MOST OVERRATED AIRCRAFT OF WWII (1 Viewer)

[cherry blossom]

My take is that the Zero's greatest problem was its development. The A6M2 entered service at approximately the same time as the Spitfire II. The A6M2 was still the aircraft used against Guadalcanal in late 1942 and against Darwin in early 1943. The Buna Zero from mid 1943 is an A6M3, which had actually entered service about a year earlier but had less range than the A6M2 and had thus not been able to quickly replace it. The A6M3 is thus the contemporary of the Spitfire IX. Early A6M5s were available for the Battle of the Philippine Sea and thus these are contemporaries of the Spitfire XIV. Notice that the power available to a Spitfire pilot in an emergency had increased rather more rapidly than the power available to a Zero pilot between 1940 and 1944.

Part of the problem was a simple failure of the IJN command as the Kinsei 60 series (AKA Ha-112 II) was being installed in prototypes of the Ki-46 in late 1942 and in the production Ki-46 III during 1943. Thus the IJN could have flown the A6M8 for the Battle of the Philippine Sea although that would not have changed the result given the previous pilot loses.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Have you ever heard of St. Valentines Day Massacre ?
Pacific Wrecks

I have - and that was one encounter where the Japanese bloodied the nose of US forces. From Mid-1942 on the 5th AF conducted numerous raids that prevented the Japanese from holding on to their empire. In April 1943 Yamamoto tried to take the advantage back by launching operation I-go and later operation A against Guadalcanal and Port Moresby and the whole thing failed miserably.
Are you aware of this battle? The P-38's combat introduction in the PTO...

"December 27, 1942, was the day the P-38 began to take over the skies of the Southwest Pacific. A flight of 12 Lightnings was sitting strip alert at Laloki Aerodrome at Port Moresby when they got word that a large Japanese formation was headed their way. Captain Thomas J. Lynch, who had already achieved some success in P-39s, led the P-38s off the ground and climbed to intercept the formation of 25 Japanese fighters and dive-bombers.

When the battle ended, 15 of the Japanese formation had been claimed (the official history of the Army Air Forces in WWII lists nine Japanese fighters and two dive-bombers destroyed). Lynch himself claimed two, as did Bong. Lieutenant Kenneth Sparks also claimed a pair of Japanese fighters."

Warfare History Network » The Lockheed P-38 Lightning

And even though that was ONE battle, look at what the participants eventually achieved (Bong, 40 kills, Lynch, 20 kills, Sparks 12 kills)

The actual records indicate that at least until mid 1943 Zeke could hold on its own staying in 1:1 range, hell, even in 1944 there were events when Corsairs and P-38s took a beating :
WildEagles: Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" - Rabaul - pt4. - video stills

Do you have PROOF that the Zeke maintained a 1:1 ratio against US forces in 1943??? Was it against the F4F? I'd like to see that.

Video stills are meaningless unless you have comparative data to match them up against (your example shows this but this was ONE battle that in the end didn't go well for the Japanese, they lost their objective). We could see 1000s of video stills of Me 109s and Fw 190s tearing in to B-17s and B-24s but in the end do they paint a true picture???

Air combat doesnt become always and instantly one sided just because new aircraft is introduced, pilots must learn to take advantage of it as well.

Of course not, but you can look at one engagement that would begin to set the precedence of things to come, and this encounter was one of them.

"On April 30, 1942 took off from 7-Mile Drome near Port Moresby at 13:00. One of eleven Airacobra led by Lt. Col Boyd D. "Buzz" Wagner on a strafing mission against Lae Airfield, the 8th Fighter Group's first combat mission. The AIracobras strafed the airfield at 14:37, hitting parked aircraft and seaplanes, then departed. A6M2 Zeros of the Tainan Kōkūtai scrambled, and attacked the Airacobras while they were near Salamaua.

During that mission Wagner shot down 3 Zeros in a P-39!

 

[Hiromachi]

Please forgive me for late reply, was spending weekend in Netherlands (was amazing!) and driving back takes both time and energy, so only now I've found some time to write a reply. Hope you dont mind

Are you aware of this battle? The P-38's combat introduction in the PTO...

Yes Flyboyj, I'm aware. One thing that makes me always wonder with those kinds of articles is complete like of reference nor details, I would be really pleased to find out what units, Japanese in particular, participated in the fight.
By any chance you know further details ?

And even though that was ONE battle, look at what the participants eventually achieved (Bong, 40 kills, Lynch, 20 kills, Sparks 12 kills)

S. Sakai, H. Nishizawa, T. Iwamoto, Jun'ichi Sasai, ... aces dont win the wars, if they would then Germans would by all means rule the world.

Do you have PROOF that the Zeke maintained a 1:1 ratio against US forces in 1943??? Was it against the F4F? I'd like to see that.

I cant obviously copy everything and post here, but can write up a quote and leave further reference.

