syscom3
Pacific Historian
Another blunder the Germans did was not prepare for the mass production of high octane avgas early in the war.
Just imagine the -109 and -190 with 115 octane fuel.
Just imagine the -109 and -190 with 115 octane fuel.
Poor Strategic Decisions in Aviation Development
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I was going to start another thread about aviation fuel. Richard Overy made the point in "Why the Allies Won the War"
Was too much faith put into synthetic fuels? Obviously they must not of worked very well.
mkloby
Senior Master Sergeant
I was just alluding to the wave of Devastators that got jumped by Zekes, leaving the SBDs to dive and attack the Jap carriers w/ virtual impunity, inflicting horrific damagethrough dive bombing, if my memory serves me right.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
I remember reading an article about the mass production of high octane aviation fuels. The process that worked on an industrial scale wasnt really perfected untill the late 1930's. By a Frenchman of all things........
I dont think the issue was using synthetic fuels as such, but of the additional refining steps that were needed might have made it appear unatractive to produce untill the allies showed it could be done.
The US had a few years lead over Germany in this regards. And a few years lead was nearly unsurmountable in the end.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Comiso, that would be a great thread to start.
From wikipedia....
World War II and octane ratings
World War II Germany received much of its oil from Romania. From 2.8 million barrels in 1938, Romania's exports to Germany increased to 13 million barrels by 1941, a level that was essentially maintained through 1942 and 1943, before dropping by half, due to Allied bombing and mining of the Danube. Although these exports were almost half of Romania's total production, they were considerably less than what the Germans expected. Even with the addition of the Romanian deliveries, overland oil imports after 1939 could not make up for the loss of overseas shipments. In order to become less dependent on outside sources, the Germans undertook a sizable expansion program of their own meager domestic oil pumping. After 1938, the Austrian oil fields were made available and the expansion of Nazi crude oil output was chiefly concentrated there. Primarily as a result of this expansion, the Reich's domestic output of crude oil increased from approximately 3.8 million barrels in 1938 to almost 12 million barrels in 1944. Even this was not enough.
Instead, Germany had developed a synthetic fuel capacity that was intended to replace imported or captured oil. Between 1938 and 1943, synthetic fuel output underwent a respectable growth from 10 million barrels to 36 million. The percentage of synthetic fuels compared to the yield from all sources grew from 22 percent to more than 50 percent by 1943. The total oil supplies available from all sources for the same period rose from 45 million barrels in 1938 to 71 million barrels in 1943.
By the early 1930s, automobile gasoline had an octane reading of 40 and aviation gasoline of 75-80. Aviation gasoline with such high octane numbers could only be refined through a process of distillation of high-grade petroleum. Germany's domestic oil was not of this quality. Only the lead additive tetraethyl could raise the octane to a maximum of 87. The license for the production of this additive was acquired in 1935 from the American holder of the patents, but without high-grade Romanian oil even this additive was not very effective.
In the US the oil was not "as good" and the oil industry had to invest heavily in various expensive boosting systems. This turned out to have benefits: the US industry started delivering fuels of increasing octane ratings by adding more of the boosting agents and the infrastructure was in place for a post-war octane agents additive industry. Good crude oil was no longer a factor during wartime and by war's end, American aviation fuel was commonly 130 to 150 octane. This high octane could easily be used in existing engines to deliver much more power by increasing the pressure delivered by the superchargers. The Germans, relying entirely on "good" gasoline, had no such industry, and instead had to rely on ever-larger engines to deliver more power.
However, German aviation engines were of the direct fuel injection type and could use methanol-water injection and nitrous oxide injection, which gave 50% more engine power for five minutes of dogfight. This could be done only five times or after 40 hours run-time and then the engine would have to be rebuilt. Most German aero engines used 87 octane fuel (called B4), while some high-powered engines used 100 octane (C2/C3) fuel.
