German losses: 1 300 lost German aircraft (all causes) in operations in May-June 1940 on the Western Front (RAF and DCA included, not forgetting the Aviations Dutch and, to a lesser extent, Belgian) 17. In the end, the official data of the Air force and those based on German sources are not as contradictory and incompatible as it might appear at first glance, but with the imperative requirement to make it a reading and use Critical.

ASeule(???) outstanding question, to definitively clarify the figures and their distribution: the respective contributions of the French and English DCA and the share of the other aviations. To stick to round figures (necessarily approximate, but the important thing here is to set orders of magnitude more in line with the historical reality), if we credit the French aviation of 500 real victories for the campaign of France and the DCA of 100, we obtain a total approximate of 600 enemy aircraft destroyed by the French armies; If the RAF is credited with 400 real victories and the British DCA of 50 (total: 450), a total of 1 050 destroyed German aircraft is coming; This leaves about 250 real victories to the Dutch (surtout18) and Belgian aviations to a much lesser extent. This assessment, for the approximate reason that it is, remains perfectly compliant or compatible with the total German aircraft losses in May-June 1940, of which there is no reason to doubt the veracity.

Official figures for actual losses of a completely different magnitude. Significant underestimation of Air force casualties

In this field we observe a process comparable to the evaluation of victories won by the Air Force but in the opposite direction of a systematic underestimation: These are not 4 to 500 aircraft that the Air Force lost because of the fights of May-June 1940 But in the order of 1 500 to 2 000, much more and three to four times more. Again, it is necessary to show the accounting mechanisms and their effects on the representation of the effectiveness of the action of the French aviation.


Officially recognized material losses

This assessment of losses is also quite central, since it is based on a false balance of victories (significantly overstated by the official certification procedures, as has been seen) and losses (dumped) that the myth otherwise From the "victory" of the Air force, at least from an "undefeated" weapon in May-June 1940 was able to build up and develop widely until our jours19. The official figures are indeed very partial and it seems necessary to take them on as rigorous, precise and diverse a basis as possible, in order to correct them and to make them more in line with the historical reality.

A threefold conclusion can be reached: on the one hand, these data favour "noble" losses (directly in combat) in relation to the professional military ethics of airmen and according to a classification grid particularly Restrictive; On the other hand, they accredit the idea that the Air force held in some way "its rank" and was effective, the losses being less than the "thousand victories" otherwise obtained at least claimed; But unfortunately, they do not correspond to reality, and by far the total losses are of a completely different magnitude.

In the first place, it was essentially the combat casualties that were retained. In this area, estimates range from 410 to 575, with official data becoming increasingly uncertain towards the end of the campaign, as the Air force disorganized and the evacuation of the most exposed airfields and Threatened, many groups were even folded in North Africa in mid-June 1940 in the event of a possible continuation of the GUERRE21

Almost a thousand victories for the loss of 4 to 600 devices (more or less), it is with regard to this comparison speaking, apparently balanced but fundamentally biased that some have claimed to argue in favor of the thesis of an Air force "undefeated", even Even relatively "victorious", or whose contribution would have been important, if not decisive, with regard to the possibility of the RAF winning the Battle of Britain. Moreover, this figure of combat casualties, it is true relatively small, is not explained by any superiority but is the revealing part of the numerical inferiority of the Air force vis-a-vis the German aviation, and on the other hand, of Its low rate of exits linked to the shortage of devices as to a high rate of equipment unavailability. Here too, we must not be mistaken in interpretation.

This only estimate is still far too partial to be true. To combat casualties, it is appropriate to add, on the one hand, the ground losses by bombardment of the parking lots of the Air force units, which led to the destruction of 230 aircraft and, on the other hand, the accident losses which were also numerous (230); or more than 450 additional perdus23 devices. This makes for a more complete assessment of losses which is in the range of 900 planes to 1 000 depending on the sources (there also more or less complete and systematic) but the thesis of an "undefeated" Air force is still tenable insofar as , either the losses are still lower than the claimed wins, or the balance is still relatively balanced.