Quote comes from Richard Dunn book, so often quoted by me, Exploding Fuel Tanks by Richard L. Dunn
" Chapter VII. Tactical Consequences - 1943, Page 107 and 108
Optimistic claims tended to give each side an exaggerated view of the relative performance of its aircraft. However, the facts suggest the two sides were relatively evenly matched in early 1943. While Japanese bombers only rarely visited Allied main bases in daylight, the same was true of Allied bombers. After suffering losses to unescorted B-17s and B-24s over Rabaul in January 1943 the US 5th Army Air Force abandoned daylight raids on the target until October 1943. Following losses suffered in escorted raids against Buin in the Solomons in February, heavy bombers did not return to that target in daylight until July.

In a series of fighter vs fighter combats near Guadalcanal in the first half of 1943 the results were recorded by post-war Allied historians based on Japanese and Allied records as follows :
a) April 1 Claims - Japanese 40 and Allies 18:
Actual loss - Japanese 9 and Allies 6

b) May 13. Claims - Japanese 28 and Allies 16:
Actual loss - Japanese 4 and Allies 5.

c) June 7. Claims - Japanese 33 and Allies 23:
Actual loss - Japanese 9 and Allies 9.

d) May 12. Claims - Japanese 25 and Allies 31:
Actual loss - Japanese 7 and Allies 6.

Despite the fact that these combats occurred close to the American bases on Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands and up to 300 miles from the Japanese base at Buin the results were roughly a draw with the Japanese losing 29 Zeros and the Allies losing 28 fighters (and at least 3 others damaged beyond repair). Allied losses included eleven new high performance F4U Corsairs and P-38s. Both sides had additional aircraft damaged. "

Further details, not in English anymore though, can be found here :
No. 1 - 海軍零戦隊撃墜戦記１: 昭和１８年２月－７月、ガダルカナル撤退とポートダーウィンでの勝利 (IJN Zero battle diary #1 - Victories and losses for Zero over Solomon from February to July 1943) :
Amazon product ASIN 4499230624View: http://www.amazon.co.jp/%E6%B5%B7%E8%BB%8D%E9%9B%B6%E6%88%A6%E9%9A%8A%E6%92%83%E5%A2%9C%E6%88%A6%E8%A8%98%EF%BC%91-%E6%98%AD%E5%92%8C%EF%BC%91%EF%BC%98%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%92%E6%9C%88%EF%BC%8D%EF%BC%97%E6%9C%88%E3%80%81%E3%82%AC%E3%83%80%E3%83%AB%E3%82%AB%E3%83%8A%E3%83%AB%E6%92%A4%E9%80%80%E3%81%A8%E3%83%9D%E3%83%BC%E3%83%88%E3%83%80%E3%83%BC%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A3%E3%83%B3%E3%81%A7%E3%81%AE%E5%8B%9D%E5%88%A9-%E6%A2%85%E6%9C%AC-%E5%BC%98/dp/4499230624

Video stills are meaningless unless you have comparative data to match them up against (your example shows this but this was ONE battle that in the end didn't go well for the Japanese, they lost their objective). We could see 1000s of video stills of Me 109s and Fw 190s tearing in to B-17s and B-24s but in the end do they paint a true picture???

You misunderstood the idea as well as the contents of the link. It was only supposed to present that even as late as in 1944 there were occasions where Japanese could do very well and bring down high performance aircraft such as P-38 or F4U with little own losses, those were only occasional successes but that was exactly the point.

And text provides all the important data.

During that mission Wagner shot down 3 Zeros in a P-39!

You mean Wagner claimed 3 Zeros in his P-39 ? Because thats what happened.

On April 30, 1942 both sides presented a considerable activity in a quite confusing manner. It involved early defense of Lae by Tainan Kokutai against B-26s and later P-39s, but also separate actions as far as Horn Island.
First, the Maruders from 19th Bombardment Squadron attacked Lae at 6:40, dropping their 100 lb pills. Japanese scrambled their machines trying to catch the intruders, but despite Lt. Sasai claim of single B-26, none was in fact lost.
Then, action moved to the Horn Island where 8 Rikkos (Navy bombers) armed with 60 kg bombs escorted by six Tainan Ku Zeros, where escorting Zeros spotted four B-26s and decided to carry on attack on Maruders and then satisfied with it, went for a strafing of the airfield. Then bombers dropped their ordnance, damaging and destroying RAAF No. 24 Squadron Wirraways. No losses were recorded here for the Japanese, though one of the pilots was hit by a single round.

Now we come to the Cobra raid, which you're quote was focusing on. As said 11 Aircobras of 8th Fighter Group carried an attack on Lae, with Lt. Colonel Boyd D. 'Buzz' Wagner. Over the target there was a CAP, so when strike was delivered at 14:37 at Lae Aircobras were spotted by Japanese, but still in a swift manner managed to strafe the field and riddled one Zeke and one G4M, while they claimed five bombers destroyed. Then fighters flew offshore, shooting the floatplanes of Kiyokawa Maru Hikokitai, eventually leaving and heading directly across Huon Gulf for Salamaua's.

Eventually Tainan launched more fighters and flew straight at Salamaua, where they caught Aircobras and a fierce dogfight ensued. But how stretched that day was Tainan Ku is underlined by the fact that FPO2c Izumi Hideo was flying his third mission !

