Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?

[Schweik]

Only if there was enough P-51B/Cs to go around. The ETO got most and a few to the MTO.

I think that was basically Caldwells beef, what modern Aviation researchers now recognize as the "Bomber Mafia" was basically calling the shots in the USAAF and they got the priority. But that didn't have to be the case.

There never was a serious threat of invasion.

That is easy to say in retrospect. But I'm not even sure if it's true. If the Battle of Coral Sea and subsequent narrowly thwarted invasion attempts (Milne Bay, Kokoda trail etc.) had gone the other way, I suspect Australia might very well have been invaded. The Philippines was basically a cakewalk for the Japanese in spite of a very heavy garrison. They defeated a numerically superior force of 150,000 men in 5 months and only suffered about 10,000 casualties. They were already in New Guinea and Coral Sea etc. was basically about their completely taking it over (i.e. gaining control of Port Moresby and the Southern Coast) which would have given them bases from which to stage an invasion.

I don't know how many trained troops were available in Australia in 1942 was it more than 150,000 ?

S

 

[GrauGeist]

The Japanese goal was not to invade Australia, but rather isolate her by restricting her much needed transport traffic.

They had already quite a curtain hanging over Australia that reached from Burma to the Gilberts and had they successfully taken (and held) PNG, defeated the Allies at Coral Sea (forcing a USN and Allied withdrawel) as well as forcing the Royal Navy to withdraw from the Indian Ocean after Operation C, they may have some succees in that goal.

In regards to Japan actually invading Australia, it simply was not feasable, as they did not have the manpower nor resources for such an adventure, but blockading Australia to force terms would be a viable alternative.

 

[Peter Gunn]

S - I wouldn't say the Philippines campaign was a "cakewalk" for the Japanese, rather I think they were surprised it came off quicker than what they planned for. The terrain allowed them some of their typical flanking maneuvers and while I'll not say the defense, while a "heavy garrison" as you say, was second string, it was cut off from decent supply.

I'm of the thought its (Philippines) defensive structure was more paper tigerish than anything, but the Japanese devoted what was needed to get the job done. As far as Australia, I'm not sure they could have seriously invaded and accomplished much, they could have taken a port but hell, the 5 foot spiders alone would have kicked their collective asses... ok, just a bit of hyperbole but I think you get my meaning.

Had the Japanese actually invaded a port in NW or Northern Australia I'd wager the US would have kicked in harder and sooner, I think it would have been reasonable that the allies would have cut off and killed off whatever invasion force made it ashore, maybe not right away, but much like the island outposts left to die on the vine they would have cut off their supply and it would be the Philippines in reverse (they're the ones cut off and forced to surrender).

I could be full of hot air too, it's just my two cents worth.

 

[Kevin J]

S - I wouldn't say the Philippines campaign was a "cakewalk" for the Japanese, rather I think they were surprised it came off quicker than what they planned for. The terrain allowed them some of their typical flanking maneuvers and while I'll not say the defense, while a "heavy garrison" as you say, was second string, it was cut off from decent supply.

I'm of the thought its (Philippines) defensive structure was more paper tigerish than anything, but the Japanese devoted what was needed to get the job done. As far as Australia, I'm not sure they could have seriously invaded and accomplished much, they could have taken a port but hell, the 5 foot spiders alone would have kicked their collective asses... ok, just a bit of hyperbole but I think you get my meaning.

Had the Japanese actually invaded a port in NW or Northern Australia I'd wager the US would have kicked in harder and sooner, I think it would have been reasonable that the allies would have cut off and killed off whatever invasion force made it ashore, maybe not right away, but much like the island outposts left to die on the vine they would have cut off their supply and it would be the Philippines in reverse (they're the ones cut off and forced to surrender).

I could be full of hot air too, it's just my two cents worth.

The Australians were fighting for national survival and it made all the difference. That's why they fought so well along the Kokoda Trail and defeated them at Milne Bay. Their troops were more inspired than the American troops.

 

[Schweik]

The Japanese goal was not to invade Australia, but rather isolate her by restricting her much needed transport traffic.

