Out of the Big Three WW2 bombers (B-17, B-24, Lancaster), was the Flying Fortress the most redundant? (9 Viewers)

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The magazines exploded due to enemy gunfire, or torpedoes. The British may have been sloppy about handling cordite, but you kind of need the ammo if you are going to fight a battle.
As has been pointed out already, not all. HMS Vanguard was lost to a magazine explosion at Scapa Flow in July 1917. The IJN Mutsu blew up while in her anchorage in Japan in June 1943. No enemy action involved in either case.
 
The magazines exploded due to enemy gunfire, or torpedoes. The British may have been sloppy about handling cordite, but you kind of need the ammo if you are going to fight a battle.
Agreed ... but none of the ships I listed above was in combat at the time of their magazine explosions. Regarding British battlecruisers at Jutland: my understanding is that the root cause of the loss of these ships was more a matter of cutting corners (e.g., disabling anti-flash measures) in order to secure the maximum possible rate of fire. HMS Tiger, notably, did NOT follow this directive (i.e. 'standard' anti-flash procedures were still followed) and survived a fair pounding without going boom
 
HMS Bulwark lost 1914, HMS Princess Irene lost 1915, HMS Natal lost 1915, HMS Vanguard lost 1917 and HMS Glatton lost 1918., all lost to spontaneous cordite explosions
Bulwark was the battleship I missed :) I should have remembered Glatton, having just finished reading a book on monitors....
 
French Iéna commissioned 14 April 1902 blew up in dry dock 12 March 1907.
French Liberté commissioned 13 April 1908 blew up at dock 25 Sept1911.
Japanese Kawachi commissioned 31 March1912 blew up 12 July 1918.
Japanese Tsubuka Armored Cruiser/battlecruiser (four 12 in guns)
960px-Tsukuba_%281907%29_1.jpg

commissioned 14 Jan 1907 blew up 14 Jan 1917.
Edit.
Russian Imperatritsa Mariya commissioned 10 June 1915 (?) blew up 20 Oct 1916.
960px-ImperatritsaMariya1911-1916Sevastopol.jpg

Of few of these have been listed by other members.
 
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Two factors, the accident rates climbed steeply at the start of the war then declined, so when the aircraft was around is important, also the numbers that were around. USAAF Statistical Digest Table 214 Aircraft Accident rates in Continental US per 100,000 flying hours, for January 1942 to August 1945.
TypeAll Accidents - numberAll Accidents - rateFatal AccidentsFatalitiesAircraft wrecked
B-29
272​
40​
63​
461​
119​
B-17
1,589​
30​
284​
1,757​
479​
B-24
1,713​
35​
490​
2,796​
746​
B-25
921​
33​
233​
936​
446​
B-26
739​
55​
223​
993​
408​
A-20
728​
131​
167​
303​
331​
A-26
181​
57​
29​
77​
50​
A-36
226​
274​
24​
24​
69​
P-38
1,403​
139​
337​
379​
758​
P-39
1,934​
245​
369​
395​
865​
P-40
3,569​
188​
324​
350​
967​
P-47
3,049​
127​
404​
455​
1,125​
P-51
824​
105​
131​
137​
358​
P-63
251​
131​
39​
47​
109​
F-4/5
223​
145​
48​
52​
127​
F-6
14​
62​
2​
2​
7​
C-46
145​
29​
19​
94​
39​
C-47/53
604​
20​
109​
648​
181​
C-54
22​
18​
4​
16​
5​
Advanced Trainer
13,511​
55​
943​
1,888​
2,227​
Basic Trainer
4,881​
27​
825​
1,175​
1,558​
Primary Trainer
8,256​
48​
333​
439​
1,032​
Communications
2,407​
108​
133​
197​
500​

The B-17 had a lower accident rate and fatal accident rate than the B-24 plus a lower number of people killed per accident but a higher number of deaths when an accident became fatal, deaths include non crew as can be seen from the statistics for the fighters.
 
It was not Boeing's fault if the Wright R-3350 magnesium based crankcase and carburator were sources of troubles...
The R-3350 did not have a magnesium crankcase. It was ether a thin walled steel or aluminum one. Any thing that can cause a magnesium fire well wreck steel or aluminum parts too. The B-29 didn't have a well designed engine installation and this contributed a good deal to its service difficulties. As did the whole operating in the middle of F-ing nowhere with very green flight and ground crews. Even with all of its troubles, R-3350 first 18 months of combat were not that far out of line from any other engine.
 