So about eight Zeros threw themselves into the Aircobras, and based on the claims Allies were granted 11 victories including machines destroyed and damaged on the ground. However 3 pilots went missing, that was Andres, Bevlock and Durand. Allied pilots were gathered by Wagner and discussion ensued, in which they concluded that Zeros were definitely more maneuverable but Cobra was as fast as Zero and could dive away from it if needed.
On the other side of the Owen Stanley ridge, Tainan pilots landed safely except for missing (lost and killed) FPO2c Izumi Hideo. And that is the only loss recorded by Tainan that day, however based on the confusion in dogfight it is hard to conclude who delivered the killing blow - could be Wagner, could be someone else like Greene. Japanese claimed 2 Aircobras shot down and 2 as probables.
Other losses were 3 fighters damaged beyond repair on the ground and 7 other receiving lighter damage, while Dai-4 Kokutai had 10 rikko damaged on the flightline.

Fact stays, that Wagner did not shoot down 3 fighters but 1 at best, though its still impossible to distinguish who was the actual killer of Izumi Hideo.

Source : Eagles of the Southern Sky

Early A6M5s were available for the Battle of the Philippine Sea and thus these are contemporaries of the Spitfire XIV.

Ekhem, production of A6M5 started in August 1943. And first models were delivered to Rabaul in the same month or next. A6M5s were in combat since mid 1943, not mid 1944.

Part of the problem was a simple failure of the IJN command as the Kinsei 60 series (AKA Ha-112 II) was being installed in prototypes of the Ki-46 in late 1942 and in the production Ki-46 III during 1943. Thus the IJN could have flown the A6M8 for the Battle of the Philippine Sea although that would not have changed the result given the previous pilot loses.

And still that A6M8 returns ... the relative performance increase was minimal or in fact there was little to none if compared to A6M5.
Ha-112-II delivered almost 1250 HP at 6 km, that is 250 more than Sakae 21. At the same time aircraft was a lot heavier and airframe produced far more drag then A6M3-A6M5 - Cd0 0.0215. I had no idea what was the propeller efficiency of prop used in A6M8, it was larger then Sakae one (3.150 m if compare to 3.050 of A6M5) but if it was any better ? So on a rough calculation I got Cd0 close to 0.0240 which is quite a drastic increase.

A6M8 was a dead end. Just because someone attaches big engine to a small airframe, it wont make it a great or even decent aircraft.

 

[tomo pauk]

I liked the post, but still - the A6M8 was an improvement over the A6M5c, the variant of the Zero that featured protection, along with heavi(er) armament. The clean, loaded A6M5c weighted exactly as much as the A6M8, and A6M8 was faster by 22 km/h.
A6M5c was heavier, in clean & loaded state, some 400 kg than A6M5.
The A6M8 was indeed the dead end, the 560 km/h fighter aircraft were outmoded by 1941/42.

 

[Hiromachi]

I liked the post, but still - the A6M8 was an improvement over the A6M5c, the variant of the Zero that featured protection, along with heavi(er) armament. The clean, loaded A6M5c weighted exactly as much as the A6M8, and A6M8 was faster by 22 km/h.

In that way, yes, that was an upgrade. But A6M5c was introduced to service in mid October 1944. Cherry Blossom however mentioned A6M8 in regard to Battle of the Philippine Sea, which saw A6M5-A6M5b models. And generally speaking A6M8 was no better performer than A6M5.

But again, if we would believe Jiro Horikoshi, as long as Navy wouldnt be stubborn and A7M from the day 1 would be powered by Mitsubishi MK9A engine, then the aircraft would make it by the mid 1944. And that was something, that Navy should put utmost attention to !

 

[Venturi]

"Speed is life."

Erik Shilling would have something to say about the Zero's supposed superiority!

 

[Shortround6]

You not only have to consider speed but climb rate and the A6M8 may have had a better climb rate. Source is old and may not be right but the A6M8 may have been around 1 minute quicker to 6000 meters than the A6M5c. Climb rate is important as it indicates surplus power at less than full speed. Surplus power that can be used to help turning performance, not in a smaller turning circle but in the ability to better maintain speed in a turn/maneuver or recover speed after a turn/maneuver, without loosing altitude.
Having better protection and still keeping as good or slightly better performance is not a small thing either.

The Zero did have a rather overblown reputation in the first year of the Pacific war (or at least the first 6-8 months). This was for a variety of reasons. The word "neutralized" is way too strong and perhaps better wording would be "normalized" as in while the Zero was still a threat the Allies had learned it was a threat that could be dealt with or managed using proper tactics/techniques. Perhaps not always in favor of the allies in a one on one or even for a particular action but the Zero could no longer advance the Japanese forces in general (not that the Zero was 100% responsible for the Japanese advances in the first 6 months of the war, that took some help from allied bumbling and a lot of help from Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen using other types of aircraft.) The Zero could not defend the Japanese held areas well enough from 1943 on for a variety of reasons. The Japanese could no longer inflict disproportional losses on the allies as they did early in the war which it what they needed to do to have a hope in a war of attrition.

 

[buffnut453]

Erik Shilling would have something to say about the Zero's supposed superiority!

