Motor transport in the German army

[psteel]

German motorised/Panzer divisions TOE had 4000 vehicles through out the war. A German Panzer Army had 50,000 increasing to 60,000 vehicles as the war progressed, while a comparable infantry army had 24,000 vehicles at the start of the war, reducing to about 12,000 vehicles at the end. All these are TOE strengths and the actual numbers were some what below this. At the start of the war actual number should be 90% of TOE while later in the war they might start off a campaign at 1/2 to 3/4 strength but cycle down to 1/3 to 1/4 within a matter of weeks.

In theory if 700,000 German vehicles particpated in "Operation Barbarosa" to semi motorize 144 divisions for the attack, they could have instead mobilized 12.7 x Panzer Armies at full strength or 14 Panzer Armies at 90% of strength [126 divisions] ....in theory.

In practice the Wehrmacht GHQ would have cyphened off at least 100k ,as would the LW. So the practical strength could be around 500k ; enought to mobilize about 9 Panzer Armies at 100% strength or 10 Panzer Armies at 90% strength . Thats 90 motorized/Panzer Divisions at 90% of strength.

But then what do you do with all those horse and wagon units? Mountain divisions are better equipped with such transport instead of vehicles; due to the rugged terrain. Do/should Paratrooper divisions be fully motorized? Do occupation troops need to be fully motorized or could fully staffed wagon units be substituded? Or maybe they should be fully motorized, but a large portion of their motorization substituted for Wagon units so the motorized units could be formed into independant Gross Transport Regiments to help the Panzer spear heads remained as resupplied as possible?

 

[Shortround6]

There is a theoretical limit as to how far an army can advance before all of it's transport is used up hauling supplies from the supply point to the tip of the army. This point is reached much sooner using horse transport. If you do not haul in the horse fodder an average horse will have to graze for 6-8 hours a day. With thousands of horses per division any local (to the road) fodder/ grazing will disappear in very short order and that is without a scorched earth policy. There were definite tactical and strategic reasons for scorched earth policies when armies depended on horse transport.

 

[parsifal]

Thats true. The average distance to railhead for the german Army, in the early months of 1942 was 180 miles to the supply heads. At that distance , frontline divisions were only just viable, but as 1942 wore into 1943, and the heer took additional losses they were less and less able to undertake any serious forward movement. Defensively there was a partial solution and the german State railways increased the density of operational railways, and distances to supply heads were reduced, but mobility for forward movement, ie offensive action and mass redeployment of the Infantry, became a virtually impossible ask.

German shortages were not just restricted to a decreased vehicle park. By 1943 they were also suffering a serious shortage of horses divisions.

I would say that because of th4 efforts of the state rail organization, the Germans were able to maintain a static line in most area, but had a significantly reduced capability to undertake ldeep penetration offensive action because of the reduced intrinsis transport for each division. this applieed to both MT and DA. Even though there was a theoretical TOE for vehicles and horses that should have been adequate, the actual situation on the ground was much worse.

 

[parsifal]

I found the motorization figures for Soviet Post 1941 Divs, but not for the much larger pre-1941 divs.

MNain source for this information is a published version by Victor Madej of the "Troop survey And organization of the red Army - 1944", compiled by the Heer Foreign Armies East unit, headed by none other than Gehlen.
As a source, probably not as good as TM30-430, but good enough for what we are doing.

A type Soviet Infantry Div had 1700 DA in 1942, which increased to over 2500 by 1944. it had 143 vehicles attached, which increased to about 250 by 1944. Guards units typically had 10-30% more transport when not equipped for offensive operations.

Most of the Russian MT was centrally controlled by Stavkha. If an offensive was planned, they would use their truck pools to build up supplies at the front, transporting these supplies from the rail head to front.

A division in the Soviet Army was not a self sustaining formation. It relied on higher echelon formations to provide it with transport and logistic support. In 1942-3, this was mostly supplied directly from their army HQs. However, as 1943 and 1944 wore on, more and more of the Infantry was reformed back into Corps, which took over the logistic support functionj. Though not part of the Div structure, a Div on offensive operations could have a variable amount of MT attached.....typically two or three times its establishment. By 1944, an Infantry Div equipped for offensive operations was two or three times more mobile than its equivalent German Infantry formations, particulalry amongst the guards units.

Soviet supply services however remained the weak link in the Red Army. They were never able to keep their breakthrough formations properly supplied and this caused many casualties to be suffered.

As 1943 and 1944 wore on

 

[ivanotter]

It is a very interesting topic. Let me side-track for a secons with something on motorised transport:

The "little" war of 1940-41 in Africa, the only theater where the allieds actually scored victories for some time, was run by South Africa.

