SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I was hoping someone would ask.
Picture of the day (general).... (16 Viewers)
- Thread starter Lucky13
- Start date
Only first of FIVE missed opportunities to properly prepare for threat of 12/7/41.
Fleet Problem IX 1)First-wave take-off, 26 January 1929 F3B fighters and T4M bombers prepare to leave the USS Saratoga to mock-attack on the Panama Canal.
- 2) Fleet Problem XIII (February 1932): Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell commanded the "Black Fleet" raiding force and approached Oahu from the north with the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and USS Saratoga. He launched 152 aircraft in a surprise dawn raid. Exercise umpires ruled that all Army airfields on Oahu were destroyed and every major ship in Pearl Harbor was sunk. Instead of fixing the vulnerability, senior commanders argued such a raid was unrealistic.
- 3) Fleet Problem XIX (March 1938): U.S. carrier task forces again launched surprise dawn air strikes from north of Oahu, successfully "destroying" ground aircraft and scoring direct attacks against Pearl Harbor warships.
- 4) Fleet Problem XX (1939) and
- 5) Fleet Problem XXI (April–May 1940): These exercises continued to test carrier aviation and command coordination in the Pacific, with Fleet Problem XXI explicitly simulating a conflict between "Purple" (representing Japan) and "Maroon" (representing the U.S.).
Escuadrilla Azul
Master Sergeant
- 2,327
- Feb 27, 2020
Do you know how many aircraft mocked the attacks 3, 4 & 5?
Good question. Those Exercises are well documented and were quite rigorous and should be easy to search online. The last three involved over 100 warships including most of the Pacific fleet carriers that were thankfully absent on 12/7/41.
Still leaves the question as to why after these exercise successes and those in the Scapa Flow attack in '39 and Taranto in '40, why we didn't maximize our defenses for our crown jewel base.
MiTasol
Major
Because the chest thumping "we are the best in the world" people who were in charge were not willing to tell Washington that they were all show and not substance.
Viking1066
Brigadier General
Registered CF-BGZ on 14 September 1937 ex NC16793 and here on the Fleetwings seaplane ramp prior to delivery the net
Viking1066
Brigadier General
Second prototype of the Koolhoven FK.58 on Soesterberg during a demonstration on the 31st of March, 1939 the net
Viking1066
Brigadier General
Three Navy Nurse Corps flight nurses pose on Guam, 1945 the net
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,278
- Sep 30, 2021
Start with the racism that ensured both sides thought the other was inherently inferior. By the mid 1930's both the US and Japan had seen each other's war plans for a fight between them and there was general agreement. The Japanese would attack the Philippines, Wake and Guam and the US would advance along the island chains to defend or recapture the relevant areas. The IJN would largely be on the strategic defensive in the western Pacific. No homeland invasions, fighting ending in a negotiated treaty.
The Japanese idea was the USN would be attritioned as it advanced until the main IJN fleet could engage successfully and win, hence the IJN submarines as fleet weapons, long range torpedoes and night surface combat. The USN plan was basically as per the WWII central Pacific advance but with a much lesser role for aircraft. The combat power of two battle lines was not considered to be the ratio of battleships, in this case 15 to 9 but the square of the battleships, so 225 to 81, you can see the IJN need to attrition the USN.
As a result the idea the Japanese would advance into the eastern Pacific was simply ruled out, the IJN could not refuel at sea for example and did not have many fleet oilers, the raiding force used commercial tankers. As of mid 1941 only 1 IJN carrier could make the round trip from Japan to Hawaii. Therefore if there was going to be a major assault on Pearl Harbor it would have to come from the mandated islands. The intelligence that came in during 1941 was fitted into the above picture.
In 1940 the Combined Fleet was put under command of Admiral Yamamoto who saw the flaw in the Japanese war plan, that the US would have the initiative, it could always wait and built up its strength before advancing using its much bigger economy to ensure it had the numbers. Yamamoto wanted a series of operations to force the US to fight, in particular early in the war and with aircraft, since the IJN had more aircraft carriers, which would push the US into a treaty.
Then the Japanese government had to make a decision about what to do about the USA when it attacked the British and Dutch colonies in South East Asia and the Pacific. Part of the diplomatic efforts of FDR and Churchill in 1941 were trying to convince the Japanese the US would fight on the British side if there were any invasions. The Japanese government decided this was probably correct, in any case having the US in control of the Philippines was a big risk and the US had recently decided to change strategy from deciding the islands were an indefensible outpost to a major forward base stocked with large numbers of aircraft, with visions of Kyushu being in heavy bomber range. This created a dilemma for the IJN, it needed to be in two places at the one time, in South East Asia attacking the areas the declaration of war was really all about and in the central Pacific defending against the major fleet in the Pacific, the USN.
