Operation Rolling Thunder

[XBe02Drvr]

And the war became unpopular around 1968. I'm guessing his "chosen sources" told him just what he wanted to hear, right?

It's always dangerous to point out that the emperor has no clothes.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

That's not a very precise analogy, most BG's would have been in the service at least 25 years, so they'd probably be quite experienced.

But in this case, the "grocery store" was the Pentagon, where the bag boy analogy fits.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[mikewint]

During World War II, Westmoreland fought with a battalion in North Africa and Sicily, and was chief of staff of the U.S. Army's Ninth Division when it entered Germany in 1944. In the Korean War he served as commander of the 187th Regimental Combat Team. In 1955, at 42, Westmoreland was promoted to major general, becoming the youngest man to have achieved that rank in the U.S. Army. He was given command of the 101st Airborne Division in 1958 and became superintendent of West Point two years later. A few months after the Kennedy assassination, newly inaugurated President Lyndon Johnson chose Westmoreland to go to Vietnam as deputy to General Paul Harkins, then head of MACV. In June 1964, he became a full four-star general, and replaced Harkins in command of U.S. forces in Vietnam. So all of Westmoreland's concepts of war, battle strategy, and victory were shaped by his WWI and Korean experiences.

State Department officials had maintained back in October 1963 that that statistical evidence pointed not to success but to mounting troubles against the Vietcong, Pentagon officials—both civilian and military—had rejected those arguments. Thus LBJ was encouraged to follow his first impulse as the new president: shift the war into higher gear. Meeting with his top civilian advisers on Vietnam, LBJ told them to forget about the counterinsurgency social, economic, and political reforms that Kennedy had stressed had to occur. Now Victory in the military conflict became the new administration's top priority.

As I posted in the past nobody in the chain of command was really competent to critique Westmoreland's performance. Lyndon Johnson had no understanding of military affairs whatever, nor did Robert McNamara. General Earle Wheeler was essentially a staff officer with virtually no troop leading experience, much less experience in actual combat operations.
Now General Harold K. Johnson was an authentic battlefield hero, and he was fundamentally at odds with Westmoreland's approach, but he was not in the chain of command. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he theoretically had some influence there, but LBJ and McNamara were impervious to advice from the Joint Chiefs.

Thus, almost by default, Westmoreland was left to go his own way, year after bloody year.

 

[Zipper730]

X XBe02Drvr

Wes, it seems that the biggest thing at the time were x things that were causing a lot of trouble

1. A one size fits all mentality: There seemed to be a pervasive attitude that what worked in previous wars would work in this case.
   • We armed ARVN as a conventional force rather than a counter-insurgency organization that could actually do (and was actually doing) stuff.
2. Distrust in certain officials: Particularly the USAF.
   • The USAF was based mostly on one mission: Total War.
     • They invariably favored nuclear weapons over conventional war
     • They invariably favored busting cities over supporting ground-forces.
     • They viewed CAS as a mission who's value only mattered insofar as it kept the Army's hands off that mission: Ironically, they were supposed to make available a certain number of tactical aircraft for the US Army's use.
   • General LeMay and his disciples were just a little too quick to push the big red-button, even when their decisions weren't excessively trigger happy
     • They were unconcerned in the conflict escalated outside of Vietnam and into China: They seemed to almost welcome it, as it'd allow them to hammer Lop Nor (not sure if that continued into 1965, but I could imagine it would still be something they'd want to hit as it would prevent anymore nuclear weapons being built).
     • They were unconcerned if the conflict escalated into a full blown nuclear weapons exchange: After all, they figured they could deliver more damage than could be done in return (maybe true, but when you engage in a nuclear exchange that kills 15% of the global population in the short-term, and probably sets in motion complications that serves to wipe out much, or all of, the remaining 85% over the next few years, it might not matter who wins.)
3. Misplaced trust in certain officials.
   • Robert McNamara: While I could imagine he was a spectacular mathematician, and could have probably made a great professor or analyst, he was not a spectacular Secretary of Defense (Ironically, he didn't even think he'd be qualified for the job at first, but was persuaded to take the position).
     • On the bright side, he did...
       • Prevent Operation Northwoods from lighting off: It called for setting up an excuse for war with Cuba, it involved actions that would have killed American servicemen, American civilians, involved frame-ups of people that would be punished for crimes they didn't commit; it would have resulted in an invasion of Cuba, that would have likely been undesired by the Cuban populace (Castro did have some supporters). To avoid a political discussion -- you can just do your own research on Wikipedia as a starting point -- it's now well-known.
       • Created a joint-designation system for aircraft and missiles.
       • Focus more effort on flexible response (something that had been proposed here and there from 1954-1957), and should have been implemented years earlier.
       • Create the DIA which meant the DoD had some direct control over intel matters: Even the USSR had two intelligence services.
   • General Westmoreland: He really didn't understand counterinsurgency, and figured using the tactics of before would work.

