P-47N Thunderbolt vs. F4U-4 Corsair - Which was superior?

[DAVIDICUS]

Remember also that when a plane went down, the ensuing rescue operation risked aditional lives and hardware as well. I have a book that mentions Corsair and Skyraider pilots' awareness of the vulnerability of the Corsair issue in that context.

I will drag it out when I get back from being out of town.

 

[drgondog]

By "mission was the same" do we mean the same type of mission or that both P-47's and P-51's were flying literally against the same targets, at the same time and facing the same defensive fire? Were both types taking about the same number of hits per sortie? Were P-47's more likely to be hit in such missions? Were P-47's more likely to be delivering bombs? Does that matter?

8th AF doctrine had all fighter groups flying escort (penetration, target, withdrawal, fighter bomber sweep, sweep, etc.

What is the "same time" period that we are taking about? The first air to ground attacks on enemy airfields were performed by the 78th FG and 355th FG in P-47s in February and March, 1944. The Mustangs came into USAAF 8th AF to replace P-47s in February 1944, then 355th and 4th FG in late Feb/early March, 1944. The 357th came into ops in Feb 1944

How do we count "aircraft destroyed on the ground"?

By virtue of the same governing authority as 'aircraft destroyed in the air' - namely the USAAF 8th AF Victory Credits Board, who as far as I know did not discriminate (use different criteria) betweeen ground/air scores in P-38, P-47 and P-51 aircraft. Originally the ground score also included Destryed/Probable and Damaged but later changed to Destroyed or Damaged.

About mid April the criteria for Destroyed included observable fire or explosion for ground destruction of aircraft. The 355th pioneered the process of one aircraft orbiting, taking film and counting fires to help the VCB get better data.


Do we mean aircraft that appeared to have been destroyed on the ground as claimed by US fighter pilots flying above? We mean AWARDs (right or wrong) granted by the 8th AF VCB using the additional criteria of observation of the airfield in addition to individual gun camera film and eyewitness reports.


Were any of those "destroyed" aircraft not really destroyed but just damaged?

Probably.... as well as some claimed as damaged were actually destroyed - what judgment are YOU going to apply otherwise? if you choose to question ground awards for P-51s wahy do you suppose P-47 awards were more refined or belivable"

Was it more likely for P-51 or P-47 drivers to actually destroy an aircraft on the ground as opposed to it just appearing to have been destroyed and claiming it to be destroyed? Did the eight gun battery of the P-47's generally inflict more damage per strafing run thus making it more likely that aircraft that appeared destroyed were actually destroyed?

Who knows - do You? If you question 8th AFVCB for ground scores, do you also discount all 56th FG air scores because they were AWARDED by 8th AF VCB?

Are we also relying on German data on aircraft destroyed on the ground in a given location at a given time and then trying to match that to US records of claims of aircraft destroyed on the ground at those same locations? Does this pose any problems?

Of course - do you have a better source?

Did more P-51's in a given mission fly against such targets than P-47's? Were larger numbers of attacking aircraft able to neutralize anti aircraft measures to a greater extent than their increased numbers provided additional targets for anti-aircraft gunners? Did larger numbers of attacking aircraft result in multiple claims on the same destroyed aircraft due to more passes on the same grounded aircraft? Were P-51's more likely to re-visit the same targets and thus possibly re-destroy and reclaim some of the same aircraft previously hit and totaled?

Who knows - do you? Are we now in the market for questioning or comparing 'Statistical' data??

How do targets of opportunity fit in where US claims of aircraft destroyed on the ground can't be reliably matched to specific locations for which German data is available? Were P-51's more likely to engage targets of opportunity pursuant to their roving around on longer missions that afforded more targets deeper into enemy territory? Did P-47's have access to those same targets? Do we discount US claims for which we don't have corroborating German data? Would this be more likely to affect P-51 or P-47 claim totals?

Answer your own questions - use Statistics' as your bible?

It sounds like there are too many "wild cards" and I suspect that you, with your wealth of knowledge, can not only dispel some of the issues I have raised above, but can identify additional issues that would interfere in any evaluation based on the limited parameters you have constructed. I do know, however, that at the Report of Joint Fighter Conference, NAS Patuxent River, MD 16-23 October 1944, the following discussion ensued:



Lieutenant Gavin: "In connection with this discussion by the aircraft manufacturers, on the preference of an engine, I think it would be interesting if we could have comment from some of the Army people here as to relative vulnerability of the liquid-cooled and air-cooled installations based on their experience in Europe."