Two factors, the accident rates climbed steeply at the start of the war then declined, so when the aircraft was around is important, also the numbers that were around. USAAF Statistical Digest Table 214 Aircraft Accident rates in Continental US per 100,000 flying hours, for January 1942 to August 1945.
TypeAll Accidents - numberAll Accidents - rateFatal AccidentsFatalitiesAircraft wrecked
B-29
272​
40​
63​
461​
119​
B-17
1,589​
30​
284​
1,757​
479​
B-24
1,713​
35​
490​
2,796​
746​
B-25
921​
33​
233​
936​
446​
B-26
739​
55​
223​
993​
408​
A-20
728​
131​
167​
303​
331​
A-26
181​
57​
29​
77​
50​
A-36
226​
274​
24​
24​
69​
P-38
1,403​
139​
337​
379​
758​
P-39
1,934​
245​
369​
395​
865​
P-40
3,569​
188​
324​
350​
967​
P-47
3,049​
127​
404​
455​
1,125​
P-51
824​
105​
131​
137​
358​
P-63
251​
131​
39​
47​
109​
F-4/5
223​
145​
48​
52​
127​
F-6
14​
62​
2​
2​
7​
C-46
145​
29​
19​
94​
39​
C-47/53
604​
20​
109​
648​
181​
C-54
22​
18​
4​
16​
5​
Advanced Trainer
13,511​
55​
943​
1,888​
2,227​
Basic Trainer
4,881​
27​
825​
1,175​
1,558​
Primary Trainer
8,256​
48​
333​
439​
1,032​
Communications
2,407​
108​
133​
197​
500​

The B-17 had a lower accident rate and fatal accident rate than the B-24 plus a lower number of people killed per accident but a higher number of deaths when an accident became fatal, deaths include non crew as can be seen from the statistics for the fighters.
Better training help and some planes did not have an easy transition path.
A-20s and P-38s had no two seat trainers (two cockpit) and sitting in an A-20 or P-38 cockpit for several hours while an "instructor" quizzed you while sitting the wing with plane not moving was not a good substitute. Using B-25s as trainers was a help.
 
This is true but I think that the reduction gear case (front cover) and the rear cover (supercharger? auxiliary drive case) may have been magnesium.
Steel melts but usually does not contribute to the fire, unlike magnesium.

The use of magnesium in the rear cases of engines was not exclusive to the R-3350 but a common feature of many engines including many Bristol, Pratt, and other engines.

As J Jugman says The B-29 didn't have a well designed engine installation and this contributed a good deal to its service difficulties.

This is not to say that the R-3350 was problem free. Far from it, and it's problems were so severe that all the Lockheed C-69 (Constellation) aircraft were grounded for many months while Wright fixed problems with the engine.
 
The Avro Lancaster could be modified to deliver the Dam Buster bouncing bomb as well as the Tall Boy, which was used to sink the battleship Tirpitz, and the Grand Slam to destroy U-boat bunkers. This was possible because of its cavernous bomb bay.

The B-24 Liberator was known for its long range enabling it to engage targets out of reach of the other heavy bombers. It closed the Atlantic Gap which contributed to turn the tide in this war theater in the Allies' favor and it could attack the Romanian oilfields of Ploesti from bases as far as North Africa. For the same reason it replaced the B-17 to cover the vast ranges of the Pacific.

The B-17 had the advantage of being able to drop its bombload from greater heights than the other two and it was a bit more rugged although its loss rate was about the same as the Liberator's. In the end the B-24 could do the same strategic bombing missions as the Fortress.
The Lib could also be produced more easily and faster being optimized for mass production.

So could one say that the B-17 could have been done without?
No, the B-17 was not redundant. Embracing the philosophy of total war, as was done by all sides in WWII, one needs all of the equipment they can get to the front to fight. Both Consolidated and Boeing were pumping out as many bombers a day as they could. At its peak, Boeing was rolling out 16 bombers a day. It should be noted the B-17 had a couple of advantages over the B-24. First, pilots preferred it as it was easier to fly. Imagine going on a 10-12 hour mission where the pilot and co-pilot are flying the entire time while holding it in formation. The B-24 was more work to fly which caused higher pilot fatigue. The B-17 also had a higher service ceiling than the B-24 which helped, to a degree, to make it harder for German AA to damage them. One could also argue that the B-17s flew regularly into the teeth of the German air defenses by flying deep into Germany. The Third Reich was hard over about defending German air space, especially later in the war. B-24s flew many missions earlier in the war from North Africa into Italy (some B-24s also were posted in East Anglia) where AA and fighter strength was arguably less, thus the lower loss rate per sortie.
 
