Origins of The First World War and ramifications

[parsifal]

hi mike

Most of your immediate description of the congress of vienna, i agree with. however I think it important to understand the context of this congress, and why it took on the form that it did.

The congress of vienna was essentially a conference by the great powers of europe, following the defeat of napoleon to decide what to do with the Confederation of the Rhine States. This confederation was formed in 1806 following napoleons victory at austerlitz over prussia and austria, and saw a huge realignment of german territory fall under french control. it lasted until 1813, following the defeat of napoleon in russia. It confered huge power on napoleon, giving access to vast resources and manpower, and was a key reason why the napoleonic wars lasted for so long. these german states had proven weak individually and fairly easily dominated and exploited by the great powers that surrounded them. Whoever controlled these central European states held a clear advantage, positionally, economically, and manpower wise over any of the other states in europe. Napoleon had demonstrated this in spades in the recent napoleonic wars. Much of the focus of the campaigning from 1805-15 had been about maintaing or wresting control of this region from each of the states involved. moreover the strategic importance of the german states was not lost on any of them.

At the conclusion of the Napoloeonic wars (in 1814, not including the last 100 days in 1815), the victorious great powers decided to dissolve the redundant Holy Roman Empire, permit the expanded german states of the confederation to continue their existence 9many of the smaller duchies had been swallowed by the larger members of the confederation) and to declare the entire region independant , and in todays terms reach agreement that the region was essentially non-aligned. The region was essentially akin to a 19th century nuclear weapon, it conferred great power on whosoever controlled it, but also conferred great suffering on everyone, including the party that used it. in typical age of reason logic, these powers decided that if no single nation could be trusted with this region, then no-one should have it.

Keeping the german non-aligned was aprgmatic solution to a Napoleonic problem. the reason that in subsequent years, as Prussia through its various statesmen began to erode that neutrality and gradually pull these states into its orbit, was seen with both envy and fear by the other surrounding states. The vienna accords gave peace to Europe for a long period of time. when those accords were breached by Prussia, the long road to war began again. The new state of germany was seen by many as the prussian exploiting latent german nationalism for their own ends. In the end, it was Prussia who finished controlling the nuclear weapon that was Germany. this led to wars with Denmark, France and Austria, all of which were won by the Prussians, ending in unification of the german states in 1870.

Not as sure about the creation of the italian state, but i do know that for many years it was fought over by both france and austria. My guess is that Italian nationalism has a lot to do with the local population getting tired of being constantly fought over like a piece of meat.

Britain had some parts to play in all of this, but really was not a major player in the ebb and flow of European politics. So long as no single european power could lay claim to dominance of the continent, and so long as no european Power could mount an effective challenge to british naval supremacy, the british were content to let each of them squabble with the others. whilst Europe bickered amongst itself, Britain could dominate world trade, expand its colonial possessions and generally sit fairly pretty at the top of the heap, not quite in the middle of it all, but well placed to profit handsomely nonetheless. In the beginning the rise of the new german state was not viewed with much alarm....bismarck was an able statesman who knew how to keep the british in their glorious state of slumber. gradually, however the emerganece of the german state as an ecomic powerhouse, the rise of Germany as a rival naval plower, and her bid for empire, as well as her constant meddling in british colonial affairs made the british take notice and react. by 1895, Germany was seen as the principal rival to british supremacy, and a definite possibility to dominate europe. The british realized that something had to be done, and hence the reaction that we have previously talked about.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... bismarck was an able statesman who knew how to keep the british in their glorious state of slumber. gradually, however ....."

Dropping the pilot ... the Kaiser dismisses Mr. B.

