Operation Rolling Thunder

[swampyankee]

Tick....tick....tick.....

Do note that I'm not criticizing the bravery of the vast majority of US servicemen*, nor am I criticizing the patriotism or character of the people in charge of the war. One can be wrong while being both patriotic and of good character.

I think Vietnam also brought numerous problems with the way the US military was training and planning, most of which have been corrected**. It was also during a very turbulent time within the US, as an oppressed minority's struggle for equal rights was coming to a head after being suppressed by state (and local) governments*** and, bluntly, state-endorsed terrorist organizations and strongly biased law enforcement practices.


______

* Women were not in combat, although this doesn't mean that servicewomen in theatre were necessarily safe.

** One that the US Armed Forces seem to have fixed, quite a lot better than both the private sector and many local and state government agencies, is bias in promotion and assignment.

*** with the acceptance of the executive branch federal government, at least until President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National Guard and sent in the US Army.

 

[mikewint]

Investigation seems to indicate that the purported action never happened.

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was President Johnson's key to unlocking public and congressional support for greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the key to the resolution was LBJ's brilliant manipulation of the press. It is, perhaps, the best example of how presidential news management can shape public policy. In early August 1964, North Vietnamese PT boats and a U.S. destroyer did battle in the Gulf of Tonkin. Other than those two facts virtually every other report was either misleading or even false. Contrary to the New York Times report that the U.S. destroyer "was on a routine patrol when an unprovoked attack took place" the destroyer Maddox was on an intelligence gathering operation near an area where the U.S. had twice attacked North Vietnam the day before. In fact, evidence suggests that the second attack by North Vietnamese PT boats never happened. Real or not, when heavily reported in the media, it became the public rationale for retaliation and increased U. S. involvement in Vietnam-a policy change decided upon before the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

 

[Zipper730]

It sounds like you've got the Great Leap Forward, ( 58-62) and Cultural Revolution ( 66-76) confused.

So, at the start of the air war in Vietnam (1964-1965), this would have largely been a non-issue?

The serious border clashes happened in early 1969. Lasted most of the year.

Were things sour in 1964-1965, and did we know it if they were?

I think there were two major political fallacies in place during the Vietnam War. The first was that all US wars must be crusades to an ultimate, indisputable victory and the second was the sunk cost fallacy: the war must continue until all the US deaths are avenged.

Did all nations think this way?

A third, historical fallacy is the "action" which resulted in the Golf of Tonkin resolution. Investigation seems to indicate that the purported action never happened.

Well, there were two battles. The first one did happen, the second one didn't...

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was President Johnson's key to unlocking public and congressional support for greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the key to the resolution was LBJ's brilliant manipulation of the press. It is, perhaps, the best example of how presidential news management can shape public policy.

Basically you don't win on facts, you win on persuasive narratives.

In early August 1964, North Vietnamese PT boats and a U.S. destroyer did battle in the Gulf of Tonkin. Other than those two facts virtually every other report was either misleading or even false. Contrary to the New York Times report that the U.S. destroyer "was on a routine patrol when an unprovoked attack took place" the destroyer Maddox was on an intelligence gathering operation near an area where the U.S. had twice attacked North Vietnam the day before.

And the second attack didn't even happen, even the ship's CO attested to this. The sonarmen were hyper-vigilant, and some people have a way of interpreting things through a lens (in this case, of potential impending combat), and weather was bad: The weather produced false returns, some of appeared close enough to pose a threat: So they fired, and basically created some cool splashes; the ship began evasive action and they misinterpreted either their own acoustical signature, or another friendly ship for a torpedo.

 

[mikewint]