However, the cahllenges were a bit extreme: Although sitting in Kenya, they had to get an army to with all its ancillary services to grips with its enemy across a terrotory known to be waterless, trakless. Desert turned to mud after an hour of rain, temp of 150 degrees (F), bush, rivers.

The ffrontier stretched fro 1,200 miles from the undrinkable waters of Lake Rudolf to the indian ocean. Territory as large as France and Germany combines.

(freely quoted fromJames Brown's, "Th War of a Hundred Days).

So, General Smuts called in all the experts and asked: Can it be done? The said yes, and:

A deal was strusk With Ford In Port Elizabeth, SA, giving the total output for exports. Qithi a year 18,349 trucks were asembled and sent North.

Now, On top of, water diviners were employed, because water was needed, roads had to be built, maps had to be drawn, bridges, everything.

Conclusion: it was done, probably the first and (nearly?) only fully 100% motorised army. in 1940!

The result: Somalia and Abyssinia were conquered. Italy out of East Africa, Italian air force decimated.

Ivan

 

[michaelmaltby]

Thanks for that, Ivanotter .

MM

 

[michaelmaltby]

Useful site: Engines of the Wehrmach:

Engines of the Wehrmacht in WW2

This more than illustrates what a hodge-podge German truck transport really was.

MM

 

[pinsog]

I read somewhere that German transport vehicles in the North African campaign was something like 90% captured vehicles. I've often wondered if the British could have won that campaign by simply running away and making sure they left no salvageable transport trucks behind. Once you stretch the supply lines out far enough, the poor German army would have simply starved to death without ever firing a shot! Anyway, just a thought.

What amazes me is how much the German army accomplished with the crap they had to do it with, or the equipment they had to do without, however you want to phrase it. It is scary to think what the Germans might have accomplished if they would have had a fleet of say 2.5 ton GMC 6x6's, or maybe a fleet of 4 ton Diamond T 6x6's. The whole army, 1 type of supply truck, well constructed, all-wheel-drive. Scary.

 

[parsifal]

It wasnt 90%, but there were large numbers of captured vehicles used. Your second point i agree with completely. Every time you see people singing the praises of german equipment, treat the statement cautiously. Some equipment was excellent, but the majority was pure chaff. The germans achieved all that they did, mostly because they were damn good soldiers, not because of the equipment they carried into battle.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Some equipment was excellent, but the majority was pure chaff.

I think that is overstretching it a bit. To say that the majority of the equipment was "chaff" is probably not correct.

Like any military they had equipment that was great, good, solid and just plain crap.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"..... What amazes me is how much the German army accomplished with the crap they had to do it with, or the equipment they had to do without ...."

Hear, hear. Great point. And lots of German vets would tell you that, I believe.

MM

 

[parsifal]

Yes, on reflection your right, but surely you would agree that german success in battle was mostly about their personnel with equipment a relatively secondary consideration.. Any nation that can overrun half of Europe with tanks mostly equiped with weapons no larger than a 20mm cannon cant be relying on the equipment, as how nthey use the equipment

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... Any nation that can overrun half of Europe with tanks mostly equipped with weapons no larger than a 20mm cannon cant be relying on the equipment, as how they use the
equipment..."

This is certainly very true, Parsifal, but must be tempered by the fact that Europe in general was not armed (or committed) for war the way Germany was from 1933, AND,
German victories were almost always reinforced by the element of surprise. German audacity and elan are to be admired and admonished at the same time -- if that is possible
.

MM

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Yes, on reflection your right, but surely you would agree that german success in battle was mostly about their personnel with equipment a relatively secondary consideration.. Any nation that can overrun half of Europe with tanks mostly equiped with weapons no larger than a 20mm cannon cant be relying on the equipment, as how nthey use the equipment

Agreed on all accounts.

I think you have to take into account the armies they were fighting against at the time as well. I also believe it had to do with land warfare doctrine as well.

 

[pinsog]

I think that is overstretching it a bit. To say that the majority of the equipment was "chaff" is probably not correct.

Like any military they had equipment that was great, good, solid and just plain crap.

Of course they had some good equipment, the FW190 comes to mind, along with most of their small arms and machine guns. They probably had a good transport truck buried somewhere in the hundreds of different types that they produced in relatively small batches. But what they lacked was a single, mass produced, do everything, all-wheel-drive transport truck like the GMC 2.5 ton, or much better, the Diamond T 4 ton. Germany needed a truck just like one of those 2, in hindsight I would choose the 4 ton, and stop production on all other trucks and just build that one truck. It could do anything asked of it and do it well. Parts comminality would be a huge plus.