 

[mikewint]

We are in about 90% agreement maybe more and Michael brought in another 5% and we are back to what I stated earlier about Wilhelm II and his disastrous control of Germany. With Bismarck in control WWI would never have occurred. Local/national wars like the Austro-Prussian or even like the Franco-Prussian but nothing like the global WWI. Additionally continental peace was purchased at the price of German and Italian peoples not being allowed to have a nation of their own. Also, as stated above, Castlereagh's Congress system for solving Continental problems initially worked very well but by 1822 it had broken down due to irreconcilable differences between the major powers. So by 1822 the four major powers themselves had begun to erode the peace.
In my view, the four major powers had no right to unilaterally decide the fate of the Germans and Italians nor to deny them what everyone else had, a nation. Repressing that urge causes it to fester and swell until it finally bursts. I personally have always prayed to be saved from those who wish to do me well no matter what I want
Parsifal, to answer your question above:
The Third Italian War of Independence was a conflict which paralleled the Austro-Prussian War, and was fought between the Kingdom of Italy and the Austrian Empire.
Victor Emmanuel II of Savoy had been crowned King of Italy on March 17, 1861, his reign did not control Venetia and Lazio. The situation of the Irredente (literally meaning un-redeemed) created an unceasing state of tension for the inner politics of the newly created Kingdom, as well as being a cornerstone of its foreign policy.
The growing divergences between Austria and the growing Prussia's predominance in Germany turned into an open war in 1866, offering Italy an occasion to regain Venetia. On April 8, 1866 the Italian government signed a military alliance with Prussia, through the mediation of Napoleon III of France. Italian armies, led by general Alfonso La Marmora, were to engage the Austrians on the southern front. Simultaneously, taking advantage of their naval superiority, the Italians threatened the Dalmatian coast, forcing Austria to move part of its forces there from the central European front.
Prussian peace with Austria forced the Italian government to seek an armistice with Austria, on August 12.
The ceasing of hostilities was marked by the Armistice of Cormons signed on August 12, followed by the Treaty of Vienna of October 3, 1866.
The terms included the cession of Venetia (with Mantua and western Friuli) to France (which ceded it to Italy) and of the Iron Crown (worn by the old Lombard Kings of Italy and by the Holy Roman Emperors, as well as by Napoleon Bonaparte himself).
The Redente ("Redemeed") lands were annexed to Italy through a plebiscite held on October 21 and 22 of 1866.
This left only Rome and its Patrimony of St Peter (now Lazio) outside the Kingdom of Italy, until the "Capture of Rome" in September 1870 and the subsequent plebiscite approving its unification with the rest of Italy.

 

[parsifal]

I dont think the great powers in the terms of reference that could be reasonably applied to post napoleonic european politics denied the german states anything. The concept of a unified german state did not exist in 1815, there was no such thing as German nationalism (at least not as a popular movement, though there were signs of it discernible from the shared napoloeonic experience, albeit under french dominance).... indeed the partial process of unification that had occurred under the Confederation (whereby larger German states had assimilated smaller ones) was allowed to stand. However, far from either allowing one nation to control this conglomeration of non-aligned states or repressing the desires of this region as they existed at that time, the great powers simply agreed to treat this area as independant, and under the control of no-one. That is not denying the "germans" anything.

As the tide of nationalism began to develop, Prussia (which is not Germany, and at that time could not legitimately claim leadership of the independant German states) by every turn was able to expoloit this rising national movement. I believe, they, more than any of the other states exploited the independant german states to their own advantage. The other states, whilst acting in their own self interest, were not reacting to rising german nationalism as such, rather its exploitation by one of the four post napoleonic great powers. As far as I am aware, there was never any attempt by anyone to suppress German nationalism, merely a resistance to Prussia....an outside power.... exploiting this phenomena to their own advantage. Even though Prussia was resisted the focus of its intrigues were not suppressed, (though the later machinations of the french may not entirely fit that cosy picture).

The model of diplomatic spheres of influence resulting from the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15 after the Napoleonic Wars endorsed Austrian dominance in Central Europe. However, the negotiators at Vienna took no account of Prussia's growing strength within and among the German states, failing to foresee that Prussia would challenge Austria for leadership within the German states. This German dualism presented two solutions to the problem of unification: the small Germany solution (Germany without Austria), or greater Germany solution (Germany with Austria).