Again, easy to say in retrospect. I'm not sure that is necessarily the case either. If things had gone a little smoother for them around New Guinea I think they may well have invaded Australia. What would stop them? They certainly considered it. if their "Operation FS" had succeeded the Navy may have been able to convince the Army to 'have a go'.

An invasion of Australia and the capture of one or more of the major cities, even if only partly successful (i.e., even if they were eventually pushed out) would seriously degrade the economic and military contribution of what turned out to be a pretty important (if small) proponent of the Allied War Effort.

Strategically, it could have meant that rather than having 300 - 400k IJA troops tied down in Manchuria or wherever, or sitting on some forlorn Islands waiting to starve (or force Americans to pay a sharp but ultimately insignificant price for capturing it), they could tie down a large number of Australian (and other Allied) troops and resources in what would have to become a major priority for the Allied War effort. All those Aussie planes and troops would be focused on pushing out the IJA instead of say, helping win El Alamein.

Keep in mind, nobody thought the Japanese Empire could knock over Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia or the Philippines, let alone cripple half of the US Pacific Fleet in one day. For the Aussies in 1942, the threat was very real.

defeated the Allies at Coral Sea (forcing a USN and Allied withdrawel)

Well, I'm sure you realize that is an outlier position. The Strategic goal of the IJN was to allow the army to invade Port Morseby and the Southern Coast of New Guinea (since it proved basically impossible to march across the Owen Stanley range) as well as some of the southern range of the Solomon islands. The naval battles may have gone slightly in the favor of the Japanese but their transport ships turned around and with the help of a bitter and desperate air battle there, Port Morseby was not invaded. That is why it is almost universally (as far as I know) considered an Allied Strategic Victory.

In regards to Japan actually invading Australia, it simply was not feasable, as they did not have the manpower nor resources for such an adventure, but blockading Australia to force terms would be a viable alternative.

I don't think you actually know that. The IJA agreed with you but the IJN did not, and in 1942 I certainly don't think anyone knew what would happen, especially if Midway had gone the other way (and as we know, Midway was a close run thing).

S

 

[GrauGeist]

Let's be realistic here:
Imperial Japan had only so many assets and manpower to go around.
They already held Manchuria, vast swaths of China, Formosa, Hong Kong, Burma, French Indo-China, Korea, Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Brunei, Borneo, Java, Timor, a majority of PNG, Nauru, the Carolines, the Marshalls, the Solomons, the Marianas, the Gilberts plus Attu, Kiska, Wake and Guam. Add to that, Ryukyu, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Sakhalin, Kuriles and Japan proper.

Then look at Australian topography: there are coastal towns/cities seperated by vast tracts of wildland with no real resources to draw from. Then there's the Australian interior, which really needs no explanation. To invade Australia and have any hope of success in holding it, would have taken the entire sum of the Japanese military amd they would have been fighting the Aussies on their home turf. Every single nook and cranny would have revealed determined Diggers who would have made the Japanese pay dearly for their folly and a clear example of this determination can be seen in their defense of PNG.

 

[Milosh]

I think that was basically Caldwells beef, what modern Aviation researchers now recognize as the "Bomber Mafia" was basically calling the shots in the USAAF and they got the priority. But that didn't have to be the case.

The American-British staff conversations opened in Washington on 29 January 1941 and continued through fourteen sessions to 29 March, when the delegates submitted a final report, commonly known as ABC-1. [42] At the outset, the British stated their position clearly and fully:

1. The European Theater is the vital theater where a decision must first be sought.

2. The general policy should therefore be to defeat Germany and Italy first, and then deal with Japan.

3. The security of the Far Eastern position, including Australia and New Zealand, is essential to the cohesion of the British Commonwealth and to the maintenance of its war effort. Singapore is the key to the defense of these interests and its retention must be assured.

In line with this strategy, U.S. naval Forces, after appropriate dispositions for defense of the Western Hemisphere, should be employed mainly in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, the British stated. But they also declared that the United States should maintain in the Pacific a fleet large enough to prevent the Japanese from prejudicing the main effort in the Atlantic.