Colonel Garman: "I can only speak for the African Theater and only for a particular type of operation. The P-38 was used at low level on many occasions and we found that it was quite vulnerable to ground fire - any type of ground fire, even small-arms fire. But the other airplanes also experienced that same ground fire and the radial engines brought the planes home. You can't lay down any hard and fast rule and say the inline is no good at low altitude as far as ground fire is concerned. It all depends on the operation entirely."

Lieutenant Colonel Tyler: "We have data which shows that in the entire European theater the P-47 is much better able to take punishment and return after any sort of mission - either ground attack or any mission which incurs damage. That may be due to the P-47 airplane or due to the air-cooled feature. We don't know which but it certainly can take it better than the other plane types."

And the data he cited was what???

It would be interesting to obtain that "data."
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All agreed - I posed to you 'how do you reconcile the lower performance ofP-47 stafing credits to strafing losses vs the P-51 and you threw up a blizzard of anecdotal disussions and questions?

What is your answer - base it on facts not desire to skew it to one conclusion or another based on personal preference.

 

[DAVIDICUS]

I posed to you 'how do you reconcile the lower performance of P-47 stafing credits to strafing losses vs the P-51 and you threw up a blizzard of anecdotal disussions and questions?

You said:

what are your thoughts regarding why 8th AF Mustangs destroyed 50% more aircraft on the ground per Mustang lost to flak than the 8th AF Jugs?

I didn't attempt a reconciliation of the stats you provided. I responded with my thoughts about a naked stat.

As I also said, "I suspect that you, with your wealth of knowledge, can not only dispel some of the issues I have raised above, but can identify additional issues that would interfere in any evaluation based on the limited parameters you have constructed."

I would venture that you know a great deal about the facts behind that data and I have the distinct impression that you think you can reconcile the data which you provided. You posed the stat. Not me. You posed the question about thoughts and then reconciliation. Not me.

Here's an idea. Why why don't you answer your own question. I for one would like to know the answer as well and as I have indicated, I do not have an answer for you.

 

[drgondog]

I posed to you 'how do you reconcile the lower performance of P-47 stafing credits to strafing losses vs the P-51 and you threw up a blizzard of anecdotal disussions and questions?

You said:

what are your thoughts regarding why 8th AF Mustangs destroyed 50% more aircraft on the ground per Mustang lost to flak than the 8th AF Jugs?

I didn't attempt a reconciliation of the stats you provided. I responded with my thoughts about a naked stat.

As I also said, "I suspect that you, with your wealth of knowledge, can not only dispel some of the issues I have raised above, but can identify additional issues that would interfere in any evaluation based on the limited parameters you have constructed."

I would venture that you know a great deal about the facts behind that data and I have the distinct impression that you think you can reconcile the data which you provided. You posed the stat. Not me. You posed the question about thoughts and then reconciliation. Not me.

Here's an idea. Why why don't you answer your own question. I for one would like to know the answer as well and as I have indicated, I do not have an answer for you.

Fair enough D.

Simply stated is that one may not draw statistical conclusions as there is not enough data regarding flak defenses at airfields in different locations (but one may assume airfields with Me 262s ALWAYS had very strong defenses - mostly out of Jug range). The 355th lost a lot of Mustangs in the Augsburg, Leipheim, Oberpfaffenhofenetc airfields around Munich.

The only way, in my opinion, would to be build up a body of facts for P-47s and P-51's attacking the same airfields over a significant period of time, and at essentially the same time frame. I would like to see that in the USN reports also.

8th AF Mustangs were strafing airfields all over Germany, in addition to the same ones strafed by Jugs (Western Germany, Holland, France), as well as strafing in Czechoslovakia and Poland - so the Mustang coverage was approximately four times the area reachable by the P-47 until the very late P-47D-25 and M.

We can point out how tough a Jug was and pitiful the Mustang was to ground fire - but the airfield strafing statistics don't seem to support the conclusions. I am equally circumspect about F6F and F4U statistics and drawing conclusion that the oil cooler was the culprit. I can agree it was more vulnerable, but someone has to do some serious presentation before I conclude that any definite percentage of F4U losses were due primarily to hits to the very small area represented - relative to say the pilot or the fuel tank or a even a fuel line.

Other questions raised already lead back to doctrine - were the F4U's more prone to be in the dirt with F6F flying higher runs? Were the targets attacked essentially and statistically the same from a defense capability standpoint?

I respect the USN analysis, just don't have enough data to come to same conclusions?