Historians debate whether or not Otto von Bismarck had a master plan to expand the North German Confederation of 1866 to include the remaining independent German states into a single entity, or whether he simply sought to expand the power of the Kingdom of Prussia. They conclude that factors in addition to the strength of Bismarck's Realpolitik led a collection of early modern polities to reorganize political, economic, military and diplomatic relationships in the 19th century. Reaction to Danish and French nationalism provided reason detre for expressions of German unity under prussian control. Military successes—especially Prussian ones—in three regional wars generated enthusiasm and pride that Prussia could harness to promote unification. This experience echoed the memory of mutual accomplishment in the Napoleonic Wars, particularly in the War of Liberation of 1813–14. By establishing a Germany without Austria, the political and administrative unification in 1871 at least temporarily solved the problem of dualism. Again, however, it was not a resistance to latent and rising german nationalism, merely a resistance to Prussian domination of that phenomena, and a protection of their various self interests. that is a fundamentally different juxtaposition to these powers preventing the development of german nationalism, in the sense of not allowing them the right of self determination. it merely denied them the right of self determination at the expense of the dissolution of their own national identities, or for the direct gain of the paria state prussia

 

[michaelmaltby]

The raw seeds of WW1 are in 1870 - the Franco Prussian War. Total French humiliation - The Emperor was captured. Revenge for France poisoned all relationships after that. The neighborhood had changed - France didn't.

MM

 

[mikewint]

Parsifal, Perhaps I am again off topic but I can not believe that the Four Powers had any altruistic intent toward the various 37 German states, France in particular did everything possible to keep the Germans from uniting into their own Nation. Today we term this Self-Determination.
Self determination is the principle in international law that nations have the right to freely choose their sovereignty and international political status with no external compulsion or external interference. The principle does not state how the decision is to be made, or what the outcome should be, be it independence, federation, protection, some form of autonomy or even full assimilation. Neither does it state what the delimitation between nations should be — or even what constitutes a nation. In fact, there are conflicting definitions and legal criteria for determining which groups may legitimately claim the right to self-determination.
Pan-Germanism's origins began in the early 19th century following the Napoleonic Wars. The wars launched a new movement that was born in France itself during the French Revolution, Nationalism. Nationalism during the 19th century threatened the old aristocratic regimes. Many ethnic groups of Central and Eastern Europe had been divided for centuries, ruled over by the old Monarchies of the Romanovs and the Habsburgs. Germans, for the most part, had been a loose and disunited people since the Reformation when the Holy Roman Empire was shattered into a patchwork of states. The new German nationalists, mostly young reformers such as Johann Tillmann of East Prussia, sought to unite all the German-speaking and ethnic-German (Volksdeutsche) people.
The German question was a debate in the 19th century over the best way to achieve the Unification of Germany. From 1815–1871, 37 independent German-speaking states existed. The Großdeutsche Lösung ("Greater German solution") favored unifying all German-speaking peoples under one state, and was favored by the Austrian Empire and its supporters. The Kleindeutsche Lösung ("Lesser German solution") sought only to unify the northern German states and did not include Austria; this proposal was favored by the Kingdom of Prussia. The solutions are also referred to by the states they would create, Kleindeutschland and Großdeutschland ("Lesser Germany" and "Greater Germany"). Both movements were part of a growing German nationalism. The movements also drew upon similar efforts to create a unified nation-state of people who shared a common language in the era, such as the Unification of Italy by the House of Savoy or the Serbian revolution for independence.
By the 1860s the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian Empire were the two most powerful nations dominated by German-speaking elites. Both sought to expand their influence and territory. The Austrian Empire — like the German Empire — was a multi-ethnic state, but German-speaking people there did not have an absolute numerical majority; the creation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was one result of the growing nationalism of other ethnicities especially the Hungarians. Even some Austrians themselves began to resent their own diverse Empire. Identifying themselves as descendants of the Bavarians, who had conquered and expanded into the region, many Western Austrians supported a separation from the Habsburg Empire and unity with the new German Empire. There was also a rejection of Roman Catholicism with the Away from Rome! movement calling for German speakers to identify with Lutheran or Old Catholic churches.
Prussia under Otto von Bismarck would ride on the coat-tails of nationalism to unite all of modern-day Germany. The German Empire ("Second Reich") was created in 1871 following the proclamation of Wilhelm I as head of a union of German-speaking states. Thus the debate was settled in favor of the Kleindeutsche Lösung with Protestant Prussia becoming the dominant power of the new state, and Austria-Hungary remaining a separate polity. Wilhelm I did indeed disregard millions of its non-German subjects who desired self-determination from German rule. On the other hand, German-speakers living outside the new Empire preferred living under its rule or in an ethnically homogeneous environment, but this wish clashed with the opposing wishes of other ethnicities. Consequentially regions like Austria and Bohemia witnessed nationalistic controversies for decades.
That the militaristic Prussia formed the new nation is a direct result of German self-determination being blocked by the Four Powers. Thus the Four Powers created, inadvertently, that which they most wanted to avoid

