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By "mission was the same" do we mean the same type of mission or that both P-47's and P-51's were flying literally against the same targets, at the same time and facing the same defensive fire? Were both types taking about the same number of hits per sortie? Were P-47's more likely to be hit in such missions? Were P-47's more likely to be delivering bombs? Does that matter?
8th AF doctrine had all fighter groups flying escort (penetration, target, withdrawal, fighter bomber sweep, sweep, etc.
What is the "same time" period that we are taking about? The first air to ground attacks on enemy airfields were performed by the 78th FG and 355th FG in P-47s in February and March, 1944. The Mustangs came into USAAF 8th AF to replace P-47s in February 1944, then 355th and 4th FG in late Feb/early March, 1944. The 357th came into ops in Feb 1944
How do we count "aircraft destroyed on the ground"?
By virtue of the same governing authority as 'aircraft destroyed in the air' - namely the USAAF 8th AF Victory Credits Board, who as far as I know did not discriminate (use different criteria) betweeen ground/air scores in P-38, P-47 and P-51 aircraft. Originally the ground score also included Destryed/Probable and Damaged but later changed to Destroyed or Damaged.
About mid April the criteria for Destroyed included observable fire or explosion for ground destruction of aircraft. The 355th pioneered the process of one aircraft orbiting, taking film and counting fires to help the VCB get better data.
Do we mean aircraft that appeared to have been destroyed on the ground as claimed by US fighter pilots flying above? We mean AWARDs (right or wrong) granted by the 8th AF VCB using the additional criteria of observation of the airfield in addition to individual gun camera film and eyewitness reports.
Were any of those "destroyed" aircraft not really destroyed but just damaged?
Probably.... as well as some claimed as damaged were actually destroyed - what judgment are YOU going to apply otherwise? if you choose to question ground awards for P-51s wahy do you suppose P-47 awards were more refined or belivable"
Was it more likely for P-51 or P-47 drivers to actually destroy an aircraft on the ground as opposed to it just appearing to have been destroyed and claiming it to be destroyed? Did the eight gun battery of the P-47's generally inflict more damage per strafing run thus making it more likely that aircraft that appeared destroyed were actually destroyed?
Who knows - do You? If you question 8th AFVCB for ground scores, do you also discount all 56th FG air scores because they were AWARDED by 8th AF VCB?
Are we also relying on German data on aircraft destroyed on the ground in a given location at a given time and then trying to match that to US records of claims of aircraft destroyed on the ground at those same locations? Does this pose any problems?
Of course - do you have a better source?
Did more P-51's in a given mission fly against such targets than P-47's? Were larger numbers of attacking aircraft able to neutralize anti aircraft measures to a greater extent than their increased numbers provided additional targets for anti-aircraft gunners? Did larger numbers of attacking aircraft result in multiple claims on the same destroyed aircraft due to more passes on the same grounded aircraft? Were P-51's more likely to re-visit the same targets and thus possibly re-destroy and reclaim some of the same aircraft previously hit and totaled?
Who knows - do you? Are we now in the market for questioning or comparing 'Statistical' data??
How do targets of opportunity fit in where US claims of aircraft destroyed on the ground can't be reliably matched to specific locations for which German data is available? Were P-51's more likely to engage targets of opportunity pursuant to their roving around on longer missions that afforded more targets deeper into enemy territory? Did P-47's have access to those same targets? Do we discount US claims for which we don't have corroborating German data? Would this be more likely to affect P-51 or P-47 claim totals?
Answer your own questions - use Statistics' as your bible?
It sounds like there are too many "wild cards" and I suspect that you, with your wealth of knowledge, can not only dispel some of the issues I have raised above, but can identify additional issues that would interfere in any evaluation based on the limited parameters you have constructed. I do know, however, that at the Report of Joint Fighter Conference, NAS Patuxent River, MD 16-23 October 1944, the following discussion ensued:
Lieutenant Gavin: "In connection with this discussion by the aircraft manufacturers, on the preference of an engine, I think it would be interesting if we could have comment from some of the Army people here as to relative vulnerability of the liquid-cooled and air-cooled installations based on their experience in Europe."
Colonel Garman: "I can only speak for the African Theater and only for a particular type of operation. The P-38 was used at low level on many occasions and we found that it was quite vulnerable to ground fire - any type of ground fire, even small-arms fire. But the other airplanes also experienced that same ground fire and the radial engines brought the planes home. You can't lay down any hard and fast rule and say the inline is no good at low altitude as far as ground fire is concerned. It all depends on the operation entirely."
Lieutenant Colonel Tyler: "We have data which shows that in the entire European theater the P-47 is much better able to take punishment and return after any sort of mission - either ground attack or any mission which incurs damage. That may be due to the P-47 airplane or due to the air-cooled feature. We don't know which but it certainly can take it better than the other plane types."