Hence Pearl Harbor as a method of neutralising the USN for long enough to stake out the planned defensive perimeter. The perimeter idea largely fitted into the original war plan and Yamamoto would continue to push his aggressive ideas, which resulted in the Midway operation and the major defence of Guadalcanal. In 1941 the IJN learnt enough about refuelling at sea to send a task force of the big 4 pre war carriers, reinforced by two new carriers that were really still being worked up, but even then 3 of the carriers had to carry additional fuel as cargo.
Then the very nature of the Japanese attacks provided security, lots of sighting reports of lots of Japanese ships heading south, surely the IJN carrier fleet, which experience had shown was radio silent when in Japan, would either be sailing to help the invasions but not spotted yet or alternatively the defensive screen in the Pacific or simply the reserve, ready to be deployed as needed. Certainly the IJN Naval General Staff wanted the carriers near Asia.
Pearl Harbor guarded the obvious approach routes with what they thought was an appropriate level of cover which was about all they could do with the aircraft available.
The USN knew the IJN had options and "knew" the Japanese could attack South East Asia without immediate intervention from the US. If Japan took the option it might be months before the US congress agreed war should be declared. The US did not know when Japan was going to war with the US, indeed if it actually was, instead of relying on US inertia to take South East Asia before the US intervened. Even the breaking off of negotiations as part of the final message can be interpreted as we are going to take what we need by force but not by attacking the US, no declaration of war.
1) The IJN could not put a large carrier fleet into Hawaiian waters except from the mandated islands, according to intelligence.
2) Pearl had enough search aircraft to guard this approach.
3) Pearl Harbor had 161 out of the USAAF total of 1,618 fighters at the end of November 1941 (the Philippines had 228, Latin America 231 according to the USAAF Statistical digest). Pearl had several radar sets available, plus the radars on USN ships.
4) Until Shokaku and Zuikaku could be considered operational the carrier raid from the north was 1 IJN carrier.
5) Until at sea refuelling was possible the carriers coming from the north would have minimal escorts.
6) The possibility of an airstrike was always on the table, the point was how probable, how much to tie Pearl Harbor up on that possibility, cutting into the time and material needed for other things like training, given the USN expansion. In early 1939 the USN had about 1 destroyer in reserve for the 115 DD on active service, similarly it had 55 submarines active and others in reserve, in November 1941 it was up to 196 destroyers and 112 submarines active. Lots more warships scheduled to arrive in 1942.
7) The "best" use for the IJN carriers was covering the landings in South East Asia (like the IJN Naval General Staff wanted).
8) The known IJN war plan was to attrition the USN as it advanced, the carriers and most battleships in home waters waiting to engage the advancing USN fitted into this.
"The population of all the islands is something of a racial kaleidoscope. The largest single element in 1940 was of Japanese descent-roughly, 37 percent of the total of 423,000. On both Hawaii and Kauai those of Japanese descent outnumbered those of Caucasian descent by three to one, and on Oahu the two groups were about equal in number. Although more than three-fourths of the people of Japanese descent were American-born citizens, their preponderance in the total population had a profound influence on military thinking about what might happen in a war with Japan." 25% of 37% of 420,000 is around 39,000 Japanese citizens in Hawaii, about the same size as the US Army garrison, out of 156,000 people of Japanese origin.
From Europe came the claims of 5th columnists who helped ensure countries like Norway fell quickly. An effective 5th column, as envisaged pre war, would be relatively simple to set up, since the majority of the population was not American. It would also be highly effective. Were the Hawaiians 100% happy with US rule? Did the US have enough Japanese speakers to track the population?
There was plenty of opportunity to stockpile enough weapons to make a start, then for example raiding army stores to equip the rest of the saboteurs as part of an attempt to capture the island.
Pre war no US person knew how much effort was needed to make a 5th column work, nor how detectable it would be. There were enough Japanese in Hawaii expressing admiration for Japan to make the US assume this meant there were enough volunteers, the idea that people who leave a country often do so because they find a better life was discounted.
The US built a picture based on, in one sense, that old colonial revolt fear, the majority of the island's population was not of American origin, a Japanese revolt might have help from the Hawaiians, or at least neutrality. Governing when a large minority hate you and a large majority are not sympathetic to you is very hard to do. Once the picture was formed the inevitable steady stream of ambiguous information was interpreted accordingly.