 

[parsifal]

I agree that ther was no altruistic approach by the great powers following Napoleon. It was a pragmatic solution to a difficult problem for them. The german confederation during Napoleons reign (at least after 1806, after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire) was not a single united entity, it was a collection of divided states, many of them opposed to each other, and not thinking as a single entity. This is evidenced by the fact that many of the smaller Duchies were taken over, absorbed, even conquered by some of the larger entities during the time of Napoleon. Being so divided made them an easy target for manipulation, but the latent strength of this region, in terms of economic and manpower potential, as well as its central location in Europe, made it crucial for any power wishing to dominate the rest of Europe. This is precisely what Napoleon did. He dominated and controlled the region, which enabled him to use the resources of the region in his wars of conquest. A good proportion of the Ententes campaigning was about wresting control of that region from him.

Eventually, of course Napoleon lost control of the region, brought about in no small measure by the wars of liberation against him in 1813-14. This was the first faint stirrings of pangerman nationalism...the first time the region began to think of itself collectively.

The question facing the great powers after Napoleon was what to do with the region. If any one nation was able to control this region in the same way as Napoleon had, then these other states that were not controlling the region were in deep trouble....again. The fact that the states might one day unite, had not been considered, it was not opposed, because at the time of the Council of Vienna,. and its immediate aftermath, German unification was non-existent in their eyes.

The struggles of the next 50 years that ultimately led to the formation of the German state, was not a resistance to german nationalism per se. It was a resistance to try and prevent the region being domninated by another outside power. Chiefly, it was a contest between Prussia and Austria, but there were others. Prussia was better placed to exploit its position, geography, language, economic ties, common religion were all factors that led to the prussian dominance of the emerging German state.

Later however the concept of Pan Germanic aspiration began to encroach onto the direct national intersts of its neighbours. The Germans toyed with the idea of the greater germany which would have involved the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian empire. It also involved encroachment and expansion of the german state into regions that were not exclusively German....such as Schleswig Holstein, and Alsace Lorraine. There were other areas, that were never really disputed, but if the new Germany had believed they could get away with it, they would have jumped at the chance of absorbing these areas....Some areas of Holland and Belgium for example, some areas as far away as Rumania were also at risk under that logic. This brings us full circle to where we started. Pan germanism at some point ceases to be a nationalist movement, and starts to be a vehicle for foreign conquest. Those areas in Ruthenia, for example, even though populated by ethnic germans, never ever thought of themselves as german, until they were told as such. At some point a process of national liberation ceases to be that, and becomes a process of foreign conquest. Exactly where that point was reached is open to debate, but it occurred sometime between 1871 and 1914. Certainlyamongst most scholars, there is no serious debate that the invasions of 1914, were anything other than wars of aggression by the Germans to secure those long held aspirations. The peoples they did manage to overrun were not crying out for German liberation, in fact German treatment of those "liberated" peoples (in Belgium mostly), was about as brutal as its gets.

 

[mikewint]

