P-40 the RAF in 1940/41

[Shortround6]

Thank you for the corrections.

Just because you can stick XXX amount of fuel in a plane doesn't mean you should fly it in combat that way.

 

[Shortround6]

AS a further note to trying to use early P-40s in the BoB I would n ote that early Allison engines had a few problems that caused The Army and Allison to restrict power to 950hp for take-off (at 2770rpm) and 930 hp at 8,000ft (2770rpm) military and a "normal" rating (max continuous) of 838hp up to 8,000ft at 2600rpm until the engines in question (the first 228 built) could be sent back to the factory for rework (which included a new crankcase). It took Allison until April of 1941 to complete the rework what with their commitments to deliver new engines.
There were also problems with overspeeding due to slow response of the electric propeller and problems with the reduction gear which was a weak point and limited the ability of the engine to be over revved or over boosted. Confusingly one of the results of over speeding was not a failure of the reduction gear but a failure of the crankshaft near the #6 Bearing.
Early P-40s also used a different oil tank to later P-40Bs & Cs (and Tomahawks) that starved the engine of oil during inverted flight. A rather severe limitation for an actual combat aircraft.
Later production P-40Bs and Cs gave good service but the combat capability of P-40s of any type/model during the Summer/Fall of 1940 doesn't look good.

 

[bobbysocks]

Interesting about the stoppages. I didn't know it was that widespread of a problem. I quoted James Edwards earlier - he's got another bit on this issue;

"All Kittyhawks I flew had six .50 guns, excellent for strafing or blowing up a target. However, one very annoying feature was gun stoppages in the desert. In ground strafing one could count on firing all the ammo without problems, but when it came to dog-fighting and excessive 'G' forces came into play, the guns most always packed up after a few bursts, leaving the fighter in a most perilous position. The 109s never appeared to have any problem with the nose cannon ..."

It must have been maddening. Reading the accounts of his dogfights - many 109s escaped his (and many others obviously) grasp because of this.

I am wondering if gun/ammo arrangement in those p40s was the same or similar enough to those in the early mustangs...that seemed to suffer the same problem...???

 

[michaelmaltby]

RCAF Armourer on maintaining the 50's in the Aleutians:

"1) Corporal Max Crandall On the six 50 caliber machine guns:
"The P-40 carried three fifty calibre Browning Colt machine guns on each wing. The guns were cocked hydraulically and those hydraulics gave us so much trouble that we eventually disconnected them entirely, and from then on the guns were cocked manually before the aircraft went up. The only disadvantage to this was the fact that the pilot could no longer cock the guns from the cockpit, should one or more misfire for any reason. This wasn't a serious problem, though, as these guns were very dependable, but they had to be properly serviced." (Farm Boy Goes to War, page 23)
"We Canadians realized what effect the weather would have on our guns, especially a finely-machined weapon like the Browning Colt. We had one tent which we used as a shop and we made it a routine practice to remove the guns of each aircraft once a week - replace these with spares and proceed to strip, clean off any rust spots and re-oil these guns with a light gun oil."

 

[Milosh]

RCAF Armourer on maintaining the 50's in the Aleutians:

"1) Corporal Max Crandall On the six 50 caliber machine guns:
"The P-40 carried three fifty calibre Browning Colt machine guns on each wing. The guns were cocked hydraulically and those hydraulics gave us so much trouble that we eventually disconnected them entirely, and from then on the guns were cocked manually before the aircraft went up. The only disadvantage to this was the fact that the pilot could no longer cock the guns from the cockpit, should one or more misfire for any reason. This wasn't a serious problem, though, as these guns were very dependable, but they had to be properly serviced." (Farm Boy Goes to War, page 23)
"We Canadians realized what effect the weather would have on our guns, especially a finely-machined weapon like the Browning Colt. We had one tent which we used as a shop and we made it a routine practice to remove the guns of each aircraft once a week - replace these with spares and proceed to strip, clean off any rust spots and re-oil these guns with a light gun oil."

Were the guns re-harmonized?

 

[michaelmaltby]

"..... Were the guns re-harmonized?"

The account doesn't specify .... you can read it in the P-40 thread, account of Sqd 111

 

[stona]

"..... Were the guns re-harmonized?"

The account doesn't specify .... you can read it in the P-40 thread, account of Sqd 111

I would suggest that depends on the nature of the mounts and whether the previous adjustments for harmonisation had to be undone or altered to remove the weapons.
This would surely be covered in some manual for the type, if someone has it.

The Germans employed some nifty optical devices to align their aircraft guns without actually firing them.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Capt. Vick]

I remember reading in "Doomed From The Start" that the P-40's in the Philippines had the "cocking from the cockpit" feature disconnected by order of the brass back in the States because of all the problems they were having with it. In the book there were accounts of the guns packing up in a dogfight with no way to clear them. Sad that.

