MOST UNDERRATED AIRCRAFT OF WWII?

[GrauGeist]

Hey...did I just hear the sound of a toilet being flushed?

 

[pbehn]

An important point you have raised, quite right too. In late 1939, early 1940, they were producing about five a day (two Hawker, three Gloster). By the BoB this was up to around seven a day, mainly down to Gloster's increased rate.
There were only three weeks between July 1940 and the beginning of November 1940 in which Hurricane losses exceeded production.

I would note that the British were never short of pilots, as Douglas and the men at the Ministry were keen to point out (and did in the thoroughly misleading BoB pamphlet), they were short of operational pilots, as Dowding, Park et alter were equally keen to point out.
This is what led to the much disliked system whereby rather than entire squadrons being rotated in and out of 11 Group and to a lesser extent 12 Group, squadrons in other Groups were stripped of their experienced hands and reduced to B or C Class status. A C class squadron was not in any sense operational, typically including only three operational pilots. Even a B Class squadron might include up to six non operational pilots. Only A Class squadrons were required to maintain a minimum strength of sixteen operational pilots. Most of these were in 11 Group, there were a few in 10 and 12 Groups, none in the others.

Cheers

Steve

Thanks steve, I was not suggesting we had no one who could fly a plane, when you consider WW1 veterans and bomber/coastal command we must have had thousands just not fully trained on Spitfire Hurricanes. The LW however was having to consolidate and merge squadrons of both fighters and bombers due to pilot losses and lack of operational aircraft. The RAF were never so short of machines that they had to consider it.

 

[stona]

Thanks steve, I was not suggesting we had no one who could fly a plane, when you consider WW1 veterans and bomber/coastal command we must have had thousands just not fully trained on Spitfire Hurricanes. The LW however was having to consolidate and merge squadrons of both fighters and bombers due to pilot losses and lack of operational aircraft. The RAF were never so short of machines that they had to consider it.

I am a great admirer of Dowding and he always resisted merging squadrons, it was done. At the infamous 7th September conference Park confirmed that on that very day nine of 11 Group's squadrons had started the day with less than 15 pilots and that on the previous day he had put squadrons together and ordered them off as composite units. To put these numbers in perspective a front line squadron was supposed to have 25 operational pilots, though this had been lowered to 21 during the Battle. 15 represents a shortage and became the number at which 11 Group would request pilots from other Groups to reinforce a squadron. An A Class squadron (all in 11 Group) was to have a minimum of 16 operational pilots
This rather flies in the face of those who simply look at the raw figures for pilot numbers and deny the shortage being stressed by both Park and Dowding.
This is why when in the Battle of Britain pamphlet, in which the Air Ministry claimed that Fighter Command's squadrons were stronger at the end of the Battle than the beginning (a claim accepted uncritically by some historians who ought to know better) both Dowding and Park rejected the claim, vigorously and publicly.

There were all sorts of solutions proposed for the shortage, some like creating more OTUs were not too clever and Dowding pointed out the drain on his Command that this would create. Others, like Park's proposed 'sector training flights' in which young men fresh from OTUs would be posted to squadrons in the quieter Groups for more on the job training had more merit. The squadrons in 11 Group were simply too busy fighting and dying to do it.

Dowding may have missed one trick. There is no mention by him or anyone else, at any of these meetings/conferences of the qualified pilots at Defiant and Blenheim squadrons. By grounding these squadrons and converting their pilots to Spitfires and Hurricanes a pool of qualified pilots, mostly more effective than those fresh from the OTUs, could have been created.
We have the benefit of hindsight. I don't know why this option was never even looked at. There may be very good reasons, unknown to us 70+ years later but important at the time why it wasn't done.

Others have argued that the pilot shortage was brought about by the Air Ministry's determination to maintain a large bomber force and its failure to expand the training programmes soon enough, lacking an appreciation of the level of losses that the RAF would suffer. Both factors contributed, but there wasn't much Dowding could have done about either.

Cheers

Steve

 

[My109]

This may sound funny but I think the me109 is a very underrated aircraft............maybe because the plane was defamed so much that the reputation of the plane was lower than it should be. I really don't like how many people see the me109 as a flying stone with big guns that cannot maneuver properly.

 

[pbehn]

This may sound funny but I think the me109 is a very underrated aircraft............maybe because the plane was defamed so much that the reputation of the plane was lower than it should be. I really don't like how many people see the me109 as a flying stone with big guns that cannot maneuver properly.