Again Sir we are in 90% agreement, there are so many "what if's" In any movement the strong will rise to the top and Prussia rose to the point where it was able to challange Austria who was faltering as all of its ethnic component were coming apart. The eventual Kleindeutsche Lösung that resulted would have been a much different Germany had Fredrick III lived. Although celebrated as a young man for his leadership and successes during the Second Schleswig, Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, he nevertheless professed a hatred of warfare and was praised by friends and enemies alike for his humane conduct. Frederick married Princess Victoria, eldest daughter of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom. The couple were well matched; their shared liberal ideology led them to seek greater representation for commoners in the government. Frederick, in spite of his conservative militaristic family background, had developed liberal tendencies as a result of his ties with Britain and his studies at the University of Bonn. As the Crown Prince, he often opposed the conservative Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, particularly in speaking out against Bismarck's policy to unite Germany through force and in urging for the power of the position of Chancellor to be curbed. Liberals in both Germany and Britain hoped that as emperor, Frederick III would move to liberalize the German Empire. Frederick and Victoria were great admirers of the Prince Consort of the United Kingdom, Victoria's father. They planned to rule as consorts, like Albert and Queen Victoria, and to reform the fatal flaws in the executive branch that Bismarck had created for himself. The office of Chancellor, responsible to the Emperor, would be replaced with a British-style cabinet, with ministers responsible to the Reichstag. Government policy would be based on the consensus of the cabinet. Frederick "described the Imperial Constitution as ingeniously contrived chaos." However, his illness prevented him from effectively establishing policies and measures to achieve this, and such moves as he was able to make were later abandoned by his son and successor, William II.
Wilhelm II also might have been a much different person had his birth been less traumatic. A traumatic breech birth left him with a withered left arm due to Erb's palsy, which he tried with some success to conceal. In many photos he carries a pair of white gloves in his left hand to make the arm seem longer, holds his left hand with his right, or has his crippled arm on the hilt of a sword or holding a cane to give the effect of a useful limb posed at a dignified angle. Biographers including Miranda Carter have suggested that this disability affected his emotional development.
When Wilhelm was in his early twenties, Bismarck tried to separate him from his liberal parents with some success. Bismarck planned to use the young prince as a weapon against his parents in order to retain his own political dominance. Wilhelm thus developed a dysfunctional relationship with his parents, but especially with his English mother. In an outburst in April 1889, which the Empress Victoria conveyed in a letter to her mother, Queen Victoria, Wilhelm angrily implied that "an English doctor killed my father, and an English doctor crippled my arm – which is the fault of my mother" who allowed no German physicians to attend to herself or her immediate family.
So as I had stated earlier lots of blame to go around and lots of "what if's" My personal feelings are a 60-40 split with Germany (Wilhelm II actually) getting the 60%

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... In an outburst in April 1889, which the Empress Victoria conveyed in a letter to her mother, Queen Victoria, Wilhelm angrily implied that "an English doctor killed my father, and an English doctor crippled my arm – which is the fault of my mother" who allowed no German physicians to attend to herself or her immediate family.

So as I had stated earlier lots of blame to go around .....

Just like King George VI was right to "blame" his brutish father and Nazi brother for his stutter, or FDR to "blame" God for his polio.

Mike - so what is your view of British doctors and their role in the origins of WWI?

MM

 

[mikewint]

Michael, I have none. that was a quote from Wilhelm II. Included to show his mind set which was very much a causative agent of the war. Wilhelm did indeed START WWI. I never disputed that. My point has always been that ALL the participants share some blame for the war. Wilhelm II was groomed by Bismarck but eventually got out of his control to the point of starting a total world war. Bismarck would have also probably gone to war but I think it would have been kept in check, more like the earlier Franco-Prussian war.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... that was a quote from Wilhelm II. Included to show his mind set which was very much a causative agent of the war. "

I caught that, Mike. The point I was making was that when you say "plenty of blame to go around" I think you are passing judgement on an event(s) where judgement is impossible.

You say: "ALL the participants share some blame for the war". By that argument, all participants in an autombile crash share some blame, prey as well as predators share some "blame" for eating or being eaten, etc. etc.

I know lots of people talk about blame. Victim is another popular concept, these days. But LIFE (and by association all life events) isn't about BLAME, or guilt or victimhood. Life is about survival, and prospering. Germany arrived 'late' in Europe as a unified nation. Germany wanted to thrive and prosper and was willing to use aggression to achieve its ends. At first it worked - then it didn't - and Germany was punished. "Blaming" is not part of that scenario.

I pulled the Kaiser's British doctors quote that you used because you have written on this thread already how Britain is at the root of most of the world's troubles. You know by now I'm not buying that.