But these figures still remain significantly and even very strongly undervalued and do not conform to reality insofar as they do not take into account significant additional losses: on the one hand, abandonment and even self-destruction By the units themselves of devices not in flight and not repairable immediately on the airfield evacuated often in the precipitation before the German advance (thus numerous fighter jets Morane-Saulnier 406 and even of Dewoitine 520 Much more modern, rare and précieux24); On the other hand, abandonment of new devices pending delivery but not evacuated (whether or not they were taken into account by the Air force, no matter, ultimately, this essentially administrative distinction) in the parks of some CONSTRUCTEURS25; Finally, reformed later sometimes in the weeks or even the few months following the armistice of June 1940, but because of their direct participation in the fighting; Thus many of the hunters Morane-Saulnier 406 and Bloch 152 of the repair shop of the Air Force (ARAA) of Aulnat, near Clermont-Ferrand, stored after the armistice before being reformed because they could not be repaired.

In order to have a more complete and systematic view of the situation, it is necessary to complete this first assessment with a complementary analysis. The figure of actual physical losses of the Air force can be validated "hollow" by a critical reading of the inventories carried out in the aftermath of the Armistice by the military institution itself. Without this sensitive re-evaluation, we are obliged to note that several hundred machines that have been released from the factory and delivered to the Air force have disappeared or simply volatilized, without any explanation and without leaving any traces. As human losses are not subject to bail, only material losses that appear to have been considerable in a limited and relatively short period of time will be attached.

 

[parsifal]

Translation of the article linked in Post 514
(Part IV)
The contribution of the figures to the construction of a myth. The "undefeated" Air Force in 1940.


The losses actually suffered: a "hollow" estimate

This estimate is made possible thanks to the numerous detailed, concordant and verified sources existing in this field. In principle, it consists in reporting the received production of combat equipment to inventories carried out immediately after the armistice of June 1940. These data are compiled according to the indications of specialized works on the different types of apparatus, particularly documented and rich in information, too often used in more scientifique26 work. In some cases it becomes even possible to know the individual fate of each of the devices in question. To go to the basics, and for fear of losing or tiring the reader by too much secondary data, we will not enter into the detail of this quantitative and accounting estimation. This data should be presented in relation to the 18 types of main aircraft equipped with Air Force combat units (hunting, bombing and reconnaissance groups), which is not necessary.

With regard to fighter aviation first of all, 2 000 modern aircraft (Morane-Saulnier 406, Curtiss H-75, Bloch 152 and Dewoitine 520, PAL 631 for the most part) were received on 10 May, which must be added the 627 devices delivered in May-June; A total of 2 627. Post-Armistice Inventories report 1 705 surviving aircraft, representing a difference of 923 aircraft lost (without even counting pending reform aircraft remaining in unoccupied areas). In the case of bombardment aircraft (no less than eight different types of main aircraft), 564 aircraft were received on 10 May to which the 473 aircraft delivered during the French campaign should be added, i.e. a total of 1 037. Post-Armistice inventories report 808 surviving aircraft, representing a difference of 229 lost aircraft. Finally, with regard to the reconnaissance devices (PAL 63 and derivatives and Bloch 174 essentially), 1 063 were received on 10 May and 136 subsequently delivered, a total of 1 199. Post-Armistice inventories report 569 aircraft survivors or a difference of 630 aircraft lost, with the loss of reconnaissance aviation having been particularly heavy due to the lack of hunting coverage and the solitary appearance of Their missions.

If total bombing and reconnaissance aircraft were made, 2 236 were received by the Air force prior to the armistice and 1 377 recorded after the armistice; A difference of 859 planes lost. And if we sum up the number of fighter planes, bombardments and Reconnaissances received before the armistice, we arrive at a total of 4 864 aircraft, which is an important production which is indicative of the gradual increase in power albeit late ( The figures for deliveries in May-June 1940 are evidenced by the French aeronautical industry. 3 082 of them only being counted after the armistice, a total difference of 1 782 combat aircraft lost (without even counting the aircraft pending reform in France due to the fighting and the hasty wear of the equipment, perhaps of Order from 2 to 300).

In view of these figures, it is therefore reasonable to assume that the Air force has lost, directly or indirectly, all causes (fighting, ground destruction, accidents, abandoned aircraft, irreparable and reformed aircraft, etc.), a Total number of combat equipment greater than 1 500 or even in the order of 2 000 in 1939-1940. Different factors, most often interdependent, can help explain these losses particularly important with regard to the limited duration of the May-June 1940 campaign (less than seven weeks): In particular a qualitative inferiority Marked (new fragile materials and little to no point having caused many accidents, types of devices too numerous and lack of standardization) 27, but also an organisation perfectible otherwise lacking (weakness of the means of repair Organic units for the repair of damaged or broken down aircraft, lack of conveyor drivers, or very unfavourable conditions of operations and action (need for units to abandon sometimes in emergency Their land before the speed of German advance, high rate of unavailability of the devices).

