Part of the German communications technology would have necessarily been better airborne R/T radios and ignition shielding.
Nice CGI from IJN perspective
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Thumpalumpacus
Major
We learnt a lot from losing Lexington. Her fate wasn't very different from Taiho two years later, fuel fumes turning the ship into essentially an FAE. Hence, the innovation Capt Buckmaster approved (mentioned above by
SaparotRob
) of draining the fuel lines and filling them with CO² under Condition Zed, which came about as a direct result of the Lady's loss.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
One should hope! But the fact that the Japanese removed the radios rather than improved them bespeaks an attitude towards aerial warfare that is, to my mind, a touch outdated for the time.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Removing the radios was in most cases a field activity rather than a fleet wide policy choice. An understandable reaction to being sent into battle with crappy equipment. It's a typically Japanese cultural phenomenon that a shortcoming in a superb weapon like the Zero would have trouble percolating up the chain of command.
It wasn't outdated, in their experience, until suddenly, it was. And that was when they came up against competent opponents who had radios that worked and the numerical strength to press them severely. Midway was their first experience of that.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Of course I have the benefit of hindsight in writing what I wrote. But it's weird how they paid attention to, say, tactics at Taranto, but not tactics from the BoB. It seems to me the latter would be more useful on a much wider scale, given those German radars and radios.
Japan is an island nation and had a heavy focus on the naval aspect of things. The BoB was a land based campaign and Japan, lacking an analog to the Straits of Dover, likely failed to see its significance.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
That baffles me, insofar as the principles (early warning radar, early launch, and GCI) would translate neatly to both home and carrier defense. Am I missing something here, outside of their naval culture which emphasized offense rather than defense?
It seems to me to be a natural for borrowing. Why didn't some clever IJN captain or rear-admiral say "we should have this"? Or did someone suggest it only to be rebuffed?
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Midway would have been the ultimate challenge for any contemporary radar equipped fleet, as typical engagements would show enemy elements approaching from a predicted direction.
The Japanese, however, were being hit from all directions and altitudes in successive waves.
I honestly don't think that any radar equipped Navy at that time could have kept up with trying to get CAP up or down or over here or over there fast enough.
And all this was without the Hornet's elements, which would have added to the confusion.
The Japanese, however, were being hit from all directions and altitudes in successive waves.
I honestly don't think that any radar equipped Navy at that time could have kept up with trying to get CAP up or down or over here or over there fast enough.
And all this was without the Hornet's elements, which would have added to the confusion.
Many things about the East baffle us westerners, one of them being the fixation on offense to the almost total exclusion of defensive measures, or even thinking. Defensive thinking was culturally akin to a "loser mentality", and afflicted the entire culture, not just the IJN
Even the likes of Yamamoto could get away with only so much.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I think that's my hang-up. But it's odd that they didn't seem to see how efficiency on defense aids the resumption of the offensive.
I get how culture colors thinking. I've seen that both in my own military experience (which is as culture-bound an institution as anything around), and also having lived in the Middle East for five years. I get that decisive battle doctrine also permeated the IJN in the decades between Tsushima and their final defeat in WWII.
I don't get why they'd spurn a tool for their toolbox that held so much promise as a force-multiplier, especially after the Brits had shown the effectiveness of good C³I earlier. Even the USN paid attention to that, and they were as hide-bound as anyone in 1940-41.
Right. He had to threaten resignation over PH, and Midway as well IIRC, and have personal guard against assassins (of the Japanese variety).
"If an American bomber ever reaches Tokyo, you can call me Meyer!"
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Yeah, all cultures have their blind-spots, if I'm understanding you correctly. Maybe I'm just displaying my own, here.
One's own culture is nigh impossible to shake off when viewing others, especially for those with not much practice at it. You sound like you've had some practice. Ditto here, but immersion is a whole nother level.
Maybe someday...
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I've had some practice, but escaping my own preconceived notions is, as always, difficult. I find I do better when I practice the concept of perspectives.
I don't know if it's culture or whether it's what you know in hindsight that affects your thinking. We know so much more about the war than the combatants could have known about one another back in the day because of what we read and absorb from what's been produced in the war's wake. It could be presumptuous to suggest that the Japanese could have learned from the Battle of Britain, it might not be, also; they possibly did have access to intel, but it also depends on what the Germans as allies are offering the Japanese intel-wise, too. I suspect they read about it from newspapers, but without reporters in Britain, how much coverage is the battle getting, and is that information factual? Besides, information took a bit longer to get places and be disseminated back then. Being on the other side of the world was a greater hindrance to the passage of intelligence.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Japanese did have a consulate in Berlin as well as a military attache, so they would have had some idea of what was going on.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
This too is a fair point which indicates I should give this some more thought.
This is true, but to what degree was the information the Japanese were receiving affected by bias? The Germans didn't like admitting they were losing.