 

[DAVIDICUS]

The only way, in my opinion, would to be build up a body of facts for P-47s and P-51's attacking the same airfields over a significant period of time, and at essentially the same time frame. I would like to see that in the USN reports also.

NACS report indicated that Corsairs were 58% more likely to be losses from AA fire than Hellcats when actually hit by AA in the same time period, flying from the same ships and flying missions under the "same conditions" in "comparable operations" where the two aircraft received "about the same number of hits per sortie."

Other questions raised already lead back to doctrine - were the F4U's more prone to be in the dirt with F6F flying higher runs? Were the targets attacked essentially and statistically the same from a defense capability standpoint?

You raised that question earlier in post #280

Ditto the F4U vs F6F. I suppose the USN may have had some sense of the mission profiles but it would be interesting for example to look at losses at Okinawa where the AA was heavy and the fighters were at very low level. Were more F6F's flying CAP for the fleet while the Corsairs were getting singed on the deck?

JoeB addressed that exact point in post #282

The figures are damaged suffered and losses per sortie encountering AA. So it should basically correct for mission profile differences. It wouldn't include pure air to air sorties, nor total milk run ground attack sorties. And 1945 carrier sorties only, so cuts out a lot USMC operations on Okinawa (which I doubt was heaviest AA loss environment anyway, that would probably have been going after airfields in Japan, as it had similarly been in ETO). And as mentioned already stats are given for both a/c damaged and lost, and rate of damage was similar, undercutting any assumption of a hidden difference in average mission profile or tactics between the two types on 'sorties encountering AA'. The main difference was % of a/c hit by AA which didn't make it back, which was much higher for the F4U, and that's actually the succinct point made in the notes to the NASC table, as quoted above.

Obviously JoeB is more knowledgeable than I with respect to the reasons for your continuing doubt. If he has not already tired of this dead horse beating exercise, perhaps he will re-address your continuing doubt.

 

[drgondog]

I respect JoeB's opinions. I respect the USN reports. I respect the individual pilot accounts.

What I question, only because I have not seen the data from which the statistics were derived, is the collection and allocation process to view the combat reports, gather the staistically quantifiable data surrounding the variables being examined, see what was tossed and what was included... then see what data was sampling process reliable for 'oil cooler' losses between the two ships.

So I remain skeptical of the process of assigning oil cooler as the prime determinant, much less assign a percentage to it. I can intuitively agree it was a point of vulnerability, just not prepared to accept assign a reliable percentage cause of failure to the F4U oil cooler.

Having said THAT, I am more comfortable with a conclusion that for the same mission profile in the same period, for the aircraft losses when flak was a factor - the the F6F was less vulnearble per sortie than the F4U. That would represent a fact gathering/validation process less subject to error than digging out primary system failure cause

THAT conclusion is less of a reach than assigning "oil Cooler' as a statistically measurable cause of failure. My mind would change if I was told that there was a high enough population of pilots downed that were able to report to another pilot that his oil pressure had dropped after being hit... and that the data was included in the vulnerabilty report as a footnote.

Summary - I agree JoeB's conclusions that the USN was able to reduce the comparison between F6F to F4U to the primary variable of ships lost to number of ships damage by flak to number of sorties in which flak was encountered to point one or more ships were damaged. I GET THIS. I ACCEPT THIS. I AM NOT DEBATING THIS (I am not shouting - just want you to understand what I am debating versus what I agree)

What I have expressed the most 'doubt about' is the conclusion a.) that the Oild Cooler was as statistically provable root cause as the primary reason for much higher loss rate for F4U, and b.) your presumption that the P-47 was less vulnerable than the F4U without bringing the data and the assumptions and the analysis to the table?

Back to the Thread - there is no data to support a conclusion that the F4U was more or less vulnerable to flak than a P-47N.

Ditto for a similar conclusion between F4U and Mustang. I say this ONLY because I am not aware of a survey to compare the two a/c for Korean War ops. Ditto for P-47 vs P-51.

I apologize for distressing you with my continuing doubt bhave many other flaws we haven't addressed yet.

 

[JoeB]

Ditto for a similar conclusion between F4U and Mustang. I say this ONLY because I am not aware of a survey to compare the two a/c for Korean War ops. Ditto for P-47 vs P-51.