In all rigour and in order not to excessively blacken the table thus drawn up and presented, it should be clarified, however, that a proportion of these losses falls within the normal attrition rates of the equipment (i.e. the gradual but continuous decrease in Number of devices in use) due to training accidents inevitably associated with the implementation of aeronautical equipment, including in a "normal" situation of peace, especially at a time when the aircraft quickly retaliateed and had only a long of Life Limited.

At the end of this critical re-evaluation, and to stick to more talking round figures, it thus appears that the claimed "thousand victories" for the loss of about 500 combat aircraft are transformed into some 500 effective victories for the loss In the range of 1 500 to 2 000 aircraft. We then pass a positive ratio of losses/victories from one to two favorable to the Air force at a negative rate of three or even four to one. Therefore, the interpretation that can be made of the role of the Air force during the French campaign, the evaluation of the scope and the effectiveness of its action change drastically.

From the end of the French campaign, the Air force and its action were severely challenged and criticized both strictly military and political. In a second later stage, against the perception or belief of an "absent" or "non-existent" aviation, largely built and disseminated by some officials or representatives of the Terre28 Army, has gradually developed and Crystallized in reverse the myth of an Air force "undefeated" or "victorious" in terms of efficiency, which has managed to continue until today. It therefore appears that defenders of the institution (whether or not they belong to the Air force as such) have built and produced a system of representations and beliefs which has gradually diffused, but which is unfortunately not In line with the historical reality as it emerges from a critical analysis of the available figures. The data presented, discussed and put into perspective make it possible to establish it in a relatively rigorous manner.

However, it is necessary to underline the time-sensitive shift in these two phenomena affecting perceptions of the role of the Air force which do not fall within the same temporality. Indeed, it is after the events themselves that this myth of an Air force "undefeated" or even "victorious" is formed, which has a relatively late character since it takes over from the years 1960 to the years 1990. The report by Harcourt can help to base the myth because of the figures established but this was not its purpose or its function insofar as it constitutes a simple accounting and technical evaluation. And in this process, some actors played an active role as entrepreneurs of beliefs: especially, on the one hand and initially, Jean George, former fighter pilot in 1939-1945 then journalist, who has formatted and disseminated the myth and The very expression of the "thousand victories" over the three editions of his work from 1967 to 1990 (see bibliography); On the other hand, on a more institutional level, the Air Force Magazine News which aired this system of representations on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of France. And since the years 2000, it has been gradually put to bad and does not seem seriously tenable

What is now known as the "Duty of remembrance" is necessary and legitimate and it is true that Air force airmen were most often the forgotten ones of evocations or commemorations (whether they are television, editorial or cinematographic) Yet quite many of the tragic events of May-June 1940, when they did not figure "accused". But it must not be carried out against the historical reality and the facts, or otherwise distort them in a meaningful way, or even to disguise them completely. It is in no way detrimental to the memory of the fighters or even to the institution as such as to recognize it. Such an enterprise only participates in a "normal" scientific activity, legitimate and necessary, and it does not imply any value judgement on the men who faced this war situation under particularly difficult conditions, of which They were not responsible.

 

[parsifal]

Table 1. Estimated number of aircraft lost by difference between the number of aircraft entered into service before the armistice and the number of aircraft identified after the armistice in July 1940

The Curtiss H-75 fighter aircraft, like the bombing of Glenn-Martin 167 and Douglas DB-7, are American aircraft ordered in 1938-1939 to try to compensate for the lack of French production to equip the Air force with airplanes. Modern. Delivered in crates, they were assembled in France for the first or in Morocco for the last two.

* * These data are only partial insofar as they do not take into account the older Amiot 143 and Bloch 210 transition bombers, which entered into service prior to the declaration of war, considered to be too vulnerable and outdated in May-June 1940 and relatively little used (mainly night missions), but also suffered losses. It is estimated that approximately 300 of these aircraft were still in service in 1940. It is for the bomber category that the losses still appear to be the most underrated.

We do not count here the Bloch 131 of recognition of which more than 100 copies were still in service at the declaration of War. Engaged in remote recognition missions without escort, they are withdrawn from the first lines and downgraded as early as October 1939 following the losses suffered.