8th Air Force peaked at 40 bomb and 15 fighter groups on 6 June 1944, which includes the 492nd (B-17/24) which was more about training by that time and became Carpetbagger/leaflets, the 489th (B-24) was made non operational in November and sent to USA, leaving 15 fighter to 38 bomber (26 B-17, 12 B-24 after 5 B-24 groups converted to B-17 July to September). The 15th Air Force grew to 21 bomber (6 B-17 and 15 B-24) and 7 and 1/3 fighter groups. The 8th Air Force transitioned its 4 P-38 groups to P-51 July to September 1944, after which it converted 3 of its 4 P-47 groups to P-51, the 15th kept 3 P-38 groups to the end of the war and converted its 2 P-47 groups to P-51 May/June 1944.

Heavy Bomber Effective sorties, USAAF Statistical Digest
MonthETOETOETOMTOMTOMTO
MonthSortieslost% lostSortieslost% lost
Jan-43​
220​
18​
8.18​
622​
11​
1.77​
Feb-43​
313​
23​
7.35​
585​
6​
1.03​
Mar-43​
823​
21​
2.55​
720​
2​
0.28​
Apr-43​
349​
29​
8.31​
1,359​
13​
0.96​
May-43​
1,471​
69​
4.69​
1,890​
16​
0.85​
Jun-43​
1,268​
90​
7.10​
1,944​
10​
0.51​
Jul-43​
1,743​
118​
6.77​
2,860​
30​
1.05​
Aug-43​
1,850​
117​
6.32​
2,097​
85​
4.05​
Sep-43​
2,457​
98​
3.99​
2,339​
20​
0.86​
Oct-43​
2,117​
186​
8.79​
1,427​
37​
2.59​
Nov-43​
2,581​
95​
3.68​
1,069​
28​
2.62​
Dec-43​
4,937​
172​
3.48​
1,606​
36​
2.24​
Jan-44​
5,027​
203​
4.04​
3,811​
54​
1.42​
Feb-44​
7,512​
271​
3.61​
2,380​
128​
5.38​
Mar-44​
8,773​
345​
3.93​
4,202​
85​
2.02​
Apr-44​
9,945​
420​
4.22​
8,084​
194​
2.40​
May-44​
13,975​
376​
2.69​
11,584​
175​
1.51​
Jun-44​
22,713​
320​
1.41​
10,001​
196​
1.96​
Jul-44​
18,864​
352​
1.87​
10,825​
317​
2.93​
Aug-44​
18,964​
331​
1.75​
10,760​
254​
2.36​
Sep-44​
15,617​
374​
2.39​
8,509​
94​
1.10​
Oct-44​
17,058​
177​
1.04​
6,037​
140​
2.32​
Nov-44​
15,245​
209​
1.37​
6,955​
132​
1.90​
Dec-44​
16,424​
119​
0.72​
7,235​
205​
2.83​
Jan-45​
14,750​
314​
2.13​
2,918​
88​
3.02​
Feb-45​
19,933​
196​
0.98​
10,748​
147​
1.37​
Mar-45​
28,804​
266​
0.92​
12,737​
149​
1.17​
Apr-45​
18,180​
190​
1.05​
11,771​
83​
0.71​
May-45​
2,254​
7​
0.31​
36​
14​
38.89​
Total
274,167​
5,506​
2.01​
147,111​
2,749​
1.87​

For June 1944 to May 1945 inclusive
8th AF 208,806 effective sorties (76.16% of total wartime), 2,855 heavy bombers lost, including 703 listed as lost to enemy aircraft and 1,764 to flak, 1.37% loss rate
MTO 98,532 attacking sorties (66.98% of total wartime), 1,819 heavy bombers lost, including 303 listed as lost to enemy aircraft and 1,042 to flak, 1.85% loss rate

In November 1943 the 15th Air Force inherited 4 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups from the 12th Air Force, which had in turn inherited B-24 groups from the 9th Air Force in September 1943.

8th Air Force using first mission dates as proof of a unit being operational, the first B-24 group became operational in October 1942, two months after the first B-17 group, and joined 4 operational B-17 groups.

