Post-BoB: workable options for Luftwaffe

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Guns that Germany might be producing for the Luftwaffe:
- Earlier and much wider application of the belt-fed MG FFM - it might be an easier fit on some places the MG 151/20 is a tad too big for, like the wings of the Bf 109.
- 'MK 105' - a 30mm cannon half-way between MK 103 and 108. Say, a 100 kg cannon, firing a 'standard' 330g shell, ~700 m/s, ~500 rd/min. One as 'motor cannon', two on outer wings of the Fw 190, on a jet fighter and on a night fighter.

Surrender?

Not an option here :
There is no option 'we throw in the towel'
 
The HE 111 never got the better engines. It ended it's career (except for the H-23 variant) using pretty much the same engines it was using in 1940.
Let's Imagine the British building Wellingtons in 1944 using under 1100hp Pegasus engines. Then we could claim the Wellington hit the peak of it's development almost from the start of the war.

The Luftwaffe had a strategic bomber. It was the He 111. It could reach a good part of England from Germany, it could hit a large part of France from Germany (excepting the coast of the southern part of the Bay of Biscay and the western part of the Spanish/French border.) it could hit most of Poland and any other targets in the Balkans. What else did they need to hit in 1939/40? After The fall of the France the He 111 could hit Northern Ireland, How much further west do you need to go?
The whole "Ural" bomber program was a waste, just look at a map.

It is almost 200 miles further from MInsk to Chelyabinsk (Tankograd) than it is from London to Minsk. 1340 miles from Minsk to Chelyabinsk and this requires the Germans to capture Minsk and be able to supply the air fields there in any planning done before the summer of 1941.

How effective was anything short of a B-29 operating at a 1300 mile radius? What would it take to supply hundreds of German almost B-29s in Russia East of Minsk?

I wasn't thinking of a B29 equivalent. The He111 had a broadly equivalent performance to the Wellington and no one from 1942 onward, no one would describe the Wellington or the He111 as a strategic bomber, time had moved on. The Wellington was replaced by the four engine bombers with their significantly improved range/payload performance and it's that capability that would be exceptionally helpful against Russia.
 
I wasn't thinking of a B29 equivalent. The He111 had a broadly equivalent performance to the Wellington and no one from 1942 onward, no one would describe the Wellington or the He111 as a strategic bomber, time had moved on. The Wellington was replaced by the four engine bombers with their significantly improved range/payload performance and it's that capability that would be exceptionally helpful against Russia.


The trouble is that the distances in Russia mean that even four engine bombers of types used by the allies in 1942/43 and into 1944 won't do what the German need to do. The Allies only needed to fly 300 miles to hit the Ruhr and 650 miles would see the Polish border. The Germans need planes that will fly much further with the same amount of bombs.

The Germans also need lots of them, thousands, not hundreds.
 
The trouble is that the distances in Russia mean that even four engine bombers of types used by the allies in 1942/43 and into 1944 won't do what the German need to do. The Allies only needed to fly 300 miles to hit the Ruhr and 650 miles would see the Polish border. The Germans need planes that will fly much further with the same amount of bombs.

The Germans also need lots of them, thousands, not hundreds.
You are correct in the first instance, to reach the production yard would have been beyond the range of the Lanc, Halifax, B17 and B24. But between them and the front line would have been valuable targets, storage area's, railway centres, depots, repair facilities plus others who would have been ripe for air assault. Plus I think hundreds would have sufficed. It would have spread the Russian defences over a much larger area plus of course the Russian fighters were short ranged, lacked high altitude performance (except the Mig 3) and Russia were woefully prepared to defend against a night attack.
 
You would also need long range reconnaissance planes to find the targets.
If the targets are storage areas, depots and repair facilities only 200-400 miles behind the front lines then the existing (or slightly improved) German twins can make the attacks.
1/2 the number of 4 engine planes makes little difference.
Navigating over Russia has some problems of it's own. There was a lot more empty space in Russia (or more collective farms) and alternate targets are much more spread out.
The ability to use deceptive dog leg courses are diminished. The Russians can make more successful guesses at the location of a target as the Bomber formations fly inbound because there was only so much they could reach or so many different targets, number of possible targets being much less than in Germany or Britain. Due to distances involved (curvature of the earth) some of the German beam navigation won't work. Neither will some of the British systems.
 