One final point, Previously the US had been noting,
"After a lengthy maritime strike in the winter of 1936-37 General Drum resubmitted his recommendations with the argument that the Army must extend its protection to the outer islands if it wished to assure an adequate supply of food for Oahu in time of war. Oahu produced only 15 percent of its own requirements in food, but the other islands could readily make up the deficiency in an emergency if communication was maintained with them. Again the War Department objected. In both 1935 and 1937, its basic argument against broadening the Army mission in Hawaii was the following: "If the Fleet is in the Pacific and free to act, Oahu will be, with the completion of the existing defense project, secure against any attacks that may be launched against it. It is only in the case that the Fleet is not present or free to act that the security of the Hawaiian Islands can be seriously threatened." (10) That the presence of the fleet in or near Hawaiian waters provided a more or less automatic guarantee against any serious attack on Oahu continued to be a widely held conviction both in Washington and Hawaii until the Japanese demonstration to the contrary in December 1941." (10) Memo, ACofS WPD for Col Miles, WPD, 29 Jul 37, and other papers in WPD 3878-3.
So Hawaii did not need external food supplies provided you could do inter island shipment and the presence of the fleet lessened the threat to Hawaii, which was actually correct, the other side was it raised the threat to the fleet.
The Japanese idea was the USN would be attritioned as it advanced until the main IJN fleet could engage successfully and win, hence the IJN submarines as fleet weapons, long range torpedoes and night surface combat. The USN plan was basically as per the WWII central Pacific advance but with a much lesser role for aircraft. The combat power of two battle lines was not considered to be the ratio of battleships, in this case 15 to 9 but the square of the battleships, so 225 to 81, you can see the IJN need to attrition the USN.
As a result the idea the Japanese would advance into the eastern Pacific was simply ruled out, the IJN could not refuel at sea for example and did not have many fleet oilers, the raiding force used commercial tankers. As of mid 1941 only 1 IJN carrier could make the round trip from Japan to Hawaii. Therefore if there was going to be a major assault on Pearl Harbor it would have to come from the mandated islands. The intelligence that came in during 1941 was fitted into the above picture.
In 1940 the Combined Fleet was put under command of Admiral Yamamoto who saw the flaw in the Japanese war plan, that the US would have the initiative, it could always wait and built up its strength before advancing using its much bigger economy to ensure it had the numbers. Yamamoto wanted a series of operations to force the US to fight, in particular early in the war and with aircraft, since the IJN had more aircraft carriers, which would push the US into a treaty.
Then the Japanese government had to make a decision about what to do about the USA when it attacked the British and Dutch colonies in South East Asia and the Pacific. Part of the diplomatic efforts of FDR and Churchill in 1941 were trying to convince the Japanese the US would fight on the British side if there were any invasions. The Japanese government decided this was probably correct, in any case having the US in control of the Philippines was a big risk and the US had recently decided to change strategy from deciding the islands were an indefensible outpost to a major forward base stocked with large numbers of aircraft, with visions of Kyushu being in heavy bomber range. This created a dilemma for the IJN, it needed to be in two places at the one time, in South East Asia attacking the areas the declaration of war was really all about and in the central Pacific defending against the major fleet in the Pacific, the USN.
Hence Pearl Harbor as a method of neutralising the USN for long enough to stake out the planned defensive perimeter. The perimeter idea largely fitted into the original war plan and Yamamoto would continue to push his aggressive ideas, which resulted in the Midway operation and the major defence of Guadalcanal. In 1941 the IJN learnt enough about refuelling at sea to send a task force of the big 4 pre war carriers, reinforced by two new carriers that were really still being worked up, but even then 3 of the carriers had to carry additional fuel as cargo.
Then the very nature of the Japanese attacks provided security, lots of sighting reports of lots of Japanese ships heading south, surely the IJN carrier fleet, which experience had shown was radio silent when in Japan, would either be sailing to help the invasions but not spotted yet or alternatively the defensive screen in the Pacific or simply the reserve, ready to be deployed as needed. Certainly the IJN Naval General Staff wanted the carriers near Asia.
Pearl Harbor guarded the obvious approach routes with what they thought was an appropriate level of cover which was about all they could do with the aircraft available.