As well as Johnson not really understanding much about matters involving the military, and knowing what people he should pick as qualified leaders (admittedly, easier said than done)

 

[tyrodtom]

What was Westmoreland faced with when he was put in charge of MACV.
A ARVN that was untrained, largely incompetent, and corrupt.
Those first two takes time to change.
That last fault was the stumbling block, how to motivate SVN to root out the corruption that was probably one of the VC's best recruiting tools.

Meanwhile Westmoreland had the US forces, already trained, already competent, not riddled with corruption.
He went in thinking he could have the situation under control with his own people in less time than he could correct all the faults with the ARVN.

Well he was wrong, and it's easy to pick apart his methods 50 years later.
But knowing only what he knew at the time could any of us bag boys have done any better ?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

But knowing only what he knew at the time could any of us bag boys have done any better ?

Any ranking Special Forces officer could have done it better. But that would never happen.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Wes, it seems that the biggest thing at the time were x things that were causing a lot of trouble

Zip, go back and read all of MikeWint's and TyrodTom's posts on this topic. They were there, they saw it firsthand, and they are gracious enough to clearly and eloquently share their experiences with us despite the pain it causes. Stop trying to wrap it up into neat little "rules of thumb", and accept it in all its complexity and contradictions. It was what it was.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[michael rauls]

That's a good point -- he didn't seem very good at that sort of thing. He also seemed to lack advisors he trusted who would be able to tell him such things.

Did he know anything about General Landsdale, or knew anybody who did realize he had a level-headed approach?
I think there was also a distrust in some of the Generals, particularly those in the US Air Force: Some might have been seen as dangerously unhinged, and almost eager to take the situation to full blown total war and expand the war right into China and possibly the USSR.

Yep
That's not a very precise analogy, most BG's would have been in the service at least 25 years, so they'd probably be quite experienced.
And the war became unpopular around 1968. I'm guessing his "chosen sources" told him just what he wanted to hear, right?

Like set all the cities in NVN on fire?

That is something interesting...

No I didn't mean burn down all the cities in North Vietnam. I don't think that would accomplish anything except earn alot of bad will.
I meant a concerted all out effort against targets that would directly or indirectly affect the Norths capability to make or supply war. I suspect, although there is no way to prove it of course, that had we done this from the get go instead of a piece meal measured effort there's a good chance we could have avoided the whole slow grind that wasted so many lives for nothing.
Certainly we would have got to where we were in 73 where the the South was militarily viable with the help of air support a whole lot quicker with a whith lot less loss of life........on both sides.
Of course this could still be sabotaged by a lack of political reforms but militarily it would seem to be a better course. At least to me.

 

[michael rauls]

Just out of curiosity, here, how many northeners (%) do you think were dedicated ideological communists vs self identified patriots who just wanted the foreigners gone and the country reunified, and viewed Uncle Ho and his approach as the most likely means to that end? Did the average DRVN citizen live and work to create the ideal communist society, or did they just worship Uncle Ho as the "father of his country" with communism as part of the package?
Cheers,
Wes

I think there's alot of wisdom in what you are saying here. It seems to me that the macro issues in any conflict may be clear and delineate a contrast between good and bad but when you drill down to the individual things get alot more complex and individuals may be good or bad or somewhere in between and the reasons they are there may have little or nothing to to do with the big issues. Maybe if were up to them but for a sense of duty they wouldn't be there at all.