Not many with that opinion here, my opinion is it was one of the two greats (with the spitfire) of the war simply because it served from before the start to the finish in front line service

 

[GrauGeist]

This may sound funny but I think the me109 is a very underrated aircraft............maybe because the plane was defamed so much that the reputation of the plane was lower than it should be. I really don't like how many people see the me109 as a flying stone with big guns that cannot maneuver properly.

Not sure where you've heard those sentiments, as the Bf109 remained a formidable adversary right up to the last days of the war...certainly not an under-rated aircraft.

 

[stona]

It was one of the greats. It struggled at the end of the war and was outclassed by late Marks of Spitfire, something that hadn't happened earlier, but still a great aircraft.
'Johnnie' Johnson's politically incorrect but apt recollections of commanding a Spitfire Wing and flying the Mk.XIV late in the war are apt. He bemoaned the lack of "Kraut traffic" around late in the war whilst recalling that what there was "did not last long". His conclusion was that. "If, God forbid, we had to fight WW2 again with WW2 kit, my weapon of choice would be a four cannon XIV."
It was the possibility of more successful late development that elevates the Spitfire over the Bf 109 in my mind, but it's by a narrow margin.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Hickam Field]

With a 5.5:1 aerial victory ratio over Japanese aircraft, I'll throw the Grumman F4F Wildcat/Martlet into the hat. Actually, I personally think that in comparison to manufacturers like Supermarine, North American, and several others, Grumman was very underrated with thier rugged birds like the F4F, F6F, and TBM.

 

[pinehilljoe]

The Curtis P-40

 

[Greyman]

The C-47 is the most underrated. By me. Eisenhower lists it as one of the four pieces of equipment most important to victory in WWII - and I never give it its due.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The C-47 is the most underrated. By me. Eisenhower lists it as one of the four pieces of equipment most important to victory in WWII - and I never give it its due.

We've had discussions here to the same, IMO the C-47 was the best all round aircraft of WW2. Too many people are hung up on combat aircraft to appreciate it's importance, not only in performing its mission, but the operational and developmental legacy it paved in later years.

 

[stona]

We've had discussions here to the same, IMO the C-47 was the best all round aircraft of WW2. Too many people are hung up on combat aircraft to appreciate it's importance, not only in performing its mission, but the operational and developmental legacy it paved in later years.

It's hard to disagree, it was an important aircraft. Under rated though? If Eisenhower made it the fourth most important piece of military equipment vital to victory in WW2 it received recognition by those in the know

When reading up on the beginnings of British airborne forces in 1940/41 I noticed the British bemoaning the fact that they didn't have something like the German Ju 52, despite the earlier requirements for bombers to double as transports. The C-47 was much superior to the Ju 52, but the principle is the same.

Cheers

Steve

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

We've had discussions here to the same, IMO the C-47 was the best all round aircraft ever built. Too many people are hung up on combat aircraft to appreciate it's importance, not only in performing its mission, but the operational and developmental legacy it paved in later years.

Fixed

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Grumman was very underrated with their rugged birds"

Many of which were built by GM .....

 

[GrauGeist]

Perhaps instead of listing the C-47 itself, we could actually say the DC-3, since it launched not only the C-47, but was built by both the Japanese (L2D) and the Soviets (Li-2).

A great many DC-3 were also pressed into military service during the war, and the Luftwaffe captured several DC-2 and DC-3 aircraft (mostly KLM), too.

 

[Shortround6]

It's hard to disagree, it was an important aircraft. Under rated though? If Eisenhower made it the fourth most important piece of military equipment vital to victory in WW2 it received recognition by those in the know

When reading up on the beginnings of British airborne forces in 1940/41 I noticed the British bemoaning the fact that they didn't have something like the German Ju 52, despite the earlier requirements for bombers to double as transports. The C-47 was much superior to the Ju 52, but the principle is the same.

Cheers

Steve

Actually the British did have similar planes to the Ju 52, just not in large numbers. Bristol Bombay and Handley Page Harrow.
Both were much superior in performance to the Ju 52 even if not in the same league as the DC-3

 

[stona]

Numbers were the problem. A Combined Operations officer described the Ju 52, slightly over stating the case, as having "poured troops into the Low Countries".

It is telling that in Goering's 1934 'Rhineland Programme' no less than 440 of the 4021 total aircraft to be produced were Ju 52s. The Ju 52 is listed under the larger bomber heading as an auxiliary aircraft in the 1934 programme, and it is known that some had bomb bays fitted. It was always intended as a transport aircraft, not dual role in the sense of British specifications. The 'Rhineland' bombers are listed as Do 11, Do 13 and 23.
As late as 1936/7 the Ju 52 still appears as an auxiliary bomber, but in the March-December 1937 production summary it acquires a new category, transport, where it stays in glorious isolation apart from the occasional appearance of the Ju 90 or Fw 200 in some plans.