I'm sure he did but, then again, he never encountered the Zero in combat so his comments must be taken with a huge pinch of salt. Better yet, apply his comments to the aircraft he did face in combat, the Ki27 and Ki43.

 

[GrauGeist]

The KI-43 was a very capable fighter but it was woefully underarmed. This was perhaps, it's biggest shortcoming.

 

[GregP]

The Japanese were combat veterans when we were rank beginners. So the early actions SHOULD well have favored them.

As they lost veterans they got less good in the air and we got better as we were training a very large cadre of pilots. The Japanese never did get their training up to the needs of the wartime attrition rate, and never got their aircraft up to the standard of the Hellcat, overall. They had the raw material in the J2M Raiden, but didn't ever get it heading in the right direction, production-wise.

They suffered from it as a direct result.

 

[Hiromachi]

Erik Shilling would have something to say about the Zero's supposed superiority!

Oh yes, Erik Shilling had a PhD in how to beat a Zero : AVG Flying Tigers combat tactics (Erik Shilling)
The P-40 (Erik Shilling; John Lundstrom; Steven Vincent; CDB100620)
Except neither he, nor AVG as a formation ever encountered any Zero. For the most they were fighting Ki-27s with addition of Ki-43s (one has to remember that at the oubreak of the war only two units were equipped with Ki-43-I - that would be 59th and 64th Sentai), both were even more nimble then Zero and Oscar had a better rate of roll but they were also slower (in particular Nate) and weaker armed.

You not only have to consider speed but climb rate and the A6M8 may have had a better climb rate. Source is old and may not be right but the A6M8 may have been around 1 minute quicker to 6000 meters than the A6M5c. Climb rate is important as it indicates surplus power at less than full speed. Surplus power that can be used to help turning performance, not in a smaller turning circle but in the ability to better maintain speed in a turn/maneuver or recover speed after a turn/maneuver, without loosing altitude.
Having better protection and still keeping as good or slightly better performance is not a small thing either.

Again, if we compare it to A6M5c then yes. It had greatly improved rate of climb and acceleration. But the weight increase over original A6M5 was more then noticeable, that affects the stall speed which in turn affects the maneuverability and other flight characteristics.

But idea to which I referred was that what would it be, if A6M8 would be present at Battle of the Philippine Sea. And if compared to the Zeros present there A6M8 did not possess any performance increase, while it had inferior flight characteristics. Sure, it had a better protection and armament but what would change in the battle outcome ?
Nothing.

The KI-43 was a very capable fighter but it was woefully underarmed.

It seems that two 12.7 mm machine guns with special ammunition were usually up to a task in fighter vs fighter combat, they however obviously were not enough against robust allied bombers. Even though Army developed a tactics allowing Oscars to make frontal attacks on B-24s over Burma, which proved both effective and successful as they brought down multiple bombers in late 1943.

But yes, overall, the armament was biggest shortcoming of Oscar indeed.

never got their aircraft up to the standard of the Hellcat, overall. They had the raw material in the J2M Raiden, but didn't ever get it heading in the right direction, production-wise.

I believe that general opinion was that N1K George was equal or even superior to the Hellcat. Of course it never appeared in sufficiently large numbers, even despite the fact that Navy ordered more than 6000 of those, Kawanishi was simply not capable of delivering as many airframes in 1944-1945 period.

I've recently bought a new Osprey book, "J2M Raiden and N1K1/2 Shiden/Shiden-Kai Aces" by Yasuho Izawa with Tony Holmes.
The overall impression I have, is that J2M was considered a big failure. Development started slowly in October 1938 but aircraft wasnt operationally ready until end of 1943, since the first batch of Raidens was accepted in December and still had issues. It took only few months for the Navy to realize that continuing problems with the airframe as well as reliability will not make of it a main fighter, so decision was made to adopt and mass manufacture a faster and more reliable Kawanishi fighters. Raidens would be kept in production only until A7M became available (which did not happen until July-August 1945).
On contrary as I've learnt reading the book, Kawanishi N1K1-J and N1K2-J were a private developments of the company which were approved by IJNAF HQ Technical Director for Aircraft, Vice Admiral Rikizo Tada. No official specifications were issued, however Kawanishi was certain they can build a machine better than any in the service or under development.
And as we know well from 343rd Ku their final result was more than pleasing and was totally capable of meeting allied fighters like Corsair or Hellcat on equal terms.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Please forgive me for late reply, was spending weekend in Netherlands (was amazing!) and driving back takes both time and energy, so only now I've found some time to write a reply. Hope you dont mind


Yes Flyboyj, I'm aware. One thing that makes me always wonder with those kinds of articles is complete like of reference nor details, I would be really pleased to find out what units, Japanese in particular, participated in the fight.
By any chance you know further details ?

11th Sentai against the 35th FG, 39th FS, and my text is from the book "Peter Three Eight" by John Stanaway. Much of his research was based on face to face interviews with members of the P-38 pilot's association . BTW an other battle ensured the next day with similar results. I don't have the book in front of me but it was one of Richard Bong's first missions.