 

[mikewint]

Any ranking Special Forces officer could have done it better

They were already in place but:
Started in August 1959 a special NVA Army Group the 559th Transportation Group had created the Truong Son route from Ha Tinh Provence to various S Vietnamese destinations. We would eventually name this the HO Chi Minh Trail (for the next 16 years Hanoi insisted it had no role in the fighting in S Vietnam.) This part of Laos was unmapped wilderness covered by heavy jungle, aerial recon was useless thus it formed a perfect infiltration route into S Vietnam.
The CIA had recruited French coffee planters who normally traveled along Rte 9 to watch for any activity but they saw nothing as most movement occurred at night. At Nha Trang American GBs and SEALS worked to train ARVN's 1st Observation Group. During 1961-1962 the group made 41 recons onto Laos but they were very cautious and learned little. The CIA recruited Montagnard tribesmen to penetrate the area but they could not comprehend paper maps so their observation could not be pinned down to a precise location. Next the CIA formed a special VNAF squadron headed by Nguyen Cao Ky commander of Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase (eventually he would head the VNAF and become S Vietnam's president. Flying unmarked and unarmed C-47s Ky and his pilots would drop groups of from 3 to 8 agents, trained by GBs and CIA personnel, into Laos. The drops began in May 1961. The first team ATLAS never made contact and their plane also disappeared. Next Team Castor was dropped into N Vietnam. Three months would pass when, in a much publicized event, Hanoi put three ATLAS survivors on trial. Within days CASTOR went silent. From the faulty information received it became obvious that teams DIDO and ECHO had been captured and turned. The last Team TARZAN went silent.
Then came the CIA Bay of Pigs debacle. A Presidential Commission found that the CIA could not exert sufficient control over large scale operations and they were ordered to turn over all large scale operations including their operations in Vietnam to the military by November of 1963.
Then on 1 Nov 1963 Diem was overthrown and killed. Three weeks later Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas.
Finally on 24 Jan 1963 MACV had its covert unit ready to take over CIA operations termed initially the Special Operations Group. However after a few months of operations the military decided that this sounded too militaristic and changed the name to Studies and Observations Group. The Group was staffed by GBs, SEALS, and Air Commandos and answered directly to the Joint Chiefs in Washington.
In April 1964 McNamara arrived in Saigon and suddenly ordered ARVN forces to recon west of Khe Sanh without any type of US leadership. Operation "Leaping Lena" was underway. By 24 June five teams of poorly trained unmotivated Vietnamese were ready?? The eight man teams were literally forced at gunpoint onto aircraft and parachuted into N Vietnam. By 1 July only 4 of the original 40 managed to return. They reported that all teams had been quickly located and eliminated. The 4 survivors reported crossing networks of roads and trails invisible from the air. Truck convoys, bicycles, and NVA were everywhere.
On 8 March 1965 TV cameras recorded the first US Marine troops wading ashore at Danang and the Studies and Observation Group was finally allowed to infiltrate along the Ho Chi Minh Trail using GB lead recoon teams AND and a new Commander was enroute: Col. Donald Blackburn the Philippine "Headhunter". In 1941 Blackburn escaped the Japanese "Death March" and in the northern Luzon mountains began training Filipino resistance fighters. These Igarote tribesmen had been headhunters in the 1800s. When MacArthur returned Blackburn's headhunters numbered over 20,000 guerrilla fighters.
As one of the worlds foremost guerrilla experts Blackburn developed his plan to uncover, control, contain, and eliminate the Trail:
Phase I - Recon teams of 3 GBs and 9 tribesmen (initially all Nungs) would explore southern Laos finding NVA bases and troop concentrations and then direct air strikes on them.
Phase II - Company sized raiding units or "Hatchet Forces" would be recruited and trained. These Hatchet forces would execute lightning heliborne attacks on targets identified by the recon teams. They would land, sweep through, destroy a target and be gone before the enemy could react.
Phase III - Thousands of Laotian tribesmen would be recruited to attack the NVA at every opportunity forcing them to mass together for security effectively creating targets for the recon and hatchet forces.

Needless to say Blackburn's plan made too much sense and was opposed by William Sullivan ambassador to Laos. Blackburn could only operate in two small boxes along the S Vietnamese border, all airstrikes had to come from Thailand, and helo insertions were banned. Blackburn's raiders would have to walk in to Laos.

 

[Zipper730]

Zip, go back and read all of MikeWint's and TyrodTom's posts on this topic. They were there, they saw it firsthand, and they are gracious enough to clearly and eloquently share their experiences with us despite the pain it causes.

