Operation Rolling Thunder

[tyrodtom]

Each ARVN battalion commander was allotted so much money for each troop under his command.
This money was to be used to pay and feed the soldier.
So it was in the commanders best interest to not get men killed, and if they did get killed delay reporting the deaths as long as possible.
The same delay was used in reporting desertions also.
So nobody really knew just what the combat strength was of any ARVN unit at any time.

Most ARVN saw very little of their pay, most of it was held back for their family in case they were killed, or injured. That was the tale.
The reality was that if they died, their family usually got nothing, if they got seriously injured, that was just too bad.
It didn't take most ARVN long to figure most of that money was finding it's way to the commanders secret bank account in other countries.

The ARVN and the VC got their recruits from basically the same pool of people, and the VC recruiting methods often wasn't any gentler than the ARVN.
But the battle toughness of the usual VC unit made the typical ARVN unit look like sissies.
Of course there were sometimes exceptions.
But evidently the VC did a much better job of convincing their recruits they had a cause worth dying for

When I was in Vietnam in 1970-71, my 1st SGT was a veteran of combat in WW2 and Korea, wore a CIB with 2 stars. Never saw him in his Army dress uniform so I don't remember what other awards he might have had.
By anyone's measure this man was a battle hardened veteran.

He wasn't a big fan of our tactics in Vietnam.
I heard him say one time we were losing the war because of the helicopter.
With us being a Army aviation unit, that was sacrilege to our young ears.
And various other times he'd say " I think we're making enemies faster than we can kill them "

 

[mikewint]

Wes, I was a young, naive country boy who had never shot and killed anything that I did not intend to eat. I could not in any sense of the word even think of shooting another human. Drafted with no way out, except Canada, two years pre-Med at UofI under my belt, I thought - "well you can draft me but you can't make me kill another human." Make me a Medic, a 'Good Guy' who only wants to help everyone - Yea, I know, go back and re-read: Young & Naive!!
Initially assigned to the 8th Field Hospital I hated every minute and all my training was wasted there - cleaning ORs, emptying bed pans, changing dressings was not what I trained for. Along came Hearts and Minds and they were looking for volunteers (Young/Naive) to open roving clinics in the Highlands, effectively making friends with/keeping them out of the hands of the VC/NVA with the disenfranchised Nungs and Yards. Scared spit-less initially I quickly came to love/admire/respect these noble people. After the first few trips I even stopped carrying a gun (Young/Naive remember). 10 months into my first tour a VC company raided the village and hospital that I had established. They killed everyone they could men, women, children, patients, and within an inch or so unarmed stupid me. Field Hospital-Japan-Walter Reed followed and I healed. Returned to Vietnam, I was no longer young nor naive and I wanted payback

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I was no longer young nor naive and I wanted payback

That payback is history now. Payback (forward) for all of us now is to be the best possible influence on the future we can be.
Shalom,
Wes

 

[Dimlee]

Just out of curiosity, here, how many northeners (%) do you think were dedicated ideological communists vs self identified patriots who just wanted the foreigners gone and the country reunified, and viewed Uncle Ho and his approach as the most likely means to that end? Did the average DRVN citizen live and work to create the ideal communist society, or did they just worship Uncle Ho as the "father of his country" with communism as part of the package?
Cheers,
Wes

Good question and valid one and the one which can not be answered. One can only speculate about this statistics - until the day when archives open in Hanoi. And that day might never come or the archives will disappear.
Why I think so. There is example of USSR. Until now it's hard to answer similar question ("how many... were ideological communists vs patriots...") regarding USSR citizens involved in WWII. How many were "dedicated" believers, now many just wanted the invaders gone, how many welcomed the invaders or wanted to stay away of all that... No free press, no polls, no sociological studies. NKVD/MGB (KGB later) acted as a sociology center and submitted reports on regular basis. Some of them survived in archives. But there is no way to cross check them or to compare to alternative sources.

