MOST OVERRATED AIRCRAFT OF WWII

[Hiromachi]

Right, so before you will conclude that Zero is overrated (though some already did) it would be fair to provide some actual arguments, rather then feelings and presumptions.

even without armor or self-sealing tanks, the F2A was still a more rugged aircraft built to take much higher G-loads and higher dive speeds all while having far lighter stick forces and -like most American fighters- having light ailerons with good roll rate at low speeds and retaining that quality at high speeds, while the Zero was more like the Hawker Hurricane in that respect)

This I dont understand, A6M was build to sustain up to 12.6 G structural load. That is quite a lot for aircraft of that time (even though there were aircraft that went even beyond that), the mentioned F2A (dash 3 variant) had positive 11.5 or something like that. And those are still more of a theoretical limits, since any pilot going over 8 Gs for more than a second might loose consciousness, so practical limit is pilot, not machine.

Also, you have any specifics on F2A stick forces and A6M. I am aware that latter one had heavy ailerons which was true and often criticized even by Japanese test pilots, but elevators construction and arrangement was one of the most positive sides of Zeke. Particularly if you would read a Report published in '60s at University of Tokyo explaining the reduced stiffness concept applied to elevator control systems, which used as an example A6M - first Japanese fighter to take advantage of that.

Several accounts by Japanese plots (Sakai's account comes to mind) where they did "park" on a Wildcat's six and literally emptied all their ammo into it with no "kill" for their effort.

The quote you have in mind comes from Samurai by M. Caidin. There are however other quotes:

"The decision to adopt the 20mm cannon on the Zero is generally believed to be an epoch making advance in fighter design. However, having used the cannon in combat, I had always held this weapon in doubt, despite its great destructive power. In fact, I would go as far as to say that I regarded the cannons in disfavor. "

"70% of my kills in fighter vs fighter combat was made with 7.7mm machine guns"

Zero-sen no Shinjitsu , Saburo Sakai ISBN 4-06-205886-3 by j-aircraft.com, a6m quotes section.

Like any fighter of the period it could always be deadly given the right situation. but the numbers at the end of the war don't remotely match it's reputation.

Is that really related to the aircraft itself or to overall situation on the fronts. Zero lacks after 1943 are more than known, but its not only aircraft issues, rather a multidimensional problem of logistics, aircraft, lack of pilots, great numerical advantage of allies and so on ...

For this aircraft that was supposed to be the scourge of the Pacific, it was basically neutralized within a year into the war.

Thats quite a bit of a statement, the Zero could hold more than on its own until late 1943. Its not true and fair to say that it was "basically neutralized" within a year.

Tactics are most often developed through trial and error and with the sturdy American fighters, the Japanese discovered (the hard way) that it didn't pay to camp out on their six and use up most (or all) of their ammunition to bring the aircraft down.

I'd say that it would be fair if someone actually brought any description of Japanese tactics, even in brief form.

 

[drgondog]

IMO the A6M remained very formidable in the hands of an experienced pilot all the way through the war. Its limitations were a.) speed disadvantage against all Allied front line fighters from 1943 forward, including level and insufficient dive speeds, and b.) limited high altitude performance at USAAF typical bombing altitudes.

The result was limited 'escape' options for the Zero and increasingly limited interception capability- combined with increasing performance disadvantage versus US fighters (after P-39/P40 were replaced by P-38, F6F, F4U, P-47 and P-51).

I also believe that philosophically, the Japanese military culture did not encourage formation and flight discipline required to efficiently engage against trained Allied pilots who were well prepared for unit disciplines in the face of superior numbers or tactical disadvantage..

That said, it was superb in the escort role for Japanese bombing doctrine, superb in intercept role versus US fighter and escorted bombers in medium altitudes, and superb given pilot skill equality in air to air combat role from the deck to 20,000 feet. .

The Allies tend to gloss over the lack of Pilot replacement strategy as well as inadequate logistics/repair capability in places like the Solomon's before the Allies built up dominant air/land and sea capability.

