However, the final reason why tip and run attacks stopped was far simpler in that there were no fighter-bombers available for 'tip and run' missions left in north-west Europe by the middle of June 1943. On the 12th of May 1943, German forces had surrendered in North Africa and it was clear that the Allies would soon invade southern Europe. The Germans thought that the greater threat was now in the Mediterranean, the 'soft underbelly of Europe', so in order to reinforce one wing of SKG 10, a second was rushed from France to southern Italy in the second week of June 1943 whilst a third wing was withdrawn from France and operational from Italy by the end of June 1943. By then, the only fighter-bomber unit still in northern France was the nocturnal wing of SKG 10.
For much of the 15 months that 'tip and run' attacks occurred, the Germans could only muster a maximum of 28 aircraft to attack targets on a coastline which stretched from Great Yarmouth to the Lizard, a distance in excess of 1300 kilometres. However, this length of coastline and uncertainty of what would be attacked also played into the German's hands. There were insufficient anti-aircraft guns of the correct calibre to counter a low-flying high-speed threat, whilst: "…the RAF could offer no positive defence against these fast, low-flying fighter-bombers which achieved an effect out of all proportion to the effort they represented. The Chain-Home and Chain-Home Low radar stations…were unable to plot the movements of the jabos on account of their low altitude and Fighter Command was forced to mount standing patrols in order to counter the threat…"65 It is interesting to note that wartime analysis stated anti-aircraft guns accounted for 55 'tip and run' attackers during the period March 1942 to the 6th of June 1943; fighters were said to have accounted for a further 51.66 Analysis carried out by myself tells a different story – anti-aircraft fire actually accounted for 28 fighter-bombers, fighters a further 28, one aircraft was shared whilst a further five either collided with buildings, high-tension wires or other aircraft.67 It is clear that to lose 62 aircraft and 62 pilots over a 15 month period was high but at this stage of the war, this was sustainable. Furthermore, these losses should be compared against a comparable German twin-engined bomber group which, for the same period, lost 122 aircraft in attacks on Britain, costing in the region of 480 aircrew killed, missing or prisoners of war.68 From a military viewpoint, 'tip and run' attacks did result in many more anti-aircraft guns and associated personnel being dedicated to defend potential targets. Furthermore, Fighter Command was forced to dedicate many aircraft to try and prevent the fighter-bombers from dropping their bombs, something normally met with little success. These assets could have been better used
For much of the 15 months that 'tip and run' attacks occurred, the Germans could only muster a maximum of 28 aircraft to attack targets on a coastline which stretched from Great Yarmouth to the Lizard, a distance in excess of 1300 kilometres. However, this length of coastline and uncertainty of what would be attacked also played into the German's hands. There were insufficient anti-aircraft guns of the correct calibre to counter a low-flying high-speed threat, whilst: "…the RAF could offer no positive defence against these fast, low-flying fighter-bombers which achieved an effect out of all proportion to the effort they represented. The Chain-Home and Chain-Home Low radar stations…were unable to plot the movements of the jabos on account of their low altitude and Fighter Command was forced to mount standing patrols in order to counter the threat…"65 It is interesting to note that wartime analysis stated anti-aircraft guns accounted for 55 'tip and run' attackers during the period March 1942 to the 6th of June 1943; fighters were said to have accounted for a further 51.66 Analysis carried out by myself tells a different story – anti-aircraft fire actually accounted for 28 fighter-bombers, fighters a further 28, one aircraft was shared whilst a further five either collided with buildings, high-tension wires or other aircraft.67 It is clear that to lose 62 aircraft and 62 pilots over a 15 month period was high but at this stage of the war, this was sustainable. Furthermore, these losses should be compared against a comparable German twin-engined bomber group which, for the same period, lost 122 aircraft in attacks on Britain, costing in the region of 480 aircrew killed, missing or prisoners of war.68 From a military viewpoint, 'tip and run' attacks did result in many more anti-aircraft guns and associated personnel being dedicated to defend potential targets. Furthermore, Fighter Command was forced to dedicate many aircraft to try and prevent the fighter-bombers from dropping their bombs, something normally met with little success. These assets could have been better used