There was no disagreement between the Americans and the British on the first two points. Both sides were agreed that Germany was the main enemy and their first objective. They agreed further that the Atlantic would be the decisive theater of the war and the principal effort of the two nations would be made there. The delegates also recognized the legitimate interests of each side, an indispensable basis for co-operation. On the American side, the security of the United States and the defense of the Western Hemisphere were considered of paramount interest, with first call on American forces. British interests were broader, encompassing the security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. "A cardinal feature of British strategic policy," the delegates agreed, "is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort."

Germany First

 

[Schweik]

Let's be realistic here:
Imperial Japan had only so many assets and manpower to go around.
They already held Manchuria, vast swaths of China, Formosa, Hong Kong, Burma, French Indo-China, Korea, Philippines, Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Brunei, Borneo, Java, Timor, a majority of PNG, Nauru, the Carolines, the Marshalls, the Solomons, the Marianas, the Gilberts plus Attu, Kiska, Wake and Guam. Add to that, Ryukyu, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Sakhalin, Kuriles and Japan proper.

Needless to say, I think I am being realistic. On a map, and perhaps in TO&E charts, Japan looks too small to invade and conquer China and Burma, let alone all the other places listed, but they came damn near to completely doing that didn't they. In spite of some success in the air Allied ground forces held on by the skin of their teeth in the CBI through 1943. The Japanese even invaded India briefly, losing 54,000 casualties in the process so I guess on a fairly large scale. Maybe those troops would have been better spent invading Brisbane.

Then look at Australian topography: there are coastal towns/cities seperated by vast tracts of wildland with no real resources to draw from. Then there's

I never suggested they could have conquered all of Australia, at least not before beating the US, and I'm sure for that matter the entire Japanese War Effort was ultimately doomed, but I don't think in 1942 that seemed to be a certain thing by any stretch of the imagination.

As I wrote earlier, an invasion of Australia that captured one or two significant cities, say Brisbane or Sydney, or even Darwin or one of the smaller towns on the North East coast of Queensland*, would have tied down a lot of Allied troops and I suspect, caused the Australians to reorient their strategic objectives away from helping the British defeat Rommel or what have you and focus much more close to home.

In the second half of WW2 the Japanese had a lot of formidable army divisions just sitting around as occupation forces not doing much. Quite a few ended up being bypassed on islands that ultimately had little Strategic value, or waiting in Manchuria for a Soviet Army that never came until the very end of the War when it was way too late. If I was Tojo in 1942 I definitely would have considered invading Australia. It was a long shot but then, so was the whole war.

Needless to say the supply lines were long and exposed but the Navy though they could handle it (correctly or otherwise). If we hadn't cracked their code who knows.

S


*Not sure if any of those were being used as wartime ports but if they were that would make a good target.

 

[Schweik]

The American-British staff conversations opened in Washington on 29 January 1941 and continued

Germany First

I'm well aware of the "Germany First" policy (who here isn't?) but Item #3 on your list was subject to a certain amonut of wiggle room in their priorities. Obviously we know what did actually happen, but it's not written in stone that it's the only way it could have happened.

When it came down to deployment of specific aircraft types the Air Force generals were able to decide, at least initially. And nobody really know how Strategically valuable Mustangs would turn out to be in the beginning or middle of 1943. That in part explains why they took so long to be deployed in large numbers.

S

 

[wuzak]

During the Second World War, the city was host to more than 50,000* American and Australian troops and air crew, and it became a major staging point for battles in the South West Pacific. A large United States Armed Forces contingent supported the war effort from seven airfields and other bases around the city and in the region. The first bombing raid on Rabaul, in Papua New Guinea, on 23 February 1942 was carried out by six B-17s based near Townsville*.

*These points were marked "citation needed"

In July 1942, three small Japanese air raids were conducted against Townsville, which was by then the most important air base in Australia.[20] Several 500-pound (230-kilogram) bombs were dropped in the harbour, near the Garbutt airfield and at Oonoonba, where bomb craters are still clearly visible.[21] No lives were lost and structural damage was minimal, as the Japanese missed their intended target of the railway and destroyed a palm tree. Although the Japanese aircraft were intercepted on two of the three raids, no Japanese planes were shot down.