The other thing they should have done was SIMPLIFY things. The Panther could have been great, just quit overengineering the stupid thing(I read once a German hammer has 8 moving parts). Replace the interleaved road wheels with a standard suspension, preferably a Christy suspension like the T34, but anything besides the interleaved suspension would have worked. Then replace the transmission with a standard, manually shifted 5 speed transmission. Simple and durable like a Sherman or T34. German crews would have loved it and it wouldn't have spent the war broke down or frozen to the ground with ice and mud freezing the roadwheels together.

 

[parsifal]

after '42 Rommel wanted to abandon turretted tank production altogether. He wanted to concentrate on Stugs and towed AT guns. He wanted to thicken up the AT defences on the eastern front so much, it would give germany the ability to snot the russians well and truly and then sue for peace.

Rommels strategy was elegantly simple, and might have worked. Tanks are an inherently offensive weapon....Rommel was saying, lets ditch the offensive and get into the right position for a peace settelement

 

[pinsog]

after '42 Rommel wanted to abandon turretted tank production altogether. He wanted to concentrate on Stugs and towed AT guns. He wanted to thicken up the AT defences on the eastern front so much, it would give germany the ability to snot the russians well and truly and then sue for peace.

Rommels strategy was elegantly simple, and might have worked. Tanks are an inherently offensive weapon....Rommel was saying, lets ditch the offensive and get into the right position for a peace settelement

Interesting tactic. Essentially, bog the whole front down into the trench type warfare of the 1st World War. It would have depended on the Luftwaffe to keep air superiority over the front or the towed gun crews would have gotten strafed unmercifully. It would also have depended on the German long range artillery to keep the Russian artillery back far enough that the dug in anti-tank guns couldn't be targeted.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Of course they had some good equipment, the FW190 comes to mind, along with most of their small arms and machine guns. They probably had a good transport truck buried somewhere in the hundreds of different types that they produced in relatively small batches. But what they lacked was a single, mass produced, do everything, all-wheel-drive transport truck like the GMC 2.5 ton, or much better, the Diamond T 4 ton. Germany needed a truck just like one of those 2, in hindsight I would choose the 4 ton, and stop production on all other trucks and just build that one truck. It could do anything asked of it and do it well. Parts comminality would be a huge plus.

The other thing they should have done was SIMPLIFY things. The Panther could have been great, just quit overengineering the stupid thing(I read once a German hammer has 8 moving parts). Replace the interleaved road wheels with a standard suspension, preferably a Christy suspension like the T34, but anything besides the interleaved suspension would have worked. Then replace the transmission with a standard, manually shifted 5 speed transmission. Simple and durable like a Sherman or T34. German crews would have loved it and it wouldn't have spent the war broke down or frozen to the ground with ice and mud freezing the roadwheels together.

I don't think I stated otherwise...

 

[renrich]

Many thanks to all of you who have brought up the large role that horses played in the German war effort in WW2(and even more so in WW1) I read somewhere and have lost the reference that more than a million horses died in German service in WW2. For those of us who are horse lovers, those numbers really hurt. A good horse will work himself to death if asked to do so.

I have a friend named Philip, an old now retired rancher from the Gunnison Country in Colorado who told me an interesting story. He was in a division that landed at Omaha Beach ( I think the first day.) As they were moving up off the beach, he saw a two horse team of German horses, still in harness hitched to some sort of equipment. One of the horses was dead and the other appeared to be in shock. Philip could not stand seeing them like that and walked over and cut loose the live horse. The horse was so in shock he just stood still when Philip freed him. A heartwarming but sad story. Incidently, Philip leased horses and wrangled them in the early fifties to the movie company that filmed the John Ford western, "The Searchers" part of which was made near Gunnison ( the winter scenes.)

 

[Juha]

On fully motorized German army, would have been too small for successful 1940 Campaign or at least after it they would not have fuel reserves left, so no Eastern front in 1941, too bad for GB for 41-42, only hope would have been that Stalin would have joined in sometimes later. But of course Germany would have benefited gratly if they had concentrated their production for say 4 types of cars and 3 types of lorries of which two would have been 4x4 or 6x6 types to equip their motorized and mechanized divs.

Rommel's idea was bogus, eastern front was simply too long and 75mm Pak40 too heavy. Soviets would have been anyway able to a breakthrough somewhere and the withdrawal would have mean loss of many of the Paks, especially during winters.

Juha

Addum: IIRC Christie type suspension would not handle well with 45 ton Panther and anyway Christie type suspension was uneconomical in its use of armoured space.