MOST UNDERRATED AIRCRAFT OF WWII?
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buffnut453
Captain
No...it was the diversion asset. Some poor sucker had to fly it in the vicinity of the real drop zone with the intent of making the Germans laugh so hard that they cried and so couldn't see the Carpetbagger aircraft coming in.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Liaison
I think I can explain the width of the Stirling fuselage.
The B.12/36 Specification included the ability to carry seven 2,000lb GP bombs. Shorts had decided to move away from a tiered bomb bay in their re-submission and I think that this might have been due to the transport requirement, keeping a relatively unencumbered fuselage. The result was three parallel 'bomb cells' underneath the floor. The 2,000lb bomb had a diametre of 18.7 inches and it is surely no coincidence that each of the bomb cells had a width of 19 inches. That is a very tight fit, but it is a fit. I think it entirely possible that the exact width of the Stirling fuselage was heavily influenced, if not dictated, by the voluntary adoption of a troop carrying capability, from conception it was designed to carry 26 troops, and the need to meet the various bomb loads required in the specification.
Cheers
Steve
The B.12/36 Specification included the ability to carry seven 2,000lb GP bombs. Shorts had decided to move away from a tiered bomb bay in their re-submission and I think that this might have been due to the transport requirement, keeping a relatively unencumbered fuselage. The result was three parallel 'bomb cells' underneath the floor. The 2,000lb bomb had a diametre of 18.7 inches and it is surely no coincidence that each of the bomb cells had a width of 19 inches. That is a very tight fit, but it is a fit. I think it entirely possible that the exact width of the Stirling fuselage was heavily influenced, if not dictated, by the voluntary adoption of a troop carrying capability, from conception it was designed to carry 26 troops, and the need to meet the various bomb loads required in the specification.
Cheers
Steve
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There was a crisis in British transport capabilities that came to a head in the summer of 1941. In July the Prime Minister asked the Secretary of State for Air to produce a consultation paper, outlining the RAF's likely transport strength for the rest of the year, to inform Cabinet discussion of what was already perceived as a serious situation. The resulting paper made for gloomy reading.
Home Based:
27 Squadron (Hendon); one DH 84, one DH 86B, nine DH 89As, five DH 95 Flamingos', two Lockheed Electras.
271 Squadron (Doncaster); fifteen Harrows and two DH 91 Albatrosses.
Total: thirty five aircraft, in addition to Whitley paratroop trainers and such impressed ex-civilian aircraft that were suitable for employment.
North Africa and the Middle East:
117 Squadron; four ex-Italian Savoia Marchetti SM 79s, three DC-2s and seven Bombays.
216 Squadron; fourteen Bombays
267 Squadron; one Anson, one Caudron Simoun, two Hudsons, one Lockheed 14, two Electras and seventeen Lodestars, two of the latter soon to be passed to the Free French.
Total: fifty two aircraft plus sundry light transports.
India:
31 Squadron; twelve DC-2s, twelve Vickers Type 264 'Valentias', six of each type being temporarily base in Iraq.
Total: twenty four aircraft.
Far East:
Nil.
In 1941 the British were expecting delivery of just 76 transport type aircraft from the US, including 30 Hudsons.
It is no wonder that they were looking enviously at the hundreds of transport aircraft available to the Luftwaffe just a few months earlier. Throughout 1941 the RAF never had a total of more than 119 transport aircraft available worldwide.
Cheers
Steve
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
all the groups had a "taxi" in case someone needed to go somewhere or the CO was summoned for a briefing or go get parts for something , etc... seems they had a 2 seater and something larger like the norseman.
Barrett
Senior Airman
Hellcat. It destroyed Japanese airpower, credited with almost as many shootdowns as the entire AAF stable in the PTO and CBI combined. (Nobody realizes that but I took time to crunch the numbers.) Established air superiority over nearly every 'phib op from 43 onward. Often in the PTO context the F6F is lumped with the F4U and P-38 but neither made the strategic contribution of the Long Island Feline.