S. Sakai, H. Nishizawa, T. Iwamoto, Jun'ichi Sasai, ... aces dont win the wars, if they would then Germans would by all means rule the world.

Agree - but what that battle showed the trend, and although you pointed out some battles where the Japanese had the upper hand, this trend was to continue until the Japanese capitulated in the SE Pacific.

I cant obviously copy everything and post here, but can write up a quote and leave further reference.

Quote comes from Richard Dunn book, so often quoted by me, Exploding Fuel Tanks by Richard L. Dunn
" Chapter VII. Tactical Consequences - 1943, Page 107 and 108
Optimistic claims tended to give each side an exaggerated view of the relative performance of its aircraft. However, the facts suggest the two sides were relatively evenly matched in early 1943. While Japanese bombers only rarely visited Allied main bases in daylight, the same was true of Allied bombers. After suffering losses to unescorted B-17s and B-24s over Rabaul in January 1943 the US 5th Army Air Force abandoned daylight raids on the target until October 1943. Following losses suffered in escorted raids against Buin in the Solomons in February, heavy bombers did not return to that target in daylight until July.

In a series of fighter vs fighter combats near Guadalcanal in the first half of 1943 the results were recorded by post-war Allied historians based on Japanese and Allied records as follows :
a) April 1 Claims - Japanese 40 and Allies 18:
Actual loss - Japanese 9 and Allies 6

b) May 13. Claims - Japanese 28 and Allies 16:
Actual loss - Japanese 4 and Allies 5.

c) June 7. Claims - Japanese 33 and Allies 23:
Actual loss - Japanese 9 and Allies 9.

d) May 12. Claims - Japanese 25 and Allies 31:
Actual loss - Japanese 7 and Allies 6.

Despite the fact that these combats occurred close to the American bases on Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands and up to 300 miles from the Japanese base at Buin the results were roughly a draw with the Japanese losing 29 Zeros and the Allies losing 28 fighters (and at least 3 others damaged beyond repair). Allied losses included eleven new high performance F4U Corsairs and P-38s. Both sides had additional aircraft damaged. "

Further details, not in English anymore though, can be found here :
No. 1 - 海軍零戦隊撃墜戦記１: 昭和１８年２月－７月、ガダルカナル撤退とポートダーウィンでの勝利 (IJN Zero battle diary #1 - Victories and losses for Zero over Solomon from February to July 1943) :
Amazon product ASIN 4499230624View: http://www.amazon.co.jp/%E6%B5%B7%E8%BB%8D%E9%9B%B6%E6%88%A6%E9%9A%8A%E6%92%83%E5%A2%9C%E6%88%A6%E8%A8%98%EF%BC%91-%E6%98%AD%E5%92%8C%EF%BC%91%EF%BC%98%E5%B9%B4%EF%BC%92%E6%9C%88%EF%BC%8D%EF%BC%97%E6%9C%88%E3%80%81%E3%82%AC%E3%83%80%E3%83%AB%E3%82%AB%E3%83%8A%E3%83%AB%E6%92%A4%E9%80%80%E3%81%A8%E3%83%9D%E3%83%BC%E3%83%88%E3%83%80%E3%83%BC%E3%82%A6%E3%82%A3%E3%83%B3%E3%81%A7%E3%81%AE%E5%8B%9D%E5%88%A9-%E6%A2%85%E6%9C%AC-%E5%BC%98/dp/4499230624

You're basing your claim in only one portion of the Pacific over the course of one month. One needs to look at the entire PTO during the course of the entire year, an yes I understand that BOTH sides overclaimed.

You misunderstood the idea as well as the contents of the link. It was only supposed to present that even as late as in 1944 there were occasions where Japanese could do very well and bring down high performance aircraft such as P-38 or F4U with little own losses, those were only occasional successes but that was exactly the point.

And text provides all the important data.

"Occasions." There was one occasion in 1944 where the IJA/ IJN lost 600+ aircraft

Great Marianas Turkey Shoot - WW2 Timeline

You mean Wagner claimed 3 Zeros in his P-39 ? Because thats what happened.

On April 30, 1942 both sides presented a considerable activity in a quite confusing manner. It involved early defense of Lae by Tainan Kokutai against B-26s and later P-39s, but also separate actions as far as Horn Island.
First, the Maruders from 19th Bombardment Squadron attacked Lae at 6:40, dropping their 100 lb pills. Japanese scrambled their machines trying to catch the intruders, but despite Lt. Sasai claim of single B-26, none was in fact lost.
Then, action moved to the Horn Island where 8 Rikkos (Navy bombers) armed with 60 kg bombs escorted by six Tainan Ku Zeros, where escorting Zeros spotted four B-26s and decided to carry on attack on Maruders and then satisfied with it, went for a strafing of the airfield. Then bombers dropped their ordnance, damaging and destroying RAAF No. 24 Squadron Wirraways. No losses were recorded here for the Japanese, though one of the pilots was hit by a single round.

