P-51D vs Dora

[stona]

Engaging the P-51s early on is easily a loosing proposal for the LW in early 1944, since that would locate them within the scope of P-47s when airborne, and within scope of many tactical fighters bombers when at the airbase, taking off and landing.

It is and the Luftwaffe knew this. Most importantly any fighters attempting to engage the escorts early render themselves unavailable to attack the bombers, which is exactly what the 8th AF would have liked.

The Luftwaffe had limited resources and had to marshal them accordingly. In June 1944 Luftflotte Reich had 472 operationally ready single engine fighter (from a total of 788 ) but by the end of July this had fallen to only 273 (of 460).

Cheers

Steve

 

[pattern14]

While researching some info on the Heinkel He 162 ( for an R/C modelling project), I came across an interesting piece of information regarding the quality of Luftwaffe leadership at the end of 1944. Written by a junior officer in 1./JG1, it paints a bleak picture once again of the state of affairs by this time. He states that many of the squadron leaders were not suitable to command, but had been promoted for bravery or combat records. Most of them were "alcoholics", who cared little about their wingmen or inexperienced pilots, and were primarily interested in racking up more personal tallies than protecting their fellow fliers. He goes on to say that many of the German aces were not what they were made out to be. His opinion of course, but he was there at the time. If any one is interested in looking it up, it is in Forsyth and Creeks' book on the He 162, which is acknowledged as being the most comprehensive text available on this aircraft. To answer the original question that started this thread, it is fine to discuss horsepower and operational ceilings etc, but the difference between the P51 and the FW 190 ( in all its variations) was of less importance than the difference between who flew them. Machine Vs machine will always be objective, as these parameters are set, but pilot vs pilot is a whole different world. The number and quality of allied pilots increased, the number and quality of German ones went steadily down hill. U.S pilots had far more training hours, resources and support, as well as the benefit of doing it while not in an active war zone. They were also rotated. By 1944, Luftwaffe pilots had minimal hours, with fewer instructors, out numbered 20-1, with limited petrol and supplies. They learned to fly with the allies above having total air superiority. They also fought until they died or could no longer fly an aeroplane. Little wonder things turned out the way they did.

 

[swampyankee]

The US pilots got better as their training got better. Once our guys flew their mission limit, they rotated home, did a war bond tour if famous, and then went to the combat-prep schools to pass on the hard-won lessons of air combat. I believe a US combat pilot fresh out of school in late 1944 was better than his early-war pilots compatriots by a considerable margin. Some of the guys who were there say so, too.

This means the Germans were doubly screwed: the Allied pilots are getting better and the Luftwaffe's are getting worse. When you think about it, it would be very difficult for Germany to maintain the same pilot quality once Allied aircraft started roaming overhead: some guy just out of flight school, his first flight in a shiny, new Fw190D-9 is likely to be a combat mission, whether intended to be so or not. For the P-51D pilot, his first combat mission would be after he's had enough flight time so that he's familiar with the aircraft's flight characteristics: he's learned to fly his the airplane where the sky is unpolluted by enemy aircraft.

 

[drgondog]

Another ETO standard Op was to put most of the arriving US pilots into a two week program at 495 and 496FTG, to learn the communications procedures, IFR type beacons and frequencies, Link time, etc - all taught by fighter pilots who had completed a tour - before extending to their new combat organization. When the 495 and 496FTG folded in favor of instituting same process at Operational Group level, the Clobber College was born.

So, it (mostly) didn't matter what your prior flying experience was when you arrived in England. You were going to be checked out on SOP and have oversight to your ability in the fighter you were going to fly.

A fine point, but it was an additional layer of training to transition a lot of Advanced Flight School grads who learned to fly in near perfect weather - to Jolly Old and the ETO.

 

[stona]

It is important to distinguish between quantity and quality.
For operation Bodenplatte on 1/1/45 many participating units had more operational pilots present and ready to fly than they did serviceable aircraft. Many of these pilots had only left what passed for fighter schools at the end of 1944 and had very little operational experience. They were present and willing, just how able they were is a moot point.
Cheers
Steve

 

[vinnye]

I agree that tactics used by tank commanders bears no resemblance to those used by fighter pilots.
The point I was making was that the LW were very successful in the early years of the War and before it - when they did not have radar control over where when and how they operated ie their commanders had the freedom to assess the situation and use whatever tactics they thought best in that situation. Granted the LW had several significant advantages in equipment and training over the Spanish, Czech and Polish and British airforces and the fact that they were dictating the battles more often than not. They still managed to lose a good number of aircraft and pilots during the Fall of France, the first time that they were up against opponents who had something better than a bi-plane.
Over prescription of how the LW fighters operated ie in close escort of their bombers in the BoB made them less effective than they had been when operating more independently at higher altitudes and hence far more able to bounce the RAF fighters trying to get to the bombers.
Radar was no doubt an absolute blessing to the RAF and it with all of the defence network set up by Dowding and Park was otstanding and enabled them to decide when to engage and when not to.
Fighter pilots do need to be told what height course and speed their targets are at and their numbers - but once that is done = let the commanders in the air decide what height and bearing to attack from as they can then utilise any cloud or arrange to attack from out of the sun. If there are enough fighters, the commander can then assign groups of his aircraft to bounce any escort and try to draw them off, or co-ordinate an attack from several directions to break up the bombers.
On the ground a tank commander would deploy his assets to make use of any features in the terrain in order to get the advantage over his opponent - same should apply in the air.