There are no comprehensive statistics that I know of for the naval services which plot loss rates per sortie for the whole Korean War. The loss stats I quoted above is from the last (July '53) of the Navy's monthly reports of losses and losses to date in Korean ops by type, but it doesn't give sorties. The USN did a number of 'interim reports' of Korean ops that have loss rates for sub periods for USN a/c. Also USMC unit period records in Korea were very detailed, much more than USN. Sortie loss rates could be calculated bottom up from those reports. USAF (5th AF) also had a series of monthly reports that gave both losses and sorties, and total losses and sorties are quoted as well.

The problem is, a raw comparison of F4U and F-51 sorties loss rates *would* in general be apples and oranges. Several of the doubts and challenges to the F4U v F6F comparison, which are not really valid in that case, *would* be valid objections in an F4U v F-51 Korea comparison. Such as most of the combined USN and USMC F4U losses in Korea were from carriers, and comparing carrier to land based losses penalizes the carrier plane, not only for accidents but combat losses where a land based plane would have been able to land. Then, even comparing USMC land based to USAF, the possibility of different mission profiles and tactics is a much more real concern. In F4U v F6F case we know both a/c were *hit* about as often, further reassuring us of similar mission profiles in the carrier only, 'encountered AA' only, sorties in the 1945 stats. In Korea AFAIK there are no stats for rate of a/c *hit*.

The USN and USMC specifically changed tactics as the KW went on to raise the altitude of ordnance release and cut down some of the losses. So it's very possible that in any given period USAF and USMC tactics actually did differ, and the Marines wouldn't necessarily have been the more aggressive at all times.

But with all that said, from what I've seen F4U and F-51 loss rates in Korea were very broadly similar, and F-51's were ~.5% per combat sortie. Those were of course lower rates than typical in WWII. But they were mainly viewed as high in both services compared to much lower loss rates of jets on strike missions (for example F-80's rate=.15%, and most of its missions were ground strike for most of the war*), and v the AD's lower loss rate in case of the naval services.

*Navy jet types too; in the "Bridges at Toko-ri" (book version) one small caliber bullet knocks out a twin engine F2H, and it could theoretically have happened, but in general jets were harder to hit because of their speed, and also tougher if hit.

Joe

 

[DAVIDICUS]

What I have expressed the most 'doubt about' is the conclusion ... and b.) your presumption that the P-47 was less vulnerable than the F4U without bringing the data and the assumptions and the analysis to the table?

Back to the Thread - there is no data to support a conclusion that the F4U was more or less vulnerable to flak than a P-47N.

Agree that there is no "data" to support a conclusion that the F4U was more or less vulnerable to flak than a P-47N. The only "data" I have brought to the table, so to speak, is that the F4U was far more vulnerable than the Hellcat. I have lots of presumptions and opinions drgndog. On this forum we all throw around speculation, presumption, extrapolation, etc. when comparing aircraft (something that goes on an awful lot here) as there is very little hard data that affords apples to apples comparisons for which we can assign conclusions grounded in established fact. Are you now the forum's policeman who will be issuing citations every time someone throws out an opinion based on an assumption for which there is no hard data available?

As for the "conclusion" you seem to think I have issued and are foisting upon others, let's review exactly what I have said.


Post #309

Assuming the culprit here is the oil cooling design which confers a tremendous advantage to the Hellcat and because the Hellcat and Thunderbolt share the same oil cooling design and there are no known issues (none that I know of) with survivability that are Thunderbolt specific, I would prefer the Thunderbolt for ground support as it would "appear" to have more than a significant edge in survivability over the Corsair.

Post #324

With respect to Corsair v. Thunderbolt, I think that for ground attack, the astonishing vulnerability of the Corsair simply made it unsuitable for ground attack. I think that for low and medium altitude air combat, the Corsair was quite excellent. I think that for high altitude escort work, 25,000ft and above, the Corsair was again unsuitable. Conversely, I think the Thunderbolt was quite excellent for ground attack and higher altitude escort work.

Post #336

I know that the P-51 also performed admirably in air to ground operations. In my opinion, if the same defended target could be reached with P-47's for the delivery of the same ordinance, the P-51 would be unsuitable for such operations. I base that opinion on the mere assumption that far fewer Mustangs would return. Now perhaps fewer Mustangs would be hit to begin with. I don't know. Admittedly, I am taking license in engaging in some speculation. With respect to the Hellcat vs. Corsair, we don't need to base such an opinion on assumption and speculation. We have well controlled data establishing clear, bright conclusions.