Townsville - Wikipedia

Note that Townsville to Rabaul is 1,771km (1,100 miles) and Tonwsville to Sydney is over 2,000km (1243 miles).

 

[Schweik]

Townsville - Wikipedia

Note that Townsville to Rabaul is 1,771km (1,100 miles) and Tonwsville to Sydney is over 2,000km (1243 miles).

Interesting. Port Moresby to Townsville is 1,000 km...

 

[Shortround6]

And nobody really know how Strategically valuable Mustangs would turn out to be in the beginning or middle of 1943. That in part explains why they took so long to be deployed in large numbers.

A large part of why they took so long to deploy was that it took a long time to build the infrastructure to build the required P-51s.
All the Allison powered planes were built in California. NAA got a contract for 400 P-51Bs (Aug 1942)a few weeks before the A-36 first flew (Sept 1942).
NAA Dallas got a contract for 1350 Merlin powered P-51Cs in early Oct 1942, This is before either a Mustang X flies in England or XP-51B Flies in the US.
At the end of Feb the 201st and 202nd P-51Bs are assigned to be prototypes for the P-51D. Please note that actual production of the P-51Bs is not really underway at this point. First production P-51B flies May5th 1943.
Please note that it took until the end of April 1943 for Packard to build eight (yes eight) two stage Merlins. The initial contract for single stage Melrins was drawing to a close and best month saw 864 engine built. Production per month was doubled in the last 4 months of 1943.
at some point in July 1943 Packard has delivered 173 Merlis to NAA, while NAA has built 534 airframes. Please note that NAA Dallas delivers it's first P-51C in Aug of 1943. In addition to the order listed above NAA Dallas was awarded a contract in May of 1943 for 2500 Mustangs, 400 more "C"s, 800 "D"s and the rest "K"s (Ds with different props).

You need all the back up industries in place, Packard to build many more engines in the later contracts than the original. You need NAA to vastly increase work space and employees (and train them) and in Places like Texas you even need to build housing for the workers. You also need the propellers, landing gear, radiators and all the other "stuff" the main factory does not make in house.
If not the Premier fighter the P-51 was certainly seen as one of the top 3/4 american ones at the start of 1943.

 

[GrauGeist]

Here's a great wartime video that shows not only the genesis of Packard's Merlin production, but also how Packard met the increased demand not only from the USAAF and RAF, but the USN, too.

It's 20 minutes long, but worthwhile.

 

[slaterat]

Like the A-36 and P-51A and F4F and P-40 and P-39 - the AAF and Commonwealth 'made do' with what they had. There is a reason that P-51B/D destroyed more than any Commonwealth or US fighter by a significant total.

Francis K Mason, in "The Hawker Hurricane", States the Hurricane as as responsible for 51.5% of the 11,400 claims that are in traceable RAF air combat reports.
That gives the Hurricane 5,871 claims , compared to 5163 for the Hellcat and 4,950 for the Mustang in air to air claims. ( last 2 sourced from the internet). However I do see the Mustang also has claims for 4131 aircraft destroyed on the ground, that's pretty impressive.

 

[drgondog]

Perhaps but it was pretty close. Caldwell knew about Mustangs and wanted them for Darwin, that's quite clear from the biography.

The first significant Spitfire battle in Darwin was in March 1943. The first production P-51B flew in May 1943.

They were still having significant combat by May. One of the big engagements that damaged the rep of the Spit V was on 2 May, and significant raids were going on through July. I think they could have gotten P-51Bs there by then though it would have had to have been a priority. Not realistic politically but they could have gotten some there as early as June, probably.

P-38s or Spit VIIIs may have been more realistic but Darwin just wasn't that much of a priority, and I think that was Caldwells real beef. For the middle of 1943 the Spit V is a bit long in the teeth. The Aussies apparently asked for P-38s but were told they were all committed up in the Solomons etc.

S

Not really. The first P-51B-1-NA was completed save Packard 1650-3 which didn't arrive until end of April, leading to Chilton's first flight on May 5, 1943. Packard didn't deliver 20 more 1650-3s until the end of June and NAA production of engineless Mustangs continued through July. The first P-51B-1 arrived in Liverpool in September 1943 and didn't achieve Group level number of 75 for the 354th FG until late November. The RAF was receiving Mustang III in late October but basically gave them all back in December to assist equipping the 357th FG.

