The Japanese often flew without parachutes, at least on offensive operations, given the attitude to being captured, the stories of surviving Japanese airmen committing suicide rather than be taken aboard an allied ship for example, plus them executing prisoners. I do not know whether the data exists to look at Japanese aircrew casualties for defensive operations. The jungle terrain in Burma and the islands north of Australia would play a part in survival rates, also the number of bale outs over water. Think of all the different terrains and weather conditions around the world and their effect on survival rates of men who made it out alive, or alive but wounded.
So as I read the question, it is survival rates for the crew on board an aircraft that needed to be abandoned in the air, no ditchings or crash landings after which the aircraft was written off. As the others have pointed out the short answer is such a rate might be calculable but not very helpful. It needs to account for those found dead on the ground, decide what to do about those still classified missing and reconcile reports of X parachutes seen but a number less than X actually survived for example.
Aircrew survival rates depended importantly on the aircraft, what caused the damage to the aircraft, what emergency equipment the aircrew had how well they were trained in its use and altitude.
Using the 8th Air force data from 4,509 B-17 losses, about 37% of an average 9.74 man crew were KIA when lost to fighters, 32.1% of an average 9.2 man crew were KIA when lost to flak, however from the 170 8th AF B-17 lost to fighters to end June 1943, 53% of the men on board were KIA, and 41.7% of the men on board the 52 B-17s lost to flak in the same time period were KIA, average 10 man crews. Training and equipment were improved, things like a tether between a gunner and their parachute. Incomplete figures for the B-24 give almost half of the men on board being killed when shot down by fighters and it was about as dangerous to be on a B-24 shot down by flak as a B-17 shot down by fighters. The B-24 losses exclude those on operations Tidal Wave and Plunder, the low level missions. Then there are all the other causes of loss, collisions had the lowest survival rates, "mechanical failure" one of the best survival rates.
Using the Stephen Bungay data on the early Battle of Britain combats, In the July to early August 1940 fighting analysis some 25% of the RAF fighters hit by bombers were shot down versus the 63% by Bf109s. The Hurricane was more vulnerable, in a sample of the air combats in July 1940 the Bf109s hit 63 Spitfires and 63 Hurricanes, 31 of the Spitfires were destroyed, versus 45 Hurricanes. When it came to fire from Luftwaffe bombers 2 out of 25 Spitfires hit were destroyed versus 15 of 25 Hurricanes. While 10% of the pilots in RAF fighters hit by a bomber were killed, it was 50% for those hit by a Bf109. However, adding data from Wood and Dempster to the Bungay figures, some 269 Hurricane and 160 Spitfire pilots lost their lives, yet with around 605 Hurricanes and 388 Spitfires lost to all causes 12 July to 2 November 1940, there is only a small difference in average pilot survival rates of the two fighters over the course of the battle.
Part 2, the RAF bombers.
Using the Bomber Command War Diaries the Halifax over the course of the war loss percentage was 2.28%, the Lancaster loss was 2.2%, Stirling losses were 3.39%. In analysing the losses from the 1943 Hamburg raids, the Peenemunde raid and the 1944 Nuremberg raid the book notes 13.2% of the Lancaster crews, 21.9% of the Halifax crews and 24% of the Stirling crews shot down survived. Or the death rates were Lancaster 86.8%, Halifax 78.1%, Stirling 76%. These are the results from 126 Lancaster, 74 Halifax and 13 Stirling losses. The British Bombing Survey Unit notes the average bomb load for the war was Lancaster 9,186 pounds, Halifax 6,834 pounds, Stirling 5,626 pounds, by dividing the bomb tonnage dropped by number of sorties despatched, NOT attacking, so it is an underestimate of the average bomb load (footnote 3, page 42, chapter 8). The ratio of Lancaster to Halifax bomb loads is 1.34 to 1 in favour of the Lancaster. The ratio of crews lost is 1.11 to 1 in favour of the Halifax. The wartime loss rates are in favour of the Lancaster at 1.04 to 1, but it is also correct Lancasters tended to be sent to the longer range and more dangerous targets more than the Halifax. Lancasters required fewer sorties for the same bomb load, and so cut losses, but it was the most dangerous aircraft to its crews when shot down. To get to the Lancaster having twice the bomb load as the Halifax II the route needed to cover between 1,400 and 1,500 miles, for the Lancaster to have twice the bomb load of the Halifax III it was slightly over 1,600 miles (Air 24/269)
Note Bomber Command hit its halfway point of bombs dropped during July 1944 and half way point for bombs on Germany end September 1944 which helps explain the overall loss rates. The heavy bomber losses when attacking targets in Germany vary between 3.5 and nearly 6% January 1942 to August 1944, then drop to under 2%, some 90,000 sorties to mid August 1944, over 147,000 for the war.
Harris Despatch on War Operations notes that in Q2 and Q3/1943 there was a big difference in Halifax and Lancaster losses, so the Halifax was achieving 11.25 and 14.43 sorties per gross wastage for the two quarters, Lancaster 15.25 and 18.59. In 1944 the loss rates were equal to slightly in favour of the Halifax, put down to the Lancaster doing the deep penetration sorties against Germany. (Appendix F, paragraph 33) It also helped the Halifax II was replaced by the III and the II stopped being used for attacks on Germany.