MM

 

[renrich]

Early in this discussion which, incidently I started, I mentioned that if the US had not entered WW1 in 1917, the Allies would have likely made peace with Germany in Spring of 1917, with no Russian Revolution, no breakdown of Italy into Fascism and no Treaty of Versailles to enthrone Nazism. In fact, the view that Europe would be better off without US intervention, was supported by Ramsay McDonald, leader of the Labor Party in Britain and was also expressed after the fact by Churchill in a statement to the New York Enquirer in 1936. One wonders why the Kaiser would have initiated unrestricted submarine warfare when he knew that the US was ticklish about that and what simpleton thought up the harebrained idea of getting Mexico into the war against the US, ( the Zimmerman telegram.) Saying that an invasion of the US by Mexico would get them back land lost during the 1846-48 war, including Texas, shows how little Europeans understood about the US in general and Texas in particular.

The British might have been instrumental in the process of eliminating slavery in the modern world in the 19th century but they were certainly not hesitant to buy and use the cotton produced in the South. If they had embargoed that cotton, along with the mill owners in the Northern US, it would have gone a long way toward making slavery financially untenable. The fact is that slavery was an emotional issue in the US in the 1800s but the root cause of the War of Northern Aggression was pure and simple political power and domination just as Mike outlined.

 

[parsifal]

I dont agree. blame, particulalry war guilt can be found. Its not however, usually a case of passing moral judgements based on persoanl values or moral positions. This is far too dangerous and subjective, and in the end has no right or wrong answer. A member of the nazi party, would find no blame for the Nazi aggression, based on his moral standards and general moral principals.

The best we can do is apply the law as is internationally accepted. In this case, the country that broke the law which led directly to the conflagaration was Germany. Other nations may have contributed to her motivations for doing that, though personally i am unconvinced of that. In my opinion, in the first instance Germany was the nation that broke the law, and is therefore the guilty party for starting the war.

In the second instance, who was responsible for providing that motivation....well each country was pursuing its national interests, and lost sight of of the greater benefit s for humanity. However I still blame Germany the most for the motivation that led to the breach of the law. She was the one that actively sought war the most, the one most anxious to "gert on with it". This has to be a matter for personal opinion to the observer, so really there is no right or wrong answer in that regard. Moreover as a legal concept, motivation and provocation are factors in determining the extent of guilt. But as to who should stand accused, it always is the one who breaks the law that stands trial, and that in this case is Germany, just Germany. There are no other co-accused.

 

[renrich]

Another point that has not been mentioned recently in this thread but which is a valid point about the origins of the war is the attempt by the Kaiser to build a navy to rival Britain's. Britain was bound to be sensitive about a German Navy equal to the RN because if Britain lost control of the sea in the Atlantic, then Britain was finished. In reality Germany could gain little by building a huge navy unless it could manage to defeat the RN which was highly unlikely. The money and effort would have been better spent in almost any other pursuit.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Nicely put, Parsifal, but ....

The courts, conventions, the "law" are all wondrous creations to be sure, but as Conrad described in Heart of Darkness, civilization can quickly fade away, so I personally take heart and courage from watching nature closely - and trying to understand what I see. (For example: why would two crows seek to drown a third crow? I thought only HUMANS did such mischief ) So I repeat - Germany was late to the "nation game" and overcompensated BIG TIME. Punish them. And we did. Now move on.

And Renrich, thank you for this thread, one of the best ! But as to this: "... Spring of 1917, with no Russian Revolution". I disagree. The 1917 revolution started in 1905 - exacerbated by the incompetence, loss of life and financial burdens of the Russo-Japan war (1904-05). Was the Russian military response in 1914 really that much more "competent" (I don't know but I'm asking )? - but the action was closer to home, with easier logistics.

So - given Russian history - a revolution was coming - Communist or otherwise - with all the chaos that such revolutions cause, because they start off as one event and morph into another (think the French).

But the world would have been better off if both Britain and the USA had stayed out of Europe in 1914. There were a lot of cards in play, empire, industrialization, modern communication, steam transportation, global markets, space to expand, but, in the end - it was a grudge match that France won because "her friends" were more powerful than Germany's.

So - I don't disagree with your thesis overall R, but would take it even further. How long would Germany have needed to subdue France and Belgium and negotiate "peace" in Europe (Napoleon's Continental System) if Britain had stayed home in September, 1914?