 

[swampyankee]

Good question and valid one and the one which can not be answered. One can only speculate about this statistics - until the day when archives open in Hanoi. And that day might never come or the archives will disappear.
Why I think so. There is example of USSR. Until now it's hard to answer similar question ("how many... were ideological communists vs patriots...") regarding USSR citizens involved in WWII. How many were "dedicated" believers, now many just wanted the invaders gone, how many welcomed the invaders or wanted to stay away of all that... No free press, no polls, no sociological studies. NKVD/MGB (KGB later) acted as a sociology center and submitted reports on regular basis. Some of them survived in archives. But there is no way to cross check them or to compare to alternative sources.

We ask the same question about
Confederate soldiers from our Civil War, Italian fascists, and German soldiers of WWII. I think the answer is in their behaviors post-war.

 

[Dimlee]

We ask the same question about
Confederate soldiers from our Civil War, Italian fascists, and German soldiers of WWII. I think the answer is in their behaviors post-war.

Probably.
But if the country of the soldier in question remains authoritarian and does not allow free speech, can we really understand what their behavior mean? It took 50 years or more for surviving Red/Soviet Army veterans to start talking openly about their experiences but not so many survived to tell their stories. Saigon has fallen 44 years ago...

 

[swampyankee]

Probably.
But if the country of the soldier in question remains authoritarian and does not allow free speech, can we really understand what their behavior mean? It took 50 years or more for surviving Red/Soviet Army veterans to start talking openly about their experiences but not so many survived to tell their stories. Saigon has fallen 44 years ago...

I know a small number of NVA veterans have been interviewed, but the government in Hanoi is, as you said, authoritarian. It's unlikely to let any of them speak without vetting what they're going to say. One of the side effects of the Cold War was that many nationalist movements and pro-democracy movements were, somehow, conflated with or co-opted by communists. In either case, the US would get involved, pretty much guaranteeing that either would become communist controlled. I think this was very close to happening with the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa (Hoover was convinced the entire civil rights movement was communist; Reagan was opposed to sanctions likely because he felt the ANC was too left wing).

I've long thought the best way to defeat communism was to promote robust democracy and policies social mobility as most of the countries which have gone communist had neither. Indeed, the only one that had either that even came vaguely close may have been Chile. I'm actually surprised that it didn't in reaction to Pinochet.

 

[Barrett]

Since LBJ has been quoted on this thread regarding Thanh Hoa Bridge, here's a relevant connection. Steve and I spent 5 years on it, and found it worth the effort.

Amazon product ASIN 0306903474
As for LeMay nuking NVN, that was impossible. He couldn't make the decision, and he reached mandatory retirement in early 65. I confirmed that in my bio, which was the first one published after his death.

 

[Zipper730]

"I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the communists."

And the ARVN was not properly trained for a counter-insurgency operation, were riddled with corruption, and didn't give a crap about the people it was to protect.

I'm guessing any attempt at guerrilla training required them to train in places that some Ambassador wouldn't allow, right?

The top generals and admirals in Saigon and Washington both held tenaciously to this conventional way of war, despite paying lip service to the counterinsurgency training and doctrine that the war in Vietnam seemed to require.

Why?

The commanding generals of the US from John O'Daniel to William Westmoreland, had all come of age as junior officers in World War II. Under no circumstances could they imagine how a largely guerrilla army with no air force or tanks could possibly defeat the US trained and equipped ARVN forces, let alone the most technologically advanced army on the face of the planet.

And yet partisans and commando units were often small and exacted a punishing toll on the Germans at times. While they might have received assistance from the British, these guys were receiving assistance from the Soviet Union, so it's just a different country.

I'm surprised nobody moved to just remove Westmoreland.

These negative reports were routinely dismissed, and the advisers who filed them were told to "get on the team" and were often given negative fitness evaluations and shunted off to career-ending billets. Intelligence reports were routinely doctored, and "the Vietcong capability was always downgraded and reduced."

Which served to make intel all but useless as nobody would risk telling the truth if it would get their career scuttled...

