Motor transport in the German army

[parsifal]

Hi Juha

I dont see how having improved defences for the Infantry is going to make them more vulnerable. By 1943 Heer on the eastern front lacked the mobility to engage in large scale movements of units. They could move portions of their front, but not their whole front. Moreover, as the war progressed and the numbers of vehicles and horses fell, the amount of the front that the germans could move quickly fell. So, because of the decreasing mobility of the major part of their army, they were incapable of engaging in mobile warfare successfully. I d ont see how having a couple of hundreed heavy tanks makes any difference to that situation. However, if they fortified their line, and built up the anti-tank defences, it would give their Infantry the ability to hurt the Russians more during those breakthrough battles. Increased resistance means more time, more time means being able to concentrate a counterattack force better, having a better counterattack force with more AFVs greatly increases the ability of the germans to defeat breakthroughs, or at least contains them. Moreover Soviets only carried limited amounts of supply, and had virtually no tail to support them....if they needed both their assault formations and a sizable proportion of their breakthrough forces to achieve their breakthroughs, and those that made it through the defences for exploitation were short on supplies, because of the severity of the defences, the whole overrun battle on which the Soviet offensives were predicated starts to look very shaky.

I agree that Rommels plan was "bogus" at least to an extent, but it was less "bogus" than spending resources on a few dodgy tanks that cant really assist the Infantry anyway, for an Infantry force increasingly static in character.

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
as I wrote, the Eastern Front was too long, and the side which had initiative could mass overwhelming superiority to the point his choosing, Soviet intelligence was very good, they were experts to cover their attack preparations etc so many times they achieved at least partial surprise in place . time and force of their attacks. And Germans built many fortificated lines in the East, sometimes they had months to fortify their MLR in fact in some areas years, but for ex in Orienbaum, where frontline had been static 2½ years, when Soviet made their attack, they went straight through Germans defensive system. And Germans knew the Soviets skill in producing breakthroughs, they for ex warned Finns in early 44, that Soviets will always break through and that the question wasn't how to prevent breakthroughs but how to manage situation after breakthroughs. So fixed positions were not the answer.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Fixed position were never properly developed on the eastern front by the wehrmacht due to logistic shortages....not enough rail capacity, too much money spent on frivolous projects like panther, manpower shortages, and cockeyed policies instituted by the high command. Germany needed to take a reality check at the end of 41 and work on logistics rather than increasing firepower.

And your response doesnt really get to the issue facing the wehrmacht. By the latter part of '43 they could no longer fight a mobile war....not enough transport to do that effectively. Youve tried to argue in other threads that german Infantry could move 500 km in a day, but this is clearly impossible, especially with the truck and horse drawn resources available. Under conditions of engagement, except if massive losses were to be accepted, they might b able to retreat 10 km per day. if greater retreats were attempted Germany would lose huge amounts of men and material whenever they tried to move further or retreat large sections of their fronbt. The only thing they could do is fight a static line....hedgehog, quadillage, pakfront, call it what ever. The points of resistance simply sat there and resist, holding up the advance, centred around their AT defences (as Soviets say, all defence on the eastern front is an Anti-trank defence), forcing the attacker to spend time and resources to either contain them, or destroy them. The encircled, fortified and properly armed Infantry (with AT guns) defenders sat in place for as long as possible and await relief by a larger reserve of mobile forces centreed around a produceable, cheap SPG like the Stug III rather than impractical behemoths like Panther. Germans could have had 4-5 times as many Stugs as they had Panthers, giving them the ability to have the numbers needed to contain and defeat Soviet breakthroughs, and then relieve their encircled Infantry. This approach was well proven, and would have minimised losses for the defender, maximised losses for the attacker, and contained Soviet breakthroughs far more than they were by attempting to employ wholesale retreats of the entire front. Hitlers stand fast orders, in a perverted way made some sense. What was missing was that his Infantry was not properly entrenched, lacked sufficient AT defences, and the mobile forces continued to be equipped with inadequate numbers of turreted tanks 9an inherently offensive weapon). The force structure and the preparations needed to be chaged to make this policy workable.

Contrary to what you might think or say otherwise, Germany could no longer afford to think and fight fully mobile wars by 1943-4. They didnt have the transport. Big sweeping movements of the army would always cause massive losses because german Infantry could not move fast enough, and there is nothing so vulnerable as Infantry caught exposed and poorly dug in or not dug in at all.