Let's not over-rate it either.
IJN airpower was destroyed by a combination of Allied effort (suitable manpower, radars, abiity to read Japanese mail, submarines, AAA both on land and ships, F4F, P-40, P-39, -38, SBD and other bombers both land- and CV-based, plus UK-made stuff, plus F4U and F6F, proximity fuses, etc) and Japanese mistakes and limiations (squandered time and money to came out with better A/C, wrong philosophy behind many A/C designs, lack of more and better pilots as the war progressed, lack of industrial base and raw materials, overstretching, faulty & complicated plans, etc).
Naming just one silver bullet, that came into play in time when the Allies have had measure of the IJN (both under sea, at sea and over surface) does not do the justice to the members of the team that contributed. It is like saying that Spitfire won Battle of Britain, or that T-34 broke the back of Wehrmacht.
IJN airpower was destroyed by a combination of Allied effort (suitable manpower, radars, abiity to read Japanese mail, submarines, AAA both on land and ships, F4F, P-40, P-39, -38, SBD and other bombers both land- and CV-based, plus UK-made stuff, plus F4U and F6F, proximity fuses, etc) and Japanese mistakes and limiations (squandered time and money to came out with better A/C, wrong philosophy behind many A/C designs, lack of more and better pilots as the war progressed, lack of industrial base and raw materials, overstretching, faulty & complicated plans, etc).
Naming just one silver bullet, that came into play in time when the Allies have had measure of the IJN (both under sea, at sea and over surface) does not do the justice to the members of the team that contributed. It is like saying that Spitfire won Battle of Britain, or that T-34 broke the back of Wehrmacht.
Glider
Captain
I do not doubt for a second the importance of the Hellcat and totally support the view that it was the Hellcat that broke the back of the IJN. My only comment is that in my mind it has always been given the credit due to it and therefore wouldn't be considered underrated.
parsifal
Colonel
Japanese airpower had well and truly been bled white well before the Hellcat began to have significant impact.
JAAF and IJN had sustained well over 6000 combat losses since December 1941 to mid'43 when the Hellcat began to have effect. I don't know the full extent of replacement that the japanese received, but as late as May 1942, the IJN was receiving a miserable 60 replacement pilots per month, whilst the USN was receiving about 1000. its in that stark reality that you find the reasons for the defeat of Japanese airpower, not the mythical qualities of the hellcat......
Serious losses were inflicted on Japanese airpower, not by fighters, but by bombers. The Japanese had no real answer to aircraft like the B-24, which they found hard to shoot down, and which packed a killer punch in their own right. One only has to look at the effectiveness of the destruction of the IJA's 4th Air Army along with (or forming part of the parent formation) the 6th and 7th Air Divisions at Wewak-Hollandia to see that.
I used to be of the opinion that the Hellcat was a waste of money, that the PTO could have been won simply by stretching the design of the F4F. I'm prepared to concede I was wrong in that regard. Hellcats were necessary and probably materially shortened the war because they were so effective. but they were not instrumental in defeating Japanese airpower in the Pacific. that had already happened by the time the hellcat rolled into the scene.
JAAF and IJN had sustained well over 6000 combat losses since December 1941 to mid'43 when the Hellcat began to have effect. I don't know the full extent of replacement that the japanese received, but as late as May 1942, the IJN was receiving a miserable 60 replacement pilots per month, whilst the USN was receiving about 1000. its in that stark reality that you find the reasons for the defeat of Japanese airpower, not the mythical qualities of the hellcat......
Serious losses were inflicted on Japanese airpower, not by fighters, but by bombers. The Japanese had no real answer to aircraft like the B-24, which they found hard to shoot down, and which packed a killer punch in their own right. One only has to look at the effectiveness of the destruction of the IJA's 4th Air Army along with (or forming part of the parent formation) the 6th and 7th Air Divisions at Wewak-Hollandia to see that.