So the Army's trainers organized the ARVN forces on the American model, as a nine-division force designed to repel a conventional invasion from North Vietnam, similar to the one the North Koreans had launched in June 1950 against South Korea.

If JFK understood that this was a method, why didn't anybody operate along those lines? I know he was killed in 1963, but I'm surprised nobody after him in the military or the civilian leadership got it. There seemed to be few people in the US military that wanted to train along a counter-insurgency model (General Blackburn).

Hanoi's strategists however had never for a minute contemplated such an invasion. Instead, the communists launched a well-conceived campaign to break down the legitimacy of the Saigon regime under Ngo Dinh Diem with propaganda, political subversion, and guerrilla warfare.

Of course, they only attempted massive conventional campaigns a few times.

ARVN's senior officers were generally reluctant to engage their forces against the Vietcong for fear of taking casualties, and thus incurring the wrath of Diem for "losing face."

However once Ngo Diem was killed, what happened after that point?

battling the insurgency fell very heavily on the ill-trained regional and local paramilitary forces, the Civil Guard and Village Self-Defense Corps.

Was there anyway of finding skilled groups of people that could be properly trained and united around the basic cause of not having their homes overrun and not being under Communist control? I'm sure there's a share of outrages they committed that could be used to stoke up the feelings of indignation.

Were these people trained by us, or by the ARVN?

JFK's ideas were greeted with a total lack of enthusiasm by the Army's senior leadership. Pushed by Washington studies were prepared on counterinsurgency. British experts like Sir Robert Thompson were brought in and consulted. And the subject of counterinsurgency was inserted into the curriculum of military training schools.

However the WWII/Korea model was simply too entrenched in the military mind to be overcome. Thus in the end, the Army took the view that the lethality of conventional combat as waged by U.S. forces was such that no guerrilla force could long survive.

I'm surprised they didn't realize what the UK, and the OSS did in WWII. They were quite effective, and when combined with airpower (I don't just mean bombing cities like some pyromaniac, I mean using aircraft to interdict and perform air support).

I'm also surprised their conclusions would involve only small unit operations instead of working with the population. Didn't the USMC have some expertise on counter-insurgency programs? I remember they wrote a manual. I'm surprised nobody had any memory of that detail.

Regardless, war is a continuation of policy by other means: Which means options can range from political with varying ranges of force, right on up to total war.

ARVN's operations against the VC were effectively alienating the population from the Saigon administration and pushing them into the open arms of the communists. Washington and Saigon could simply not comprehend that the war was only 15 percent military and 85 percent political. That is it was not just a matter of killing Vietcong, but of coupling security with the people's welfare in the countryside.

I'm surprised JFK realized this, and nobody else did.

The VC adhered to a strict code of conduct in their interactions with the villagers. They never stole from them; never molested women; they paid for whatever food they obtained. And they were masters of small-unit infantry tactics that the ARVN had long neglected and that were indispensable in fighting a "people's war."

Sure, you don't wnat to tick off the people you want to win over...

Thanks to Vann's sterling reputation and contacts, he was ultimately able to secure a hearing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington about what needed to change if the United States and South Vietnam were to prevail in Vietnam. A couple of hours before he was scheduled to give his briefing, General Maxwell Taylor, chairmen of the JCS, nixed the presentation when he was informed of its substance. He didn't want bad news on the record.

This was all in 1963... I'm surprised nobody changed anything or got anything from 1963 to 1965.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The top generals and admirals in Saigon and Washington both held tenaciously to this conventional way of war, despite paying lip service to the counterinsurgency training and doctrine that the war in Vietnam seemed to require.
Why?

As Mike explained, they learned their lessons in WWII and Korea. Minds grow rigid with age and responsibility. Despite all the activities of the resistance and the partisans in WII, it took a massive conventional effort to bring the war to a close. This carried a lot more weight than the faraway lessons of the American Revolution. And there was a cultural angle too. Living in the comfort and convenience of DC and never having had to scramble for a living or live under a corrupt and repressive regime, how could they be expected to understand the mindset of the Vietnamese or the nature of the VC political campaign? Americans are used to thinking of military and political as separate arenas, which I think is our greatest weakness.