Okay

 

[michael rauls]

They were already in place but:
Started in August 1959 a special NVA Army Group the 559th Transportation Group had created the Truong Son route from Ha Tinh Provence to various S Vietnamese destinations. We would eventually name this the HO Chi Minh Trail (for the next 16 years Hanoi insisted it had no role in the fighting in S Vietnam.) This part of Laos was unmapped wilderness covered by heavy jungle, aerial recon was useless thus it formed a perfect infiltration route into S Vietnam.
The CIA had recruited French coffee planters who normally traveled along Rte 9 to watch for any activity but they saw nothing as most movement occurred at night. At Nha Trang American GBs and SEALS worked to train ARVN's 1st Observation Group. During 1961-1962 the group made 41 recons onto Laos but they were very cautious and learned little. The CIA recruited Montagnard tribesmen to penetrate the area but they could not comprehend paper maps so their observation could not be pinned down to a precise location. Next the CIA formed a special VNAF squadron headed by Nguyen Cao Ky commander of Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase (eventually he would head the VNAF and become S Vietnam's president. Flying unmarked and unarmed C-47s Ky and his pilots would drop groups of from 3 to 8 agents, trained by GBs and CIA personnel, into Laos. The drops began in May 1961. The first team ATLAS never made contact and their plane also disappeared. Next Team Castor was dropped into N Vietnam. Three months would pass when, in a much publicized event, Hanoi put three ATLAS survivors on trial. Within days CASTOR went silent. From the faulty information received it became obvious that teams DIDO and ECHO had been captured and turned. The last Team TARZAN went silent.
Then came the CIA Bay of Pigs debacle. A Presidential Commission found that the CIA could not exert sufficient control over large scale operations and they were ordered to turn over all large scale operations including their operations in Vietnam to the military by November of 1963.
Then on 1 Nov 1963 Diem was overthrown and killed. Three weeks later Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas.
Finally on 24 Jan 1963 MACV had its covert unit ready to take over CIA operations termed initially the Special Operations Group. However after a few months of operations the military decided that this sounded too militaristic and changed the name to Studies and Observations Group. The Group was staffed by GBs, SEALS, and Air Commandos and answered directly to the Joint Chiefs in Washington.
In April 1964 McNamara arrived in Saigon and suddenly ordered ARVN forces to recon west of Khe Sanh without any type of US leadership. Operation "Leaping Lena" was underway. By 24 June five teams of poorly trained unmotivated Vietnamese were ready?? The eight man teams were literally forced at gunpoint onto aircraft and parachuted into N Vietnam. By 1 July only 4 of the original 40 managed to return. They reported that all teams had been quickly located and eliminated. The 4 survivors reported crossing networks of roads and trails invisible from the air. Truck convoys, bicycles, and NVA were everywhere.
On 8 March 1965 TV cameras recorded the first US Marine troops wading ashore at Danang and the Studies and Observation Group was finally allowed to infiltrate along the Ho Chi Minh Trail using GB lead recoon teams AND and a new Commander was enroute: Col. Donald Blackburn the Philippine "Headhunter". In 1941 Blackburn escaped the Japanese "Death March" and in the northern Luzon mountains began training Filipino resistance fighters. These Igarote tribesmen had been headhunters in the 1800s. When MacArthur returned Blackburn's headhunters numbered over 20,000 guerrilla fighters.
As one of the worlds foremost guerrilla experts Blackburn developed his plan to uncover, control, contain, and eliminate the Trail:
Phase I - Recon teams of 3 GBs and 9 tribesmen (initially all Nungs) would explore southern Laos finding NVA bases and troop concentrations and then direct air strikes on them.
Phase II - Company sized raiding units or "Hatchet Forces" would be recruited and trained. These Hatchet forces would execute lightning heliborne attacks on targets identified by the recon teams. They would land, sweep through, destroy a target and be gone before the enemy could react.
Phase III - Thousands of Laotian tribesmen would be recruited to attack the NVA at every opportunity forcing them to mass together for security effectively creating targets for the recon and hatchet forces.

Needless to say Blackburn's plan made too much sense and was opposed by William Sullivan ambassador to Laos. Blackburn could only operate in two small boxes along the S Vietnamese border, all airstrikes had to come from Thailand, and helo insertions were banned. Blackburn's raiders would have to walk in to Laos.