On 15 Dec 1963 McNamara issued OPLAN-34A calling for covert attacks on N Vietnam as retaliation for their support of the VC in S Vietnam. To implement these covert attacks along N Vietnam's coast the CIA had acquired several 88 foot high-speed Norwegian Nasty-class PT boats. They were light, heavily armed and at over 47 knots bat-out-hell fast. Political deniability absolutely forbade the use of Americans to crew the Nastys but the Vietnamese used to tiny runabouts and Junks just could not master the high speed maneuvering of the Norwegian PTFs. Consequently the CIA additionally hired the Norwegian skippers to instruct and handle the high speed runs of the PTFs. The Norwegians were NOT Americans but a Caucasian at the helm of a covert boat in N Vietnamese waters would put a real strain on that deniability but McNamara insisted that the raids commence without delay. So on 16 Feb 1964 three Nastys attempted to destroy a bridge but failed under heavy coastal fire. A few nights later another attempt was made but also failed. By early summer the Norwegian skippers were making quite a reputation for themselves in Danang getting involved with Vietnamese girls and the police. Deniability was wearing very thin.
By July the Nastys had destroyed five targets in N Vietnam and two major hit-and-run, over-the beach attacks on 9 and 25 July. On 30 July five Nastys attacked and destroyed several coastal radar sites almost to Haiphong itself. It was two days later when NVA PT boats attacked the Maddox. LBJ had been informed of the Nasty raids but made no mention of them when he warned Hanoi that another attack "would have dire consequences". A second Destroyer the Turner Joy was ordered to reinforce the Maddox.
On 3 August Nastys destroyed another coastal radar site and on 4 August in heavy weather and rough seas the Turner and Maddox began to receive radar and sonar signals that they assumed was another attack. As a result the two ships spent 4 hours maneuvering and firing at these signals. They reported sinking two N Vietnamese PT boats although no wreckage or bodies had been found.
At 13:27 Herrick (Captain of the Maddox) sent the first of three cables stating that the second attack had probably not occurred. At 14:30 Herrick cabled that all actions should be suspended until daylight reconnaissance could be made. At 16:00 Herrick cabled that the details of the attack were still confused and contradictory. However McNamara decided against informing LBJ about these new reports of a possible non-attack

 

[tyrodtom]

So, at the start of the air war in Vietnam (1964-1965), this would have largely been a non-issue?
Were things sour in 1964-1965, and did we know it if they were?

Did all nations think this way?
Well, there were two battles. The first one did happen, the second one didn't...

Basically you don't win on facts, you win on persuasive narratives.
And the second attack didn't even happen, even the ship's CO attested to this. The sonarmen were hyper-vigilant, and some people have a way of interpreting things through a lens (in this case, of potential impending combat), and weather was bad: The weather produced false returns, some of appeared close enough to pose a threat: So they fired, and basically created some cool splashes; the ship began evasive action and they misinterpreted either their own acoustical signature, or another friendly ship for a torpedo.

The Great Leap forward killed probably millions of Chinese, among it's other results, there's no way it couldn't have effected China's ability to supply NVN, just 2 years later.
Then by 1966, the cultural revolution was going on, that probably didn't enhance China's abilities either.

 

[tyrodtom]

I remember in early 1975, I kept up with the news during SVN's collapse , when I got the news of the NVN tanks busting through the gates at the presidential compound in Saigon, I took off from work.

I went up on top of a local mountain , thought about my friends and cousin who gave up their lives for a lost cause, I cried like a baby.

 

[Zipper730]

On 15 Dec 1963 McNamara issued OPLAN-34A calling for covert attacks on N Vietnam as retaliation for their support of the VC in S Vietnam.

This is actually a fairly smart move: It avoids the public outcry a regular war provides, yet allows NVN to be struck.

To implement these covert attacks along N Vietnam's coast the CIA had acquired several 88 foot high-speed Norwegian Nasty-class PT boats. They were light, heavily armed and at over 47 knots bat-out-hell fast. Political deniability absolutely forbade the use of Americans to crew the Nastys but the Vietnamese used to tiny runabouts and Junks just could not master the high speed maneuvering of the Norwegian PTFs. Consequently the CIA additionally hired the Norwegian skippers to instruct and handle the high speed runs of the PTFs. The Norwegians were NOT Americans but a Caucasian at the helm of a covert boat in N Vietnamese waters would put a real strain on that deniability but McNamara insisted that the raids commence without delay.

I'm curious if it would have been workable to crew the ships with Japanese, Taiwanese, or some other Asian group...

On 3 August Nastys destroyed another coastal radar site and on 4 August in heavy weather and rough seas the Turner and Maddox began to receive radar and sonar signals that they assumed was another attack. As a result the two ships spent 4 hours maneuvering and firing at these signals. They reported sinking two N Vietnamese PT boats although no wreckage or bodies had been found.
At 13:27 Herrick (Captain of the Maddox) sent the first of three cables stating that the second attack had probably not occurred. At 14:30 Herrick cabled that all actions should be suspended until daylight reconnaissance could be made. At 16:00 Herrick cabled that the details of the attack were still confused and contradictory. However McNamara decided against informing LBJ about these new reports of a possible non-attack

That I didn't know: I just figured the President had committed to a war and didn't care about the facts.

 

[mikewint]

thought about my friends and cousin who gave up their lives for a lost cause, I cried like a baby.