100,000, impossible. But had the Germans ramped up production in 1939 to 1942 they might have got close to 50,000 Bf 109s. This is the biggest error of the Luftwaffe and RLM (Reichsluftfahrtministerium) that they didn't go to war production levels until the after the war was essentially lost in 1942/3.

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Messerschmitt Bf 109 - Wikipedia

I gots millions of fighters but....and here's the crunch.....no gasolina.

So unless you can find a few Millon barrels of crude then you better find horses that can fly on a few bales of hay.
 
I gots millions of fighters but....and here's the crunch.....no gasolina.

So unless you can find a few Millon barrels of crude then you better find horses that can fly on a few bales of hay.
Considering their limited and declining access to oil (mostly from Ploiesti, Romania), it's no surprise that the German war machine was remarkably adept at creating gasoline from coal. The Germans weren't short on a gas for its fighters.

Back in 2010 this was discussed on this forum. Apparently by 1943 the Germans were producing 56,000 barrels per day of synthetic aviation gasoline, in addition to avgas created from conventional oil reserves.

German C3 fuel production and consumption during 1944-1945?
 
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Using hindsight, we can see that Germany in late 1940 was taking a series of gambles that were unlikely to win. It is argued in Adam Tooze's Wages of Destruction that decisions were taken at that time to invest in a massive expansion of production capacity to prepare for a coming air war against both Britain and America and chapter 13 is entitled "Preparing for Two Wars at Once". Thus Tooze attributes the Speer "Miracle" to those plants coming online as planned. He also notes that armament production for the invasion of Russia was limited because a quick victory was anticipated. This left the German Army short of transport and equipment and prevented them supplying, for example, enough anti-tank guns to their Italian, Romanian and Hungarian allies to enable them to survive Russian attacks. The use of steel for construction explains the paradox that Germany produced much more steel than the USSR but far fewer tanks.

The only plausible way to prepare for a war against Britain and America over 1943-4 without building a huge Luftwaffe would be to build a technologically advanced LW, most obviously with hindsight by giving maximum priority to developing jet engines and aircraft. The He 178 had flown in 1939 and there were already technical officers and officials who believed jet aircraft were the future, just few who believed that they could be deployed within three years (for example, "Engines of Desperation: Jet Engines, Production and New Weapons in the Third Reich" by Hermione Giffard has for 1941 that Helmut Schelp "viewed jet engine development as a long-term activity that would only come to fruition after the war"). Meanwhile others without a technical background, such as Udet, failed to see any of the possibilities over 1940-1 even when shown the He 280 in flight on 5th April 1941, showing that sacking Udet was an urgent necessity.

Giffard's thesis and subsequent book (neither of which I have read) apparently argues that the decision in 1942 to build jet engines with a minimum use of nickel and chromium was a choice rather than a necessity (see the thread at Early German gas turbine development). Even if after the loss of Finland in 1944, Germany was very short of nickel, the situation in 1941 was very much better and it seems clear that the Jumo 109-004A could have been produced from 1942 to power the Me 262. I am not sure if more money and urgency could have brought the HeS 30 into production quickly enough give the He 280 a chance to compete. Historically it was running at full power by October 1942 (compared to December 1941 for the 109-004A) but it did have a much better power to weight ratio. If it really was as good as the data from Heinkel suggested, the next step should have been a scaled up engine to compete against the Nene.

It is probably not enough to just talk about money. We need to cancel projects to free engineers. Obvious cancellations with hindsight include the A4/V-2 and the Me-163 Komet. We can also forget the BMW-802 and 803, the DB-604, 606 and 610 and the Jumo-222 and 223 (I must confess that I suspect that the BMW-802 and the Jumo-222 could have been sorted out but not in time. The 802 was the very first engine with variable valve timing and the Russians produced a successful engine using the 222 arrangement Dobrynin VD-4K - Wikipedia).