As I indicated previously, assuming the Corsair's oil cooling design is the culprit responsible for the very large disparity in survivability, in my opinion the Thunderbolt would probably have the same or similar advantage over the Corsair that the Hellcat enjoyed. Just an opinion. To the extent that my opinion is that the Corsair was not well suited to attacking defended targets in relation to the Hellcat, I also hold that opinion about the Corsair in relation to the Thunderbolt. You are, of course, free to refuse to extend the comparison beyond the Hellcat due to the lack of well controlled data between the Corsair and Thunderbolt.


Notice the last sentence of post #336. I stand by the above statements which are appropriately qualified and explained and frankly do not care if they are not good enough for you.
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[drgondog]

W


Notice the last sentence of post #336. I stand by the above statements which are appropriately qualified and explained and frankly do not care if they are not good enough for you.
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works for me.

 

[drgondog]

There are no comprehensive statistics that I know of for the naval services which plot loss rates per sortie for the whole Korean War. The loss stats I quoted above is from the last (July '53) of the Navy's monthly reports of losses and losses to date in Korean ops by type, but it doesn't give sorties. The USN did a number of 'interim reports' of Korean ops that have loss rates for sub periods for USN a/c. Also USMC unit period records in Korea were very detailed, much more than USN. Sortie loss rates could be calculated bottom up from those reports. USAF (5th AF) also had a series of monthly reports that gave both losses and sorties, and total losses and sorties are quoted as well.

The problem is, a raw comparison of F4U and F-51 sorties loss rates *would* in general be apples and oranges. Several of the doubts and challenges to the F4U v F6F comparison, which are not really valid in that case, *would* be valid objections in an F4U v F-51 Korea comparison. Such as most of the combined USN and USMC F4U losses in Korea were from carriers, and comparing carrier to land based losses penalizes the carrier plane, not only for accidents but combat losses where a land based plane would have been able to land. Then, even comparing USMC land based to USAF, the possibility of different mission profiles and tactics is a much more real concern. In F4U v F6F case we know both a/c were *hit* about as often, further reassuring us of similar mission profiles in the carrier only, 'encountered AA' only, sorties in the 1945 stats. In Korea AFAIK there are no stats for rate of a/c *hit*.

The USN and USMC specifically changed tactics as the KW went on to raise the altitude of ordnance release and cut down some of the losses. So it's very possible that in any given period USAF and USMC tactics actually did differ, and the Marines wouldn't necessarily have been the more aggressive at all times.

But with all that said, from what I've seen F4U and F-51 loss rates in Korea were very broadly similar, and F-51's were ~.5% per combat sortie. Those were of course lower rates than typical in WWII. But they were mainly viewed as high in both services compared to much lower loss rates of jets on strike missions (for example F-80's rate=.15%, and most of its missions were ground strike for most of the war*), and v the AD's lower loss rate in case of the naval services.

*Navy jet types too; in the "Bridges at Toko-ri" (book version) one small caliber bullet knocks out a twin engine F2H, and it could theoretically have happened, but in general jets were harder to hit because of their speed, and also tougher if hit.

Joe

Thanks Joe -

 

[renrich]

I printed the Naval Aviation Combat Statistics. 158 pages of fine print, I think, and have been studying. I have acquired eyestrain, but the material is most interesting. It does appear to me that the authors were trying to bolster the case for carrier aviation during that postwar period that the argument between the Navy and the Air Force was going on. It is unfortunate that the record is not as complete as far as the early part of the war, 1942-43, is concerned as later. Table 19, Aerial Combat data for the entire war contained some information that the author's failed to highlight. Carrier based F6Fs flew 6582 sorties where EA were engaged. There were 245 F6Fs shot down and 419 damaged. The F4Us flew 1042 of the same type of sorties and lost 34 and had 31 damaged. The damage/loss ratio is much higher for the Hellcat than the Corsair, while the EA destroyed per loss is fairly even, 20.2 for the Hellcat and 17.0 fro the Corsair. In land based sorties where EA were engaged, the F4U flew 2258 sorties with 155 Corsairs shot down and 231 damaged whereas the F6F only flew 393 action sorties with 25 losses and 38 damaged so that damage to loss ratio is more even. Does that info indicate the Corsair was less likely to incur damage in an aerial encounter? Also am reading a recent book about the Marianas Battle and a couple of interesting points were related. One was that a Coronado pilot, of all things, fancied himself as a fighter pilot and on two separate occasions shot down a Betty snooper. A second was that the Japanese Army AC copied the French in that the throttle was pulled to you to increase power whereas the IJN AC used the US and British method of pushing the throttle to increase power. An interesting observation in the book; " Next up was Commander Bill Dean's Fighting 2, whose eight Hellcats claimed nine Zekes and three Jills that broke off from the main formation. The Hornet pilots found they could not stay with the speedy attackers in a high speed descent, though two Cowpens divisions tried without success." Does that situation indicate perhaps why the Navy came to value the Corsair over the Hellcat? Anyway this book, by Barrett Tillman, makes it obvious that even as early as June 1944 the skill and training of most of the Japanese pilots was sadly lacking.

