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I remember that Douglas was developing more streamlined weapons as of 1946, I assume some were fielded in the US Navy at least (carrier-based aircraft), were any used in the USAF?Our last serious conflict before Vietnam was in Korea, most of the munitions I saw had been stored in the Pacific rim, Okinawa, Philippines, Guam, Japan, western USA and so on.
I knew the new look policies did reduce expendature on conventional weapons in favor of nuclear ones because they got more bang for our buck and avoided spending ourselves to death. That said, I figured we had more weapons available than you described.It was we didn't have the personnel to man all these new bases, or expanded old bases.
Once we started attacking NVN, they would pull out all the stops to protect themselves from us: We had greatly more firepower, and technically, could have turned them into an irradiated wasteland.
Would it have gotten the USSR involved in support of China, or would Russia have been happy to see China subdued?
"I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the communists."
President John Kennedy in a televised interview with Walter Cronkite on September 2, 1963.
One wonders if the government of South Vietnam ever got advised of that plan. Certainly, having a very senior police official publicly murder a prisoner did very little to show the moral superiority of the government of South Vietnam.
I am curious how much of it had to do with training. I remember a book about the Grumman Tiger/Super Tiger, written by Corky Meyer, who said that the Swiss were remarkable when it came to hitting targets on the ground -- 90% accuracy. The USN were doing around 40% accuracy in comparison, from what I recall.Hard for me to knowledgeably comment on anything USAF or Naval Air related as I was strictly a "groundpounder". Our interactions were pretty much confined to calling in air strikes and/or spotting targets. As to air strikes, the USAF/Navy loved their jets. For what we needed the Jets were too fast to consistently hit small targets and had too little loiter time.
They required (our) troops to be pulled back before they let rip, I'd guess?As to the B-52 Arc-Light strikes they were unbelievable, like the hand of God smacking the ground.
I never actually thought about that, but it makes sense that it'd cushion the blows.That dense sea of greenery had no landmarks so while those massive Arc-light strikes chewed up a a lot of jungle they seldom really hurt the NVA and missed more than they hit. Plus the NVA/VC were so dug-in that even when an Arc-Light hit on top of them most survived. The greenery and soft jungle loam absorbed a lot of bomb energy
They were deathly afraid of the Chinese sending a million and a half people across the border, or worse?Throughout the war the Political/Military leaders in Washington were haunted by the "Korea-Syndrome".
Why did we stop? I figure if they were serious about giving up, they'd contact us, or contact somebody, who'd contact us and say "we give up, okay?"Then after days of bombing that were actually being effective and were hurting the NVA the politicos in Washington would call a halt allowing the NVA an opportunity to rebuild and regroup
I'm curious what efforts the ARVN did to beat back North Vietnam's advances. They rarely ever mention this in history books. They talk about us, the NVA, the NLF, even the NVAF, but never them. At least they mention fairly little.It's also important to note that the US was facing hardened and trained NVA Regulars equipped with the latest and best Soviet/Chinese military hardware guns/tanks/aircraft/missles. The equal of anything the US/ARVN forces had.
I thought we did carry out some operations into Laos as early as 1965 with Operation Barrel Roll, with bombing campaigns into Cambodia under Nixon.Ho-Chi-Minh Trail was not a trail but hundreds of paths through Laos every mile of which was under the care of hundreds of NVA who within hours of a strike had the road either repaired or by-passed. Then there are the very simple bicycle paths with each bike carrying a minimum of 200kg (440 lbs) of supplies some 60,000 of them. One bike reportedly carried 420kg (924 lbs) along the entire trail. In addition walking porters carried 50kg (110 lb) loads on their backs. Each porter/bicyclist was assigned about 25 miles of trail which they traveled over and over. Truck parks were covered in the day by movable trees so they could not be seen in the daylight. By 1968 they trail was carrying 10 - 20,000 troops a month and 120 tons of supplies a day into south Vietnam. Without expanding the war into Laos/Cambodia little could be done
Obviously, it was just a physical capability.US could - technically. But could not - politically.
They knew our limits better than we knew theirs...And Hanoi was very well aware about constraints and limitations of the Western democracies.
Why is it that the bad guys always know more than the good guys? Is it that in order to get that good, you have to become bad?There were very smart leaders in Hanoi, including Uncle Ho himself, and they were given a lot of support from Moscow (intelligence and diplomatic - on international level, starting from UN) where leadership has acquired vast experience of manipulating Western policies
Did we know that? When I say "we", I meanUSSR (not Russia, of course) would not be happy with any US victory. But tensions with China has reached very high level, there were thousands of border incidents each year since 1962 and until the armed conflict at Damansky (Zhenbao) island in 1969. Most probably there would be loud condemnation of US aggression and silent sigh of relief. USSR despite all its power, was ill equipped to fight prolonged ground war in the East.