This historical "issue" is based on a very common misapprehension about wartime fuel octane numbers. There are two octane numbers for each fuel, one for lean mix and one for rich mix, rich being always greater. So, for example, a common British aviation fuel of the later part of the war was 100/125. The misapprehension that German fuels have a lower octane number (and thus a poorer quality) arises because the Germans quoted the lean mix octane number for their fuels while the Allies quoted the rich mix number for their fuels. Standard German high-grade aviation fuel used in the later part of the war (given the designation C3) had lean/rich octane numbers of 100/130. The Germans would list this as a 100 octane fuel while the Allies would list it as 130 octane.
After the war the US Navy sent a Technical Mission to Germany to interview German petrochemists and examine German fuel quality. Their report entitled Technical Report 145-45 Manufacture of Aviation Gasoline in Germany chemically analyzed the different fuels and concluded that "Toward the end of the war the quality of fuel being used by the German fighter planes was quite similar to that being used by the Allies".
From wikipedia....
World War II and octane ratings
World War II Germany received much of its oil from Romania. From 2.8 million barrels in 1938, Romania's exports to Germany increased to 13 million barrels by 1941, a level that was essentially maintained through 1942 and 1943, before dropping by half, due to Allied bombing and mining of the Danube. Although these exports were almost half of Romania's total production, they were considerably less than what the Germans expected. Even with the addition of the Romanian deliveries, overland oil imports after 1939 could not make up for the loss of overseas shipments. In order to become less dependent on outside sources, the Germans undertook a sizable expansion program of their own meager domestic oil pumping. After 1938, the Austrian oil fields were made available and the expansion of Nazi crude oil output was chiefly concentrated there. Primarily as a result of this expansion, the Reich's domestic output of crude oil increased from approximately 3.8 million barrels in 1938 to almost 12 million barrels in 1944. Even this was not enough.
Instead, Germany had developed a synthetic fuel capacity that was intended to replace imported or captured oil. Between 1938 and 1943, synthetic fuel output underwent a respectable growth from 10 million barrels to 36 million. The percentage of synthetic fuels compared to the yield from all sources grew from 22 percent to more than 50 percent by 1943. The total oil supplies available from all sources for the same period rose from 45 million barrels in 1938 to 71 million barrels in 1943.
By the early 1930s, automobile gasoline had an octane reading of 40 and aviation gasoline of 75-80. Aviation gasoline with such high octane numbers could only be refined through a process of distillation of high-grade petroleum. Germany's domestic oil was not of this quality. Only the lead additive tetraethyl could raise the octane to a maximum of 87. The license for the production of this additive was acquired in 1935 from the American holder of the patents, but without high-grade Romanian oil even this additive was not very effective.
In the US the oil was not "as good" and the oil industry had to invest heavily in various expensive boosting systems. This turned out to have benefits: the US industry started delivering fuels of increasing octane ratings by adding more of the boosting agents and the infrastructure was in place for a post-war octane agents additive industry. Good crude oil was no longer a factor during wartime and by war's end, American aviation fuel was commonly 130 to 150 octane. This high octane could easily be used in existing engines to deliver much more power by increasing the pressure delivered by the superchargers. The Germans, relying entirely on "good" gasoline, had no such industry, and instead had to rely on ever-larger engines to deliver more power.
However, German aviation engines were of the direct fuel injection type and could use methanol-water injection and nitrous oxide injection, which gave 50% more engine power for five minutes of dogfight. This could be done only five times or after 40 hours run-time and then the engine would have to be rebuilt. Most German aero engines used 87 octane fuel (called B4), while some high-powered engines used 100 octane (C2/C3) fuel.
This historical "issue" is based on a very common misapprehension about wartime fuel octane numbers. There are two octane numbers for each fuel, one for lean mix and one for rich mix, rich being always greater. So, for example, a common British aviation fuel of the later part of the war was 100/125. The misapprehension that German fuels have a lower octane number (and thus a poorer quality) arises because the Germans quoted the lean mix octane number for their fuels while the Allies quoted the rich mix number for their fuels. Standard German high-grade aviation fuel used in the later part of the war (given the designation C3) had lean/rich octane numbers of 100/130. The Germans would list this as a 100 octane fuel while the Allies would list it as 130 octane.