I used to be of the opinion that the Hellcat was a waste of money, that the PTO could have been won simply by stretching the design of the F4F. I'm prepared to concede I was wrong in that regard. Hellcats were necessary and probably materially shortened the war because they were so effective. but they were not instrumental in defeating Japanese airpower in the Pacific. that had already happened by the time the hellcat rolled into the scene.
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steven willard
Recruit
- 1
- Feb 17, 2018
incendiary rounds but if they used bladders you lose performance. Hi everyone, I enjoy your forum.
GregP
Major
Hi Parsifal,
Where did you find the Japanese aircraft losses by date? I have not located that yet!
Thanks!
Where did you find the Japanese aircraft losses by date? I have not located that yet!
Thanks!
parsifal
Colonel
In terms of losses, the best records are those developed by J. Fukamizu, who was in charge of the statistical section of the Japanese Naval Air Department. It is not considered by the Japanese to be the official 'final report", but as far as im aware is the most complete record of their loses. The "official" report remains incomplete as far as I am aware.
Cdr Fukamizu submitted a report on Japanese losses to the USSBS after the war, which while annexed to the final report, appears to me to be largely passed over in favour of claims data in the final summary.
As an example the following losses are recorded for the IJN air corps in the period January to March 1942
Dec....Jan....Feb....March
203....190....241.....221
April 1, 1942 to April 1, 1943, the JNAF lost 882 fighters in combat and 768 to operational causes. In the same period the JNAF lost 631 tactical bombers to combat and 131 to operational causes. Medium bomber losses were 291 in combat and 174 to operational causes.
I make those losses in that period to be 2877, for the JNAF 1 April to 1 April. This includes all types of losses, except those written off due to damage, and does not include losses sustained by the JAAF.
Fukamizu was debriefed after the war by the Americans. As ive indicated above, it is included in the USSBS but not referenced in their final summation
"Commander FUKAMIZU also had prepared a chart breaking down wastage totals by (1) Months from December 1941 to August 1945. (2) Cause, i.e. combat and non-combat losses and (3) Principal campaigns. The monthly totals coincide with those plotted on the graph. (See Annex B) The attached interrogation conducted over a two day period established the basis on which the graph and chart were prepared.
TRANSCRIPT
Q. Did you assemble the reports yourself?
A. Yes. An assistant helped me prepare the chart on monthly losses, but the production and loss graph I made myself.
Q. Is the monthly loss chart the official reply to Nav. Memo. No. 18 submitted through the Navy Liaison Office?
A. No. I understand that is being prepared by officers in the GUNREIBU.
Q. Are you familiar with aircraft production figures as well as losses?
A. No. I accepted Capt. TERAI's (GUNREIBU) figures on production. (Note: Aircraft production totals graphed coincide exactly with data furnished FEAF by GUNREIBU officers and published in FEAF Intelligence Memorandum No. 22; the production totals also are the same as those furnished FEAF -- see Intelligence Memorandum No. 28 -- by General Endo, former head of Air Ordnance Bureau of the Ministry of Munitions. The latter figures are the same as those given to Comdr. Paul Johnson.)
Q. How did you prepare the loss reports?
A. On the basis of periodic plane availability reports received at least monthly and occasionally more often, from the Air Fleets and their subordinate commands.
Q. Do you have these reports?
A. No, they were burned.
Q. Then, how could you construct the graph and chart of losses?
A. I know the exact strength by plane types of the Japanese Naval Air Force at the beginning of each fiscal year (April) and also the exact monthly production as well as the approximate losses during each campaign and major action.
Q. What was the purpose of the Air Fleets and their subordinate commands sending by dispatch and mail-plane availability and loss reports to the First Section of the First Department of KOKU HOMBU?