The other complicating factor for Darwin deployment would have been equipping P-51B-1 and P-51B-5, early series through October 1943, was that the US Depots did not have the 85 gallon fuselage tank kits - and the offshore Depots not until November. ALL of the 85 gallon kits went to BAD2 Warton in England.

Simply not enough to go around and the 23rd FG was first in CBI to get a few - not enough to equip the Group until July-August 1944

 

[drgondog]

Francis K Mason, in "The Hawker Hurricane", States the Hurricane as as responsible for 51.5% of the 11,400 claims that are in traceable RAF air combat reports.
That gives the Hurricane 5,871 claims , compared to 5163 for the Hellcat and 4,950 for the Mustang in air to air claims. ( last 2 sourced from the internet). However I do see the Mustang also has claims for 4131 aircraft destroyed on the ground, that's pretty impressive.

The total of 4950 is an oft quoted victory credit for the Mustang and represents Only US ETO/MTO (and low). The final total of Mustang air victory credits (after claims processed) for US and Commonwealth, for all types and theatres, is ~ 6300

 

[Milosh]

The faery godmother flicks her wand and poof in an instant 1000s of P-51s are built, pilots are trained to fly them and ground crew are there to maintain them.

 

[Schweik]

The total of 4950 is an oft quoted victory credit for the Mustang and represents Only US ETO/MTO (and low). The final total of Mustang air victory credits (after claims processed) for US and Commonwealth, for all types and theatres, is ~ 6300

Those are impressive numbers. I don't know what the total is for P-40s but Carl Molesworth notes that P-40 pilots made 973 claims in the CBI which he says is 64% of the total in that Theater. According to this American flown P-40s came in 5th in total number of victories at 2225.5

After the P-51, F6F, P-38, and P-47 but better than the F4F+FM2 and F4U

Aircraft Type ETO - MTO - PTO - CBI - Total
P-51(Includes F-6 and A-36) 4239 1063 297 345 5954
F6F 8 0 5160 0 5168
P-38 497 1431 1700 157 3785
P-47 2685.5 263 696.67 16 3661
P-40 0 592 660.5 973 2225.5
F4U 0 0 2140 0 2140
F4F 0 26 986 0 1012
FM-2 0 0 422 0 422
Spitfire 15 364 0 0 379
P-39 & P-400 2.5 25 288 5 320.5
SBD 0 0 138 138
P-61 59 0 63.5 5 127.5
TBF/TBM 0 0 98 0 98
Beaufighter 6 25 0 0 31
F2A 0 0 10 0 10
P-43 0 0 3 3 6
P-36 0 0 5 0 5
P-70 0 0 2 0 2
P-26 0 0 2 0 2
P-35 0 0 1 0 1
Mosquito 0 1 0 0 1

However, that is just American flown victories. All of these are also just "confirmed" victory claims it will probably turn out to about 1/3 of that for all types when and if they ever calculate verified victories based on actual lost enemy planes.

I am not sure how many Russian and Commonwealth P-40 victory claims there were but I would suspect it's at least 2000 if you put them all together. I'd really like to know those numbers because if you add them up together I suspect the P-40 actually works out to be one of the top Allied fighters in terms of enemy aircraft destroyed.

P-51s also have a significant number of Commonwealth victories to their credit though I don't know how many. P-39s a lot of Russian ones of course. F2A / B239 had quite a few in Finland (496 according to Joe Baugher)

Anyone know of a list like above which includes all Allied claims?

would also be interesting to see a list like that for Axis types. How many did the Ki-43 shoot down?

S

 

[fubar57]

Before anyone gets their pee-thing in a knot, the above numbers are only for American flown aircraft, thus the reason for the low Spitfire numbers

 

[Schweik]

Before anyone gets their pee-thing in a knot, the above numbers are only for American flown aircraft, thus the reason for the low Spitfire numbers

I did mention that. Anyone have Commonwealth or Russian numbers by type? I think this would help in rating "most overrated" and "most underrated" aircraft...

S