 

[tomo pauk]

That Zeros have had cannons installed certainly counts on the benefit side. It were the cannons that Zeros used to kill Allied bombers in many instances.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Is that really related to the aircraft itself or to overall situation on the fronts. Zero lacks after 1943 are more than known, but its not only aircraft issues, rather a multidimensional problem of logistics, aircraft, lack of pilots, great numerical advantage of allies and so on ..

The aircraft and the situation it was placed in, and agree with your statement. There were a multitude of elements playing against the Zero from 1943 on and in the end we can only go by the final outcome IMO. As you know, American propaganda really played up the Zero (even though some of the mystique was unintentionally blended with the Oscar). Considering some of the performance advantages the Zero had, it was not able to decisively counter the allied offensive, even when inferior equipment was being used (ex. P-39/ P-40/ F4F). Again, we have to look at pilot skill, numerical advantages and logistics.

 

[Hiromachi]

There were a multitude of elements playing against the Zero from 1943 on and in the end we can only go by the final outcome IMO.

But that will never be positive for the Zero, just like it wont be for 109 or any other axis aircraft. One side lost that war (thankfully), the other won. The final outcome will always favor allied fighters, regardless of the actual airframe.

As you know, American propaganda really played up the Zero (even though some of the mystique was unintentionally blended with the Oscar).

Maybe the newspapers, but the tests they performed on captured and damaged airframes were opposite, underestimating the true potential of the machine.
Untitled Document

Considering some of the performance advantages the Zero had, it was not able to decisively counter the allied offensive, even when inferior equipment was being used (ex. P-39/ P-40/ F4F). Again, we have to look at pilot skill, numerical advantages and logistics.

No fighter can counter any offensive, to stop the offensive one needs bombers. And Americans could bring them down then Japanese could deliver, or as a matter of fact same could be said of a Zeros. Americans had a great industry allowing to replace any loss at desired moment.

Also, I am not sure if P-40 or P-39 can be called inferior equipment, they did fairly well in Russia(P-39) and Africa (P-40). The AVG more then held their own, even though they still refuse to recognize that they overclaimed by a bit. They certainly cant be compared directly to later P-51s or P-47s, but they were there and they did their job.

 

[Hiromachi]

That Zeros have had cannons installed certainly counts on the benefit side. It were the cannons that Zeros used to kill Allied bombers in many instances.

But that was Saburo Sakai opinion, I think the man who was there and did what he did is entitled to have his own opinion. Even if we dont like it and disagree with it.

I also believe that philosophically, the Japanese military culture did not encourage formation and flight discipline required to efficiently engage against trained Allied pilots who were well prepared for unit disciplines in the face of superior numbers or tactical disadvantage..

I just waited for it ... fortunately, I was able lately to obtain some documents including one titled "Japanese Aerial Tactics - Excerpts from a professional notebook, undated. Captured on Peleliu.", this is a Cincpac-Cincpoa Special Translation No. 57.

Notebook was written by Lt Nagamoto, and is split into four detailed sections. The first section is unique in that it is the first (by the time of its capture) complete official statement of Japanese doctrine for carrier plane operations yet recorded. This doctrine is embodied in an order issued by the carrier fleet of the Japanese Navy, the Third Fleet on July 19th, 1943. The emphasis here is on tactics for air attack units, while tactics for striking force as a whole were analyzed in a different document.

Second section discusses fighter tactics with the aid of a number of sketches of attack situations. Third section lists torpedoes and bombs in present use and gives notes on attacking ships and airfields.
The fourth section discusses reconnaissance and tracking methods in considerable detail.

Here I bring quotes from Section 2 - Aerial Combat :
"1. The essence of attacking formation, is to exploit our maneuverability to its utmost and neutralize the enemies combined fire power with speedy, daring, coordinated attacks, thereby inflicting the maximum amount of damage upon the enemy.

2. It is necessary to keep close signal contact constantly between the planes and to keep flight in formation. For this reason it is necessary to determine the various methods of coordinated attack that are to be used so that during actual combat, the method can be indicated in a simple manner. In choosing the method of coordinated attack, therefore, the performance and armament of both sides, the enemy's customary tactics, etc., must be considered so as to insure maximum results.