Thanks for a great thread.

MM
Proud Canadian

PS - I write what I write about 1914-18 with the knowledge that my Grandfather (Dinsmore) and his two sons enlisted and served the duration overseas. They would be shocked at my cynicism. But hindsight is a wonderful thing and I honor their service.

 

[renrich]

I think the point about whether or not the entry of the US prevented a peace in 1917 is that all the combatants were exhausted in 1917 and there were movements toward a peace settlement. The US entry gave hope to the Allies and there is no doubt that the US weight on the side of the Allies tipped the scale. The revolution in Russia may have taken place anyway but probably in a different manner. A peaceful settlement would have most likely have prevented the Nazi party from taking power and also have prevented WW2.

This thread has sparked some very fine discourse and I have really enjoyed it. Thanks to all.

 

[mikewint]

renrich, hope we're not done, been working on the "ramification" end of WWI for a couple of days now. Hope to spark some more debate:
The immediate legacy of the decision to lay the blame for WWI at Germany's door was the disastrous Treaty of Versailles [1918]. Of the nations that participated in the drawing up of the treaty, only the United States sought some measure of leniency for Germany, seeing this as the path to a lasting peace in Europe. As it was, while Britain was ambivalent, France under Georges Clemenceau, elder statesman of the Third Republic wanted vengeance. The Treaty explicitly stated that Germany accepted sole responsibility for the war and promised to pay reparations for all the damage done to the civilian populations of the Allies. Germany's military was to be limited to no more than 100,000 troops, the navy severely cut back, an airforce was forbidden, as was any manufacture or import of armaments. Finally, in an effort to create a buffer zone with France, the Rhineland was to be turned into a demilitarized zone.
Most devastatingly, Germany was forced to pay reparations, initially 226 billion Marks in gold, although this was subsequently reduced to 132 billion Marks (then $31.4 billion, £6,600 million) in 1921 which is roughly equivalent to $ 385 billion in 2011, a sum that many economists at the time, notably John Maynard Keynes, deemed to be excessive and counterproductive and would have taken Germany until 1988 to pay. The final payments ended up being made on 4 October 2010. the twentieth anniversary of German reunification, and some ninety-two years after the end of the war for which they were exacted. This ruinous amount meant the Germany could not effectively rebuild its own damaged economy. This in turn created a populous impoverished underclass that was ready to listen to and embrace radical revolutionary movement that promised to alleviate the country's plight and resurrect its fortunes. Perversely, at a time when the allies were demanding this enormous sum, they stripped Germany of 13% of its territory, including Alsace-Lorraine – a powerhouse of the German economy-which reverted to France. With the loss of this region, together with west Prussia, 16% of its coal fields, half of its iron and steel industry, and all of its overseas colonies. Germany faced a ruinous future.
The most important impact of the treaty was the effect it had on German political life. The allies demanded the creation of a civil government, and so the Kaiser and his chancellor were replaced by a parliamentary democracy – the Weimar Republic – which was disliked by moderates and loathed by extremists on both the left and right. Its inability to deal with the economic crises that occurred between 1919 and 1923 left its reputation in ruins among German workers, even after the economy began to pick up in the latter half of the 1920s. In practice, the parliament was so weak that any unscrupulous but determined groups willing to target dissatisfied workers had a good chance of securing power within the republic.
In any event, the Allies were either unwilling or unable to enforce the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, most importantly the provision on re-armament. Although they made some token effort to ensure compliance, Germany soon began to roll back the terms of the treaty. When a political party arose in Germany in the late 1920s that promised to restore German freedom and pride – the Nazis – the Allies watched and did nothing. Even France, which had a clause inserted in the treaty that allowed for French occupation of the Rhineland should Germany ever attempt to remilitarize it, failed to act when the critical moment came in 1936. Vacillation simply encouraged extremists in Germany, who resented the treaty and interpreted a lack of action by the allies as weakness.
Of all the legacies of the four major powers ruthless imperial policies, the rise of Hitler was the most significant. In many respects, the horrors of the Holocaust and the misery of WWII are directly attributable to WWI and the subsequent ruin of Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. The Nazis were able to rise to power only because Germans were resentful and beset by economic and political crises. As Professor Richard J. Evans (Regius Professor of Modern History University of Cambridge) writes, the Nazis tapped into the "incredulous horror [of] the majority of Germans [and] the sense of outrage and disbelief the swept through the German upper and middle classes like a shockwave." Those were some of the people that cheered as Hitler made clear his intentions to discard the lingering military and territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles along with a promise to resurrect Germany's former glory.
Had it not been for the Four Powers Imperial delusions, WWI may never have been fought in the first place. Even if Britain had not intervened, and Germany had defeated France in a European war, the circumstances that bred Hitler would never have eventuated. A German victory would have refashioned the face of Europe, with the next big war likely to have been a clash between Germany and the rising tide of Communism in the east. World War II might have been avoided. And with nothing to hasten the fall of the old imperial powers, the way would not have been so clear for the United States and the USSR to emerge as the two contending superpowers of the second half of the twentieth century.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Had it not been for the Four Powers Imperial delusions".