You are far from alone, I was back in the world by then but I had spent time at Lang Vei 8 klicks (5mi) west of Khe Sanh on the Xe Kong river (right on the Laotian border). As such I knew many of the GBs and Yards stationed there. Eventually I heard the details of the battle from the few that survived. On 30 Jan and NVA deserter arrived at Lang Vei and warned that NVA forces with tanks were en route. MACV Saigon refused to credit the report. On 1 & 4 Feb recon teams from the camp had discovered concealed fords across the Xe Kong and tank tracks on the banks. Saigon was informed but again refused to credit he GBs saying that they had seen bulldozer tracks. On 6 Feb 1968 near midnight 3 infantry battalions, 2 sapper companies, and for the first time in Vietnam 2 armored companies (11 PT-76 Soviet tanks) attacked the camp. The GBs had been supplied with the new M-72 LAW rockets but about half mis-fired and those that did actually fire simply bounced off or exploded harmlessly against the tanks.
Fortunately the camp had 105mm recoiless rifles. Using the 105 firing the only 3 HE rounds available three tanks were knocked out
The Marines at Khe Sanh had an agreement with the Lang Vei GB to come to their aid when necessary. The GB CO requested Marine support twice and was denied. SF headquarters in DaNang requested marine support and were also denied. Available GBs volunteered to go to the aid of Lang Vei but needed helos. The Marine CO refused to allow his helos to be used. Eventually Westmorland who happened to be in DaNang over-ruled the Marine CO and ordered a 50-man relief force to be formed.
Of the 24 SF at the camp 7 were KIA, 11 WIA and 3 were captured. 316 Yards were KIA, 75 WIA and 253 captured

 

[Zipper730]

You are far from alone

I could imagine, losing people you care about is traumatic.

I was back in the world by then but I had spent time at Lang Vei 8 klicks (5mi) west of Khe Sanh on the Xe Kong river (right on the Laotian border). As such I knew many of the GBs and Yards stationed there.

What's a Yard?

Eventually I heard the details of the battle from the few that survived. On 30 Jan and NVA deserter arrived at Lang Vei and warned that NVA forces with tanks were en route. MACV Saigon refused to credit the report.

Were the tanks moving through the jungles or on land? Could some RF-4's been used to spot them?

 

[tyrodtom]

I could imagine, losing people you care about is traumatic.
What's a Yard?
Were the tanks moving through the jungles or on land? Could some RF-4's been used to spot them?

A Yard is slang for Montagnards.
Now your next question probably is whats a montagnard ? Google it.

There wasn't much of Vietnam that wasn't jungle, in one form or another. Around Khe Sanh it was mountains and highland jungle.
Our then state of the art air recon wasn't very good at picking up anything in thick jungle.
Slow moving recon aircraft and helicopter flights could if they had a reasonably small area to search, but that wasn't much help if you had huge areas to search.

 

[mikewint]

through the jungles or on land?

Like everything that the NVA used, they, tanks came down along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The PT-76 Soviet tanks were light amphibious tanks so a part of their trip from the north had been made by swimming the Xe Dong river.
On 22 Jan the 33rd Royal Laotian Battalion had been attacked by the NVA at their base at Ban Pho 12 klicks from Lang Vei. On 24 Jan an Air Force FAC spotted 5 tanks moving along Hwy 9 (Lang Vei was situated on Hwy 9). The FAC called in an air strike and one tank was destroyed. On that same day the Laotian 33rd Battalion and their families arrived at Lang Vei seeking asylum. The Laotian commander reported the earlier attack and the fact that it had been lead by tanks. (The Laotion troops were clean, unwounded, and their weapons had not been fired) They were sent to the Old Lang Vei camp.
The possibility of a tank attack was becoming more real. On 30 Jan NVA Private Luong Dinh Du wandered into Lang Vei. He walked right past the dozing Montagnard gate guards and into the team house, causing everyone to dive for cover. His unit had been attacking Khe Sanh and had suffered heavy causalities. He had found a Chieu Hoi and readily answered all questions confirming the presence of tanks.
Lang Vei requested anti-tank weapons and 100 LAWs were air-dropped into the camp. The Lang Vei SF were prepared for tanks but thought that they would be used in a support role, firing their cannons from out of the jungle. Lang Vei bunkers, wire, Claymores, etc. were well placed and strong enough to hold a human wave attack. No one expected the tanks to lead the attack crushing everything in their path
Nonetheless when the Lang Vei CO made his first call for help the J-2 officer refused to believe the tanks were in the attack: "There are NO tanks in Vietnam"

 

[michael rauls]

I remember in early 1975, I kept up with the news during SVN's collapse , when I got the news of the NVN tanks busting through the gates at the presidential compound in Saigon, I took off from work.

I went up on top of a local mountain , thought about my friends and cousin who gave up their lives for a lost cause, I cried like a baby.