The difficulties of these early days can be well shown by the way the 92nd Bomb Group, which had begun operations in September 1942, ceased operations in October 1942 to be turned into training units, it did not fly operationally again until May 1943. When it came back into the line 1 squadron had the YB-40, the B-17 gunship, for between 1 and 2 months.

There was the draw down for Torch, so by early November 1942 there were 2 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups operational, except the B-24 groups were only 3 squadrons, not 4 like the B-17s. And by mid November 1942 two more B-17 groups were declared operational. In December 1942 one of the B-24 groups left for Africa, returning in late February 1943 but the remaining group was given its fourth squadron.

The 8ths B-24 groups had an interesting 1943, with detachments to the Middle East, of which the Ploesti raid is the most famous. By mid year the 8th had 10 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups operational. The detachments meant that from the end of June to the beginning of September 1943 the 8th flew no B-24 operations while the number of B-17 groups rose to 16. (MTO detachments, 93rd 13 December 1942 to 20 February 1943, then 44th, 93rd, 389th 2 July to 21 August 1943, then 44th, 93rd, 389th again 21 September to 1 October 1943)

Then came the B-24 surge, by the end of 1943 it was 18 B-17 to 7 B-24 groups, by the end of March 1944 it was 20 to 10, and the peak was in June 1944, 21 to 19 in favour of the B-17, in squadron terms it was 83 B-17 to 73 B-24 in the bomber groups thanks to some squadron detachments, or 20.75 to 18.25 in group terms. (492nd being counted as B-24 here)

Around July 1944 the 8th began two processes, one was to convert the 3rd Bombardment Division to all B-17, the other was to regularise the various provisional units it had, like carpetbaggers. So by mid September 1944 the bomber groups were 26 B-17 to 13 B-24, with all groups having 4 squadrons. The 492nd Bomb Group had been turned into the carpetbagger unit.

The 34th, 486th, 487th, 490th and 493rd Bomb Groups were converted from B-24 to B-17 mid July to mid September 1944.

In November 1944 the 489th Bomb Group was sent back to the US, leaving the final ratio as 26 B-17 to 12 B-24.
 
I was intrigued by the MTO May-45 figures in Geoffrey's table (36 sorties, 14 losses) and decided to dig in deeper. With the help of my friends Google Gemini (yes, I know, I know).

Breakdown by Gemini:
CategoryB-24 LiberatorB-17 Flying FortressTotalPrimary Cause / Mechanism
Operational Crash516Takeoff/landing accidents, engine failures during transport runs, bad weather in the Alps.
Backlog Scrapping628Administrative condemnation of severely battle-damaged airframes leftover from March/April raids.
Total Logged11314Matches the USAAF Statistical Digest Table 123.

Also, according to Gemini:
36 sorties - May 1st, the Salzburg raid without any loss at all.
Total operational sorties in May-45 were over 2,000 and included transport, POW evacuation, etc.

Sources used by Gemini:
  • USAAF Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War II), Table 123 & Table 126 (Detailed breakdown of aircraft dispositions).
  • Aviation Archaeological Investigation & Research (AAIR), USAAF Overseas Accident Reports Database (May 1945).
  • Individual Aircraft History Cards (IAHC), MTO Heavy Bomber Blocks (B-24/B-17), archived via the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
 
Always good to compare the figures, helps understand what is being measured.
I was intrigued by the MTO May-45 figures in Geoffrey's table (36 sorties, 14 losses) and decided to dig in deeper. With the help of my friends Google Gemini (yes, I know, I know).

Breakdown by Gemini:
CategoryB-24 LiberatorB-17 Flying FortressTotalPrimary Cause / Mechanism
Operational Crash516Takeoff/landing accidents, engine failures during transport runs, bad weather in the Alps.
Backlog Scrapping628Administrative condemnation of severely battle-damaged airframes leftover from March/April raids.
Total Logged11314Matches the USAAF Statistical Digest Table 123.
From a now ancient copy of the USAAF accident listings. 15th Air Force Category 4 damage in May 1945, category 5 damage was automatic write off but no such incidents that month.

Landing Accident 1 B-17G, 1 B-24L, 1 B-24M
Taxiing Accident, 1 B-24L, 1 B-24M
Bailed Out due to Mechanical Failure 1 B-24G
Crashed on Take off Destroyed by Fire 1 B-24M.