A. They were sent to my department for two reasons: (1) To make the figures of losses available to the Minister of the Navy, and (2) in order to carry out my duties. When the GUNREIBU directed the General Affairs Department (SOMU BU) of the KOKU HOMBU to supply tactical and training units with aircraft, it was the function of my department to determine from what source such additional aircraft were to be obtained, i.e. civilian factories and/or naval arsenals, depots or other tactical or training commands. Accordingly, to accomplish its mission, my section was furnished with monthly and other periodic plane availability reports of all tactical and training commands. This was necessary so that we could know from what source aircraft would be available for supply to tactical commands.
Q. Regarding your loss and production chart, how were the exact loss figures, shown on the graph, obtained?
A. We know the exact annual production figures throughout the war and the exact strength of the IJNAF at the end of each fiscal year (31 March). By subtracting the total strength at the end of the fiscal year from the sum of the same figure for the start of the preceding year and the total years production, we arrive at an exact annual loss figure.
Q. Do the production figures represent actual acceptances by the Navy?
A. I don't know. However, it is my opinion that only planes actually accepted by the Navy are included in the production figures. During the first part of the war, all planes produced were considered Navy acceptances. This practice was found to be unsatisfactory and was abandoned in 1944 -- August, I believe. From then on, only accepted aircraft are used in the production figures.
Q. Why did you change your system of figuring production totals?
A. There was approximately a 30-50 percent discrepancy between the monthly aircraft factory production figures and the actual number of aircraft the Navy accepted.
Q. What were the reasons for the rejections?
A. Aircraft were not accepted when they failed to meet Navy specifications. There were some minor defects, modifications, adjustments, additional equipment to be added (belly tanks for over-water ferrying) etc. Some of the aircraft had to be returned to the factory for its long as a month to correct these deficiencies.
Q. How were these rejections listed in your availability reports?
A. Such aircraft were not subsequently included in the following month's factory production figures. However, at the end of the fiscal year in March, rejected aircraft were deducted from that month's aircraft production figure in order to close the yearly records and carried over into the following fiscal year.
Q. Do production figures include both aircraft produced by Navy arsenals and civilian factories?
A. Yes, both are included.
Q. The 1944 production is graphed at 14,178 aircraft, whereas previous information obtained from the GUNREIBU and Munitions Ministry shows a total of 13,418. Which is correct?
A. The lower figure does not include the OKA. (BAKA Bomb).
Q. Were aircraft requirements, established by GUNREIBU, generally met?
A. In the majority of cases, the factory orders were not fulfilled in the specified time limit. After U. S. bombings became intensive, this situation worsened. Generally speaking, orders for standard aircraft models (ZEKES, KATES etc.) were more easily met. Orders for the newer types, ( FRANCES, MYRT etc.) were often 30 to 50 percent incomplete by the time specified in the contract.
Q. What is your estimate of in-transit losses of aircraft being ferried from depots to tactical units?
A. Approximately 3 to 5 percent throughout the war. In the early part of the war, the great distances to outlying bases was the main factor in ferrying losses. Toward the end of the war the distances to bases were shortened but flight personnel were less experienced. The percentage of losses remained fairly constant.
Cdr Fukamizu submitted a report on Japanese losses to the USSBS after the war, which while annexed to the final report, appears to me to be largely passed over in favour of claims data in the final summary.
As an example the following losses are recorded for the IJN air corps in the period January to March 1942
Dec....Jan....Feb....March
203....190....241.....221
April 1, 1942 to April 1, 1943, the JNAF lost 882 fighters in combat and 768 to operational causes. In the same period the JNAF lost 631 tactical bombers to combat and 131 to operational causes. Medium bomber losses were 291 in combat and 174 to operational causes.
I make those losses in that period to be 2877, for the JNAF 1 April to 1 April. This includes all types of losses, except those written off due to damage, and does not include losses sustained by the JAAF.