3. During approach, the leader deploys the formation at the proper time by ordering the method of attack (tactics) to be used. It is difficult to set standard time and method of deployment and essentials of the maneuvers after the deployment, since these depend upon the situation. The emphasis should be placed on method taken. All planes (formations) should make it a point to cooperate closely and evaluate the situation so that they may commence attacks at the proper moment and from an advantageous position.

4. When there is a possibility of the enemy easily escaping, by reason of his high speed, by course-changing evasive tactics or when it is planned to make a frontal attack with at least a part of his forces, a portion is sent to hit the front while the rest are deployed beyond the wings to take care of any enemy plane that may change its course.

5. When a coordinated attack from the same direction is to be made, a large number of planes attack at once or in rapid succesion so that the enemy is given no time to regroup or concentrate his fire power. Care is necessary, however, not to hamper one-other's maneuvers or to endanger friendly planes attacking.
At the same time, the size and movements of the enemy formation should constantly be watched so that we can attack freely without fear of mishaps among our own planes.

6. It is obvious that even when coordinated attacks from different directions are made, all planes should attack simultaneously or in rapid succession. "

I'd say that this basic example from the material brings a different light on things as the emphasies was placed on tactics, formation maneuvers and coordination, and I think it is supported by general changes employed by Japanese during 1943 period (introduction of 4-man formation, instead of older 3-man Shotai) and so on.
However it is intention, based on what I read I get the impression that those new young pilots did not receive such training. In Dan King's book "The Last Zero Fighter ..." it is stated in last 2 chapters related to fighter pilots, that amount of formation flying and gunnery practice before the arrival to the front (from 1943-1944 period are those memoirs) was null. Young pilots were expected to get that once they reached frontlines and veterans would introduce them to those key features of combat flying. Yet the events were going so fast, that many never received more than few hours of such training and could not do much to change it.

So no, it had less to do with military culture as Japanese recognized the problem and were aware of hit and run tactics as well as maneuvers like Thach weave, so precautions were taken and specific documents written, but the application during the war in fast happening events requiring great amount of fresh pilots failed.

 

[RCAFson]

But that will never be positive for the Zero, just like it wont be for 109 or any other axis aircraft. One side lost that war (thankfully), the other won. The final outcome will always favor allied fighters, regardless of the actual airframe.


Maybe the newspapers, but the tests they performed on captured and damaged airframes were opposite, underestimating the true potential of the machine.
Untitled Document


No fighter can counter any offensive, to stop the offensive one needs bombers. And Americans could bring them down then Japanese could deliver, or as a matter of fact same could be said of a Zeros. Americans had a great industry allowing to replace any loss at desired moment.

Also, I am not sure if P-40 or P-39 can be called inferior equipment, they did fairly well in Russia(P-39) and Africa (P-40). The AVG more then held their own, even though they still refuse to recognize that they overclaimed by a bit. They certainly cant be compared directly to later P-51s or P-47s, but they were there and they did their job.

The Allies did some testing that closely replicated actual performance at military power:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/RAAF_Hap_Trials.pdf

but they also used captured IJN documents where possible and then circulated the performance as stated by the IJN:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/Zeke-32-TAIC-102C.pdf

The performance curves are at military power but the War Emergency rating of the engine is clearly stated.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

But that will never be positive for the Zero, just like it wont be for 109 or any other axis aircraft. One side lost that war (thankfully), the other won. The final outcome will always favor allied fighters, regardless of the actual airframe.

Disagree to a point. It's quite evident that the -109 will be well thought of in performance by those who flew it and flew against it. It never had the same "meltdown' the Zero had from 1943 onward.

Maybe the newspapers, but the tests they performed on captured and damaged airframes were opposite, underestimating the true potential of the machine.

I would guess dollars to donuts that those tests were not made readily available to the public. The hype was the US was facing superior enemy so we had to fight harder and give all support we can, I'm old enough to remember my wartime relatives talk about this.