Which served to make intel all but useless as nobody would risk telling the truth if it would get their career scuttled...

BINGO!

However once Ngo Diem was killed, what happened after that point?

Revolving door. One regime after another, all equally corrupt and equally out of touch with the common people.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[tyrodtom]

Replace Westmoreland, who ?? And with whom ??
I don't think you realize how far up in the chain of command Westmoreland was.
He was a General, 4 stars, only two men between him and the President in the chain of command.
Admiral Sharpe, just above him, was pretty much of the same opinion as Westmoreland.

 

[mikewint]

Not to mention he LOOKED, every inch of him, the part. It would be hard to design from the ground up, someone who better, at least visually (and Vietnam was a TV war) looked like he had everything in the country under his total control.
As the old saying goes "Generals are always prepared to fight the last war". Now when wars were fought the same way over and over with few changes in weapons tech this was a workable plan. BUT starting with the American War of Northern Aggression weapon tech began to make the old ways of battle a death sentence. The Boer War, the Russo-Japanese and the massive death toll of WWI SHOULD have taught the generals that the old tactics were suicidal against new weapons.
A couple of two three instances from WWII: the U.S. Army, for example, came up with a unique armored doctrine that envisioned tanks actually avoiding tank-to-tank combat on the battlefield. Beating enemy armor was the job of another vehicle altogether, the "tank destroyer"–big gun, lightly armored, sometimes open-topped with little or no crew protection. The British army came into the war enamored of light armor, "tankettes", and independent "jock columns," all of which were unable to stand up to the pounding inherent in modern combat. The French intended to fight a rigidly controlled "methodical battle," and instead found themselves in a maneuver contest with the Wehrmacht. The Soviet Army had a well formulated and ambitious interwar doctrine called "deep battle"–and indeed it did spend the first two campaigning seasons moving deeply, unfortunately all the movement was in reverse. The Imperial Japanese Army devised perhaps the most mistaken idea of all: that the "warrior spirit" of their officers and men would make up for a clear inferiority in material and technology. Their casualty statistics–even in places like Guadalcanal, where the numerical odds were fairly even–were staggering.
IMHO we can again see this again in action when the United States fought in Vietnam with forces equipped for a rerun of the Second World War. Now let me hasten to add that beyond a shadow of a doubt the U.S. Army did much better on the battlefields of Vietnam than was generally acknowledged. The much ballyhooed Tet Offensive was ultimately a total disaster fore the VC. But a political model of war drawn from the 1940's did us great harm. How do you win a war when you're not allowed to occupy an enemy's home country, when his economic base is off-limits, when the NVA leadership were indifferent to the human cost of engaging American power, and most of all when the US public expected the war to end with the clarity and finality that was achieved in 1945?

 

[Zipper730]

Minds grow rigid with age and responsibility.

That makes sense, I'm still surprised they didn't know or remember much about the resistance of partisans.

Americans are used to thinking of military and political as separate arenas, which I think is our greatest weakness.

That's an interesting point, why is this so?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

a

That makes sense, I'm still surprised they didn't know or remember much about the resistance of partisans.

LBJ was a domestic issues politician. McNamara was an industrial whizkid beancounter. Neither was a student of history or international affairs or of eastern culture. What they "knew" was that insurgencies and liberation movements, while they can damage and embarras a major power, can seldom subject it to outright defeat. It stands to reason, doesn't it? A bunch of barefoot, ragtag, radicals hiding in the woods haven't a chance against the most powerful army in the world, right?

That's an interesting point, why is this so?