That must have felt crushing. I can only try to imagine what that must have been like.
So many good men gone for nothing. And I don't think it had to be that way.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Could some RF-4's been used to spot them?

Under triple canopy jungle? Get real, man! Slaloming between the towers of karst in a fast mover aircraft while trying to photo through the foliage is a good way to win yourself a DFC. (Died Flying Cross)

So many good men gone for nothing.

Fifty-eight thousand of them, including friends, classmates, and boot camp buddies of mine. Nearly a quarter of my boot camp company got sent to Corpsman school, then banished to the Marine Corps. The word on the street was that if you got orders to Fleet Marine Force, you'd never see the Navy again. In almost a year of training, from first induction to first permanent duty station, I was trained by, supervised by, worked with, or worked for senior petty officers of just about every rate in the Navy, but never a Hospital Corpsman. Stateside it seemed there were never enough of them to go around, and they were not to be seen performing collateral duty in training commands like the other rates. OTOH, there were plenty of them crawling around in the rice paddies. It would take big brass ones to walk into combat unarmed and "not quite a Marine" with the real McCoy, methinks.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

Like everything that the NVA used, they, tanks came down along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The PT-76 Soviet tanks were light amphibious tanks so a part of their trip from the north had been made by swimming the Xe Dong river.

So they were heavily covered by jungles, and amphibious designs could cross rivers.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

So they were heavily covered by jungles, and amphibious designs could cross rivers.

None of this stuff is rocket science. Read up on it.

 

[Zipper730]

None of this stuff is rocket science. Read up on it.

I just wanted to make sure I understood and were on the same page. I didn't see your message when I responded to Mike's

 

[mikewint]

I'm not sure that I can even begin to describe the triple canopy jungle, the monsoon rains, rice paddies fertilized with human and animal waste, heat, humidity, snakes, leeches, ticks, mosquitoes with Malaria, and RATS!!
The Central Highlands were cooler and less humid but were still part of that relentless jungle full of biting, stinging, poisonous, disease carrying critters. Then came the Monsoons with sheets of rain so heavy that it was hard to breath. Rain that seemed never to end. Rain that penetrated everything and soaked everything so you were never dry. The ground turned into mud pits 2 -3 feet deep filled with leeches. Critters like snakes and rats headed for any semi-dry place they could find, i.e. our hooches.

There were 58,209 American deaths in the Vietnam war.
10,875 of them were not combat related.
1,207 died of drowning or suffocation
482 died of illness.
118 died of Malaria.
42 died from having a stroke.
22 died of Hepatitis.
382 committed suicide.
Some came down with illness from exposure to Agent Orange.
1,326 died from misadventure.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

1,326 died from misadventure.

IE: fragging, bar fights, mutiny, animal encounters, motor vehicle and ordnance accidents, conflicts with indigenous, etc? Carrier flight deck accidents included? Or were they excluded as "not in country"?

 

[mikewint]

Not entirely sure but at the time I DEROS out Fraggings were unheard of. They happened more in the 70s when everyone knew that the US was pulling out and no one wanted to be the last man KIA in Vietnam. It is also important to remember that Judges often gave young men convicted of drugs and various violent crimes a choice of jail or the Army. As a result the Army of 60-72 was composed of large numbers of criminals, drug addicts, and sociopaths.
I have seen various stats that set the number of fraggings at around 900 with 99 deaths. These numbers are from 1969 - 1972. Stats were not kept prior to 1969. Fragging by Army definition is ONLY by explosive device, i.e. grenades. NCOs/Officers killed by "friendly" firearm fire are very difficult to count in a combat situation. AK-47s were easily obtainable. Fraggings can also be difficult to count in a combat situation. A grenade tossed into a foxhole or tent could have easily come from a sapper. Trying to get an enlisted to rat on another proved almost impossible. As a consequence only TEN!! fraggers were ever identified an prosecuted by the ARMY.
Fragging and the resultant breakdown of discipline in the latter war years is one of the main reasons the US ended conscription in 1973 resulting in an all volunteer force and the kinder, gentler basic training of today.

My understanding of the stats is that MISADVENTURE refers to "Friendly" Fire. A horses-ass euphemism if I ever heard one.

 

[tyrodtom]

My last year in the Army was spent in Germany.
The Army Times came out every week, and always had a casualty list, I checked it every week.
By late 71 through 73 the war was winding down, but I still would sometimes see a name I thought I knew.

My room mate from flight training was listed as "missing, not as a result of hostile action " I never did find out, for sure, what happened to him.
According to a guy in his unit, he went to town, and was never seen again.

I've never been to the wall in DC, but I have seen the traveling wall, but I forgot to check for his name.