Now we come to the Cobra raid, which you're quote was focusing on. As said 11 Aircobras of 8th Fighter Group carried an attack on Lae, with Lt. Colonel Boyd D. 'Buzz' Wagner. Over the target there was a CAP, so when strike was delivered at 14:37 at Lae Aircobras were spotted by Japanese, but still in a swift manner managed to strafe the field and riddled one Zeke and one G4M, while they claimed five bombers destroyed. Then fighters flew offshore, shooting the floatplanes of Kiyokawa Maru Hikokitai, eventually leaving and heading directly across Huon Gulf for Salamaua's.

Eventually Tainan launched more fighters and flew straight at Salamaua, where they caught Aircobras and a fierce dogfight ensued. But how stretched that day was Tainan Ku is underlined by the fact that FPO2c Izumi Hideo was flying his third mission !

So about eight Zeros threw themselves into the Aircobras, and based on the claims Allies were granted 11 victories including machines destroyed and damaged on the ground. However 3 pilots went missing, that was Andres, Bevlock and Durand. Allied pilots were gathered by Wagner and discussion ensued, in which they concluded that Zeros were definitely more maneuverable but Cobra was as fast as Zero and could dive away from it if needed.
On the other side of the Owen Stanley ridge, Tainan pilots landed safely except for missing (lost and killed) FPO2c Izumi Hideo. And that is the only loss recorded by Tainan that day, however based on the confusion in dogfight it is hard to conclude who delivered the killing blow - could be Wagner, could be someone else like Greene. Japanese claimed 2 Aircobras shot down and 2 as probables.
Other losses were 3 fighters damaged beyond repair on the ground and 7 other receiving lighter damage, while Dai-4 Kokutai had 10 rikko damaged on the flightline.

Fact stays, that Wagner did not shoot down 3 fighters but 1 at best, though its still impossible to distinguish who was the actual killer of Izumi Hideo.

Source : Eagles of the Southern Sky

Wagner was eventually credited with 3 Zeros and probably received those credits with intelligence officers believing that some of the aircraft damaged in the air were actually brought down. Point here is the tide was turning and these types of raids cost the Japanese terribly because they were not able to suffer these losses and sustain operations.

Bottom line, the IJN units operating the Zero were not about to counter the eventual onslaught and in my earlier post I stated why. The Zero couldn't completely maintain aerial superiority, even when the P-39 and P-40 were being operated in the air-to-air role, and in your post you actually stated the errors in trying to expand the design to keep up with it's contemporaries, something that failed miserably.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The Japanese were combat veterans when we were rank beginners. So the early actions SHOULD well have favored them.

As they lost veterans they got less good in the air and we got better as we were training a very large cadre of pilots. The Japanese never did get their training up to the needs of the wartime attrition rate, and never got their aircraft up to the standard of the Hellcat, overall. They had the raw material in the J2M Raiden, but didn't ever get it heading in the right direction, production-wise.

They suffered from it as a direct result.

The IJN had probably the best trained pilots in the world. Their selection and training regiment was brutal and if I remember one in 35 recruits made the cut. The mistake made that their whole pre war training program did not account for the rate of pilot attrition encountered after Pearl Harbor. Here's a good piece that breaks it down;

Japan's Fatally Flawed Air Forces in World War II | HistoryNet

 

[Hiromachi]

11th Sentai against the 35th FG, 39th FS, and my text is from the book "Peter Three Eight" by John Stanaway. Much of his research was based on face to face interviews with members of the P-38 pilot's association . BTW an other battle ensured the next day with similar results. I don't have the book in front of me but it was one of Richard Bong's first missions.

Now I get it. I was expecting only and exclusively Zeros. But there were also Oscars from 11th Sentai. 11th was a first Army fighter regiment to make it to South East Pacific theater of operations, they reached Rabaul (stationed at Vunakanau airfield) arriving from Truk on December 18th, 1942 with 60 Ki-43-I. The unit suffered tremendous losses and by late June 1943 it was pulled back to Japan. 1st Chutai led by Capt Shigenori Miyabashi was first unit that became active in New Guinea, and they made a first attack on Dobodura on 26th December.
11th Sentai was no fresh formation, they had very experienced and skilled pilots who participated as early as in Nomonhan Incident, but formerly they have seen far less service then famous 59th or 64th. 11th received their Oscars in June 1942 in Japan and eventually returned to Burma in October, though in November they had to move, collecting on the road to South West Pacific left behind Ki-43-I of 50th and 64th Sentai (while those received a new Ki-43-II).

I'm not surprised they were surprised like that.
They were flying older machine that barely made it over 500 km/h in which they had little to no combat experience, their former experience was against Hurricanes, P-40s and whatever else was in early 1942 when they were flying their Nates.
Now this front was largely considered as secondary by the Army. When Japanese Navy requested Army air support the army not only doubted whether it was really needed, i.e., Navy could have reinforced themselves, but JAAF did not consider its training, equipment or doctrine well suited to operate over large expanses of water but was focused on war on the Asian mainland. It was thus reticent to provide support much less its latest and best fighters and bombers (the light bomber units sent there were former training units hastily re-equipped and brought to operational status).