 

[stona]

In the book there were accounts of the guns packing up in a dogfight with no way to clear them. Sad that.

There is a remarkably restrained letter from the officer commanding No. 19 Squadron, Squadron Leader R Pinkham, following his squadron's unsuccessful attempt to employ two 20mm cannons in their Spitfires. On 16th August the cannon had functioned properly on just one of the seven Spitfires engaged, on the 19th it was none out of three, on the 24th two out of eight and on the 31st just three out of six.

Pinkham wrote:

"In all the engagements so far occurring it is considered that had the unit been equipped with eight gun fighters it would have inflicted far more severe losses on the enemy... It is most strongly urged that until the stoppages at present experienced have been eliminated this Squadron should be re-equipped with Browning gun Spitfires. It is suggested that a way of doing this would be to allot the current cannon armed Spitfires to an Operational Training Unit, and withdraw Browning gun Spitfires from there for use in this Squadron."

On 4th September the exchange was made. The aircraft received from the OTU (Haywarden) were not exactly pristine. The 19 Squadron diary noted:

" First day with the eight gun machines, and what wrecks. At least the guns will fire."

Armament that doesn't work is, quite literally, worse than useless.

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

There were a number of issues with the 50 cal installations but I don't know how many were common across more than one aircraft. Issues reported by veterans included:

1. Ammunition shifting during combat (known for the P-51 and reportedly also the F4F).
2. The manual re-cock feature not working correctly in P-40s (as recounted by Capt Vick).
3. Breach blocks had to be reworked by the armourers to get them to function correctly (Buffalo).
4. Gun firing solenoids not being sufficiently powerful (Buffalo).
5. Interrupter gear for fuselage guns would fail frequently (Buffalo).

All in all, not an inspiring list of issues if you're going into battle with these weapons. Nos 1, 2, 4 and 5 could be the fault of the aircraft manufacturer - I'm not sure whether the gun maker or the aircraft manufacturer was responsible for ancillary items related to the gun (although I'd be surprised if the gun solenoids were not sourced with the guns themselves). However, 3 is definitely a fault of the gun.

 

[MIflyer]

That big belly tank was used on the BF-110 when they escorted bombers across the North Sea from Norway during the BoB. They figured that the RAF would never expect an attack from that direction.

The 110's had to leave the rear gunners at home to be able to carry that big tank. Imagine trying to turn around and look back through that greenhouse to spot enemy fighters closing on your tail.

And when they tried to jettison those big tanks they did not come off, frozen in place due to ice accumulated at altitude. You can imagine what occurred when the Spitfires and Hurricanes showed up. The Luftwaffe never tried that trick again.

 

[stona]

That big belly tank was used on the BF-110 when they escorted bombers across the North Sea from Norway during the BoB. They figured that the RAF would never expect an attack from that direction.

The 110's had to leave the rear gunners at home to be able to carry that big tank. Imagine trying to turn around and look back through that greenhouse to spot enemy fighters closing on your tail.

And when they tried to jettison those big tanks they did not come off, frozen in place due to ice accumulated at altitude. You can imagine what occurred when the Spitfires and Hurricanes showed up. The Luftwaffe never tried that trick again.

1. The RAF did expect attacks from that direction, the surprise was that they didn't materialise in strength until 15th August and were so easily defeated. It's why Fighter Command was organised the way it was and why the northern Groups, particularly 13 Group, could meet the attack when it came in such strength.

2. The fitting of the 'Dackelbauch' did not mean that the second crewman could not be carried. Specifically for the Luftflotte 5 raid to which you refer, all the Bf 110s lost were lost with two crew. For example, Bf 110 D-1 M8+EK of 2./ZG 76 shot down into sea by fighters of the Northumberland coast, crew Fw. Klaus Ladwein and Ogefr. Karl Wenk. (Ladwein was captured, Wenk was killed). As well as the Bf 110s shot down, several got home damaged, two with a wounded crewman, one crashed killing one of the crew (Uffz. Geischecker) and injuring the other (Uffz. Richter).

3. The 'Dackelbauch' could not be jettisoned in flight. Where the story about them being frozen in place comes from I know not.

Sorry, but your score is nought out of three

Cheers

Steve

 

[MIflyer]

Well, what can I say. A certain reference work seems to be in error.

 

[pbehn]

1. The RAF did expect attacks from that direction, the surprise was that they didn't materialise in strength until 15th August and were so easily defeated. It's why Fighter Command was organised the way it was and why the northern Groups, particularly 13 Group, could meet the attack when it came in such strength.

There were mistakes make on both sides. The radar operators badly underestimated the strength at first if the correct number of fighters were sent up it could have been a massacre.

 

[stona]

Well, what can I say. A certain reference work seems to be in error.