The USN knew the IJN had options and "knew" the Japanese could attack South East Asia without immediate intervention from the US. If Japan took the option it might be months before the US congress agreed war should be declared. The US did not know when Japan was going to war with the US, indeed if it actually was, instead of relying on US inertia to take South East Asia before the US intervened. Even the breaking off of negotiations as part of the final message can be interpreted as we are going to take what we need by force but not by attacking the US, no declaration of war.
1) The IJN could not put a large carrier fleet into Hawaiian waters except from the mandated islands, according to intelligence.
2) Pearl had enough search aircraft to guard this approach.
3) Pearl Harbor had 161 out of the USAAF total of 1,618 fighters at the end of November 1941 (the Philippines had 228, Latin America 231 according to the USAAF Statistical digest). Pearl had several radar sets available, plus the radars on USN ships.
4) Until Shokaku and Zuikaku could be considered operational the carrier raid from the north was 1 IJN carrier.
5) Until at sea refuelling was possible the carriers coming from the north would have minimal escorts.
6) The possibility of an airstrike was always on the table, the point was how probable, how much to tie Pearl Harbor up on that possibility, cutting into the time and material needed for other things like training, given the USN expansion. In early 1939 the USN had about 1 destroyer in reserve for the 115 DD on active service, similarly it had 55 submarines active and others in reserve, in November 1941 it was up to 196 destroyers and 112 submarines active. Lots more warships scheduled to arrive in 1942.
7) The "best" use for the IJN carriers was covering the landings in South East Asia (like the IJN Naval General Staff wanted).
8) The known IJN war plan was to attrition the USN as it advanced, the carriers and most battleships in home waters waiting to engage the advancing USN fitted into this.
"The population of all the islands is something of a racial kaleidoscope. The largest single element in 1940 was of Japanese descent-roughly, 37 percent of the total of 423,000. On both Hawaii and Kauai those of Japanese descent outnumbered those of Caucasian descent by three to one, and on Oahu the two groups were about equal in number. Although more than three-fourths of the people of Japanese descent were American-born citizens, their preponderance in the total population had a profound influence on military thinking about what might happen in a war with Japan." 25% of 37% of 420,000 is around 39,000 Japanese citizens in Hawaii, about the same size as the US Army garrison, out of 156,000 people of Japanese origin.
From Europe came the claims of 5th columnists who helped ensure countries like Norway fell quickly. An effective 5th column, as envisaged pre war, would be relatively simple to set up, since the majority of the population was not American. It would also be highly effective. Were the Hawaiians 100% happy with US rule? Did the US have enough Japanese speakers to track the population?
There was plenty of opportunity to stockpile enough weapons to make a start, then for example raiding army stores to equip the rest of the saboteurs as part of an attempt to capture the island.
Pre war no US person knew how much effort was needed to make a 5th column work, nor how detectable it would be. There were enough Japanese in Hawaii expressing admiration for Japan to make the US assume this meant there were enough volunteers, the idea that people who leave a country often do so because they find a better life was discounted.
The US built a picture based on, in one sense, that old colonial revolt fear, the majority of the island's population was not of American origin, a Japanese revolt might have help from the Hawaiians, or at least neutrality. Governing when a large minority hate you and a large majority are not sympathetic to you is very hard to do. Once the picture was formed the inevitable steady stream of ambiguous information was interpreted accordingly.
One final point, Previously the US had been noting,
"After a lengthy maritime strike in the winter of 1936-37 General Drum resubmitted his recommendations with the argument that the Army must extend its protection to the outer islands if it wished to assure an adequate supply of food for Oahu in time of war. Oahu produced only 15 percent of its own requirements in food, but the other islands could readily make up the deficiency in an emergency if communication was maintained with them. Again the War Department objected. In both 1935 and 1937, its basic argument against broadening the Army mission in Hawaii was the following: "If the Fleet is in the Pacific and free to act, Oahu will be, with the completion of the existing defense project, secure against any attacks that may be launched against it. It is only in the case that the Fleet is not present or free to act that the security of the Hawaiian Islands can be seriously threatened." (10) That the presence of the fleet in or near Hawaiian waters provided a more or less automatic guarantee against any serious attack on Oahu continued to be a widely held conviction both in Washington and Hawaii until the Japanese demonstration to the contrary in December 1941." (10) Memo, ACofS WPD for Col Miles, WPD, 29 Jul 37, and other papers in WPD 3878-3.
So Hawaii did not need external food supplies provided you could do inter island shipment and the presence of the fleet lessened the threat to Hawaii, which was actually correct, the other side was it raised the threat to the fleet.