Please refresh my memory, Mike. Are you talking France, Britain, Russia and Germany?, or maybe France, Britain, Russia and Turkey.

If ONE "Imperial" power was delusional than ALL were. As an American, I understand your revulsion for matters "imperial" . but all of the following were "Imperial" (or trying to maintain or be more so) in 1914: Britain, Russia, France, Austria, Turkey and Germany. If Empire is repulsive - then surely ALL empires are repulsive .... no?

MM

 

[parsifal]

Dont agreew that the the treaty was the cause of WWII because it was too harsh. Quite the opposite. It was far too lenient, and gave Germans the ability to delude themselves that they had been stabbed in the back, robbed of victory by fifth column jewish conspirators and freemansons, and a whole lot of other claptrap that allowed germany to delude itself that it had been robbed of victory.

I am firmly in agreement with Pershings view of how the war should have been ended. namely that no terms other than unconditional surrender should be offered, and no peace accepted until allied troops stood on the street corners of Berlion. That was how the peace of WWII had to be completed, and though it meant that communism had to be combatted for another 50 years, it also meant that the world was finally rid of fascism from the end of that war.

If Germany had not been given the opporunitiy to sugar coat its defeat at the end of the war and in fact had been pushed into absolute and total defeat in 1919, as Pershing and other clear thinking generals were advocating.

The 2nd Reich was an aberration by 1918. If it had been allowed to exist, or defeat the Russians and the French on the contiinent, as is being advocated here, the post war situation would have been much worse than it was historically. We would have seen the Germany in control of the whole of Europe, with an undefeated battlefleet, and controlled by men like Ludendorf who were as radical as Hitler, but far more deadly and efficient as administrators and military men. Britain would not have been able to resist such a force, and the neither could the US. The lights of democracy and freedom would have been extinguished forever. Conctration camps, murder, no rule of law, absolute eviul and terror would have been the result, and who knows the world we would be living in today.

As to the failure of Versailles as a treaty, I dont blame Clemceau, or any of the other hawks. I blame bleeding hearts like Wilson who did not understand what had to be done to make the proice of the war worth it. What had to happen under that treaty was a total and brutal suppression of all the militaistic illusions that the germans continued to believe in after the peace. Reparations, and brutal repression did not cause this, it was the half victory that was settled for, and the escape routes handed to the german militarists as a result of that weak treaty

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

While I agree that unconditional surrender was the way to go, I still can not agree with the terms of the treaty. The reparations that Germany was forced to pay was oblivious. These reparations only helped to fuel the feelings that were spreading in Germany.

The treaty should have and could have been better handled and dealt with, and in that regard I do believe the treaty led to WW2 (obviously not the whole or main reason, but something that led to it). In my opinion they are the same conflict with a cease fire in between.

I also find it too easy to give all the blame to Germany for the start of WW1 (and always will feel this way). To give the complete blame is absurd. The whole political climate during that time was aflame. In my opinion all the major nations share the blame (some more than others, and I will concede that Germany does share most of the blame).

I have a feeling that in this regard we will just have to agree to disagree (of course I am sure some will call this revisionism, but whatever...),