Col. Blackburns 3 phase plan sounds so good and makes so much sense it's hard to believe it wasn't adopted.

 

[mikewint]

it wasn't adopted.

That is just ONE of the MOST frustrating things about that so called war. Again I am absolutely not an expert and I saw only a very small piece of that conflict but the US, IMHO-IMHO- suffered severely from China/Korea-phobia. Then to compound things we wanted to project an image of "we're the good guys" and "we're not picking on the little guy". The NVA had invaded northern Laos and something like 3-4 provinces we're under their direct control. This allowed them to skate around the Geneva Accords that established Laos as a neutral state and required all foreign troops to leave the country. Thousands of NVA troops and hundreds of tons of supplies moved along the Ho Chi Minh trail.
In light of what the NVA was and had done in Laos Blackburn's plan made total sense but violated the Accords so we danced around the issue while the NVA ignored them. So as it always did POLITICAL issues controlled the prosecution of the war and we fought with one hand tied behind our backs.
Compounding the Political restrictions we had a MILITARY mindset that "If we killed enough of them they'll quit". I don't need 4 years at West Point to know than if the VC came into my town and killed members of my family my only thought would be revenge. Every village sweep, air strike, arty bombardment that killed a non-VC recruited 10 to replace him.
Then to put icing on the cake that ridiculous idea of engaging the VC/NVA in set battles on some hill or valley, killing most of them at the cost of +100 US lives, and then simply leaving. You could still hear the departing helos as the VC/NVA returned to the area
Take the "riddle of Khe Sahn" as a perfect example. It was deliberately located in a valley in VC/NVA controlled territory, exactly as had the French had located Dien Bien Phu and for the same reason, i.e. lure the VC/NVA into a set battle and use superior forces to eliminate them. MACV got what it asked for just as had the French. From 21 Jan to 6 April 1968 the VC/NVA forces pounded the base and its outposts. 274 Americans were KIA and 2541 were WIA in the siege itself followed by 1215 KIA and 5038 WIA in the relief and evacuation operations. The end result was as it always is/was the base was abandoned in July. VC/NVA troops immediately occupied the area giving them control of a strategically important area which allowed them to extend their lines of communication and supply further into S Vietnam

 

[Dimlee]

Evidence from Soviet Communist Party archives suggests that, until 1974, Soviet military intelligence analysts and diplomats never believed that the North Vietnamese would be victorious on the battlefield. Only political and diplomatic efforts could succeed. Moscow thought that the South Vietnamese government was strong enough to defend itself with a continuation of American logistical support.

As someone who can read Russian, I can confirm that. Just one small correction - USSR leadership did not believe in NVN success until about March 1975. Allegedly, Soviet advisors were very sceptical before the Ho Chi Minh Campaign initial successes proved them wrong.
Saying above, role of the USSR during post Paris Accords period remained poorly studied. It was somewhat ambiguous and relationships with Hanoi were complicated. I wonder whether Moscow was really interested in the Fall of Saigon and complete unification in 1975. The question remains open until the archives will be declassified... in next 30 years probably.

 

[Dimlee]

I browsed through Amazon and selected e-books focused on Rolling Thunder.
This is my wish list for future reading (multiple links consolidated in one):
Rolling Thunder - TRSURL

And by the way, Mark Berent's book is free on Amazon now.

 

[swampyankee]

The real question wasn't whether the US could militarily defeat the NVA and Viet Cong (largely overlapping but not identical organizations) but whether the South Vietnamese elites -- the group being supported by the US -- could actually form a functional government. To some extent, it seems some, such as Ngô Đình Diệm, may have been badly tainted by association with the French imperial government and had little credibility as nationalists. I think here, the difference between South Korea and South Vietnam is stark: regardless of the flaws* of Syngman Rhee, he was definitely a Korean nationalist.


----

* For one, he was probably responsible for at least 14,000 extra-judicial murders and close to 300,000 during the National Defense Corps incident.

 

[fubar57]

WOW!!! The War We Could Have Won

 

[Zipper730]

Then came the CIA Bay of Pigs debacle. A Presidential Commission found that the CIA could not exert sufficient control over large scale operations and they were ordered to turn over all large scale operations including their operations in Vietnam to the military by November of 1963.

Ironically, the JCS hated Kennedy so much that they worked with the CIA.