Return to US date
98th BG B-24 19-Apr-45
376th BG B-24 19-Apr-45
485th BG B-24 8-May-45
449th BG B-24 15-May-45
450th BG B-24 15-May-45
460th BG B-24 20-May-45
484th BG B-24 22-May-45
464th BG B-24 25-May-45
465th BG B-24 25-May-45
451st BG B-24 30-May-45

On 31 May the 15th Air Force HQ gave up command of the remaining units. Like the 8th Air Force the B-24 units were mostly sent back to the US first, by end July 1945 the 8th AF had gone from 26 B-17 and 12 B-24 to 17 B-17.

Also, according to Gemini:
36 sorties - May 1st, the Salzburg raid without any loss at all.
Total operational sorties in May-45 were over 2,000 and included transport, POW evacuation, etc.
The 15th Air Force records I have do not mention the May 1945 PoW and supply flights, only the 1 bombing operation, Salzburg/Main M/Y on 1 May 1945 at 1126 used H2X, 2nd BG B-17, 27 effective and 1 non sortie, flak H-M-I, bombed at 25,600 feet through 9-10/10th cloud, 77.3 short toms of bombs, Note: Visar/NOSMO Mod II sighting.
Sources used by Gemini:
  • USAAF Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War II), Table 123 & Table 126 (Detailed breakdown of aircraft dispositions).
  • Aviation Archaeological Investigation & Research (AAIR), USAAF Overseas Accident Reports Database (May 1945).
  • Individual Aircraft History Cards (IAHC), MTO Heavy Bomber Blocks (B-24/B-17), archived via the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

USAAF 1945 Statistical Digest, table, title
118 Combat Sorties flown, by theater: December 1941 to August 1945.
119 Airborne and effective combat sorties flown in European Theater of Operations, by type of airplane: August 1942 to May 1945
120 Airborne and effective combat sorties flown in Mediterranean Theater of Operations, by type of airplane: June 1942 to May 1945
121 Airborne and effective combat sorties flown in Pacific Ocean Areas, by type of airplane: May 1942 to August 1945
122 Airborne and effective combat sorties flown in Far East Air Forces, by type of airplane: December 1941 to August 1945
123 Airborne and effective combat sorties flown in China & India-Burma, by type of airplane: February 1942 to August 1945
124 Airborne and effective combat sorties flown in Alaska, by type of airplane: January 1942 to August 1945
125 Airborne and effective combat sorties flown by Twentieth Air Force, by type of airplane: June 1944 to August 1945
126 Tons of bombs dropped by Twentieth Air Force, by type of airplane: June 1944 to August 1945.

The WWII USAAF Individual Aircraft Cards generally only note activity in the US, so details to export date, then either a loss date or a return date and resumption of details. You need the relevant command records for overseas service details.
 
Dimlee Dimlee and G Geoffrey Sinclair, stupid tangential question. You both mention POW flights in May 1945. Are there any records of such flights in April 1945, especially in the timeframe 1-11 April 1945?

I have a relative who was evacuated from a POW camp in that timeframe and I'm keen to discover how he got back to the UK.

Many thanks for any insights you can share.
 
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Dimlee Dimlee and G Geoffrey Sinclair, stupid tangential question. You both mention POW flights in May 1945. Are there any records of such flights in April 1945, especially in the timeframe 1-11 April 1945?

I have a relative who was evacuated from a POW camp in that timeframe and I'm keen to discover how he got back to the UK.

Many thanks for any insights you can share.
Hi, Buff. As an amateur in this field, I can only ask Gemini again. I just switched to Gemini Pro for a trial, so hopefully, there are no "hallucinations" with this model. But you never know...

If his relative flew back to the UK between April 1 and April 11, 1945, the logistics of that journey are uniquely well-documented because they were the very first flights of the operation.
Here is the breakdown of exactly how his relative likely got home, based on RAF operational history.

The April 1–11 Evacuation Window

By early April, Allied ground advances had liberated several major POW camps, and thousands of ex-prisoners were flooding into collection points in Holland and Belgium. They were starving, exhausted, and hundreds of miles from home.
  • April 2, 1945: RAF Transport Command received the green light for Operation Exodus. Airfields in the UK, such as RAF Oakley in Buckinghamshire, were ordered to prepare reception centers, medical facilities, and food for an influx of 300 men.
  • April 3, 1945: The first aircraft touched down. Because the heavy bomber squadrons were still actively bombing Germany, the initial April 1–11 lift was flown entirely by Nos. 38 and 46 Groups of RAF Transport Command.
  • The Aircraft: His relative almost certainly flew in a twin-engine Douglas Dakota (the RAF designation for the C-47 Skytrain). By the end of April, these Dakotas had safely transported 1,787 men before the four-engine bombers took over the heavy lifting.