That information is culled from about half a dozen sources and the original German loss reports and a Bf 110 manual.
Which of the three are you disputing?

 

[stona]

There were mistakes make on both sides. The radar operators badly underestimated the strength at first if the correct number of fighters were sent up it could have been a massacre.

There were always mistakes, that is the nature of war. The Luftflotte 5 raids were a disaster for the Luftwaffe if not a massacre. It's losses amounted to about 20% of the force committed to the two raids.

The Germans first error on the first raid was navigational. The main force arrived just south of the Firth of Forth, just south of the diversionary raid mounted by He 115 seaplanes, designed to draw the defenders north. It did that, but drew them onto the main force!
The British did underestimate the size of the raid, but this was not unusual, establishing numbers from radar plots was more art than science and depended very much on the expertise of the operators. Those in the north (the raid was first seen by Anstruther Chain Home Station) were less experienced. Nonetheless Nos 72, 605, 41, and 79 Squadrons all made contact and engaged the raid in succession. Eight He 111s and seven Bf 110s failed to return from this raid.
The second raid was carried out by unescorted bombers of KG 30 from Denmark. This was first seen by Staxton Wold Chain Home Station and intercepted by 12 Group. This time of the four squadrons tasked to the raid No. 616 and a flight of No. 73 made contact and another five bombers were shot down. The raid did press on and bombed RAF Driffield and Bridlington with some damage caused.

Some authors (like Bishop) state that rear gunners (meaning wireless operators, gunnery was a secondary role) were not carried by some Bf 110s on the early raid, but all the aircraft lost, seriously enough damaged to be recorded or with wounded crewmen were carrying both crew members. This amounted to about one in three of the Bf 110s committed.
Either these supposedly single crewed aircraft were among those that returned undamaged and with the crew unwounded, which seems statistically unlikely, or someone has made a mistake that has been repeated enough to be taken as fact.
I'm not sure how keen I'd be to undertake a long, over water, combat operation with no means of communicating with anyone else in my unit, the bombers, or my base.

John Vasco, who has forgotten more about the Bf 110 and the men who flew them than most of us have ever known, makes no mention of this. He does mention that the six aircraft lost in the initial combats had a full complement of 12 crew onboard (three of whom survived) and that all three that returned damaged ( including the seventh loss) were likewise crewed.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

The British did underestimate the size of the raid, but this was not unusual, establishing numbers from radar plots was more art than science and depended very much on the expertise of the operators. Those in the north (the raid was first seen by Anstruther Chain Home Station) were less experienced. Nonetheless Nos 72, 605, 41, and 79 Squadrons all made contact and engaged the raid in succession. Eight He 111s and seven Bf 110s failed to return from this raid.

Expertise comes with practice In the south they had seen a lot of activity prior to the first big raids, feed back from pilots allows them to calibrate the system. If the size of the raid had been correctly estimated then the outcome would have been much different. Having used a CRT for ultrasonics I know how difficult it is.

 

[stona]

Expertise comes with practice In the south they had seen a lot of activity prior to the first big raids, feed back from pilots allows them to calibrate the system. If the size of the raid had been correctly estimated then the outcome would have been much different. Having used a CRT for ultrasonics I know how difficult it is.

I'm not sure we can be sure of that. Four squadrons were tasked to and intercepted the raid. The squadron was the standard tactical unit of Fighter Command and the successive interceptions were exactly how the system was supposed to work. If we look at where the interceptions occurred it is obvious that there waould not have been time to assemble a larger intercepting force, this was the fallacy of 12 Group's 'Big Wing' theory
I would have to see what other units were available to 13 Group, and what their status was, but in any case it is unlikely that many more would have been committed to one raid. We know that the next raid would arrive further south and be taken on by 12 Group, but we have the benefit of hindsight.

This was the end of the BoB for I./ZG 76, it never again flew against Britain and was eventually recalled to Germany where it was incorporated into the developing night fighter force.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

For those who understandably have no idea where Anstruther and Staxton Wold might be here's a map of the Chain Home system, as of July/August 1940 from Jack Gough's excellent 'Watching the Skies-the history of ground radar in the air defence of the United Kingdom".

There's even a bit of Norway peeking in top right to give perspective on the raids in question

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

I'm not sure we can be sure of that. Four squadrons were tasked to and intercepted the raid. The squadron was the standard tactical unit of Fighter Command and the successive interceptions were exactly how the system was supposed to work. If we look at where the interceptions occurred it is obvious that there would not have been time to assemble a larger intercepting force, this was the fallacy of 12 Group's 'Big Wing' theory

All is conjecture but the raid was originally thought to be 30+ when in fact it was a 100+ the response would therefore be different. In fact whatever the response it would have been the last raid, it was launched to test the theory that Fighter Command was taking squadrons from the north and it again showed that the 110 was incapable of protecting bombers.