Why is it that the bad guys always know more than the good guys? Is it that in order to get that good, you have to become bad?
In the zoomies world of high and fast, an unglamorous anachronism like "the Spad" was not a career builder for an aspiring pilot aiming to retire as a general, no matter how effective it was in supporting the troops. Kinda like the A10 today. Its only claim to glamour was in the SAR escort role, where not so many pilots survived to dream of wearing stars.That said, the A-1 was probably more able to be consistently accurate, and their loiter would allow them to both be observers and hitters.
It's all about your level of dedication to mud moving. For USN, it's an "additional mission" on top of air superiority, recon, fleet defense, and nuclear strike (not to mention ASW, aerial refueling, COD, and SAR, all of which have to operate off the same deck). For the Swiss (and Israelis, and Swedes, and USMC), it's the be-all and end-all, the raison d'être, the core mission. These services view their aviators as soldiers in the sky whose focus is the war on the ground, and train accordingly.the Swiss were remarkable when it came to hitting targets on the ground -- 90% accuracy. The USN were doing around 40% accuracy
Can you imagine George Washington and the Continental Congress doing that in 1780 when the war was going badly and the Treasury was bankrupt? No, they had to get the enemy off our soil, come hell or high water. The idea of "North" Vietnamese and "South" Vietnamese was a western imposed concept, not a native one. The ARVN troops could be excused for being less than enthusiastic, fighting for a corrupt, ever-changing government seen as a puppet of foreign powers, against their own people who were displaying a far more plausible sense of patriotism and dauntless determination.Why did we stop? I figure if they were serious about giving up, they'd contact us, or contact somebody, who would contact us and say "we give up, okay?".
IMHO, because the "bad guys" (by OUR definition) were more dedicated, determined, and goal driven, and had a better grasp of the hearts and minds of the people, with all of the information pipelines that gave them.Why is it that the bad guys always know more than the good guys? Is it that in order to get that good, you have to become bad?
Just out of curiosity, here, how many northeners (%) do you think were dedicated ideological communists vs self identified patriots who just wanted the foreigners gone and the country reunified, and viewed Uncle Ho and his approach as the most likely means to that end? Did the average DRVN citizen live and work to create the ideal communist society, or did they just worship Uncle Ho as the "father of his country" with communism as part of the package?Those particular "bad guys" worked and lived for the ultimate goal of "creating the communist society" according to the 3rd Program of CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) adopted in 1961.
Just out of curiosity, here, how many northeners (%) do you think were dedicated ideological communists vs self identified patriots who just wanted the foreigners gone and the country reunified, and viewed Uncle Ho and his approach as the most likely means to that end?
Cheers,
Wes
Roger, concur. IMO the US had a bad case of communiphobia combined with cultural ignorance that rendered nuance impossible. The echoes of McCarthyism were still reverberating underground to the extent that many in the power structure looked askance at hippie communes, farm and electric co-ops, credit unions, and even labor unions as communistic erosions of the pure capitalism they held dear. To that might be added social security, the "social safety net", and all remaining vestiges of FDR's New Deal.Of course, some of the "dedicated ideological communists" could also have been nationalists who wanted the foreigners gone.
"Communist threat" was a term applied far too broadly, and a little nuance — not every political protest against military dictatorships, autocratic regimes, or foreign encroachments was communist-inspired until the US reacted against it and the USSR reacted to support it, usually ensuring the local communist co-opted the movement — may have improved the lot of many people outside of the Warsaw Pact and prevented things like Castro's regime in Cuba.
Which government of South Vietnam? Diem? Cao Ky? "Big" Minh? From Kennedy's speech in '63 to Tet in '68 spans half a decade, at least four governments and seemingly a century in the evolution of the war. That's the problem. There was no "there" there, just a revolving door, and very little sense of a separate nationality from the other half of the Vietnamese people.One wonders if the government of South Vietnam ever got advised of that plan. Certainly, having a very senior police official publicly murder a prisoner did very little to show the moral superiority of the government of South Vietnam.
There it is folks, from our man on the scene. Thank you, Mike!However the WWII/Korea model was simply too entrenched in the military mind to be overcome.
Amen, brother. Almost every VN combat vet I've ever spoken with feels the same. My best friend from our high school track team shot three kids in a tunnel as they swung their AKs toward him, and it haunts him to this day. And he's one of many whose stories I've heard. None of you guys have to buy your own beers if I'm around.I always think that if anyone really knew what I did in Vietnam they wouldn't thank me.