No fighter can counter any offensive, to stop the offensive one needs bombers. And Americans could bring them down then Japanese could deliver, or as a matter of fact same could be said of a Zeros.

Not during the early part of the war. The US did have an advantage that eventually overwhelmed the Japanese but look at the state of US affairs during the summer of 1942. In many areas (Guadalcanal, Rabual, the Solomons) the Japanese were being slowly contained and in some cases beaten back with a USAAF consisting of P-39s and P-40 as front line fighters. The P-38 entered the fray in December 1942 and almost from it's first operational mission, the tides quickly turned.

Also, I am not sure if P-40 or P-39 can be called inferior equipment, they did fairly well in Russia(P-39) and Africa (P-40).

IMO you cannot compare the Russian experience with the P-39 and P-40 to the South pacific in any way, shape or form. Entirely different environment, tactics, mission and logistics structure.

The AVG more then held their own, even though they still refuse to recognize that they overclaimed by a bit. They certainly cant be compared directly to later P-51s or P-47s, but they were there and they did their job.

The AVG NEVER fought the Zero - that's a myth that is rolled into the Zero mystique!!!

 

[tomo pauk]

But that was Saburo Sakai opinion, I think the man who was there and did what he did is entitled to have his own opinion. Even if we dont like it and disagree with it.

I'm not sure what is the problem with my statement. I've talked about one type of target, Sakai about another. Since you've researched Japanese hardware extensively, I'll politely ask what was opinion of Japanese pilots regarding shooting down of Allied bombers (from 1- to 4-engined) by what kind of on-board guns.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

If it was a Saburo Sakai quote mentioned by Martin Cadin, I'd would only believe it if another witness was there to verify it.

 

[stona]

.


However it is intention, based on what I read I get the impression that those new young pilots did not receive such training. In Dan King's book "The Last Zero Fighter ..." it is stated in last 2 chapters related to fighter pilots, that amount of formation flying and gunnery practice before the arrival to the front (from 1943-1944 period are those memoirs) was null. Young pilots were expected to get that once they reached frontlines and veterans would introduce them to those key features of combat flying. Yet the events were going so fast, that many never received more than few hours of such training and could not do much to change it..

This was not just a problem for the Japanese.
Pilots of all nationalities fall into three types. All this is borne out by statistics which I can't be bothered to look up and reproduce here.
First there are the hunter killers who will shoot down the vast majority of enemy aircraft that are destroyed in air to air combat. These men are very few.
Then there are the prey, usually inexperienced, who essentially serve as targets for the first group, these become more numerous as the quality of pilots and their training decreases.
Finally there is a third intermediate group comprised of pilots who have survived for long enough to gain the experience to evade the hunter killers and acquired enough skill to themselves occasionally score a victory.
What good training and sound tactics does is allow many of the most vulnerable prey group to survive long enough to become part of that intermediate group. This will limit overall casualty rates by denying the enemy's hunter killers the easy victories they are looking for. It is obvious that in a war of attrition, as all the various campaigns fought around the world were, the side with the best training and pilots, not necessarily the side with the best aircraft, will eventually prevail.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Hiromachi]

The Allies did some testing that closely replicated actual performance at military power:

This HAMP was rebuilt from multiple machines laying across the New Guinea and it certainly did not replicate the full performance. Not to mention that actual engine specifics were not met as well, I dont know what exactly did not work but regardless, the NK1F (Sakae 21) had following revolutions and manifold pressures :
- Take-off / emergency - 2750 RPM / 41.7"Hg (In english nomenclature also Military Rating)
- Rated power - 2700 RPM / 37.8"Hg
- Cruising - 2520 RPM / 32.8"Hg

So in RAAF evaluation both the revs and manifold pressures are not matching and results can be seen in HP section as less power was delivered, aircraft even at military power was not meeting the specification (at 10,000 ft it was making 512 km/h, the original specification indicated 518 km/h at 3250m, but at RATED POWER. Same for 2nd critical altitude, at 6150 m A6M3 model 32 should reach 538-540 km/h, in the test it however reaches only 521 km/h, and max achieved in test is 527 km/).
The engine specifications are messed in that test as well as performance is not correct.