After the war the US Navy sent a Technical Mission to Germany to interview German petrochemists and examine German fuel quality. Their report entitled Technical Report 145-45 Manufacture of Aviation Gasoline in Germany chemically analyzed the different fuels and concluded that "Toward the end of the war the quality of fuel being used by the German fighter planes was quite similar to that being used by the Allies".
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
I understand what you're trying to say but I think the poor Swordfish were so slow the Japanese might of had enough time to shoot them all down and then climb up after the SBDs (I am exaggerating). My point is even the Devastator made the Swordfish look like a brick, but reality the Swordfish had a way better overall combat record because where it served...
Glider
Captain
Cannot disagree with that but remember that the RN didn't have the Dauntlass which saved the day. All we would have had were more Swordfish and on that basis there is no doubt we would have lost the Battle of Midway.
Adding to my list of errors in the UK.
h) Prematurely taking out of service planes that could perform a useful role.
Example the Skua.
It may not have been the best dive bomber of the early war years but it wasn't the worst either being a fair match to the Ju87B. The RAF could have used it as a ground attack in the early war years plus by Midway we had taken them out of service.
PS don't anyone accuse me of not seeing the failings of my home country, or sevice, being ex Fleet Air Arm.
the lancaster kicks ass
Major General
- 19,937
- Dec 20, 2003
why did the RAF need a ground attack aircraft let alone the Skua early in the war? in the Battle for France she would've been useless and proved by the Battle for example, and by '40 we were on the defensive, sending small fleets of Skuas over the channel to attack German airfields would not only have been a tiny dent because jerry had so many more aircraft and so few would've gotten through, by '41 when the RAF tried to take the fight back to the Germans they would have faired worse than the spitfires did, what the RAF was good at was still using aircraft that'd been bought back off the frontline, old obsolete aircraft were used for donkey's years for domestic duties, as was common in many air forces..........
Glider
Captain
During the battle for France there were a number of ocaisions where German troops were attacked by the RAF and they achieved basically nothing.
The Battle and the Blenhiem had one LMG firing forward, hardly enough to cause much trouble, they were large, slow targets that had to come in from a low altitude and were not very accurate as they were doing a task they were not trained for.
The Skua would have come in high, been far more accurate with their bombs and when straffing, had four LMG's which while not fantastic was a lot better than one.
Read one report of a British Army unit in France attacked by a Blenhiem by mistake. After making numerous attacks the Blenhiem went back. Honours were considered even as all he destroyed was one truck without hitting anyone, whilst he was shot up pretty badly by the troops but made it home and by dumb luck, no one in the crew was hit.
Chingachgook
Banned
- 214
- Nov 20, 2006
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Could you imagine Devastators being used at Midway!
They were used and slaughtered so badly, that it was the last time they were used in combat.
Underpowered, short ranged, small payload and slow.
They were so slow, once they went into their attack runs, a Japanese carrier could turn to run from them and extend their approach runs by 1/3. All the while AA and fighters are after them.
Now imagine the Swordfish doing this. And remember the Swordfish didnt even have the speed to maintain formation with the SBD's and F4F's getting to the target.
Chingachgook
Banned
- 214
- Nov 20, 2006
Perhaps my sarcasms is under-appreciated...
You Californians are so uptight!
You Californians are so uptight!
the lancaster kicks ass
Major General
- 19,937
- Dec 20, 2003
there were about 150 in service at the start of the war, suppose 80 of these were sent to France (a lot more than the FAA would allow anyway), she would be far, far outnumbered by other RAF types and her numbers would have dropped considderably as you cannot claim she would've faired better than the hurricane as a fighter, thus the Skua would've been dead meat in the LW's what was effectively air superiority, with a limited production run of 190 aircraft there'd be even fewer spares and ground crew for them, so however many you loose to fighters you'll probably loose as many through the fact you can't service them out in France! so you send 10 out on a sortie, what the hell are they supposed to to in terms of damage? and this is the thrust of my point, in the unlikely event all of them get through, they're up against the entire German war machine! there're thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks coming their way, their very, very minimal effect will barely be felt by the Germans, the types already out there to do the bombing and attacking the problem wasn't in their ability it was in the poor communications (hence the friendly attack you decribe- hardly the fault of the bomber!) and supporting network, the Skua would've fared even worse due to their minimal numbers, there was just no point in such small numbers going up against such large numbers..........