Fukamizu was debriefed after the war by the Americans. As ive indicated above, it is included in the USSBS but not referenced in their final summation
"Commander FUKAMIZU also had prepared a chart breaking down wastage totals by (1) Months from December 1941 to August 1945. (2) Cause, i.e. combat and non-combat losses and (3) Principal campaigns. The monthly totals coincide with those plotted on the graph. (See Annex B) The attached interrogation conducted over a two day period established the basis on which the graph and chart were prepared.
TRANSCRIPT
Q. Did you assemble the reports yourself?
A. Yes. An assistant helped me prepare the chart on monthly losses, but the production and loss graph I made myself.
Q. Is the monthly loss chart the official reply to Nav. Memo. No. 18 submitted through the Navy Liaison Office?
A. No. I understand that is being prepared by officers in the GUNREIBU.
Q. Are you familiar with aircraft production figures as well as losses?
A. No. I accepted Capt. TERAI's (GUNREIBU) figures on production. (Note: Aircraft production totals graphed coincide exactly with data furnished FEAF by GUNREIBU officers and published in FEAF Intelligence Memorandum No. 22; the production totals also are the same as those furnished FEAF -- see Intelligence Memorandum No. 28 -- by General Endo, former head of Air Ordnance Bureau of the Ministry of Munitions. The latter figures are the same as those given to Comdr. Paul Johnson.)
Q. How did you prepare the loss reports?
A. On the basis of periodic plane availability reports received at least monthly and occasionally more often, from the Air Fleets and their subordinate commands.
Q. Do you have these reports?
A. No, they were burned.
Q. Then, how could you construct the graph and chart of losses?
A. I know the exact strength by plane types of the Japanese Naval Air Force at the beginning of each fiscal year (April) and also the exact monthly production as well as the approximate losses during each campaign and major action.
Q. What was the purpose of the Air Fleets and their subordinate commands sending by dispatch and mail-plane availability and loss reports to the First Section of the First Department of KOKU HOMBU?
A. They were sent to my department for two reasons: (1) To make the figures of losses available to the Minister of the Navy, and (2) in order to carry out my duties. When the GUNREIBU directed the General Affairs Department (SOMU BU) of the KOKU HOMBU to supply tactical and training units with aircraft, it was the function of my department to determine from what source such additional aircraft were to be obtained, i.e. civilian factories and/or naval arsenals, depots or other tactical or training commands. Accordingly, to accomplish its mission, my section was furnished with monthly and other periodic plane availability reports of all tactical and training commands. This was necessary so that we could know from what source aircraft would be available for supply to tactical commands.
Q. Regarding your loss and production chart, how were the exact loss figures, shown on the graph, obtained?
A. We know the exact annual production figures throughout the war and the exact strength of the IJNAF at the end of each fiscal year (31 March). By subtracting the total strength at the end of the fiscal year from the sum of the same figure for the start of the preceding year and the total years production, we arrive at an exact annual loss figure.
Q. Do the production figures represent actual acceptances by the Navy?
A. I don't know. However, it is my opinion that only planes actually accepted by the Navy are included in the production figures. During the first part of the war, all planes produced were considered Navy acceptances. This practice was found to be unsatisfactory and was abandoned in 1944 -- August, I believe. From then on, only accepted aircraft are used in the production figures.
Q. Why did you change your system of figuring production totals?
A. There was approximately a 30-50 percent discrepancy between the monthly aircraft factory production figures and the actual number of aircraft the Navy accepted.
Q. What were the reasons for the rejections?
A. Aircraft were not accepted when they failed to meet Navy specifications. There were some minor defects, modifications, adjustments, additional equipment to be added (belly tanks for over-water ferrying) etc. Some of the aircraft had to be returned to the factory for its long as a month to correct these deficiencies.
Q. How were these rejections listed in your availability reports?
A. Such aircraft were not subsequently included in the following month's factory production figures. However, at the end of the fiscal year in March, rejected aircraft were deducted from that month's aircraft production figure in order to close the yearly records and carried over into the following fiscal year.