Finally on 24 Jan 1964 MACV had its covert unit ready to take over CIA operations termed initially the Special Operations Group. However after a few months of operations the military decided that this sounded too militaristic and changed the name to Studies and Observations Group. The Group was staffed by GBs, SEALS, and Air Commandos and answered directly to the Joint Chiefs in Washington.

It seemed like a smart idea, with people at the helm who knew their shit.

In April 1964 McNamara arrived in Saigon and suddenly ordered ARVN forces to recon west of Khe Sanh without any type of US leadership. Operation "Leaping Lena" was underway. By 24 June five teams of poorly trained unmotivated Vietnamese were ready?? The eight man teams were literally forced at gunpoint onto aircraft and parachuted into N Vietnam. By 1 July only 4 of the original 40 managed to return. They reported that all teams had been quickly located and eliminated. The 4 survivors reported crossing networks of roads and trails invisible from the air. Truck convoys, bicycles, and NVA were everywhere.

I assume poison gas would probably be frowned upon? I figure it would probably be possible to just exterminate everything under those trees and, if we were accused of using poison gas, one could just call it Commie propaganda (there had been cases in Korea where claims of bio-weapons use was discredited via this route, though in that case, I don't think we actually used them).

 

[tyrodtom]

Ironically, the JCS hated Kennedy so much that they worked with the CIA.
It seemed like a smart idea, with people at the helm who knew their shit.
I assume poison gas would probably be frowned upon? I figure it would probably be possible to just exterminate everything under those trees and, if we were accused of using poison gas, one could just call it Commie propaganda (there had been cases in Korea where claims of bio-weapons use was discredited via this route, though in that case, I don't think we actually used them).

You need to provide a little proof of that first statement , while the JCS probably wasn't too fond of JFK.
What's your definition of " worked with the CIA" ?

Just as bombing needs the enemy to concentrate, and we need to know where they are, is even more true with poison gas, plus with the added complication of weather, ( wind direction)

I think we did use some poison gas in Vietnam, in the tunnel complexes .
Tear gas can be fatal if that's all you've got to breathe, like in a enclosed area.
Then look up Adamsite, a very advanced form of tear gas that makes you vomit and lose control of your bowels., in addition to tear gases usual effects.
I suspect we used adamsite, but I've never seen any proof. But I do know we stored it.

As inept as we were with the bombing, I'd hate to think how many non combatants we'd kill using the more advanced poison gases dropped by aircraft.

I don't think you realize how some of our miss steps in Vietnam came to public knowledge ( My Lai, etc. ) Some came to light because a few troops who participated in the operation wrote home to their congressman . Not everything was dirt dug up by the press. Some people have moral values.
IMO using poison gas might stretch some peoples moral limits a little too much.

 

[Zipper730]

You need to provide a little proof of that first statement

I can't provide proof of it, but the fact that so many people wanted JFK dead.

1. JFK threatened to dismantle the CIA's covert operations capability
2. JFK clashed with the top-brass
3. Defense contractors lost lots of money in McNamara's cuts (the XB-70)
4. The Mafia was getting the screws put to it by RFK and would probably love to have seen JFK gone
5. JFK wanted to add silver notes as well as gold notes, which might have been seen negatively to the Federal Reserve
6. The CIA serves the interests of international banking: It's not a coincidence that so many people who manned the OSS and CIA were Wall Street connected

What's your definition of "worked with the CIA"?

They worked together to kill him.

Just as bombing needs the enemy to concentrate, and we need to know where they are, is even more true with poison gas, plus with the added complication of weather, ( wind direction)

True enough, I just figured whenever they found trails, that would be a place to drop.

Then look up Adamsite, a very advanced form of tear gas that makes you vomit and lose control of your bowels, in addition to tear gases usual effects.

Sounds pretty nasty, though it seems a step up from Sarin (which appears to be greatly more lethal).

As inept as we were with the bombing, I'd hate to think how many non combatants we'd kill using the more advanced poison gases dropped by aircraft.

Good point

I don't think you realize how some of our miss steps in Vietnam came to public knowledge (My Lai, etc.) Some came to light because a few troops who participated in the operation wrote home to their congressman. Not everything was dirt dug up by the press. Some people have moral values.

I didn't realize there were many leaks in that fashion.