Part of the German communications technology would have necessarily been better airborne R/T radios and ignition shielding.
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Part of the German communications technology would have necessarily been better airborne R/T radios and ignition shielding.Even had German radars been present, and the IJN had had time to incorporate that technology into their doctrine, the crummy radios on the Zeros may well have rendered its impact meaningless.
Well, at Coral Sea and Midway our DC performed better than the Japanese.
Part of the German communications technology would have necessarily been better airborne R/T radios and ignition shielding.
I doubt the term "glaring" is appropriate here, "minor" is more in line with what you're describing, possibly even "unnoticeable".
You want glaring? I went to renew my drivers license this morning, and the way the questions were worded I almost admitted to being:
A). A convicted felon
B). Have been judged mentally incapable (OK, they might have a case for that one, just ask around here)
C). Addicted to hard narcotics such as cocaine or heroin
Fortunately I was able to use my wit and charm to convince the nice lady that I was none of the above, although she seemed unconvinced where B was concerned.
Removing the radios was in most cases a field activity rather than a fleet wide policy choice. An understandable reaction to being sent into battle with crappy equipment. It's a typically Japanese cultural phenomenon that a shortcoming in a superb weapon like the Zero would have trouble percolating up the chain of command.One should hope! But the fact that the Japanese removed the radios rather than improved them bespeaks an attitude towards aerial warfare that is, to my mind, a touch outdated for the time.
It wasn't outdated, in their experience, until suddenly, it was. And that was when they came up against competent opponents who had radios that worked and the numerical strength to press them severely. Midway was their first experience of that.One should hope! But the fact that the Japanese removed the radios rather than improved them bespeaks an attitude towards aerial warfare that is, to my mind, a touch outdated for the time.
It wasn't outdated, in their experience, until suddenly, it was. And that was when they came up against competent opponents who had radios that worked and the numerical strength to press them severely. Midway was their first experience of that.
Japan is an island nation and had a heavy focus on the naval aspect of things. The BoB was a land based campaign and Japan, lacking an analog to the Straits of Dover, likely failed to see its significance.Of course I have the benefit of hindsight in writing what I wrote. But it's weird how they paid attention to, say, tactics at Taranto, but not tactics from the BoB. It seems to me the latter would be more useful on a much wider scale, given those German radars and radios.
Japan is an island nation and had a heavy focus on the naval aspect of things. The BoB was a land based campaign and Japan, lacking an analog to the Straits of Dover, likely failed to see its significance.
Many things about the East baffle us westerners, one of them being the fixation on offense to the almost total exclusion of defensive measures, or even thinking. Defensive thinking was culturally akin to a "loser mentality", and afflicted the entire culture, not just the IJNThat baffles me, insofar as the principles (early warning radar, early launch, and GCI) would translate neatly to both home and carrier defense. Am I missing something here, outside of their naval culture which emphasized offense rather than defense?
Even the likes of Yamamoto could get away with only so much.Or did someone suggest it only to be rebuffed?
Many things about the East baffle us westerners, one of them being the fixation on offense to the almost total exclusion of defensive measures, or even thinking. Defensive thinking was culturally akin to a "loser mentality", and afflicted the entire culture, not just the IJN
Even the likes of Yamamoto could get away with only so much.
"If an American bomber ever reaches Tokyo, you can call me Meyer!"I don't get why they'd spurn a tool for their toolbox that held so much promise as a force-multiplier, especially after the Brits show the effectiveness of good C³
"If an American bomber ever reaches Tokyo, you can call me Meyer!"
One's own culture is nigh impossible to shake off when viewing others, especially for those with not much practice at it. You sound like you've had some practice. Ditto here, but immersion is a whole nother level.Yeah, all cultures have their blind-spots, if I'm understanding you correctly. Maybe I'm just displaying my own, here.
One's own culture is nigh impossible to shake off when viewing others, especially for those with not much practice at it. You sound like you've had some practice. Ditto here, but immersion is a whole nother level.
Maybe someday...
Yeah, all cultures have their blind-spots, if I'm understanding you correctly. Maybe I'm just displaying my own, here.
I don't know if it's culture or whether it's what you know in hindsight that affects your thinking. We know so much more about the war than the combatants could have known about one another back in the day because of what we read and absorb from what's been produced in the war's wake.
The Japanese did have a consulate in Berlin as well as a military attache, so they would have had some idea of what was going on.