"Most pilots shot down didn't see the enemy coming"

pbehn · Aug 10, 2018

An air force is a fighting unit. The USA especially had the resources to transfer its best pilots into instructor roles. This improved the effectiveness of all pilots in the force. While the very best LW pilots were possibly better than the pilots they were up against there were no easy kills, by contrast the new pilots in the LW were no were near the level of new pilots in the USAAF. In the Pacific things were even worse, Japans best pilots were in service, losing a carrier not only lost a ship and a lot of planes but also the elite of their pilots which couldn't be replaced.

Navalwarrior · Aug 10, 2018

XBe02Drvr said:
Yes, the no armor and unprotected tanks were pretty easy to figure out, but getting the word out and getting it believed were another story all together. And the wrecks couldn't tell you anything about its insane agility or its difficult high speed maneuvering, or its right turning deficiency at speed. And since most early encounters were cases where the Zero started out with an energy advantage, it took awhile to figure out what its actual level flight top speed was.
Cheers,
Wes

Resp:
Most historians are not aware that Chennault traveled to Hawaii in April (? was several months before PH) 1941 where he briefed USAAC (and possibly Navy) pilots on the merits/deficiencies of the A6M Zero. Chennault previously sent a detailed report on the Japanese Zero to either Gen Marshall or Gen Arnold in 1940. Where did that info go? Likely in a desk drawer, as it surely wasn't shared with pilots, etc.. The report indicated the Zero had great range (1000 miles? ?), which sounded unbelievable at the time. So as you stated, it often took time for the nay Sayers to accept the analysis of Japan's abilities. The fact that the report came from Chennault, who was forced out of the USAAC . . . May have played a part. However, his analysis was spot on.

pbehn · Aug 10, 2018

Navalwarrior said:
Resp:
Most historians are not aware that Chennault traveled to Hawaii in April (? was several months before PH) 1941 where he briefed USAAC (and possibly Navy) pilots on the merits/deficiencies of the A6M Zero. Chennault previously sent a detailed report on the Japanese Zero to either Gen Marshall or Gen Arnold in 1940. .

Well thankfully we have one historian (I presume) who is aware of these things. If you bump into him or her can you get a specific quote or reference, or should I just look about myself as per our last discussion?

bobbysocks · Aug 19, 2018

the 20% or 80% would depend on which side you were on. for LW and RAF pilots you were in for the duration of the war...however long it took. so, if you wanted to survive you fought with that in mind...only choose battles you were certain you could win ( unless it was forced on you ). mixing it up in dogfights lowered your chances of living to fight another day whereas bouncing and boogying was the better part of discretion. so hartmann was probably spot on with his claim where conversely a us airman had more dogfights than pure bounces. us airmen were in for only a specified number of missions...basically about a year in the combat zone and were encouraged ( after Doolittle) to go after EAs. us fighters were escorting and the LW was more intent on taking down the bombers that getting into it with the escorts...BUT escorts still got bounced.
the 51 ( as noted in previous posts ) had a tail warning radar. I remember my dad talking about it. it was a buzzer that would go off if something got behind you. in a furball where planes may zip past your tail the buzzer would go off so it annoyed a lot of pilots to the point they never used it. AND also had to be turned off when you were in formation. so if the pilot was going to use it he had to flip it on when they broke formation to go after EA. also ( depending on the year ) gun heaters and arming switches were turned off as well and needed to be armed . too many twitchy fingers put rounds past or in the element leaders that SOP became keeping them off. when flying formation your attention is focused on the plane you are keying off of. you aren't looking around too much and enjoying the scenery too much especially if the formation is tighter due to a little scud. so it wasnt too hard to sneak up on a flight. my father was flying tail end Charlie on one mission and for some reason glanced to his right. flying directly beside him and in perfect formation was a 262. more than a little startled he yelled "you got a jet job on your ass" over the radio which made everyone peel off. the 262 noticed what was going on and peeled off and firewalled his throttle. my father went after him and had him at close range and in his sites. he pulled the trigger. nothing, he pulled again...nothing. in the heat of the moment he forgot to flip on his gun heaters and by the time everything was ready the 262 was long out of range. the funny thing is tail end Charlie was usually the one the enemy bounced and why the 262 pilot did what he did instead of taking my dad out is only known to him. he never took a shot even though he had a mustang dead to rights. it was like he was playing a deadly game of counting coup...but its fitting he got away.