There was an entirely different emphasis and understanding of the importance of so called auxiliary aircraft by Goering and the RLM. The British muddled along with a few converted bombers, having in fact abandoned the requirement for bombers to double as transports in both Specifications B.12/36 and P.13/36.

Both the Bombay and Harrow had been built to an earlier specification requiring a dual role. Whether one was a transport that could bomb and the other a bomber that could transport is open to debate. Neither was built as a transport aircraft and bearing in mind that the Bombay was always intended for operations overseas, nowhere near enough were built.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

I have brought up both planes before in other threads to show that the Ju 52 was obsolete as a transport even in 1939.
Both British aircraft could fly faster, further and carrying more payload (troops or cargo) than the Ju 52 while requiring 1/3 less engines.
Granted the British engines were more powerful but all three aircraft used 9 cylinder radials of within 3-4% displacement so manufacturing costs should be similar between the engines.

Ju 52s poured troops into the low countries because they used hundreds of them. 430 according to one book. Of which 2/3s were lost at the time. Roughly 100 were later repaired or used for spare parts. Norway cost the Germans around 150 Ju 52s, I have no idea how many were later repaired.

It is one thing to have a dual purpose requirement for bomber/transport aircraft when the planes had fixed landing gear and wings mechanics could crawl though to reach engines in flight. (not that they could in the two British aircraft) but as retractable landing gear became the norm and wings got thinner (and acquired flaps,etc) fat fuselages that would hold 20-24 troops became a bigger share of the total drag and the combination aircraft began to look not so good for either job.
I believe the Stirling started out with the combination requirement and while the requirement was dropped at some point in the design process they kept the oversize fuselage rather than start over to save time.

 

[stona]

The Stirling was designed in response to Specification B.12/36. Shorts were not initially included in the circulation of the specification for tender, but were included shortly after the July '36 release on a recommendation because they supposedly had an aircraft meeting some of the requirements on the drawing board. When approached the company was keen to participate.
This means that there was no troop carrying requirement in the specification to which the aircraft was designed.
The actual wording of the specifications (it was included in P.13/36 too) was:

"Consideration is to be given in design for fitting a light removable form of seating for the maximum number of personnel that can be accommodated within the fuselage when the aircraft is being used for reinforcing Overseas Commands."

This is not demanding provision for troop carrying as in earlier specifications. Crucially the new requirement was that seating could be fitted in the fuselage, not that the fuselage be designed to take seating. The need here was to transport RAF ground crew to Overseas Commands, this was a direct result of the introduction of a reinforcement range into the bomber requirements.
AFTER the 1936 requirements had been issued the Air Staff did investigate using the resulting designs as transports. There was even proposed a provisional allocation of funds for a new transport should this not be possible. When this proposition was discussed in 1937 it was decided that one of the bombers "must" be used as a transport, though this was obviously not an ideal solution, except for the Treasury.
Shortly after it was noted that

"by reason of the multiplicity of internal installations in the fuselage the troops may not enjoy the same degree of comfort available in present types."

Just how little consideration was given to a troop carrying capacity is shown by the results of an inspection of the mock up for the Supermarine design to B.12/36. Far from finding room for fully armed troops the inspecting officers from Bomber Command worried whether there was enough room for the crew! The report noted that headroom throughout the fuselage was restricted and that even the captain and navigator did not have room to stand. Clearly a troop carrying requirement did not dominate, or even in some cases influence, the designs submitted to the 1936 specifications.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Well something was going or trying to explain the size of the Stirling Fuselage gets a little difficult.

It may be that as you stated "Shorts were not initially included in the circulation of the specification for tender, but were included shortly after the July '36 release on a recommendation because they supposedly had an aircraft meeting some of the requirements on the drawing board."
It maybe that the project Shorts had on the drawing board had provision for troop transport (seeing as how Shorts may have started work on this project when such a requirement was still common). And Shorts adapted this large fuselage design to more fully meet the new requirement. Rather than start fuselage design from scratch and take up more time they used the legacy fuselage even though the strict requirement for troop transport was no longer in the official requirement.

There has got to be some reason the Stirling had a wider, deeper and 5 meter longer fuselage than the Halifax and Manchester/Lancaster and it doesn't seem to be the size of the bomb bay considering the complaints about the size of the Stirling's bomb bay.