And in regard to taic, its only theoretical calculation. I dont spend much time reading calculations ...

Disagree to a point. It's quite evident that the -109 will be well thought of in performance by those who flew it and flew against it. It never had the same "meltdown' the Zero had from 1943 onward.

Numbers speak otherwise. 109 G-10 and K-4 were a good performance mostly, but the airframe was outdated. And the requirements for modern fighter were met a lot easier by 190 D-9. Even Messerchmitt was aware at that time that new airframe should be produced.

In many areas (Guadalcanal, Rabual, the Solomons) the Japanese were being slowly contained and in some cases beaten back with a USAAF consisting of P-39s and P-40 as front line fighters.

Japanese were reaching limits of their expansion, Guadalcanal is prime example of airfield build against the rules, far away from any other airfield that could provide any support. Normal Navy instructions required airfields to be constructed in some decent radius from the others, and this is not the case here.

The P-38 entered the fray in December 1942 and almost from it's first operational mission, the tides quickly turned.

Not true at all. It was a process of turning the tides.

Have you ever heard of St. Valentines Day Massacre ?
Pacific Wrecks

The actual records indicate that at least until mid 1943 Zeke could hold on its own staying in 1:1 range, hell, even in 1944 there were events when Corsairs and P-38s took a beating :
WildEagles: Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" - Rabaul - pt4. - video stills

Air combat doesnt become always and instantly one sided just because new aircraft is introduced, pilots must learn to take advantage of it as well.

The AVG NEVER fought the Zero - that's a myth that is rolled into the Zero mystique!!!

I'm more then aware of that. But it doesnt really matter. They fought Oscars, not incredibly different aircraft from Zeros. And what matters is that they used P-40s to its limit.

Since you've researched Japanese hardware extensively, I'll politely ask what was opinion of Japanese pilots regarding shooting down of Allied bombers (from 1- to 4-engined) by what kind of on-board guns.

I dont know answer to every question Tomo
But based on general readings, 20 mm was considered crucial by the Navy for those 2-4 engined big birds. Army managed to find proper tactics to bring down even B-24s and B-17s with 12.7 mm's only.
Navy pilots also often envied American Brownings for great ballistics allowing for deflection shooting from greater ranges. This came in particular to my attention when reading stories of 343rd Kokutai fighting Hellcats and Corsairs.

 

[GrauGeist]

The AVG NEVER fought the Zero - that's a myth that is rolled into the Zero mystique!!!

I'm more then aware of that. But it doesnt really matter. They fought Oscars, not incredibly different aircraft from Zeros. And what matters is that they used P-40s to its limit.

By saying "it doesn't really matter" sort of contradicts the whole discussion, doesn't it?

The AVG encountered the Ki-27, Ki-43 and occasionally, the Ki-45 aircraft. An A5M was even downed near an airfield in Burma.

 

[Hiromachi]

By saying "it doesn't really matter" sort of contradicts the whole discussion, doesn't it?

Not exactly, Oscars and Zeros were often misidentified for their appearance and they had similar flight characteristics, with some differences like greater rate of roll of Ki-43 but more smooth and stable controls of A6M. Performance was also not tremendously different, Zero was faster but had inferior rate of climb.

Though if you want to be that precise, then yes, A6M was a better aircraft then first Oscar and AVG would most likely had harder time with Zeros.

The AVG encountered the Ki-27, Ki-43 and occasionally, the Ki-45 aircraft.

True that.

 

[RCAFson]

This HAMP was rebuilt from multiple machines laying across the New Guinea and it certainly did not replicate the full performance. Not to mention that actual engine specifics were not met as well, I dont know what exactly did not work but regardless, the NK1F (Sakae 21) had following revolutions and manifold pressures :
- Take-off / emergency - 2750 RPM / 41.7"Hg (In english nomenclature also Military Rating)
- Rated power - 2700 RPM / 37.8"Hg
- Cruising - 2520 RPM / 32.8"Hg

So in RAAF evaluation both the revs and manifold pressures are not matching and results can be seen in HP section as less power was delivered, aircraft even at military power was not meeting the specification (at 10,000 ft it was making 512 km/h, the original specification indicated 518 km/h at 3250m, but at RATED POWER. Same for 2nd critical altitude, at 6150 m A6M3 model 32 should reach 538-540 km/h, in the test it however reaches only 521 km/h, and max achieved in test is 527 km/).
The engine specifications are messed in that test as well as performance is not correct.