But afaik, 11th Sentai pilots claimed on that day 7 Lightnings for a single Oscar loss (+ 1 pilot was MIA). So 11th Sentai suffered no unusual losses. The other units participating in the combat were 582nd Kokutai which was a composite air group which operated D3A dive bombers and A6M fighters.
Here is a quote from John Stanaway "P-38 Lightning Aces of the Pacific and CBI", page 8 :
"Tom Lynch was was leading the interception at the head of 'Trapeze Red Flight' in P-38 G-1 42-12715 'White 19', whilst Ken Sparks and Dick Bong closely followed behind. The flight soon sighted the 'Oscars' and dove in to attack, Lynch quickly claiming two Ki-43s shot down. One of these was apparently blown in half by an accurate burst from the Lightning's formidable armament. Meanwhile, Bong and Sparks became involved with the Zeros, and as a result of their subsequent action reports, each pilot was credited with a single kill. Bong only got a very short burst in at the Zero from just 50 ft away, but was later persuaded to claim the fighter by other observers of the combat. The pair also reportedly destroyed a 'Val' apiece directly over the Dobodura strip.
Other claims for the day included Zeros for Lts Hoyt Eason, Charles Gallup and Stanley Andrews - in total, some 11 confirmed kills and three probables were granted on mostly visual evidence from eyewitnesses. Japanese records admit the loss of two 'Oscars' (Sgt Kurihara got as far as New Britain in his damaged aircraft, before he crash-landed and was subsequently picked up by a Japanese naval flying boat, whilst WO Yoshitake failed to return from the mission) and one Zero (which crash-landed back at Rabaul), whilst a 'Val' was listed as missing and another returned to based badly damaged.
The only American loss was Ken Sparks's P-38 F-5, which was so badly damaged that he had to force-land it on the Dobodura strip."

So for 11 victory claims and 3 probables actually 3 fighters (2 Oscars, 1 Zeke) and one Val were the victims. Americans suffered a single loss in form of crash landing Ken Sparks.

Nothing unusual. And far from official history of the US Army Air Forces, listing nine Japanese fighters and two dive-bombers destroyed.

You're basing your claim in only one portion of the Pacific over the course of one month. One needs to look at the entire PTO during the course of the entire year, an yes I understand that BOTH sides overclaimed.

April, May, June ... looks like more than one month. Besides, I did not claim that it was equal for the whole 1943. I said specifically that at least until mid 1943 Japanese could keep it in 1:1 range.

Also, I was thinking that at that time Lightnings and Corsairs were only present over SWPA and Solomon islands ? So how is the rest of the Pacific related ?

"Occasions." There was one occasion in 1944 where the IJA/ IJN lost 600+ aircraft

And how is that even related to what we discuss ? I mean, unless you assume that all the fault for incredible losses in this battle has to be placed on Zeros.

Wagner was eventually credited with 3 Zeros and probably received those credits with intelligence officers believing that some of the aircraft damaged in the air were actually brought down. Point here is the tide was turning and these types of raids cost the Japanese terribly because they were not able to suffer these losses and sustain operations.

That's April 1942, and for the next few months Tainan Ku would be beating plenty of those Aircobra pilots. So far nothing indicated that tides were turning and Navy could not replace the losses.

Bottom line, the IJN units operating the Zero were not about to counter the eventual onslaught and in my earlier post I stated why. The Zero couldn't completely maintain aerial superiority, even when the P-39 and P-40 were being operated in the air-to-air role, and in your post you actually stated the errors in trying to expand the design to keep up with it's contemporaries, something that failed miserably.

No, a carrier borne fighter designed in late '30s and serving up to 1944 as the only Navy fighter could not maintain the aerial superiority. Certainly.
Also, I dont see anything particularly weird that aiframe for carrier borne fighter, designed 5-6 years earlier was not suitable for engines over 50 % more powerful and more heavy, to keep the competition with land based fighters designed over engines with twice as much horsepower.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

April, May, June ... looks like more than one month. Besides, I did not claim that it was equal for the whole 1943. I said specifically that at least until mid 1943 Japanese could keep it in 1:1 range.

Also, I was thinking that at that time Lightnings and Corsairs were only present over SWPA and Solomon islands ? So how is the rest of the Pacific related ?

It's related because had the Japanese kept a 1:1 kill ratio through out the pacific and had non-combat attrition favored their operation, they would have faired a lot better. I don't believe they would have turned the tide of the war, perhaps made it last longer.

And how is that even related to what we discuss ? I mean, unless you assume that all the fault for incredible losses in this battle has to be placed on Zeros.

No it's a snapshot in time - one battle, just like the one's you shown.

That's April 1942, and for the next few months Tainan Ku would be beating plenty of those Aircobra pilots. So far nothing indicated that tides were turning and Navy could not replace the losses.

Those Aircobras (and P-40) were maintaining a 1:1, 1: 5 ratio.And were holding the line. In the Bigger Picture the Japanese could not take back Guadalcanal and as stated in my earlier posts but of Yamaoto's attempts at a counteroffensive failed. the Japanese could not gain total air superiority and supply their troops.

No, a carrier borne fighter designed in late '30s and serving up to 1944 as the only Navy fighter could not maintain the aerial superiority. Certainly.
Also, I dont see anything particularly weird that aiframe for carrier borne fighter, designed 5-6 years earlier was not suitable for engines over 50 % more powerful and more heavy, to keep the competition with land based fighters designed over engines with twice as much horsepower.

