North Africa v Eastern Front....

BTW, Hitler never really wanted to have to invade Britain because of the Germanic back round of England. He really thought that they would just surrender after heavy bombardment from the Luftwaffle. Stalin never really wanted to go to war with Germany, Especially after the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-40. Finland may have lost land, but the soviets blead too much for it. Hitler saw that and it helped him realize how weak Russia was at the time.

"... Stalin never really wanted to go to war with Germany ..."

I simply do NOT believe that. Stalin had been itching ... Soviet Communism had been itching .. to take on Fascism since the mid thirties .... Spain, for starters.

Starting in the street fights in Berlin circa 1918-19, the Fascists and Communists couldn't keep their hands off each other , they wanted "at it".

As for this comment ".... Hitler saw that and it helped him realize how weak Russia was at the time". Hitler knew Russia wasn't weak ... he saw what Zhukov did to the Japanese in Khulgin Gol in the summer of 1939 ... (just months before Finland, the Soviets had thoroughly whipped a German ally - Japan).

The bottom line - if Hitler hadn't been mad, he would have stopped at Dunkirk - with perhaps a few aerial thrusts to let the British public know what was in store for them - and begun negotiations. There would have been a measurable public outcry in Britain for "peace" - in lieu of a war for France (the second in 30 years.)

Hitler's mistake was that misread situations because he was (1) paranoid, (2) egotistical, and (3) mad. He was further ahead at the fall of Dunkirk than he was again -- but he didn't realize that.

MM

MM, agree!

michaelmaltby said:

"... Stalin never really wanted to go to war with Germany ..."

I simply do NOT believe that. Stalin had been itching ... Soviet Communism had been itching .. to take on Fascism since the mid thirties .... Spain, for starters.

Starting in the street fights in Berlin circa 1918-19, the Fascists and Communists couldn't keep their hands off each other , they wanted "at it".

As for this comment ".... Hitler saw that and it helped him realize how weak Russia was at the time". Hitler knew Russia wasn't weak ... he saw what Zhukov did to the Japanese in Khulgin Gol in the summer of 1939 ... (just months before Finland, the Soviets had thoroughly whipped a German ally - Japan).

The bottom line - if Hitler hadn't been mad, he would have stopped at Dunkirk - with perhaps a few aerial thrusts to let the British public know what was in store for them - and begun negotiations. There would have been a measurable public outcry in Britain for "peace" - in lieu of a war for France (the second in 30 years.)

Hitler's mistake was that misread situations because he was (1) paranoid, (2) egotistical, and (3) mad. He was further ahead at the fall of Dunkirk than he was again -- but he didn't realize that.

MM

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Germany went into the SU with about 1.5 million men against 15 million Red Army soldiers. That ratio is 1 to 15, and also was the true for the Death ratio for the Soviets. They were unorganized and as soon as they got organized they were strong, but when they were organized they were weak, or at least combat ineffective.

Zniperguy114 said:

Germany went into the SU with about 1.5 million men against 15 million Red Army soldiers. That ratio is 1 to 15, and also was the true for the Death ratio for the Soviets. They were unorganized and as soon as they got organized they were strong, but when they were organized they were weak, or at least combat ineffective.

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At the time of the invasion it was more like 4.5 million Axis Troops (3.5 million Germany and 1 million Romanian, Italian, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia and Croatia) up against about 3.5 million Soviet Troops.

parsifal said:

I have to raise issue with the supposition that the Soviets were not going to attack the Germans. My understanding from released archive material was that Stalin had no intention of honouring the the non-aggression pact. The indications are that he intended to make aggressive moves into southern Europe, in particular, against Rumania, and her oilfields, in 1942, or 1943. Soviet armour was certainly massing ther in the summer of 1941, which helps to explain the stiffer resistance encountered by AGS during Barbarossa.

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Never heard of a stiffer resistance in the south, except for a couple of strongholds like Odessa and Sevastopol, other then that, AGS with support of some less motivated romanian troops went through Ukraine like a knife through butter. Kiev was taken in September. That's almost a 1000km east to romanian border, in two month timeframe. A classical blitzkrig.
Much stiffer resistance was in the Center where at Smolensk Wehrmacht first ever was forced to retreat in August 41'. And in the North, not much progress been made at all during first months of Barbarossa.

Relative to the progress in the the AGN and AGC sectors, the progress in the South was relatively modest. This has been attributed to a number of factors, including the relatively smaller sized armoured formation given to the German commander, but also to the relatively large size armoured formation under the Soviet command. The progress of AGS was delayed by almost a month as a result of the activities of this formation, and was a matter of increasing concern to Hitler, AND OKH. It was a major reason why Hitler diverted a large proportion of his remaining armour south towards Kiev in September. That and the fact that the Infantry of AGN and AGC were exhausted and needed time to recoup their losses (partially) before moving onto Moscow and Leningrad....

Hitlers decision to divert south was not just whimsical, it was driven by two things....expediency (the need to do something whilst his army recovered from its losses), and the flank attack concerns, brought on by the relatibve effectiveness of the southern group of forces.

Rumanian forces were successful against the Soviets, but they never cut through them like a knife through butter. There were no major encirclements, and the Rumanins only achieved their war objective (recapture of Moldovia) with considerable help from the Germans. It was they who suffered the big defeats at Odessa, though in fairness it is only the Rumanians amongst the minor Axis that can claim the capture of a major Soviet city.

Great perspective, parsifal.

MM