And the data he cited was what???
It would be interesting to obtain that "data."
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I posed to you 'how do you reconcile the lower performance of P-47 stafing credits to strafing losses vs the P-51 and you threw up a blizzard of anecdotal disussions and questions?
You said:
what are your thoughts regarding why 8th AF Mustangs destroyed 50% more aircraft on the ground per Mustang lost to flak than the 8th AF Jugs?
I didn't attempt a reconciliation of the stats you provided. I responded with my thoughts about a naked stat.
As I also said, "I suspect that you, with your wealth of knowledge, can not only dispel some of the issues I have raised above, but can identify additional issues that would interfere in any evaluation based on the limited parameters you have constructed."
I would venture that you know a great deal about the facts behind that data and I have the distinct impression that you think you can reconcile the data which you provided. You posed the stat. Not me. You posed the question about thoughts and then reconciliation. Not me.
Here's an idea. Why why don't you answer your own question. I for one would like to know the answer as well and as I have indicated, I do not have an answer for you.
There are no comprehensive statistics that I know of for the naval services which plot loss rates per sortie for the whole Korean War. The loss stats I quoted above is from the last (July '53) of the Navy's monthly reports of losses and losses to date in Korean ops by type, but it doesn't give sorties. The USN did a number of 'interim reports' of Korean ops that have loss rates for sub periods for USN a/c. Also USMC unit period records in Korea were very detailed, much more than USN. Sortie loss rates could be calculated bottom up from those reports. USAF (5th AF) also had a series of monthly reports that gave both losses and sorties, and total losses and sorties are quoted as well.Ditto for a similar conclusion between F4U and Mustang. I say this ONLY because I am not aware of a survey to compare the two a/c for Korean War ops. Ditto for P-47 vs P-51.
W
Notice the last sentence of post #336. I stand by the above statements which are appropriately qualified and explained and frankly do not care if they are not good enough for you.
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There are no comprehensive statistics that I know of for the naval services which plot loss rates per sortie for the whole Korean War. The loss stats I quoted above is from the last (July '53) of the Navy's monthly reports of losses and losses to date in Korean ops by type, but it doesn't give sorties. The USN did a number of 'interim reports' of Korean ops that have loss rates for sub periods for USN a/c. Also USMC unit period records in Korea were very detailed, much more than USN. Sortie loss rates could be calculated bottom up from those reports. USAF (5th AF) also had a series of monthly reports that gave both losses and sorties, and total losses and sorties are quoted as well.
The problem is, a raw comparison of F4U and F-51 sorties loss rates *would* in general be apples and oranges. Several of the doubts and challenges to the F4U v F6F comparison, which are not really valid in that case, *would* be valid objections in an F4U v F-51 Korea comparison. Such as most of the combined USN and USMC F4U losses in Korea were from carriers, and comparing carrier to land based losses penalizes the carrier plane, not only for accidents but combat losses where a land based plane would have been able to land. Then, even comparing USMC land based to USAF, the possibility of different mission profiles and tactics is a much more real concern. In F4U v F6F case we know both a/c were *hit* about as often, further reassuring us of similar mission profiles in the carrier only, 'encountered AA' only, sorties in the 1945 stats. In Korea AFAIK there are no stats for rate of a/c *hit*.
The USN and USMC specifically changed tactics as the KW went on to raise the altitude of ordnance release and cut down some of the losses. So it's very possible that in any given period USAF and USMC tactics actually did differ, and the Marines wouldn't necessarily have been the more aggressive at all times.
But with all that said, from what I've seen F4U and F-51 loss rates in Korea were very broadly similar, and F-51's were ~.5% per combat sortie. Those were of course lower rates than typical in WWII. But they were mainly viewed as high in both services compared to much lower loss rates of jets on strike missions (for example F-80's rate=.15%, and most of its missions were ground strike for most of the war*), and v the AD's lower loss rate in case of the naval services.
*Navy jet types too; in the "Bridges at Toko-ri" (book version) one small caliber bullet knocks out a twin engine F2H, and it could theoretically have happened, but in general jets were harder to hit because of their speed, and also tougher if hit.
Joe
The F4U-4 did not see combat until the end of 1944. The P-47N was delivered to front line squadrons by the end of 1944 but I don't think it saw combat until the beginning of 1945.
Regarding the roll performance of the P47, this is a quote from my "Bible" "America's Hundred Thousand," by Dean, page 302, '
" Nobody raved about the aileron performance of P47s, though data from the P47C-1 showed a peak roll rate of about 85 degrees per second (a 4.2 second full roll) at 250 mph IAS with a 50 pound pilot force on the stick. Other information, for a P47D-30 or D-40 indicated a peak of about 60 degrees per second ( a 6 second roll) at around 220 mph IAS using a stick force of 30 pounds. Roll rate dropped to half that value at 400 mph IAS."