Look at our history. The USA came into being as a rebellion against what was in effect a military dictatorship. Our founding fathers had a deathly fear of military power and refused to establish a standing army or navy, preferring the militia approach to domestic defense. As our stature in the world grew and our frontiers and foreign trade expanded this became more and more impractical. Indian wars, internal rebellions, and foreign interference with our merchant shipping quickly outgrew the capabilities of the militia system. By 1812 we had a small standing army and a six frigate navy. And along with these we had a new class of citizen, the professional military man. This re-awakened the old fears of military power and re-emphasized the importance of civilian control over the military and the separation of military activity from political activity. And it's worked. (after a fashion) How many times in its 243 year history has the US suffered a military coup d'etat? None. How many times has this separation of military thinking and political thinking led to disastrous mistakes in conflicts and foreign affairs? Too many to count.
It's a two-edged sword.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[swampyankee]

a
LBJ was a domestic issues politician. McNamara was an industrial whizkid beancounter. Neither was a student of history or international affairs or of eastern culture. What they "knew" was that insurgencies and liberation movements, while they can damage and embarras a major power, can seldom subject it to outright defeat. It stands to reason, doesn't it? A bunch of barefoot, ragtag, radicals hiding in the woods haven't a chance against the most powerful army in the world, right?

Look at our history. The USA came into being as a rebellion against what was in effect a military dictatorship. Our founding fathers had a deathly fear of military power and refused to establish a standing army or navy, preferring the militia approach to domestic defense. As our stature in the world grew and our frontiers and foreign trade expanded this became more and more impractical. Indian wars, internal rebellions, and foreign interference with our merchant shipping quickly outgrew the capabilities of the militia system. By 1812 we had a small standing army and a six frigate navy. And along with these we had a new class of citizen, the professional military man. This re-awakened the old fears of military power and re-emphasized the importance of civilian control over the military and the separation of military activity from political activity. And it's worked. (after a fashion) How many times in its 243 year history has the US suffered a military coup d'etat? None. How many times has this separation of military thinking and political thinking led to disastrous mistakes in conflicts and foreign affairs? Too many to count.
It's a two-edged sword.
Cheers,
Wes

Supposedly, a military coup was very close early in FDR's first term in office.

 

[mikewint]

Supposedly, a military coup was very close early in FDR's first term in office.

If you're thinking of the 'Wall Street Pusch' that was in 1933 and was not military. A group of wealthy Wall Street financiers believed that America should be headed by a Fascist dictator and not FDR, who was suspected of being a communist. So, they began to plot a coup d'état that would later come to be known as the Wall Street Putsch.
The conspirators included Gerald MacGuire, a bond salesman; Bill Doyle, commander of the Massachusetts American Legion; investment banker Prescott Bush, the father of George H. W. Bush and grandfather of George W. Bush; and other wealthy bankers.

The plotters need a General to lead the coup and so approached retired Major General Smedley Butler, who was at that time the most decorated soldier in U.S. history. After his military career, however, Butler became a vociferous critic of war and an influential figure in the Bonus Army, a group of 43,000 World War I veterans and their families, who were camped in Washington to demand the early payment of the veteran's bonus promised to them for their service (These veterans were eventually attacked by regular army Calvary units lead by Douglas Mac and a six tank unit lead by Patton).

The bankers were to finance a 500,000 man army lead by Butler who would proceed to overthrow FDR and reduce him to a ceremonial position. The actual governmental power would be held by a Sectary of General Affairs (essentially a Fascist dictator). After meeting with the men several times and learning of the extent of their plan, Butler went to Congress to expose them as traitors. When news broke, nobody really believed that such a coup attempt could even be considered, let alone planned or put into action. Initially, Congress's reaction was similar, but with Butler's testimony and the testimony of reporter Paul French they began to take it more seriously and investigated the subject. The Congressional investigation found that Butler was telling the truth about the existence of the plot, but Congress felt that the plot had little chance of success and so nobody was prosecuted, in fact, some later went on to serve in office, such as Prescott Bush.

 

[Zipper730]

LBJ was a domestic issues politician. McNamara was an industrial whizkid beancounter. Neither was a student of history or international affairs or of eastern culture.