Glider
Captain
No one is saying that the Skua would have been used as a fighter. As a type I am saying that as a dive bomber she would have been far more effective as a Ground Attack plane than anything else we had at the time.
The fact that she was able to at least have a fighting chance when attacked isn't a point that I made but she would have at least had a better chance than a Battle or a Blenhiem.
Regarding targets. Bridges if nothing else. The RAF literally lost entire squadrons of planes trying to destroy bridges in France and achieved little if anything for their losses. The Battles and Blenhiems reached their targets so I don't see why a Skua wouldn't make it through.
As the Ju87 proved many times, a dive bomber stands a much better chance of hitting these types of targets. Of course they would have had losses and well have had very heavy losses, but they stood a much better chance of at least achieving something.
It should be remembered that the first Cruiser sunk in WW2 by a dive bomber was a German cruiser sunk by Skuas.
The fact that she was able to at least have a fighting chance when attacked isn't a point that I made but she would have at least had a better chance than a Battle or a Blenhiem.
Regarding targets. Bridges if nothing else. The RAF literally lost entire squadrons of planes trying to destroy bridges in France and achieved little if anything for their losses. The Battles and Blenhiems reached their targets so I don't see why a Skua wouldn't make it through.
As the Ju87 proved many times, a dive bomber stands a much better chance of hitting these types of targets. Of course they would have had losses and well have had very heavy losses, but they stood a much better chance of at least achieving something.
It should be remembered that the first Cruiser sunk in WW2 by a dive bomber was a German cruiser sunk by Skuas.
I think you'll find that the FAA Skua did see action - dive bombing in support of the troops - around the Dunkirk Calais area. They would've gone further inland but the RAF objected!! But worse, the Hawker Hector (biplane) was also thrown into the fray, by dive-bombing German positions around Calais.
Much better would've been the Henley, it was faster than the Battle, and it might have been mistaken for the Hurricane at a distance!
But talking about the Battle - when they realised it was obsolete but wouldn't stop production because the 'shadow factories' had make something and they were all tooled up for it; I wonder could it have been adapted into a twin -like the P-82 Twin Mustang? That is, it would've been faster, and carry a better bomb load.
And just in case someone objects that you can't change over production in the middle of a battle! I am not saying that - such a decision could perhaps have been made 1938!
Thoughts comments anyone
Much better would've been the Henley, it was faster than the Battle, and it might have been mistaken for the Hurricane at a distance!
But talking about the Battle - when they realised it was obsolete but wouldn't stop production because the 'shadow factories' had make something and they were all tooled up for it; I wonder could it have been adapted into a twin -like the P-82 Twin Mustang? That is, it would've been faster, and carry a better bomb load.
And just in case someone objects that you can't change over production in the middle of a battle! I am not saying that - such a decision could perhaps have been made 1938!
Thoughts comments anyone
the lancaster kicks ass
Major General
- 19,937
- Dec 20, 2003
the RAF doesn't like anything extraordinary, too new or different, they only just allowed a wooden bomber, to allow the coupling of two aircraft into one aircraft before the war would never happen the top brass would object..........
and did they stop the advance? no, and that's my argument, we'd need thousands of ground attack aircraft all in France to stop the German onslaught- which was never going to happen, of course ground attack was needed but we already had battles and Blenheims for that, and lots of them, as they were sent purely to support the BEF it made sence to use what they already had, not to up production of a naval aircraft that would do no more in support of the troops and not stop the advance.........
and did they stop the advance? no, and that's my argument, we'd need thousands of ground attack aircraft all in France to stop the German onslaught- which was never going to happen, of course ground attack was needed but we already had battles and Blenheims for that, and lots of them, as they were sent purely to support the BEF it made sence to use what they already had, not to up production of a naval aircraft that would do no more in support of the troops and not stop the advance.........