 

[Josh64]

The P-47N was only in combat briefly from early 1945, to compare it to the Corsair which was in combat since 1943, as to which one was better is pretty hard if not impossible to do. Both were excellent divers, but in this category it really doesn't matter because Japanese planes couldn't dive fast at all without coming apart, a cessna 150 could probably outdive a Zero!. If the Thunderbolt N had the same combat history as the Corsair then you could compare them accurately, but this unfortunately isn't the case.

 

[Jank]

The F4U-4 did not see combat until the end of 1944. The P-47N was delivered to front line squadrons by the end of 1944 but I don't think it saw combat until the beginning of 1945.

 

[Josh64]

The F4U-4 did not see combat until the end of 1944. The P-47N was delivered to front line squadrons by the end of 1944 but I don't think it saw combat until the beginning of 1945.

Oh F4U-4, didn't catch that. Thanks

 

[wwii:)aircraft]

Both the F4U-4 and P-47N were excellent aircraft.
The P-47N was probably superior in rate of role, armament, dive (remember that the 47n was heavier than the 47d), and was more durable. And it was faster above 25,000ft (maximum speed of 448mph at 25,000ft)
The F4U-4 was overall more maneuverable, was better in a climb and was faster below 20,000ft.

Both are also tied in the fighter-bomber/close-support role, just depends on what you want.
If you want more bombs, the corsair (up to 5,200lbs of bombs)
If you want more guns, the 47; 8 x .50cal machine guns (M2), and I think even 8 x M3 .50cal machine guns (not sure)

 

[renrich]

The F4U, all models had one of the best rates of roll of any WW2 fighter and It got better with each model. I doubt seriously if the P47N had a superior rate of roll over the F4U4.

 

[renrich]

Regarding the roll performance of the P47, this is a quote from my "Bible" "America's Hundred Thousand," by Dean, page 302, '
" Nobody raved about the aileron performance of P47s, though data from the P47C-1 showed a peak roll rate of about 85 degrees per second (a 4.2 second full roll) at 250 mph IAS with a 50 pound pilot force on the stick. Other information, for a P47D-30 or D-40 indicated a peak of about 60 degrees per second ( a 6 second roll) at around 220 mph IAS using a stick force of 30 pounds. Roll rate dropped to half that value at 400 mph IAS."

 

[syscom3]

Regarding the roll performance of the P47, this is a quote from my "Bible" "America's Hundred Thousand," by Dean, page 302, '
" Nobody raved about the aileron performance of P47s, though data from the P47C-1 showed a peak roll rate of about 85 degrees per second (a 4.2 second full roll) at 250 mph IAS with a 50 pound pilot force on the stick. Other information, for a P47D-30 or D-40 indicated a peak of about 60 degrees per second ( a 6 second roll) at around 220 mph IAS using a stick force of 30 pounds. Roll rate dropped to half that value at 400 mph IAS."

At what altitude?

The P47's had fast roll rates way up high.

 

[renrich]

The paragraph quoted is from the section on each aircraft called Handling Qualities and Characteristics. No mention of altitude. In the graphs that show the different roll rates there is no provision for altitude. Just roll rate limited by a stick force of 50 pounds compared to speed. Why would an aircraft have a better roll rate at high altiude than at lower altitudes? The limiting factor on roll rate seems to be the efficiency of the ailerons and the strength of the pilot and his ability to deflect the ailerons. The more efficient the aileron, the less strength needed to deflect them. As speed rises more force is required. That is why that at 400 mph the roll rate dropped to 30 degrees per second using a stick force of 30 pounds. The reason the A6M at speeds much above 200 mph began to lose it's maneuverability was that too much pilot force was needed to deflect the ailerons. I wonder if, at very high altitudes, since the air is thinner, the P47's ailerons became easier to deflect and more efficient?

 

[renrich]

On the Williams site there is a USAAF evaluation of the P47N which states that the roll rate of the P47N is worse than the earlier models of the P47. Makes sense to me because of the greater wing span and the weight of the fuel in the wings.