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To summarise the gist of this article

The Harcourt review and other credible investigations suggest that the FAF shot down 600-900 LW aircraft, however for a number of reasons the author of this report considers it appropriate to arbitrarily downgrade that loss total to 550 a/c shot down by the FAF.

The analysis does not include "probables in the tally or losses suffered by the Germans to activities like landing accidents, getting lost or the like. However in the tally up for French losses, it does include losses to all causes

The best way to make a comparison of French losses to German losses to to compare apples to apples. That means it is necessary to prepare a comprehensive loss schedule to June 1940 for the germans and compare that to the comphrehensive loss numbers given for the French. Of cohe French total loss rate of 1782 a/c (I actually think that is too low….it should be closer to 2000 in my opinion) I ashould also acknowledge that there were other nationalities that also lost large numbers of aircraft. But there is some use to comparing

 

[parsifal]

An alternative method (that is the same as is applied to the FAF in the preceding article)

Basically looking at new production and subtracting from that the "available figures at that time" to estimate LW losses in the same way as is applied to the FAF

German Aircraft Industry and Production, 1933-1945, By Ferenc A. Vajda, Peter Dancey

It is reasonable to assume that reserves (aircraft generally not shown as "available" remained relatively constant

Germany entered the war with 3468 a/c on strength. Between September 1939 and the end of May 1940, 4823 a/c were added to that starting total.

At the beginning of the June quarter of 1940, the reported strength of the LW was 3732, from the combined total of aircraft on strength 1/9/39, added to that at start force being the 4823 a/c mentioned above. Since 9/39 the LW had lost 4554 a/c.

554 have been attributed to the Polish campaign. Im not sure about Scandinavia, but a credible figure would be in the order of 300 a/c. For the campaign in the west, commencing 9/39 and continuing to the end of May (simply because that is the last quarter of unadulterated data available), the losses to the LW in the campaigns in the west had been 3705 a/c.

The RAF was only moderately engaged during this period. The Dutch and the Belgians were quickly overrun (though losses to the LW in Holland were heavy because of the loss of several hundred transports there). LW losses in the low countries, might amount to 300 aircraft. The RAF on the continent and over Dunkirk is thought to have shot down about 450 LW aircraft. It is impossible to accurately know how many losses for the LW that aren't enemy shoot downs can be attributed to each, but one could assume that noncombat losses are in proportion to the shoot downs attributed. If that is a correct assumption, in the specified time period, the FAF and if we accept 750 as the number of LW a/c shot down by the FAF, then the total losses attributable to FAF action (but not limited to direct shoot downs) is in the order of 2128 aircraft 9/39 to the beginning of June. In that same period the RAF is deduced to be responsible for about 1277 not included the losses incflicted on the LW in Scandinavia.

Remember, these are total losses from all causes. I am not claiming these are losses attributable to shoot downs.

To each of those nationalities. Its an assumption, but a reasonable one I think.

On that basis, the direct shoot downs that I know of for each of the four allied players are

Dutch: c50
Belgian: C 20
British: C450
French: C700

That's 1220 direct

So in the period 9/39 to the beginning of June the LW lost 2128 a/c. in the period to the end of june, the FAF lost 1782 a/c

 

[parsifal]

So my answer is you did misquote and misrepresent in your posts.

 

[Stig1207]

Surreal......

 

[parsifal]

It can sometimes take some effort to analyse and understand the available data

 

[Stig1207]

I do agree, and therefore I think it's only prudent not to make hasty conclusions.

At the end of these various calculations and revisions, one can reasonably estimate that the air force or, more accurately, the French aviation as a whole (and therefore not only the fighter aviation or even the air Force, as weak as the Contributions of other specialties or naval aeronautics), is responsible during the campaign of France for the effective destruction of a number of enemy planes greater than 500 and in the order of 550 to the maximum; And for the period 1939-1940, 600 real wins, to stick to a round figure, seem to be a reasonable and realistic approximation.

If this is the misquote and/or misrepresentation I have made, I'll acknowledge that, as I was quoting 500.

As for the production less strength viewpoint, where you arrive at a total loss figure of 3705 for the LW in the west for 1. Sep '39-31 May '40; that seems to be somewhat at odds with Cornwell's figures and also those of Murray, Hooton, and Groehler.

However, taking your figures at face value:

So in the period 9/39 to the beginning of June the LW lost 2128 a/c. in the period to the end of june, the FAF lost 1782 a/c

Just to clarify, that these are 2128 a/c lost against the FAF? As that is what you infer in your breakdown of the 3705 total losses.