However, the V-1 will get maximum priority because it is the ideal revenge weapon if it can be ready for 1943.

I am also going to support Hitler's idea of using jets as bombers. Me 262s or Arado 234s carrying a Bombentorpedo such as the BT-700 could have made an invasion of France very difficult.

The Me 262 and possibly He 280 might have benefited from the Askania EZ-42. An early version the EZ 40 was tested in a Bf 109F, so presumably in 1941-2, and the technicians who spoke to S/LDR Fisher believed they could have produced a working sight earlier than late 1944 and perhaps even before Britain BIOS-67. Is it too much hindsight to also develop the R4M early?
 
Since we have had a number of new members not being shy to share their opinions, how about re-start of this thread? Topics being eg. LW A/C needing better engines than it was the case historically, a real fast bomber - be it with piston- or jet engines, better night fighters, push for jet fighters, better guns etc?
Short term improvements (before 1942), mid-term (1942-43), long term (1944-45)?
 
There are several directions this could be taken. Imo there are two main directions they could take to improve after 1940.

First option, take the hard decisions asap to fix the problematic programs, a few examples such as adopting asap the long fuselage Me-210, the four engine He-177, don't develop the Ju-288/Jumo-222 to death, stick with whatever a 2000 HP Jumo-222 gets you etc.etc. As to jets, tricycle gear Me-262 and normal gear Ar-234 from the start. Would an all metal Ta-154 be any good? Is there a way to get the jets ready significatly earlier than OTL, is the He-280 any good? But really while this mostly leads to a somewhat more capable and more serviceable bomber/attack force up to 1944, it doesn't do much to improve the prop day fighter arm, which is really the only one who can significantly alter event, even if temporary, until 1944 and jets. And imo the only way to do that after 1940 is to put every Jumo-213 and DB-603 in a FW-190 airframe, and top priority for Ta-152 and two-stage engines whether Jumo-213E/F or DB-603L etc., as well as Bf-109 developments brought forward as much as realistically possible. At least the americans will really have a fight on their hand in 1944.

The second option is to asap cancel the problematic programs, reduce the number of aircraft where possible (such as no He-219, no Do-335 etc), cancel such useless programs such as Me-309/209, Ta-154 and so on and focus on what works plus jets for the future, at least they will get more numbers, which they desperately needed.

So with less disruption you can get a good several thousands more Me-110, Ju-88 (also increasing the nightfighter numbers) etc. But again the main need is for more and better day fighters to at least hinder to a higher degree the US daybombing campaign. In which case again every Jumo-213/DB-603 should go in a FW-190 and Ta-152.

There is also a need for a decent single engine jet fighter to complement the Me-262 (or He-280?), something better/safer than the He-162. Not sure if a jet powered Me-163 (actually more like a Me-263 with a jet engine) would do it, especially whether it can retain the same good aiframe qualities as the OTL plane. Either than or perhaps some other design such as that swept wing BV P210 (or was it 211?). There is also the Ta-183, but it need a workable engine, which again leads to having a more rational/realistic development of the jet engines. So that means sticking to more conventional configurations for the 1300kgf HeS-011 and 1400 kgf DB-007, no fancy contrarotating compressors on the 007 or centrifugal/axial ones on the 011 and all that nonsense.

But this is just scratching the surface.
 
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A proper Me 210/410 may get you a sort of Mosquito. 340-450mph at 20,000ft with a pair of 1100lb bombs?
ditch the dive bomber requirement?

The thing is there are two different paths (or more?) to follow after the BoB.
Hunker down and don't invade Russia and prepare for the British onslaught in 1943/44 (America has not gotten into things yet)
Prepare for BoB II and/or better preparations for Barbarossa?

If you are planning for the short war then skip all the jet and rocket stuff.
If you are planning for the long war then go heavy on the R & D and just keep enough stuff to buy time.
 
From the engines' standpoint - perhaps have the BMW 801D being outfitted with a better S/C much earlier than it was case historically (late 1944, materialized as 801S)? Even if the trade off is to continue to use the 801C through 1942. Better - a more efficient S/C - gave about 150-200 HP between 20000 ft and SL (actual power increase was about 15%). Such an engine might be a viable powerplant to a fast bomber/NF for 1943-44. Good as a plan B against the problems with Jumo 222 and/or DB 603.