Navalwarrior · Aug 24, 2018

bobbysocks said:
the 20% or 80% would depend on which side you were on. for LW and RAF pilots you were in for the duration of the war...however long it took. so, if you wanted to survive you fought with that in mind...only choose battles you were certain you could win ( unless it was forced on you ). mixing it up in dogfights lowered your chances of living to fight another day whereas bouncing and boogying was the better part of discretion. so hartmann was probably spot on with his claim where conversely a us airman had more dogfights than pure bounces. us airmen were in for only a specified number of missions...basically about a year in the combat zone and were encouraged ( after Doolittle) to go after EAs. us fighters were escorting and the LW was more intent on taking down the bombers that getting into it with the escorts...BUT escorts still got bounced.
the 51 ( as noted in previous posts ) had a tail warning radar. I remember my dad talking about it. it was a buzzer that would go off if something got behind you. in a furball where planes may zip past your tail the buzzer would go off so it annoyed a lot of pilots to the point they never used it. AND also had to be turned off when you were in formation. so if the pilot was going to use it he had to flip it on when they broke formation to go after EA. also ( depending on the year ) gun heaters and arming switches were turned off as well and needed to be armed . too many twitchy fingers put rounds past or in the element leaders that SOP became keeping them off. when flying formation your attention is focused on the plane you are keying off of. you aren't looking around too much and enjoying the scenery too much especially if the formation is tighter due to a little scud. so it wasnt too hard to sneak up on a flight. my father was flying tail end Charlie on one mission and for some reason glanced to his right. flying directly beside him and in perfect formation was a 262. more than a little startled he yelled "you got a jet job on your ass" over the radio which made everyone peel off. the 262 noticed what was going on and peeled off and firewalled his throttle. my father went after him and had him at close range and in his sites. he pulled the trigger. nothing, he pulled again...nothing. in the heat of the moment he forgot to flip on his gun heaters and by the time everything was ready the 262 was long out of range. the funny thing is tail end Charlie was usually the one the enemy bounced and why the 262 pilot did what he did instead of taking my dad out is only known to him. he never took a shot even though he had a mustang dead to rights. it was like he was playing a deadly game of counting coup...but its fitting he got away.

Resp:
Their missions were different; one the aggressor, the other the defender. So it makes sense that tactics could/were quite different. Again, it was important to adjust the tactics (as Gen Doolittle did by directing his fighters to attack aircraft on the enemies' airfields in the ETO) as the war progressed. Also, long range fighters were under threat of attack for a longer periods (ingress and egress, again in the ETO) due to the greater time of flight, and the the fact that their paths took them over the same enemy territory twice. In the beginning, Germany didn't need much air assets to protect Germany. However, it wasn't long before Germany was attacked regularly. In doing so, the Luftwaffe were forced to assign large assets (taking them away from other areas) to its Country's defense; strategic as well as tactical.

Navalwarrior · Aug 24, 2018

Navalwarrior said:
Resp:
Their missions were different; one the aggressor, the other the defender. So it makes sense that tactics could/were quite different. Again, it was important to adjust the tactics (as Gen Doolittle did by directing his fighters to attack aircraft on the enemies' airfields in the ETO) as the war progressed. Also, long range fighters were under threat of attack for a longer periods (ingress and egress, again in the ETO) due to the greater time of flight, and the the fact that their paths took them over the same enemy territory twice. In the beginning, Germany didn't need much air assets to protect Germany. However, it wasn't long before Germany was attacked regularly. In doing so, the Luftwaffe were forced to assign large assets (taking them away from other areas) to its Country's defense; strategic as well as tactical.

