parsifal
Colonel
It was the butt report, and it was 1941. BC came to the realization in late 1941 that effectively it was facing defeat. To avoid that massive reorganizations took place, to better increase the replacement rates, increased equipment and better application of technology. From the 2nd quarter of 1942 onward, the reforms, led by Harris began to take effect. BCs fight back really began with the first 1000 bomber raids in March i think.
1942 was still a rather stilted year for BC, but at last it was having some effect. so much so that the Germans had to sit up, take notice and do something about it. From 1943 onward, the battle took on mortal proportions as the stakes ever increased, and each side poured in ever increasing amounts of resources. BC began to achieve the upper hand from July IMO, and then Harris made a serious tactical mistake that really shook BC to the core, until the following July (or thereabouts) 1944. That mistake was to throw BC at berlin. From July loss rates began to fall quite dramatically, and damge inflicted increasing steadily as berlin was no longer the primary target. BC finally and belatedly included oil as one of its primary targets, though harris remained sceptical to the end. An increasing proportion of BC strikes were precision targets, undertaken by both night and day.
Like all things, the efforts of BC did not live up to full pre-wqar expectations. It proved incapable of winning the wqar single handedly. That has been seized on as evidence of its failure, along with some questionable interpretations of loss rates and damage assessments. I think those post war revisions are just as wide of the mark as the prewar bombast that tried to herald the heavy bomber as the new war winning solution to Britains apparent hopeless position. The truth, like most things, lies somewhere between these extremes.
1942 was still a rather stilted year for BC, but at last it was having some effect. so much so that the Germans had to sit up, take notice and do something about it. From 1943 onward, the battle took on mortal proportions as the stakes ever increased, and each side poured in ever increasing amounts of resources. BC began to achieve the upper hand from July IMO, and then Harris made a serious tactical mistake that really shook BC to the core, until the following July (or thereabouts) 1944. That mistake was to throw BC at berlin. From July loss rates began to fall quite dramatically, and damge inflicted increasing steadily as berlin was no longer the primary target. BC finally and belatedly included oil as one of its primary targets, though harris remained sceptical to the end. An increasing proportion of BC strikes were precision targets, undertaken by both night and day.
Like all things, the efforts of BC did not live up to full pre-wqar expectations. It proved incapable of winning the wqar single handedly. That has been seized on as evidence of its failure, along with some questionable interpretations of loss rates and damage assessments. I think those post war revisions are just as wide of the mark as the prewar bombast that tried to herald the heavy bomber as the new war winning solution to Britains apparent hopeless position. The truth, like most things, lies somewhere between these extremes.