The Route: From the Continent to the UK

If he was evacuated in that first week of April, his route was highly standardized:
  1. Departure Points: He would have been transported by truck or rail to newly secured forward airfields in Holland or Belgium (Brussels/Melsbroek was a massive hub).
  2. The Flight: Dakotas carried around 20–24 men at a time. The flight was relatively short but flew at low altitudes (around 2,000 feet) because the transport bays lacked oxygen systems for the passengers.
  3. Arrival Bases: The primary reception airfields in the UK during this early window were clustered in the south and midlands:
    • RAF Oakley and RAF Westcott (Buckinghamshire)
    • RAF Dunsfold (Surrey)
    • RAF Cosford (Shropshire)
Upon landing, the men were met with music over the tannoys, medical inspections (often dusting for lice with flit guns), and long tables of food reserved exclusively for them. From there, they were processed and given train warrants to go home.

Where Your Friend Can Find the Records

Flight manifests listing the names of individual POWs on specific aircraft rarely survived, as the goal was simply to load 24 men into a plane as fast as possible and go. However, the operational records are meticulously preserved. Your friend should look into:
  • RAF Operations Record Books (ORBs): Held at the UK National Archives in Kew (searchable online). Specifically, he wants the Form 540 (Summary of Events) and Form 541 (Detail of Work Carried Out) for RAF Transport Command Nos. 38 and 46 Groups for April 1945. These will log the exact dates, departure airfields, and number of men carried per flight.
  • Liberation Questionnaires: When British POWs returned, they were required to fill out an MI9 Liberation Questionnaire detailing their capture, camp conditions, and journey home. These are held at the National Archives under the reference WO 344. Finding his relative's specific questionnaire is the single best way to confirm his exact route.
Sources: RAF Museum ("The Long Trip Home" Archives); RAF Benevolent Fund (VE Day Operations); UK National Archives (AIR 27 - RAF Squadron ORBs).
Sources used by AI:

Here are the direct links to the digital portals and archival catalogs referenced, which your friend can use to trace the exact administrative records of his relative's evacuation.

The UK National Archives (Kew)

These two record series are the primary operational and personnel documents for tracing individual POW movements during the liberation window.
  • Liberation Questionnaires (Reference: WO 344)
    • Link: https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C14457
    • Researcher's Note: This is the most crucial link for his specific goal. He can search this specific collection within the "Discovery" portal using his relative's surname and initials. Many of these have been digitized and can be downloaded directly, detailing the exact camp, date of liberation, and route of return.
  • RAF Squadron Operations Record Books (Reference: AIR 27)
    • Link: https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C2106
    • Researcher's Note: To find the Transport Command flights (Nos. 38 and 46 Groups), he will need to search within AIR 27 for the specific squadrons attached to those groups (e.g., No. 24, No. 48, No. 271 Squadrons) and filter for April 1945.

Royal Air Force (RAF) Historical Resources

While the National Archives hold the raw data, the museum and benevolent organizations hold the contextual histories, crew narratives, and operational summaries of Operation Exodus.
  • RAF Museum Online Collection & Archives
    • Link: https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/
    • Researcher's Note: The RAF Museum holds extensive secondary literature, personal diaries, and logbooks of the Dakota pilots who flew the April 1–11 missions.
  • RAF Benevolent Fund - History of Operation Exodus

Additional Highly Credited Database

If his relative was part of an aircrew before capture, this is an indispensable secondary database:
  • International Bomber Command Centre (IBCC) Digital Archive
    • Link: https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/
    • Researcher's Note: If the relative was RAF bomber crew, the IBCC has digitized thousands of personal papers, POW logs, and post-war interviews regarding the exact logistical experience of returning to the UK in April/May 1945.
Once he gets back to you with the specific Oflag or Stalag, we can cross-reference it with the allied ground advances in early April to pinpoint exactly which forward airfield he was trucked to.
As I understand, the search can be narrowed if there is a camp's name.
Hope it's helpful, but please use this AI-generated information with caution.
 

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