And in regard to taic, its only theoretical calculation. I dont spend much time reading calculations ...
.

The RAAF test shows speeds about 3.5% below your rated speeds but there is not that much difference between the military rating and the rated output so the test is only marginally inaccurate especially since service aircraft are usually a bit slower than when factory new,

The TAIC report is not a theoretical calculation but basically a translation of IJN performance specifications.

 

[tomo pauk]

I dont know answer to every question Tomo
But based on general readings, 20 mm was considered crucial by the Navy for those 2-4 engined big birds. Army managed to find proper tactics to bring down even B-24s and B-17s with 12.7 mm's only.
Navy pilots also often envied American Brownings for great ballistics allowing for deflection shooting from greater ranges. This came in particular to my attention when reading stories of 343rd Kokutai fighting Hellcats and Corsairs.

I wasn't trying to be sarcastic, or unpleasant otherwise. We know that Mitsubishi steadily improved firepower of the Zero, so there was evident need to the improvement. We also know that, at least when reading Shattered Sword, that 7.7 was not a good weapon when a sure/fast kill was needed.
Further - not every pilot was of Sakai's, Moelders (who allegedly said one prop gun was worth 2 in the wings), Malans or Thatch's ('who cannot hit with 4 guns, cannot do it wit 6/8') caibre. Run-on-the-mill pilots needed all the help they could get, especially against demanding targets (rugged, or fast, or maneuverable, or a combination of those properties).

 

[Hiromachi]

The RAAF test shows speeds about 3.5% below your rated speeds but there is not that much difference between the military rating and the rated output so the test is only marginally inaccurate especially since service aircraft are usually a bit slower than when factory new,

Military power in this document is equal to Take-off/Emergency Rating, it is even labeled as 5 minute rating.

Japanese Rated power is a 30 minute rating, and as it should be compared to Max Continous Power (Rated) power in document (page 3).

In this case Hamp is not even reaching the speeds at the 5 minute emergency rating, which normally are reached at 30 minute Rated Power. The actual result is more then just 3%, not to mention the critical altitudes which indicate that something is wrong with supercharger.

Compare it to A6M2 engine specifications, Sakae 21 in this document has performance rather similar to a single-stage, single-speed Sakae 12 and its perfectly visible in the HP ratings.

I wasn't trying to be sarcastic, or unpleasant otherwise. We know that Mitsubishi steadily improved firepower of the Zero, so there was evident need to the improvement. We also know that, at least when reading Shattered Sword, that 7.7 was not a good weapon when a sure/fast kill was needed.

Point is that most of the victories achieved by Sakai were against fighters, and hence why his statement doesnt sound weird. Especially if compared to one before, regarding duel between Sakai and "Pug" in his F4F.
7.7 certainly is not up to a task against bombers.

 

[GrauGeist]

Though if you want to be that precise, then yes, A6M was a better aircraft then first Oscar and AVG would most likely had harder time with Zeros.

The AVG was also getting improved P-40 aircraft, though. They started with the P-40B (Tomahawk IIa) and ended with the P-40E (Kittyhawk Mk Ia), each having it's own performance profile with the P-40E being quite superior to the B in engine power, armor, armament and flight performance.

 

[tomo pauk]

The P-40E was the worst performer of all P-40s, -B included. It was especially a bad climber, past 10000 ft. Engine power wasn't much better than with P-40B, again bar low altitudes.

 

[RCAFson]

Here's what the Allies knew in mid 1943:

ZEKE: 326@16,000' clean, 307@16,000' with drop tank.

HAP: 350@17,000' clean, 328@17,000 with drop tank
HyperWar: Japanese Military Aircraft (ONI 232)