Q. Do production figures include both aircraft produced by Navy arsenals and civilian factories?
A. Yes, both are included.
Q. The 1944 production is graphed at 14,178 aircraft, whereas previous information obtained from the GUNREIBU and Munitions Ministry shows a total of 13,418. Which is correct?
A. The lower figure does not include the OKA. (BAKA Bomb).
Q. Were aircraft requirements, established by GUNREIBU, generally met?
A. In the majority of cases, the factory orders were not fulfilled in the specified time limit. After U. S. bombings became intensive, this situation worsened. Generally speaking, orders for standard aircraft models (ZEKES, KATES etc.) were more easily met. Orders for the newer types, ( FRANCES, MYRT etc.) were often 30 to 50 percent incomplete by the time specified in the contract.
Q. What is your estimate of in-transit losses of aircraft being ferried from depots to tactical units?
A. Approximately 3 to 5 percent throughout the war. In the early part of the war, the great distances to outlying bases was the main factor in ferrying losses. Toward the end of the war the distances to bases were shortened but flight personnel were less experienced. The percentage of losses remained fairly constant.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,034
- Jun 25, 2013
Just as a minor bit of bragging: one of my uncles flew, as a copilot, with the Carpetbaggers. He did mention that they had to pull up, on more than one occasion, to miss church steeples. Somehow, flying at very low level, at night, before NVG, does not strike me as a particularly safe way to spend one's time, especially over territory occupied by a government which endorsed murdering captured airmen (Shot-down enemy-flyers ; Lynching of Captured Airmen ; Kaltenbrunner and AMT IV)
DarrenW
Staff Sergeant
I agree that the F6F has received a lot of credit in the past. However, in recent years there seems to be a trend towards minimalizing it's accomplishments during the war, almost akin to character assassination. But the Hellcat is not alone in that regard, and in recent years no other warplane has been so fervently attacked as the P-51 Mustang. Maybe it's because they both have records that for years were basically never questioned, and now with the advent of the internet and other sources there has been an explosion of new data to share and analyze. To be honest I really don't know all the reasons why this is so.
Don't get me wrong, I am all for a re-evaluation of the facts, but there seems to have always been those who despise a "winner" in whatever form it may take (in this case, a WWII fighter plane), and they are always looking for the latest shred of evidence that, with the proper 'spin', could hurt the reputation of whomever (or whatever) is on top.
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swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,034
- Jun 25, 2013
In C F Taylor's book, Internal Combustion Engine in Theory and Practice, he stated that sleeve valves permitted greater volumetric efficiency
The "internet" can go into "meltdown" when a Kardashian photographs their own backside. There was only one allied fighter in 1939/40 good enough to almost match the opposition and easy enough to produce to make up for politicians huge early mistakes. Prior to the outbreak of war circa 500 Hurricanes were delivered as opposed to 130 Spitfires. Everyone from pilot up to Dowding himself may have wanted a pilot to be sat in a Spitfire in the BoB but the fact is there was always a Hurricane available, without it things would have been much different in Europe.
DarrenW
Staff Sergeant
Shortround6
Major General
It may well have had greater greater volumetric efficiency in general or especially over certain examples. However poppet valve engines have considerable variation in volumetric efficiency so unless we know what is being compared such a statement doesn't mean much.
That is to say that perhaps a sleeve valve cylinder shows a 2% increase over poppet cylinder A and a 10% improvement over poppet cylinder B.
Obviously the advantage over Cylinder B is substantial and even the difference between the sleeve valve and the average of the poppet valves is a noticeable one. However if the difference gets down to 2-3 % while the statement is still accurate does the cost/complication of the sleeve valve justify the development of engines using it?
Reading Churchills History of WW2 and seeing many documentaries there is always a discussion of sending "Spitfires to France", the fact is that the UK had very few. The Spitfire was a better aircraft but it wasn't better by 5 to 1 in service and almost 10 to 1 in production at the time. Things changed very quickly but in 1939 until well into the BoB the Hurricane was the only significant fighter.Hurricanes rock!