And for the record, fortifications could have worked if constructed properly, or at least Manstein thought so. As I said, Germany never got the chance to develop these sorts of fixed line defences properly, even if they occupied the ground for an extended period. Hitler in the first instance forbade their construction, because he thought the army would fight less hard if they had fixed defences to fall back to. in the second instance, Germany never poured the resources into building proper fixed line defences. Manstein rightly pointed out that the correct way to build proper defences was not to have a line at all, rather a series of strong points behind a natural obstacle, like a river or a desert....leave your opponent exposed, and channelise their lines of advance.

Saying that defences didnt work, on the eastern front because of the length of the front, is clearly a nonsense. Your assertions about fixed lines not being effective are clearly not views shared by some very prominent and successful generals from both sides, including Manstein, Model and Zhukov. There were many others. And there are many examples of such tactics being eminently successful, but you have to look at the Russian side of the fence to see that evidence. Even where fixed lines were eventually defeated, such as at Odessa and Sevastopol, they were successful in delaying the attacker significantly. What was missing in those instances was an effective counterattack force. In those instances where an effective counterattack force did exist, fixed line defences were essential to ultimate victory. Suggest you go back and have a look at how the russians won at Kursak and in front of Moscow, unless of course you subscribe to the view that it was all the result of the weather that the city was not taken and that in the case of Kursk you give me a Kurfurst style answer and try and argue that the germans weree successful and simply didnt need to attack anymore.

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
Qoute:"Youve tried to argue in other threads that german Infantry could move 500 km in a day"

That clearly shows that a) you have reading difficulties
b) you have a habit of use strawman argument just as Kurfürst

so I'd not argue with you anymore. I just say that read more on battles in July-Aug 43 for ex

I can add that I used a wrong term, what I should have used was defence along fixed lines, fortifications generally used to save blood.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Hi Juha

We are both getting a little hot under the collar, so perhaps time to cool down a little. Shouldnt use Kurfurst as an example....I dont really think you act like him, and I know that i dont. i know you know your stuff, and I cant believe that you think im a bit of a strawman. Attacking each other does not serve to clarify our different opinions, perhaps we will have to accept different positions here, but I think there is in fact a lot of common ground between our two positions

I dont agree on your appraisal on German Infantry mobility. I went back and checked that other thread. You did respond to my post which said that german Infantry could not undertake a controlled retreat whilst enagageed of more than about 10km per day, except if heavy losses were accepted. Whilst you responded by saying "I really cannot understand you claim, the maximum speed for 15 cm sFH 18 for motorised towing was 60 km/h, so I'd say that mot. artillery could easily retreat 400-500 km per day, provided it had fuel ", you also claimed that unmotorized Infantry could follow motorised forces at a rate of up to 50km per day. But whilst these were your resposes to very specific claims concerning retreats whilst under fire, you stated that these were rates that apply to unengaged Infantry. This was never the issue under debate, it was alway what German Infantry could do whilst engaged.

So, in order to clear up this misunderstanding, my comments and observations relate to Infantry that is engaged, and operating in conditions and terrain that might be seen as "typical" for the eastern Front. By 1943, that meant for the Germans, operating with insufficient transport, often in marshy or open conditions, often behind rivers, often in heavily forested areas. I would really like you to clarify how far a German Infantry Division might be able to undertake a controlled (ie avoid catastrophic losses) withdrawal on the eastern Front, whilst in an engaged condition with the enemy.

I disagree still with your continued assertion that fortification dont work. or that they simply save blood. Whilst the statement is true, it fails to accept what the effect of properly constructed fortifications could do. Look at Moscow, look at Kursk, look at the german defences at Kuban, there are plenty of examples of defensive sytems not only saving blod, they could also cost the enemy blood, and defeat enemy attacks. They could save on manpower, and render positions more defensible. But to an extent I agree with you. For an opponent really set on taking a piece of ground, a fortification could not completely stop an opponent....you needed a mobile reserve to do that. That is not what you originally claimed. your original claim was that fortifications dont work on the eastern Front because of the distances involved , and that Rommels suggestion was bogus. You never explained how improving th4e defence capabilities of Infantry was bogus, remember Rommel was not advocating a fully static line defence, just to abandon tank production infavour of AT production.... Given all these counterarguments and clarifications, do you still stick to that viewpoint, or do you want to modify your position at all?