Glider
Captain
Lanc. Remember that I am saying only that the Skua would have been a far more effective GA plane than the Battle and the Blenhiem which were close to useless for the role. The evidence also seems to bear this out
Over Norway the 29 Skuas claimed 29 german aircraft and while I recognise that these are claims and the actuals would have been less, they do provide a good indication that the Skua could take care of itself better than any Blenhiem or Battle.
Skuas did fly over Dunkirk not as part of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and they did well in the circumstances. They only came under the control of the RAF at the end of May 1940 to assist with the evacuation.
Over Dunkirk On the 31st May ten Albacores and nine Skuas bombed German pontoon bridges over the Nieuport Canal, near the coast North East of Dunkirk. Direct hits were claimed. Returning home the Skuas were engaged by 12 Messerschmitt Bf 109s of I/JG20 and two Skuas of 801 Squadron (L2917 and L3005) were shot down. Another Skua crash landed back at Detling. The battle was not all one sided, the Skuas claimed one Bf109 shot down and another damaged.
On this very day the British 12th Infantry Brigade (consisting of the 2nd Bn Royal Fusiliers, 1st Bn South Lancashire Regt and 6th Bn The Black Watch) were holding the sector of the Dunkirk perimeter opposite Nieuport. They had just beaten off a strong German attack but at 5pm massive German reinforcements were observed moving along the canal. Just then bombing by British aircraft stopped the enemy movements and the Germans turned and fled.
If nine Battles or Blenhiems were attacked by 12 109's I believe the losses would have been far greater and I also doubt that they would have achieved anything.
Over Norway the 29 Skuas claimed 29 german aircraft and while I recognise that these are claims and the actuals would have been less, they do provide a good indication that the Skua could take care of itself better than any Blenhiem or Battle.
Skuas did fly over Dunkirk not as part of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and they did well in the circumstances. They only came under the control of the RAF at the end of May 1940 to assist with the evacuation.
Over Dunkirk On the 31st May ten Albacores and nine Skuas bombed German pontoon bridges over the Nieuport Canal, near the coast North East of Dunkirk. Direct hits were claimed. Returning home the Skuas were engaged by 12 Messerschmitt Bf 109s of I/JG20 and two Skuas of 801 Squadron (L2917 and L3005) were shot down. Another Skua crash landed back at Detling. The battle was not all one sided, the Skuas claimed one Bf109 shot down and another damaged.
On this very day the British 12th Infantry Brigade (consisting of the 2nd Bn Royal Fusiliers, 1st Bn South Lancashire Regt and 6th Bn The Black Watch) were holding the sector of the Dunkirk perimeter opposite Nieuport. They had just beaten off a strong German attack but at 5pm massive German reinforcements were observed moving along the canal. Just then bombing by British aircraft stopped the enemy movements and the Germans turned and fled.
If nine Battles or Blenhiems were attacked by 12 109's I believe the losses would have been far greater and I also doubt that they would have achieved anything.
I am going to agree with Glider here. While the Skua would not have stopped the advance anymore than the Battles or Blenheims, it would have had more of an effect on the German offensive.
The Blenheims and Battles were suffering 70% - 90% losses over France per sortie. And very rarely did they achieve anything above a stalling action for the Wehrmacht.
Your argument, lanc, seems to be that the Skua would not stop the advance - so why use it? Well, why use the Blenheim and Battle - they didn't have a chance of stopping anything. The idea of the aircraft was to inflict as much damage as possible to the German ground forces, it was the Allied ground forces' job to stop the advance.
The Blenheims and Battles were suffering 70% - 90% losses over France per sortie. And very rarely did they achieve anything above a stalling action for the Wehrmacht.
Your argument, lanc, seems to be that the Skua would not stop the advance - so why use it? Well, why use the Blenheim and Battle - they didn't have a chance of stopping anything. The idea of the aircraft was to inflict as much damage as possible to the German ground forces, it was the Allied ground forces' job to stop the advance.