Add:
One tactic that Doolittle employed was a large formation of fighters (in formation to mimic bombers' radar print) flying many miles ahead of his bombers to draw Luftwaffe attacks on them instead.

GrauGeist · Aug 24, 2018

bobbysocks said:
...my father was flying tail end Charlie on one mission and for some reason glanced to his right. flying directly beside him and in perfect formation was a 262. more than a little startled he yelled "you got a jet job on your ass" over the radio which made everyone peel off. the 262 noticed what was going on and peeled off and firewalled his throttle. my father went after him and had him at close range and in his sites. he pulled the trigger. nothing, he pulled again...nothing. in the heat of the moment he forgot to flip on his gun heaters and by the time everything was ready the 262 was long out of range. the funny thing is tail end Charlie was usually the one the enemy bounced and why the 262 pilot did what he did instead of taking my dad out is only known to him. he never took a shot even though he had a mustang dead to rights. it was like he was playing a deadly game of counting coup...but its fitting he got away.

It's entirely possible that this was a Me262A-1a/U3 or Me262A-4/5, which for the most part, weren't armed, although some did retain a single Mk108. Great story, though...makes you wonder what the Luftwaffe pilot was doing, perhaps boldly curious or simply being a smartass.

One tactic that the Me262s used to sneak up on formations, was coming up from behind in the contrails. This not only made them hard to spot, but masked their own contrails as well.

Navalwarrior · Aug 25, 2018

GrauGeist said:
It's entirely possible that this was a Me262A-1a/U3 or Me262A-4/5, which for the most part, weren't armed, although some did retain a single Mk108. Great story, though...makes you wonder what the Luftwaffe pilot was doing, perhaps boldly curious or simply being a smartass.

One tactic that the Me262s used to sneak up on formations, was coming up from behind in the contrails. This not only made them hard to spot, but masked their own contrails as well.

Resp:
Tail end attacks, particularly after the Luftwaffe primarily focused on 'head on' attacks since mid 1943, would have caught the bomber/escort fighters off guard. A captured American crewman inadvertently revealed under interrogation . . .that the B-17F was most vulnerable from head on attacks. All Luftwaffe bases were furnished this info within an hour of getting it. Hence, tactics from that point forward focused primarily from 'head on.' The development of the 'chin turret' B-17G, gave the Flying Fortress additional nose armament to counter/deal with the 1943 tactic. From the angle and speed of experienced LW pilots, frontal attacks still were very effective until close to the end of the war in the ETO.

GrauGeist · Aug 25, 2018

Navalwarrior said:
Resp:
Tail end attacks, particularly after the Luftwaffe primarily focused on 'head on' attacks since mid 1943, would have caught the bomber/escort fighters off guard. A captured American crewman inadvertently revealed under interrogation . . .that the B-17F was most vulnerable from head on attacks. All Luftwaffe bases were furnished this info within an hour of getting it. Hence, tactics from that point forward focused primarily from 'head on.' The development of the 'chin turret' B-17G, gave the Flying Fortress additional nose armament to counter/deal with the 1943 tactic. From the angle and speed of experienced LW pilots, frontal attacks still were very effective until close to the end of the war in the ETO.

The Me262, which went operational in 1944, rarely conducted head-on attacks because the rate of closure was too great. Approaching from the rear or an oblique angle allowed more time for accurate aiming while their speed made for difficult defensive fire as the turrets couldn't keep up with their pass and the flexible mount gunners had trouble leading.

Zipper730 · Dec 19, 2018

GregP said:
View attachment 501543

That was genius... it turns out that's a real beer company. First brewed in 1990 to celebrate the Battle of Britain that occurred 50 years earlier. That might be one of the wittiest ads ever

P-39 Expert · Dec 19, 2018

You mean that fat guy who wore makeup, painted his toenails, was high on dope and head of the Luftwaffe?

"Most pilots shot down didn't see the enemy coming"

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