Another option is to with whole hog: press on with BMW 801E from early 1943 on (thin lines are for the values without ram effect - Ohne Stau; power for the prop + fan HP totals are represented on the chart ) .
Use 1942 to debug the basic 801C/D engine as per historically, with chromium-covered valves, better spark plugs etc.
MW 50 injection as an option, too (for all BMW 801s)?
Fw 190 itself should've been outfitted with better intakes, that are more streamlined than what they tried during the war. Ditch the cowl guns ASAP.

Better engine + better intakes = speed figures close to the Fw 190D, but 18 months earlier?
 
Don't invade Russia. Don't declare war on America. Stop the Wunderwaffen stuff and focus on stuff that makes a difference in combat rather than terror. Divert the resources devoted to extermination to actual fighting while you're at it. Don't invade Russia, and focus on the UK -- subs and airplanes. Kill Hitler or at least get him out of the strategy decisions. Once you've decided to support Italy in Africa, do it, don't half-ass it. Don't invade Russia and don't declare war on America.
 
Don't invade Russia. Don't declare war on America. Stop the Wunderwaffen stuff and focus on stuff that makes a difference in combat rather than terror. Divert the resources devoted to extermination to actual fighting while you're at it. Don't invade Russia, and focus on the UK -- subs and airplanes. Kill Hitler or at least get him out of the strategy decisions. Once you've decided to support Italy in Africa, do it, don't half-ass it. Don't invade Russia and don't declare war on America.
Beyond Luftwaffe's pay grade.
 
It is all a bit pointless unless you can crew these wonder planes with well trained aircrew. Establish an efficient aircrew training program and fund it and fuel it. First class aircrew can do more with adequate aeroplanes than shortfall ill trained ones with wonder planes. Training, training, training.

Indeed, better and longer training is needed. Both on how to fly an aircraft, and what to do during the combat, so the experten need to do a multi-month tour (or two) as instructors. The 2-seat versions of Bf 109s, Fw 190s and other 1-seat aircraft are needed ASAP, not in 1943 and later.

The second option is to asap cancel the problematic programs, reduce the number of aircraft where possible (such as no He-219, no Do-335 etc), cancel such useless programs such as Me-309/209, Ta-154 and so on and focus on what works plus jets for the future, at least they will get more numbers, which they desperately needed.

Interestingly enough, Luftwaffe was ordering metal-clad trainers and transports, while trying to make wooden combat aircraft. Doing the opposite should've been attempted - make low-tech trainer and transports, keep the light alloys for 1st line A/C.

As for the alternative for the Ta 154, I'd suggest FW/Tank making a fast bomber in 'classic' technology, ie. no attempts on wood as the main building material. General shape and size of Ta 154, but with a bomb bay instead of guns and ammo. Make a night fighter from it soon after the bomber version is debugged. Don't bother with day fighter versions.
Similar with the not-He-219: make it as a bomber 1st, then the night fighter version(s). Start with BMW 801s as powerplant for all I care.
Yes, I'm taking the page from the Mosquito's history.

Once jet engines are flight worthy, 2-engined jet bombers should've been in the pipeline.
 
A proper Me 210/410 may get you a sort of Mosquito. 340-450mph at 20,000ft with a pair of 1100lb bombs?
ditch the dive bomber requirement?

That is probably 340-350 mph? :)
A proper Me 210 is indeed interesting, however a bombed-up Fw 190 might've be doing the similar (single 2200 lb bomb), with better economics? Granted, a bombed-up Fw 190 has no rear defences, and Me 210 will be rangier as-is.

Back to the engines - reading Calums' book, it is evident that a lot was left to be desired with 'knowledge flow' between the different engine companies (RLM to blame), while lack of cobalt (required for stellite) and nickel hampered the valve coatings (RLM must put aero engines on 1st priority here).
DB will be also advised to take a look into the way Jumo was lubricating their engines, so the DB 605 and 603 are not in such problems before the late 1943?
 

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