You're right - and that's one of the reasons why I believe the Zero was over rated!

 

[Hiromachi]

No it's a snapshot in time - one battle, just like the one's you shown.

Not exactly. What mostly favored the outcome of the Battle of Philippine Sea was the radar, the skilled pilots in their brand new Hellcats and complete lack of the experience of their opponents, who were sent with small fighter cover and in groups.
Turkey Shoot was a consequence of well directed VFs, knowing where and when the prey will be, able to drop on them with altitude advantage. It was like a wolf feast over unaware lamb.

Could the same be said of the combat from the link ? Rabaul certainly had a radar installations, but its ability to guide Zeros was far inferior. Zero pilots were not complete newcomers with no experience, and could engage their opponents - of which they were aware and which did not possess complete advantage.

Those Aircobras (and P-40) were maintaining a 1:1, 1: 5 ratio.And were holding the line.

Based on the linked book which contains both Japanese and Allied records (for RAAF wings, for USAF squadrons and Japanese air groups) Tainan Ku managed to bring down in a period of April 1 to November 15 1942 81 allied aircraft with 148 aircrews on boards.
Those were :
17 - P-40E Kittyhawks
5 - B-17 E/F Flying Fortress
38 - P-39 D/P-400 Aircobras
5 - A-24 Banshee
10 - B-25 Mitchell
1 - Lockheed Hudson
5 - B-26 Marauder

At the same time Tainan lost 18 machines to the allied fighters, 6 to bomber defensive fire, 2 were shot down by ground fire and 5 were written off. 8 were lost/became not operational by other, non combat reasons. So overall to direct combat actions Tainan lost 31 machines. 18 of those could be attributed to P-40 / P-39 pilots. That gives Tainan about 3 to 1 kill ratio for given period of time in fighter vs fighter combat in New Guinea.
If something was holding the line then I'd say it was P-40.

In the Bigger Picture the Japanese could not take back Guadalcanal and as stated in my earlier posts but of Yamaoto's attempts at a counteroffensive failed. the Japanese could not gain total air superiority and supply their troops.

They couldnt take it back becuase the Navy split the efforts between 3 areas (Port Moresby/New Guinea, Milne Bay and Guadalcanal) and air support could not be provided from Rabaul in any sufficient form except for attacks on Henderson Field. Otherwise Japanese had to travel over 1000 km to have a chance to bomb it. It wasnt until November 1942 that Kahili Airfield was constructed.
So of course they could not gain air superiority.

You're right - and that's one of the reasons why I believe the Zero was over rated!

Because a fighter thats design is 6 years old cannot keep running forever against a newer and newer opponents makes it over rated ?
Well, I'm sorry but what does it make of F6F ?
Fighter that entered service in late 1943 and by mid 1945 was already obsolete and being replaced by F8F ?

In 1930s-1940s technology was quickly becoming old, with the amount of development and new discoveries the progress was tremendous.

 

[MrMojok]

Stuff like this has always blown my mind, about the Japanese in WWII:

"Because the army and navy did not cooperate, army aircraft on New Guinea had to fly 1,500 miles to Manila for engine changes even though the navy had major maintenance assets as close as Rabaul. "

(From Flyboy's link)

 

[Shortround6]

A number of planes had rather overblown reputations at times. In some cases the reputation was lost/destroyed in just a few months and in other cases it lasted quite while.
The Stuka had quite a reputation after Poland and into France in 1940, it was synonymous with the Blitzkrieg, rightly or wrongly. The reputation lasted right up until the English channel. It may have worked well on ships in the channel while escorted but it's ability to penetrate British airspace even escorted was limited. It's actual ability hadn't changed but the perception certainly had. The Stuka could certainly perform certain functions/missions but it wasn't the war winning weapon it's early reputation/German propaganda made it out to be.

 

[wuzak]

The A6M3 is thus the contemporary of the Spitfire IX. Early A6M5s were available for the Battle of the Philippine Sea and thus these are contemporaries of the Spitfire XIV. Notice that the power available to a Spitfire pilot in an emergency had increased rather more rapidly than the power available to a Zero pilot between 1940 and 1944.

Ekhem, production of A6M5 started in August 1943. And first models were delivered to Rabaul in the same month or next. A6M5s were in combat since mid 1943, not mid 1944.

Production of the Spitfire XIV started at a similar time, though it did not enter combat as quickly.

Still, the Spitfire IX had been in production since 1942 and would still have superior performance to the A6M5.

And the Spitfire XII was in production from late 1942, 100 only made, and its performance was superior to the A6M5. Its first combat was in April 1943.

 

[Hiromachi]

Right, there was Spitfire IX that had a better performance indeed. There was also FW-190 A-5, 109 G-4 and whatever else you name.
Only problem I see ... none of this aircraft could take-off and land on aircraft carrier nor the range to perform the tasks expected of a fighter flying over the ocean. So in this case their "superiority" would last for as long as they had fuel, then they would go to Davy Jones Locker.