If so, and taking your number of direct shootdowns for the FAF of 700, and I'm not sure whether you here mean that this is to the end of May or to the end of the campaign ; but, anyhow, that leaves more than 1400 LW a/c which the FAF caused the destruction of , in some other way than in the air. Have you speculated by which means that they did so?

 

[parsifal]

If this is the misquote and/or misrepresentation I have made, I'll acknowledge that, as I was quoting 500.

The article speculates that there was an element of double claiming in the 'hollow estimate" They have already discounted every "probable" and every 'noncombat loss to get there, as well as simply ignoring the claims they consider as too high. no real investigation into that, just an assumption that the high claims have no value and should be disregarded. so to get to their estimate of 550 they have "turned left' as they say at every instant, to get the estimate as low as they can, and still give the aura of plausibility to their results. but then, just to lay the boot in a little further, they decide to knock 50 or 100 off that total as well, just for good measure. It is not a methodology that I'm impreunssed with to be honest. but it is what it is.

As for the production less strength viewpoint, where you arrive at a total loss figure of 3705 for the LW in the west for 1. Sep '39-31 May '40; that seems to be somewhat at odds with Cornwell's figures and also those of Murray, Hooton, and Groehler.

It might not be comparable with those sources, though once again you are misquoting Murray again. Murrays figures are for the BoF, to the end of june, covering only two months, and Murray does not include damaged then scrapped after the end of june.

Not sure about those other sources though I should. I suspect they too are just for the May/June period, and don't include scrappings or some of the other sources of loss . but hard to really comment.


in any event we simply do not know the full methodology used in any if those other three sources. the purpose of this comparison was simply to apply exactly the same loss calculation method as is applied to the table appearing in Post 631, but for the germans. So that we could compare "apples to apples" the essential numbers in this analysis is to look at the starting number, add the numbers received to the beginning of 6/40, and then the new units received between 9/39 and then subtract t the numbers given for LW on strength at the beginning of 6/40. The result is the number of LW a/c lost 9/39 to 6/40 (as per the French method shown in Annex 1)

. Unless the LW was building up its reserves in that period (and that seems highly unlikely) these loss figures for the LW are a fixed point.

These losses are using the same methodologies as is applied in the article you initially submitted . It set out in the table marked annexure 1 .

Just to clarify, that these are 2128 a/c lost against the FAF? As that is what you infer in your breakdown of the 3705 total losses.

We cant be certain of that. But it seems logical to reach that conclusion. We know the total losses 9/39 to 6/40 (beginning of the month). We have five possible sources of loss....Poland, Scandinavia, low countries, against the RAF, and against the FAF. into each of those areas of activity we have noncombat losses, sometimes referred to as non-operational loses, for which we cannot be sure the reasons for those losses. We can shuffle the deck chairs about a bit, and give a greater total to the RAF, but there seems no justification in doing that . The proportion of losses are distributed in proportion to the proportion of shoots downs each of Germany's opponents managed to achieve, on the assumption that those direct shoot downs are an indicator of the level of activity the LW poured into those opponents, and the level of activity is a surrogate measure of their nonoperational losses. From that the figure of 2128 is arrived at for the French 9to the beginning of June), which is consistent with Murray 9/39 to 6/40 and just about right also for Cornwell.

If so, and taking your number of direct shootdowns for the FAF of 700, and I'm not sure whether you here mean that this is to the end of May or to the end of the campaign ; but, anyhow, that leaves more than 1400 LW a/c which the FAF caused the destruction of , in some other way than in the air. Have you speculated by which means that they did so?

The 700 is to June 25, so there is some error in there, but also, the LW losses are only to the end of May. There is some inaccuracy there which should be attended to.

The French article does not give firm numbers on this, but does speculate that the LW lost about 200 a/c to French bombers and about 100 to French flak

but this makes no difference really, we are doing a simple comparison at this point, comparing French losses, using a particular method to German losses, using the same methodology. Only if you think the total losses for the LW are wrong in some way do we have a problem here. if you think there is some over quoting for german losses, please produce your numbers and we can look at them.

 

[Stig1207]

As well as being a forum member, are you by any chance also a Member of Parliament, Parsifal?

 

[parsifal]

No. I do work in the public service and have some experiences in the services, and then teaching in the service