True enough

What they "knew" was that insurgencies and liberation movements, while they can damage and embarras a major power, can seldom subject it to outright defeat.

While they couldn't take the war straight to our shores, they could kill a lot of our people.

I'm surprised there were so few people in the military that knew so little about resistance movements. It seems that, it would have either ruined their careers to raise the issue or, they would have only known if they were in the CIA, or some form of covert operations group.

Look at our history. The USA came into being as a rebellion against what was in effect a military dictatorship. Our founding fathers had a deathly fear of military power and refused to establish a standing army or navy, preferring the militia approach to domestic defense.

True, but there was the OMGUS...

If you're thinking of the 'Wall Street Pusch' that was in 1933 and was not military. A group of wealthy Wall Street financiers believed that America should be headed by a Fascist dictator and not FDR, who was suspected of being a communist. So, they began to plot a coup d'état that would later come to be known as the Wall Street Putsch.

The conspirators included Gerald MacGuire, a bond salesman; Bill Doyle, commander of the Massachusetts American Legion; investment banker Prescott Bush, the father of George H. W. Bush and grandfather of George W. Bush; and other wealthy bankers.

The plotters need a General to lead the coup and so approached retired Major General Smedley Butler, who was at that time the most decorated soldier in U.S. history. After his military career, however, Butler became a vociferous critic of war and an influential figure in the Bonus Army, a group of 43,000 World War I veterans and their families, who were camped in Washington to demand the early payment of the veteran's bonus promised to them for their service (These veterans were eventually attacked by regular army Calvary units lead by Douglas Mac and a six tank unit lead by Patton).

The bankers were to finance a 500,000 man army lead by Butler who would proceed to overthrow FDR and reduce him to a ceremonial position. The actual governmental power would be held by a Sectary of General Affairs (essentially a Fascist dictator). After meeting with the men several times and learning of the extent of their plan, Butler went to Congress to expose them as traitors. When news broke, nobody really believed that such a coup attempt could even be considered, let alone planned or put into action. Initially, Congress's reaction was similar, but with Butler's testimony and the testimony of reporter Paul French they began to take it more seriously and investigated the subject. The Congressional investigation found that Butler was telling the truth about the existence of the plot, but Congress felt that the plot had little chance of success and so nobody was prosecuted, in fact, some later went on to serve in office, such as Prescott Bush.

I'm amazed they didn't give it the college try anyway. I'm guessing if they did...

1. It would serve to villify FDR as a totalitarian cracking down on business, and proving he's a commie
2. It would potentially set up circumstances that would set in motion a more aggressive plot

 

[XBe02Drvr]

True, but there was the OMGUS...

The one shining example of military-political planning and action that got it right. But that was overseas, not domestic to the US.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I'm surprised there were so few people in the military that knew so little about resistance movements.

There were many in the service who knew and understood, but they were voices in the wilderness, not to be heard over the roar of the heavies. Besides, most of those in the know were in the special ops community, the "ugly stepchild", the "snake eaters", the "filthy, nasty, not fit to be seen in polite society" types who were an embarrassment to "civilized" soldiers. Our ROTC company advisor was one. He was a Special Forces Captain, then Major, just returned from "Never Neverland" (Laos), who was never comfortable in his class As, didn't even own a "Mess Dress" uniform, was regularly excluded from ROTC detachment parties and the Military Ball, and in the field, had the instincts of a panther.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[tyrodtom]

The military is not different from any other organization with a lot of people in it, you've always got a hierarchy, or bureaucracy .

If you work at a car dealership, the mechanics, or detail people, don't try to tell the salesmen how to sell cars.
1-In some dealerships your chances of promotion or a raise is governed by how well you do your job.
2- In some others it is governed by how well you back the boss, no matter what he wants.
But in either situation the SOP was, don't buck the boss, if you do, you'd be wise to have another job already lined up.

That second method sounds like the military SOP in some the places I was stationed.
But in the military you don't have the option of another job of your choice.
The superior you just pissed off is going to make that choice, and you're probably not going to like it.